The German "Left" Communists answer this question in the negative with the greatest contempt—and with the greatest frivolity. Their arguments? In the quotation cited above we saw:

"…with full decisiveness reject any return to historically and politically exhausted forms of the struggle of parliamentarism…"

This is stated with pretension that is laughable, and is patently false. A "return" to parliamentarism! Perhaps a Soviet republic already exists in Germany? As if there were! How then can one speak of a "return"? Is this not an empty phrase?

Parliamentarism is "historically exhausted." This is true in the sense of propaganda. But everyone knows that it is still a very long way from this to its practical overcoming. Capitalism could have been, and with full justification, declared "historically exhausted" many decades ago, yet this in no way eliminates the necessity for a very prolonged and very stubborn struggle on the basis of capitalism. Parliamentarism is "historically exhausted" in the world-historical sense, i.e., the epoch of bourgeois parliamentarism is over, the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat has begun. This is indisputable. But world-historical scale is measured in decades. Ten to twenty years earlier or later is, from the standpoint of world-historical scale, immaterial; it is—from the perspective of world history—a trifle that cannot even be approximately calculated. But precisely for this reason, in questions of practical politics to refer to world-historical scale is the most glaring theoretical error.

Is parliamentarism "politically exhausted"? Now that is another matter. If this were true, the position of the "Left" would be sound. But this must be proved by the most serious analysis, and the "Left" do not even know how to approach it. In the "theses on parliamentarism," published in No. 1 of the "Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International" (February 1920) and manifestly expressing Dutch-Left or Left-Dutch aspirations, the analysis too, as we shall see, is exceptionally poor.

First. The German "Left," as is well known, still considered parliamentarism "politically exhausted" in January 1919, contrary to the opinion of such outstanding political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It is known that the "Left" were mistaken. This alone immediately and fundamentally destroys the position that parliamentarism is "politically exhausted." It falls to the "Left" to prove why their then undeniable error has now ceased to be an error. They do not advance the shadow of a proof and cannot. The attitude of a political party to its errors is one of the most important and most reliable criteria of the seriousness of the party and of its actual fulfillment of its duties to its class and to the laboring masses. Openly to acknowledge an error, to lay bare its causes, to analyze the circumstances that gave rise to it, to discuss carefully the means of correcting the error—this is the mark of a serious party, this is the fulfillment of its duties, this is the education and instruction of the class, and then of the masses. By failing to fulfill this duty, by not treating with extraordinary attention, thoroughness, and caution the study of their manifest error, the "Left" in Germany (and in Holland) thereby prove precisely that they are not a party of the class, but a clique; not a party of the masses, but a group of intellectuals and a small number of workers repeating the worst aspects of intellectualism.

Second. In the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of "Left" Communists, from which we quoted extensively above, we read:

"…millions of workers, still going after the politics of the Center" (the Catholic Center party), "are counter-revolutionary. Rural proletarians furnish legions of counter-revolutionary troops" (p. 3 of the pamphlet mentioned).

It is evident that this is stated too sweepingly and exaggerated. But the basic fact set forth here is indisputable, and its acknowledgment by the "Left" is especially striking testimony to their error. How can one say that "parliamentarism is politically exhausted" if "millions" and "legions" of proletarians still stand not only for parliamentarism in general, but are directly "counter-revolutionary"!? It is evident that parliamentarism in Germany has not yet been politically exhausted. It is evident that the "Left" in Germany have taken their wish, their ideological and political outlook, for objective reality. This is the most dangerous error for revolutionaries. In Russia, where the extremely wild and savage oppression of tsarism for an exceptionally long time and in exceptionally varied forms gave birth to revolutionaries of every description, to revolutionaries of extraordinary devotion, enthusiasm, heroism, and strength of will—in Russia we have observed this error of revolutionaries especially closely, studied it especially carefully, know it especially well, and therefore it appears to us especially clearly in others. For communists in Germany, parliamentarism is of course "politically exhausted," but the whole point is precisely not to mistake what is exhausted for us with what is exhausted for the class, with what is exhausted for the masses. Here again we see that the "Left" do not know how to reason, do not know how to conduct themselves as a party of the class, as a party of the masses. You are obliged not to descend to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. This is indisputable. You are obliged to speak hard truths to them. You are obliged to call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices precisely prejudices. But at the same time you are obliged to soberly observe the actual state of consciousness and preparedness of precisely the entire class (and not only of its communist vanguard), precisely the entire laboring mass (and not only of its advanced people).

If not only "millions" and "legions," but even just a fairly significant minority of industrial workers follow Catholic priests—if rural workers follow landowners and kulaks (Grossbauern)—then it follows with certainty that parliamentarism in Germany has not yet been politically exhausted, that participation in parliamentary elections and in the struggle on the parliamentary tribune is obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat precisely for the purpose of educating the backward strata of its class, precisely for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden, dark rural masses. As long as you are unable to disperse the bourgeois parliament and whatever other reactionary institutions, you are obliged to work inside them precisely because there are still workers there, deceived by priests and rural backwardness; otherwise you risk becoming mere windbags.

Third. The "Left" Communists say a great deal that is good about us Bolsheviks. Sometimes one wants to say: praise us less, delve more into Bolshevik tactics, become more familiar with them! We participated in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Was our tactic correct or not? If not, one must say so clearly and prove it: this is necessary for the development of correct tactics by international communism. If yes, one must draw certain conclusions from it. Naturally, there can be no question of equating the conditions of Russia with those of Western Europe. But on the specific question of what the concept "parliamentarism is politically exhausted" means, we must necessarily take into account our experience, for without taking into account concrete experience, such concepts too easily become empty phrases. Did we Russian Bolsheviks not have more right, in September-November 1917, than any Western communists whatever, to consider that parliamentarism in Russia was politically exhausted? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long time or not, but how far the broad masses of laborers are prepared (ideologically, politically, practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse (or permit the dispersal of) the bourgeois-democratic parliament. That in Russia in September-November 1917 the working class of the cities, the soldiers, and the peasants were, because of a series of special conditions, exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse even the most democratic bourgeois parliament—this is a completely indisputable and well-established historical fact. And yet the Bolsheviks did not boycott the Constituent Assembly; we participated in the elections both before and after the proletariat's conquest of political power. That these elections yielded extraordinarily valuable (and in a high degree useful for the proletariat) political results, I hope I have proved in the article mentioned above, which examined in detail the data on the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.[9]

The conclusion from this is completely indisputable: it is proved that even a few weeks before the victory of the Soviet republic, even after such a victory, participation in the bourgeois-democratic parliament not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but facilitates its ability to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed, facilitates the success of their dispersal, facilitates the "political exhaustion" of bourgeois parliamentarism. To disregard this experience and at the same time to claim membership in the Communist International, which must develop its tactics internationally (not as narrowly or one-sidedly national, but precisely as international tactics), means committing the gravest error and precisely retreating from internationalism in deed, while recognizing it in words.

Let us now look at the "Dutch-Left" arguments in favor of non-participation in parliaments. Here is a translation (from the English) of the most important of the "Dutch" theses mentioned above, thesis 4:

"When the capitalist system of production is broken and society is in a state of revolution, parliamentary activity gradually loses significance compared with the actions of the masses themselves. When, under such conditions, parliament becomes the center and organ of counter-revolution, and, on the other hand, the working class builds the instruments of its power in the form of Soviets,—it may even become necessary to renounce all and any participation in parliamentary activity."

The first sentence is patently false, for the action of masses—for example, a large strike—is more important than parliamentary activity always, and not only during revolution or in a revolutionary situation. This patently untenable, historically and politically incorrect argument shows only with particular clarity that the authors have taken absolutely no account of either the general European experience (French before the revolutions of 1848, 1870; German 1878-1890, etc.), or the Russian experience (see above) regarding the importance of combining legal and illegal struggle. This question has enormous significance both generally and specially because in all civilized and advanced countries the time is rapidly approaching when such a combination increasingly becomes—has in part already become—obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat owing to the growth and approach of civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, owing to the fierce persecution of communists by republican and other bourgeois governments, who resort to all manner of violations of legality (witness the single example of America), etc. The Dutch and the "Left" in general have completely failed to understand this most important question.

The second sentence is, in the first place, historically false. We Bolsheviks participated in the most counter-revolutionary parliaments, and experience proved that such participation was not only useful but necessary for the party of the revolutionary proletariat precisely after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905) for the preparation of the second bourgeois revolution (II. 1917) and then the socialist revolution (X. 1917). In the second place, this sentence is astonishingly illogical. From the fact that parliament becomes an organ and "center" (in fact it has never been and can never be the "center," but this is by the way) of counter-revolution, and that the workers create the instruments of their power in the form of Soviets, it follows that the workers must prepare themselves—prepare themselves ideologically, politically, technically—for the struggle of the Soviets against parliament, for the dispersal of parliament by the Soviets. But from this it does not follow at all that such a dispersal is hindered or not facilitated by the presence of Soviet opposition within the counter-revolutionary parliament. We have never noticed during our victorious struggle against Denikin and Kolchak that the existence of Soviet, proletarian opposition in their camp was immaterial to our victories. We know very well that the dispersal by us of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918 was not hindered but facilitated by the fact that inside the dispersed counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly there was both a consistent, Bolshevik, and an inconsistent, Left Socialist-Revolutionary, Soviet opposition. The authors of the thesis have become completely confused and have forgotten the experience of a whole series, if not all, revolutions, which testifies to how particularly useful it is during revolutions to combine mass action from outside a reactionary parliament with opposition inside that parliament that is sympathetic to the revolution (and still better: directly supporting the revolution). The Dutch and the "Left" in general reason here like doctrinaires of revolution, people who have never actually participated in a real revolution, or who have not thought about the history of revolutions, or who naively take a subjective "negation" of a given reactionary institution for its actual destruction by the combined forces of a whole series of objective factors. The surest way to discredit a new political (and not only political) idea and to damage it is to, in the name of defending it, carry it to the point of absurdity. For every truth, if it is made "excessive" (as Father Dietzgen said), if it is exaggerated, if it is extended beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be driven to absurdity, and it even inevitably, under the indicated conditions, becomes absurd. Precisely such a disservice do the Dutch and German "Left" render to the new truth about the superiority of Soviet power over bourgeois-democratic parliaments. Of course, whoever were to say in the old way and in general that a refusal to participate in bourgeois parliaments is under no circumstances admissible would be wrong. I cannot attempt here to formulate the conditions under which boycott is useful, for the task of this article is far more modest: to take into account Russian experience in connection with certain current questions of international communist tactics. Russian experience has given us one successful and correct application of boycott by the Bolsheviks (1905), and another erroneous application (1906). Analyzing the first case, we see: we succeeded in preventing the reactionary authorities from convening a reactionary parliament in circumstances when extra-parliamentary (in particular strike) revolutionary action of the masses was growing with exceptional rapidity, when no stratum of the proletariat and peasantry could give support to the reactionary authorities, when the revolutionary proletariat ensured its influence on the broad, backward masses through strike struggle and agrarian movement. It is completely evident that this experience is inapplicable to contemporary European conditions. It is also completely evident—on the basis of the arguments set forth above—that the defense, even if conditional, of a refusal to participate in parliaments by the Dutch and the "Left" is fundamentally incorrect and harmful to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat.

In Western Europe and America parliament has become particularly hateful to advanced revolutionary workers. This is indisputable. This is completely understandable, for it is hard to imagine anything more vile, base, treacherous than the conduct of the vast majority of socialist and social-democratic deputies in parliament during and after the war. But it would be not only unreasonable but directly criminal to yield to this sentiment in deciding how to struggle against an acknowledged evil. In many countries of Western Europe revolutionary sentiment is now, one might say, a "novelty" or a "rarity," which has been awaited for too long, in vain, impatiently, and it may be for this reason that people so easily yield to this sentiment. Of course, without revolutionary sentiment in the masses, without conditions promoting the growth of such sentiment, revolutionary tactics cannot be put into action, but we in Russia have been convinced by too long, heavy, and bloody an experience of the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built on revolutionary sentiment alone. Tactics must be built on sober, strictly objective analysis of all class forces in a given state (and the surrounding states, and all states, on a world scale), as well as on analysis of the experience of revolutionary movements. To demonstrate one's "revolutionariness" solely by cursing parliamentary opportunism, by a mere negation of participation in parliaments is very easy, but precisely because it is too easy, this is not a solution to the difficult and most difficult task. To create a truly revolutionary parliamentary faction in European parliaments is much more difficult than in Russia. Of course. But this is merely a particular expression of the general truth that it was easy for Russia in the concrete, historically extremely original situation of 1917 to begin a socialist revolution, while continuing it and bringing it to an end will be harder for Russia than for European countries. I found it necessary to point this out already in early 1918, and two years of experience since then have fully confirmed the correctness of such reasoning. There are such specific conditions as: 1) the possibility of combining the Soviet coup d'état with the ending, through it, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted workers and peasants beyond measure; 2) the possibility of utilizing for a certain time the mortal struggle of two world-powerful groups of imperialist predators, which groups could not unite against the Soviet enemy; 3) the possibility of enduring a relatively prolonged civil war, partly because of the gigantic size of the country and the poor means of communication; 4) the presence of such a deep bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat took the revolutionary demands from the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary party, a party sharply hostile, for the most part, to Bolshevism) and immediately carried them out thanks to the proletariat's conquest of political power;—such specific conditions do not exist in Western Europe now, and a repetition of such or similar conditions is not easy. That is why, among other reasons, it is harder for Western Europe to begin a socialist revolution than it was for us. To attempt to "get around" this difficulty by "jumping over" the difficult task of utilizing for revolutionary purposes reactionary parliaments is sheer childishness. You want to create a new society? and you are afraid of difficulties in creating a good parliamentary faction of convinced, devoted, heroic communists in a reactionary parliament! Is this not childishness? If Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Z. Höglund in Sweden were able, even without mass support from below, to set examples of genuinely revolutionary utilization of reactionary parliaments, how is it that a rapidly growing mass revolutionary party, in an atmosphere of post-war disillusionment and embittered masses, is unable to forge a communist faction in even the worst parliaments?! Precisely because the backward masses of workers and—even more—petty peasants in Western Europe are far more permeated with bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices than in Russia, precisely for this reason only from within such institutions as bourgeois parliaments can (and must) communists conduct a protracted, stubborn struggle, stopping at no difficulty, to expose, dispel, and overcome these prejudices.

The German "Left" complain about bad "leaders" of their party and fall into despair, going so far as to the laughable "negation" of "leaders." But in conditions where "leaders" often have to be hidden underground, the development of good, reliable, tested, authoritative "leaders" is a particularly difficult task, and it is impossible to overcome these difficulties successfully without combining legal and illegal work, without testing "leaders," incidentally, on the parliamentary arena as well. Criticism—and the sharpest, merciless, implacable criticism—should be directed not against parliamentarism or parliamentary activity, but against those leaders who do not know how—and still more against those who do not want—to use parliamentary elections and the parliamentary tribune in a post-revolutionary, communist manner. Only such criticism—combined, of course, with the expulsion of worthless leaders and their replacement by capable ones—will be useful and productive revolutionary work, educating simultaneously both the "leaders," so that they are worthy of the working class and the laboring masses, and the masses, so that they learn to analyze the political situation correctly and to understand the often very complex and tangled tasks that arise from that situation.[10]