NOTES AND ADDENDA TO THE REPORT
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT
February 23, 1920
It seems that this is precisely where the mistake lies.
It appears there is nothing more to be drawn
from the Southwestern Front?
…The Revolutionary Military Council of the Front believes that by reorganizing reserve divisions from the Seventh Army and redeploying available forces from the Sixth Army—with a substantial gain in time—it would be possible to effectively and promptly reinforce our Polish Front. Meanwhile, the necessary reinforcement of the Caucasus Front could be achieved through a redistribution of troops from the Southwestern Front, shifting them to the left—thus bolstering the Caucasus Front with several additional divisions. However, the prolonged logistical challenges associated with transporting reserves from the north via railroads are likely to persist, given the congestion along southern routes and the ongoing shortage of fuel, which will probably force us to continue relying on foot marches to bring reinforcements to the front lines…
Regardless of the urgent need to deploy reserves to the Western Front, it is also essential to provide immediate replenishments—lest we lose the remaining combat-ready personnel currently stationed continuously along the front lines, since the Front’s and Army’s reserve regiments have long lain idle due to a lack of reinforcements…
To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, for the Supreme Commander, regarding today’s (February 23) discussion.
25028
ON THE TRANSPORTATION OF METAL FROM THE URALS
(TELEGRAM TO B. A. ROIZENMAN)
February 24, 1920
Given the impossibility of shipping metal from the Urals by railcar, it is imperative to take all possible measures to transport it by water. To this end, we must allocate railcars to haul metal from factories to designated loading ports—and, where no railways exist, we must mobilize horse-drawn transport and laborers. The ports themselves hold only minimal stockpiles of metal; without adequate supply lines leading to the docks, waterborne transportation will remain unfeasible. It is essential to secure sufficient railcars for metal transport, and moreover, to authorize representatives of Prodrasmet to request the timely dispatch of rolling stock.