The final question we must examine in order to clarify the "unification crisis" in our party is the question of so-called party Menshevism and the evaluation of its significance.

The views of the non-factional—that is, those wishing to be considered non-factional—Ionov and Trotsky (No. 12 of *Pravda* and the Vienna resolution) are extremely characteristic in this regard. Trotsky deliberately and stubbornly ignores party Menshevism—to which attention was already called in No. 13 of the CO[47]—while Ionov reveals the "cherished" thought of his fellow-thinker, declaring that the significance of the pronouncements of "Comrade Plekhanov" (Ionov refuses to see other party Mensheviks) amounts to "reinforcing" the factional struggle of the Bolsheviks, to preaching "the declaration of the party on a war footing."

The incorrectness of this position of Trotsky and Ionov should have struck them in the face simply because the facts refute it. From No. 13 of the CO it is clear that in no fewer than seven foreign groups supporting the party—in Paris, Geneva, Bern, Zurich, Liège, Nice, San Remo—Plekhanovites, or more precisely, party Mensheviks, rose up against the *Golos* demanding the implementation of the plenum decisions, demanding the closure of the *Golos*, pointing to the liquidationist character of the ideological position adopted in Nos. 19–20 of the *Golos*. The same process, although perhaps less visibly, is occurring among workers in Russia as well. It is absurd to conceal these facts. Attempting, in spite of them, to represent Plekhanov's struggle against the *Golos*-ites as a literary "factional" struggle means—objectively—taking the side of the group of independent-legalists against the party.

This obviously false, obviously untenable position, which the indicated "reconcilers" adopted, should have opened their eyes to the incorrectness of their starting point, namely, that the political significance of the unification at the plenum consisted in an agreement "with given persons, groups, and institutions." One must not let oneself be deceived by the external forms of party events and their personal peculiarities; one must evaluate the ideological-political significance of what is occurring. Judging by appearances, the agreement was with the *Golos*-ite name-sayers. But the basis, the condition of this agreement, was the transition of the *Golos*-ites to the position of Plekhanov: this is evident from the analysis of the resolution on the state of affairs in the party given above[48]. Judging by appearances, it was precisely the *Golos*-ites who turned out to be the representatives of Menshevism in the party—for example, if one judges by the composition of the CO. In reality, the CO began to transform itself after the plenum into an organ of "cooperation" between party Bolsheviks and Plekhanovites with complete opposition from the *Golos*-ites. There resulted a zigzag in the development of party unification: at first, as it were, something like a general-reconciliatory mush without clear definition of the ideological basis of unification, but then the logic of political tendencies asserted itself, the separation of the independents from the party was accelerated by this allowance of maximal concessions to the *Golos*-ites at the plenum.

When I heard at the plenum and saw in the *Golos* (Nos. 19–20, p. 18) furious outbursts against the slogan "agreement of strong factions for the struggle against liquidators of the right and left" (this slogan is placed in quotation marks by the *Golos*, but for some reason it is not stated directly that I defended it before the plenum and at the plenum), I thought to myself: "abwarten!", "wait and see" (let's wait and see!). Wait, gentlemen *Golos*-ites, for you wish to draw up an account "without the master": the matter is not that the plenum gave everyone the possibility of participating in an agreement, and not only the "strong," strong by their ideological-political position, factions. The matter is whether your "masters"—that is, the groups of independent-legalists—will permit this possibility to be transformed into reality.

Several months have passed—and only the blind can fail to see now that in reality it is precisely "the agreement of strong factions" that constitutes the party unification, that moves it forward "through all obstacles." So it must be, so it alone can be in view of the actual correlation of forces in the party. It is beyond doubt that in the near future either all the guiding institutions of the party will be formally reorganized so as to express this agreement, or the life of the party and the development of its unification will proceed for a time outside its guiding institutions.

Of course, to call the party Mensheviks a "strong faction" seems at first glance strange, for at the present moment the *Golos*-ites are stronger—at least abroad, apparently. But we social-democrats judge strength not by how the foreign groups speak out, how literary Mensheviks group themselves, but by whose position is objectively correct and whose is condemned by the logic of political situation to subordination to the "independents." The Workers were stronger than the Iskrists both abroad and in Russia in 1898–1900, but still they were not a "strong faction."

Now, when the *Golos*-ites have mobilized all forces against Plekhanov and brought against him all their buckets of slop—up to Mr. Potresov and memories of how Martov was "offended" in 1901–1903 (sic!)—now this helplessness of the *Golos*-ites becomes especially evident. Axelrod and Co. have already hopelessly fallen behind politically, publishing in April, abroad, a collection of personal abuse against Plekhanov, when in Russia the February *Nasha Zarya* and the March *Vozrozhdenie* have transferred the question to an entirely different plane, when Plekhanov in No. 13 of the CO has already moved from the history of his collisions with the *Golos*-ites to the struggle against their contemporary policy. The *Golos*-ites thrash about as helplessly, recalling old (as far back as 1901!) "wrongs," as the Vperedovites, still appealing to good hearts for protection from the BC.

And see how more and more they expose themselves, our "aggrieved ones," who rave just as much in 1910 at the mere thought of the agreement between "Lenin and Plekhanov" (their terminology!) as a year ago Maximov raved over this. Like Maximov, the *Golos*-ites try to represent the matter as if it were almost a personal agreement between "Lenin and Plekhanov," with the actions of the latter explained by "wild caprice" (p. 16 of the "Necessary Supplement"), "the conversion of Saul to Paul," "fluttering" and so forth and so on. Martov writhes to remind oneself of the "five-year activity" (ibid.[49]) of Plekhanov in the role of Menshevik, to compromise him (retroactively) for this fluttering, not noticing that in doing so he spits upon himself the most.

In that same "Necessary Supplement" the collective editorial board of the *Golos* assures us (p. 32) that Plekhanov was "great" precisely during the indicated quinquennium (1904–1908). Just see what comes of this. The Mensheviks declare Plekhanov "great" for his activity not during those 20 years (1883–1903), when he remained true to himself, when he was neither Menshevik nor Bolshevik but was the founder of social-democracy,—but precisely during those five years when, by the admission of the Mensheviks themselves, he "fluttered," that is, did not hold consistently to the Menshevik line. It turns out that "greatness" consisted in not falling completely into the morass of Menshevism.

But precisely the five-year history of Menshevism, which Axelrod and Martov recalled to their own detriment, provides a series of facts helping to explain the split among the Mensheviks not by such paltry, personal reasons as Martov emphasizes.

Plekhanov co-opts Axelrod and Martov in 1903, announcing in No. 52 of the *Iskra*, in the article "What Not To Do," that he wishes to maneuver with opportunists and by maneuvering to correct them. In doing so he goes to the most extreme attacks on the Bolsheviks. He endeavors to pull out at the end of 1904 the openly sliding towards liberalism Axelrod ("Plan of a Zemstvo Campaign"), but does so in such a way that he says not a single word regarding such pearls as the declaration of demonstrations before the zemstvo members as the "highest type of demonstrations" (in the pamphlet "Letter to the CC," published only for party members). In spring 1905 Plekhanov becomes convinced of the hopelessness of "maneuvers" and withdraws from the Mensheviks, founding the *Dnevnik* and preaching union with the Bolsheviks. No. 3 of the *Dnevnik* (November 1905) is not at all Menshevik.

Having spent about a year and a half on maneuvering with opportunists within the party (from the end of 1903 to spring 1905), Plekhanov from the beginning of 1906 and in the course of 1907 undertakes maneuvering with the Kadets. In doing so he reaches far greater opportunistic extremes than the remaining Mensheviks. But when he, having proclaimed "maneuvering" during the First Duma, after its dissolution (in No. 6 of the *Dnevnik*), proposes an agreement of revolutionary parties for the struggle for a Constituent Assembly, the *Proletarii* (No. 2 of August 29, 1906, in the article "Tactical Waverings") immediately notes that this position is not at all Menshevik[50].

In spring 1907, at the London Congress, Plekhanov—according to the account of Cherevanin, cited already by me in the preface to the collection "Over 12 Years"—struggles against the organizational anarchism of the Mensheviks[51]. He needs a "workers' congress" as a maneuver for the development of the party, not against the party. In the second half of 1907, as Martov recounted in the "Necessary Supplement," Plekhanov "had to expend not a little eloquence" in order to defend the necessity of an illegal (that is, party) organ of the Mensheviks against Axelrod (who apparently preferred legal organs, in fact non-party ones). In 1908 the conflict over Potresov's article becomes the occasion for his rupture with the liquidators.

What do these facts speak of? That the present split of the Mensheviks is not a chance occurrence but an inevitability. "Maneuvering" does not excuse the one who made errors in the name of maneuvers, and I take back nothing of what I have written against these errors of Plekhanov. But "maneuvering" explains why it is easy for some Mensheviks to go over to the independents, and difficult and even impossible for others. A social-democrat who, by maneuvering, leads the working class after the Kadets, brings it no less harm than one who does so as a result of immanent attraction to opportunism. But the first will be able to, can, and will manage to stop where the second will slide into the pit. The Russian proverb says: make a known man pray to God—he will crack his head. Plekhanov could say: make the Potresovs and Danovs go to the right for a maneuver—they will go to the right for principle.

What certain Mensheviks have settled upon fully justifies their designation: "party Mensheviks." They have settled upon the struggle for the party—against independent-legalists. From this simple and clear question Mr. Potresov and the editorial board of the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* vainly attempt to wriggle away in the "Necessary Supplement."

And Engels too struggled with the S.D.F. (English social-democrats)—Potresov keeps saying (p. 24). Sophistry, my dear fellow. Engels corrected the party[113], but you don't say how to correct the party, you don't even say directly: is an illegal social-democratic party necessary now, is an RSDLP necessary or not. In the face of Stolypin you say no (*Nasha Zarya*), but in the face of party members, in illegal publications, you don't dare say it, you equivocate and dodge.

"Lenin and Plekhanov recommend war against new forms of the workers' movement" (p. 31), "we proceed from the state, conditions and demands of real workers' movement" (p. 32)—the editorial board assures us. Sophistry, my dear friends. You yourselves admitted that the plenum did everything for the recognition of these new forms, and the Bolsheviks themselves, by their struggle before the plenum, proved this. It is not over the question whether "new forms" are needed, whether legal work needs to be conducted, whether legal societies need to be founded—it is not over this at all that we diverge. We diverge over the question whether it is permissible for those conducting such legal work, legalists like the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co., to consider themselves social-democrats while being independent from the social-democratic party, or whether social-democratic party people are obliged to recognize the party, to preach its necessity, to work in it, to work on its organization, to establish illegal cells everywhere and in all unions for proper relations with it, etc. And you understand perfectly well that we diverge now—after the plenum—only over this.

The *Golos*-ites try to represent our striving to draw closer to the party Mensheviks, to enter into an agreement with them for the struggle for the party against the independents, as a personal bloc of "Lenin and Plekhanov." They curse abusively the author of the article against Potresov in Nos. 47–48 of the *Proletarii* for the tone of a "fawning courtier," "speculating" on an agreement with Plekhanov. I open this article and read on page 7:

"Of course, all Plekhanov's errors during the revolution stemmed precisely from the fact that he did not carry out consistently the line which he himself had pursued in the old *Iskra*."

Let readers judge what is more similar to "flattery" and "speculation": this direct indication that the Bolsheviks consider it an error in Plekhanov, or the declaration of Plekhanov as "great" precisely for that period when he was a Menshevik and when he "fluttered," according to the Mensheviks' own words.

"Plekhanov will be with us," writes the editorial board of the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,—when "the time comes again of responsible" (italics of *Golos*) "political actions" (p. 32 of the "Necessary Supplement").

This is politically illiterate, but as regards "speculation" sufficiently clear. Illiterate, because now is precisely a hundred times more responsible time for political actions for old leaders than during open struggle, when the masses themselves will much more easily find the way. Clear in the sense of "speculation," because it expresses readiness again to recognize Plekhanov as a Menshevik when he begins to "maneuver" again.

We are amazed that the *Golos*-ites do not understand the significance that such outbursts on their part have alongside, for example, the phrase of Axelrod: "we did not wish to debase ourselves" (before Plekhanov) "to the role of obsequious lackeys" (p. 19). You are behaving precisely as the type of people indicated in these words. Your attitude toward Plekhanov corresponds exactly to the "formula" of these people: "either get it in the teeth, or shake hands."

For five years you asked to "shake hands," now you give on 32 pages of double format "in the teeth," and on page 32 "express readiness": ready and willing to recognize as a Menshevik again, and to ask to "shake hands" again.

As for us, we have the right to say that during the time of "flutterings" Plekhanov was never a Bolshevik. We do not consider him a Bolshevik and never will. But him, like any Menshevik capable of rising up against the group of independent-legalists and carrying the struggle against them to the end, we consider a party Menshevik. We consider it an unconditional duty of all Bolsheviks in these difficult times, when on the order of the day stands the struggle for Marxism in theory and for the party in the practice of the workers' movement, to exert all efforts for drawing closer to such social-democrats.