V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:PSS/v42; en:CW/CW32;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

Articles and discussions on this subject create a painful impression. Take the articles by L. Kritsman in _Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn_ {131} (I—December 14, 1920; II—December 23; III—February 9; IV—February 16; V—February 20). The emptiest kind of talk. Mere verbiage. An unwillingness to take into account and study what has already been done in this field in a practical way. In five long articles they discuss how to approach the study, instead of studying the data and the facts.

Take the theses of Milyutin (_Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn_, February 19), of Larin (_Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn_, February 20), listen to the speeches of “responsible” comrades. The same fundamental defects as in Kritsman. The most tedious scholasticism, including even talk about the law of concatenation, etc.—a scholasticism that is either literary or bureaucratic, but no living work.

Worse than that. A supercilious bureaucratic disregard for the living work that has already been done and that must be continued. Again and again the emptiest “production of theses” or the concoction of slogans and projects, instead of a careful and thorough study of our own practical experience.

The only serious work on the question of a single economic plan is the _Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R._, a report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), published in December 1920 and distributed at the Eighth Congress. In this volume a single economic plan is set forth, which has been worked out—of course, only as a first approximation—by the best scientific forces of our Republic on the instructions of its supreme bodies. And the fight against the ignorant conceit of the high officials and the intellectual conceit of the Communist men of letters has to begin with the most modest task, with a simple account of the history of this book, its contents and its significance.

On February 2–7, 1920, i.e., more than a year ago, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee held a session at which a resolution on electrification was adopted. In this resolution we read:

“…Alongside the immediate, most urgent and essential tasks of organising transport, eliminating the fuel and food crises, combating epidemics and organising disciplined armies of labour, Soviet Russia is for the first time afforded the opportunity to proceed to a more systematic economic development, to the scientific elaboration and consistent implementation of a state plan for the entire national economy. Taking into account the paramount importance of electrification… assessing the significance of electrification for industry, agriculture, transport… etc., etc… the All-Russia Central Executive Committee resolves: to instruct the Supreme Economic Council, jointly with the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture, to draw up a project for the construction of a network of electric power stations…”

It seems clear, does it not? “The scientific elaboration of a state plan for the entire national economy”—can these words, this decision of our supreme authority, fail to be understood? If the men of letters and high officials who boast of their communism before the “specialists” do not know this decision, all that remains is to remind them that ignorance of our own laws is no argument.

In pursuance of the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council on February 21, 1920, approved the Electrification Commission formed under the Electricity Department, and later the Council of Defence approved the regulations for the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), the composition of which the Supreme Economic Council was instructed to determine and approve in agreement with the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture. As early as April 24, 1920, GOELRO issued No. 1 of its _Bulletin_ {132} containing a most detailed programme of work, a list of the responsible persons, scientists, engineers, agronomists and statisticians who were members of the various sub-commissions, who were directing the work in the various areas, and who had undertaken various precisely defined tasks. The mere list of these tasks and of the persons who had undertaken them occupies ten printed pages in No. 1 of the _Bulletin_. All the best forces that the Supreme Economic Council and the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture, as well as the People’s Commissariat for Railways, could find were enlisted for the work.

The result of the work of GOELRO was the above-mentioned voluminous—and excellent—scientific work. Over 180 specialists contributed to it. The list of the works they submitted to GOELRO contains over 200 items. We have, first, a summary of these works (the first part of the said volume, covering over 200 pages): (a) electrification and the state economic plan; then (b) fuel supply (with a detailed “fuel budget” of the R.S.F.S.R. for the next ten years, taking into account the required number of workers); (c) water power; (d) agriculture; (e) transport; and (f) industry.

The plan is designed for approximately ten years, with an indication of the number of workers and the capacity (in thousands of h.p.). Of course, it is only an approximate, preliminary, rough plan, with errors—a plan “as a first approximation”—but it is a real scientific plan. We have the exact calculations of the specialists on all basic questions. We have their calculations for all branches of industry. We have—a small example—a calculation of the volume of production of leather, of footwear at two pairs per head (300 million pairs), etc. In sum, we have both a material and a financial (in gold rubles) balance of electrification (about 370 million working days, so many barrels of cement, so many bricks, so many poods of iron, copper, etc., such and such a capacity of turbo-generators, etc.). The balance is calculated for an increase (“according to a very rough estimate”) in the manufacturing industry of 80 per cent in ten years, and in the extractive industry of 80–100 per cent. The deficit in the gold balance (+11,000 million—17,000 million, total deficit about 6,000 million) “can be covered by concessions and credit operations”.

The location of 20 steam and 10 hydro-electric regional power stations of the first priority is indicated, with a detailed description of the economic significance of each station.

After the general summary we have, in the same volume, with separate pagination, the works on each area: the Northern, the Central Industrial (these two are particularly good, accurate, detailed, and based on the richest scientific material), the Southern, the Volga, the Urals, the Caucasian (the Caucasus is taken as a whole, on the assumption of an economic agreement between the different republics), Western Siberia and Turkestan. For each area we have calculations not only for the power stations of the first priority; we also have the so-called “GOELRO Programme A”, i.e., a plan for the most rational and economical utilisation of the existing power stations. Another small example: for the Northern (Petrograd) area it is calculated that the interconnection of the Petrograd stations could yield a saving determined as follows. Up to half the capacity could be (page 69 of the report on the Northern area) directed to the timber-rafting areas in the North, to Murmansk, Archangel, etc. An increase in timber felling and rafting for export could, under such conditions, yield “up to 500 million foreign currency rubles a year in the very near future”.

“The annual revenue from northern timber may in the next few years reach the size of our gold reserve” (page 70, ibid.), provided, of course, we can pass from talk about a plan to the study and application of a plan actually worked out by scientists!

It should also be said that on a number of questions (of course, far, far from all) we have the beginning of a calendar programme, i.e., not only a general plan, but a calculation for each year, from 1921 to 1930, of how many stations can be put into operation and to what extent existing stations can be expanded (again, on the stated condition, which is not too easy to fulfil given our intellectual-literary and high official-bureaucratic habits).

To appreciate the full magnitude and value of the work done by GOELRO, let us glance at Germany. There a similar job was done by one scientist, Ballod. He drew up a scientific plan for the socialist reconstruction of the entire national economy of Germany. {133} In capitalist Germany the plan remained a dead letter, a literary exercise, the work of a single individual. We set a state task, mobilised hundreds of specialists, and in ten months (of course, not in two, as we originally planned) produced a single economic plan, scientifically based. We have a legitimate right to be proud of this work; we must only understand how to use it properly, and it is precisely the failure to understand this that we now have to combat.

The resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets says: “…The Congress… approves the work of the Supreme Economic Council, etc., and in particular of GOELRO, in drawing up the plan for the electrification of Russia… regards this plan as the first step in a great economic undertaking, instructs the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, etc., to complete the elaboration of this plan and to approve it, and moreover in the shortest possible time… Instructs that all measures be taken for the widest possible propaganda of this plan… The study of this plan shall be introduced in all, without exception, educational establishments of the Republic” {134} etc.

Nothing characterises so graphically the presence of sores in our apparatus, especially at the top, both bureaucratic and intellectual sores, as the attitude observed in Moscow towards this resolution, the attempts to “interpret” it in a distorted way, even to the point of evading it. The men of letters do not propagate the plan that has been worked out, but write theses and empty discussions on how to approach the elaboration of a plan! The high officials place the emphasis in a purely bureaucratic way on the necessity of “approving” the plan, understanding by this not the issuing of concrete assignments (build such and such a thing at such and such a time, buy such and such a thing abroad, etc.), but something utterly confused, like the elaboration of a new plan! The misunderstanding of the matter is monstrous; one hears speeches: first restore the old, even if only partially, before building the new; electrification is like an electric fiction; why not gasification; in GOELRO there are bourgeois specialists, too few Communists; GOELRO should provide a cadre of experts, not a general planning commission, etc.

It is this diversity of opinion that is dangerous, for it shows an inability to work, the domination of intellectual and bureaucratic conceit over real work. Sneers at the fantastic nature of the plan, questions about gasification, etc., reveal the conceit of ignorance. To correct, offhand, the work of hundreds of the best specialists, to dismiss it with vulgar witticisms, to boast of one’s right “not to approve”—is this not shameful?

We must learn to value science, to reject the “Communist” conceit of dilettantes and bureaucrats, we must learn to work systematically, using our own experience, our own practice!

Of course, “plans” are such things, by their very nature, that one can talk and argue about them endlessly. But we must not allow general declamations and disputes about “principles” (of drawing up a plan) when we should be getting down to the study of this given, the only scientific plan, and to correcting it on the basis of the indications of practical experience and on the basis of more detailed study. Of course, the right to “approve” and “not to approve” always remains with the high official or officials. If this right is understood sensibly and the decisions of the Eighth Congress on the approval of the plan it endorsed and recommended for the widest possible propaganda are interpreted sensibly, then approval should be understood as a series of orders and instructions: buy such and such a thing, at such and such a time and place, start building such and such a thing, collect and deliver such and such materials, etc. If, however, it is interpreted in a bureaucratic way, then “approval” means the arbitrary rule of high officials, red tape, the game of inspection commissions—in a word, the purely official murder of a living cause.

Let us look at the matter from another angle. It is necessary to link the scientific plan of electrification especially closely with current practical plans and their actual implementation. This, of course, is absolutely indisputable. How exactly to link them? To know this, economists, men of letters, and statisticians must not talk about the plan in general, but study in detail the implementation of our plans, our mistakes in this practical work, and the ways of correcting these mistakes. Without such study we are blind. With such study, alongside it, and on condition of studying practical experience, there remains only a very small question of administrative technique. We have planning commissions galore. To unite them, take two from the department entrusted to Ivan Ivanovich, one from the department entrusted to Pal Palych, or vice versa. Combine them with a sub-commission of the general planning commission. It is clear that this is precisely administrative technique and nothing more. To try it one way and another, to choose the best—it is ridiculous even to talk about it.

The essence of the matter is that we do not know how to pose the question and replace living work with intellectual and bureaucratic project-making. We had and have current food and fuel plans. We made a clear mistake in both. There can be no two opinions about that. A sensible economist, instead of writing trivial theses, will sit down to study facts, figures, data, will analyse our own practical experience and will say: the mistake is there, it must be corrected in such and such a way. A sensible administrator, on the basis of such study, will propose or himself carry out the transfer of personnel, changes in reporting, the reorganisation of the apparatus, etc. Neither the one nor the other practical and sensible approach to the single economic plan is to be seen among us.

The sore point is that the question of the relation of the Communist to the specialist, of the administrator to the scientist and the man of letters, is posed incorrectly. In the question of the single economic plan, as in every other question, there are aspects—and new aspects may always arise—which require decision only by Communists or require only an administrative approach. This is indisputable. But it is a bare abstraction. At present, however, it is precisely the Communist men of letters and the Communist administrators who are approaching this question incorrectly, failing to understand that here they must learn more from the bourgeois specialists and scientists, and play at administration less. No other single economic plan exists or can exist except the one already worked out by GOELRO. It must be supplemented, developed further, corrected and applied to life on the basis of the indications of practical experience, carefully studied. The opposite opinion is only “a conceit that is pseudo-radical but in reality ignorant”, to use the words of the Party Programme. {135} No less ignorant is the conceit that any general planning commission other than GOELRO is possible in the R.S.F.S.R., which, of course, does not reject the possible benefit of partial, practical corrections in its composition. Anything serious, in the sense of improving the general plan of our national economy, can be built only on this basis, only by continuing what has been begun; otherwise it will be playing at administration or, more simply, arbitrary rule. The task of the Communists inside GOELRO is to give fewer orders, or, better still, not to give orders at all, but to approach the specialists in science and technology (“they are in the majority of cases inevitably imbued with bourgeois outlook and habits”, as the R.C.P. Programme says) with extreme caution and skill, learning from them and helping them to broaden their outlook, proceeding from the achievements and data of the relevant science, remembering that the engineer will come to recognise communism not in the same way as the underground propagandist and man of letters, but through the data of his own science, that the agronomist will come to recognise communism in his own way, the forester in his own way, etc. A Communist who has not proved his ability to unite and modestly direct the work of specialists, entering into the essence of the matter, studying it in detail—such a Communist is often harmful. We have many such Communists, and I would give a dozen of them for one bourgeois specialist who conscientiously studies his subject and knows it.

The Communists who are outside GOELRO can help the cause of creating and implementing a single economic plan in two ways. If they are economists, statisticians, men of letters, they must first study our own practical experience and only on the basis of a detailed study of the relevant facts recommend the correction of mistakes and the improvement of work. Study is the business of the scientist, and here, since we are no longer dealing with general principles but precisely with practical experience, a bourgeois “specialist in science and technology” who knows his job is again ten times more valuable to us than a conceited Communist who is ready at any hour of the day or night to write “theses”, advance “slogans”, and serve up bare abstractions. More knowledge of facts, fewer wordy disputes claiming to be Communist in principle.

On the other hand, if a Communist is an administrator, his first duty is to guard against being carried away by giving orders, to learn first to reckon with what science has already worked out, first to ask whether the facts have been verified, first to secure the study (in reports, in the press, at meetings, etc.) of where exactly we have made a mistake, and only on this basis to correct what is being done. Fewer methods of Tit Titych (“I can approve, I can not approve”), more study of our practical mistakes.

It has long been observed that people’s shortcomings are mostly connected with their merits. Such are the shortcomings of many of the leading Communists. For decades we did a great thing: we preached the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, taught distrust of bourgeois specialists, exposed them, took power away from them, suppressed their resistance. That was a great, world-historic task. But if you exaggerate a little, you confirm the truth that a step from the great to the ridiculous is only one. We have convinced Russia, we have won Russia from the exploiters for the working people, we have suppressed the exploiters—we must learn to administer Russia. To do this we must learn modesty and respect for the practical work of the “specialists in science and technology”; to do this we must learn to analyse our numerous practical mistakes carefully and practically, and to correct them gradually but steadily. Less intellectual and bureaucratic conceit, more study of what our practical experience, both central and local, gives us, and of what science has already given us.

February 21, 1921.