Comrades, it seems to me that certain statements made in the discussion, and even some speeches, are worth noting only because they clearly expressed not merely exhaustion, but exhaustion that reached the point of hysteria and thus produced something completely superfluous. I would not say there was demagoguery here. Physical exhaustion reached hysteria. Such were to a considerable degree the statements of Lutovninov and Bubnov, in which there was less demagoguery than exhaustion. In part, I believe, exhaustion also manifested itself in Medvedev's statement. He said: "Now you all have begun to say that there are pathological phenomena, but before you denied this, you spoke falsehoods." I think this explanation is not entirely correct, and even completely incorrect. That there genuinely exist those unhealthy phenomena we are discussing—this could hardly have been a secret. It is also beyond doubt that the general situation is so grave that to find time for the party, to find the possibility for the party to raise this question specifically—we were unable to do so before. And now we are raising it with difficulty, because the chance we discussed here in our political discussion, that chance—to avoid a winter campaign—is extremely small. The general situation of the republic, as I indicated, has improved to such an extent that now we have the possibility to discuss with much greater composure: we are not now raising the question of prematurely terminating the conference, as we did several times during the offensive of Kolchak and Denikin. There were party congresses from which, without waiting for their conclusion, whole ranks of responsible workers left directly for the front. One might think we rarely convene congresses, and rarely can we discuss at congresses the most important questions—yet before we could not even permit ourselves to complete such rarely convened congresses. In any case, now we find ourselves in such a position that we can and must, without limiting ourselves, conclude the present discussion. I would also like to say in a few words that certain attempts to explain matters in Marxist fashion, which appeared in the remarks of Kalinin, it seems to me, on the contrary diverged far from Marxism, whereas the correct, Marxist formulation was given, I believe, by the resolution of the Moscow Committee—which you have all, of course, read and which has been published as a small pamphlet and printed in the newspaper *Pravda*—and by the letter of the Central Committee.

I would like to read several lines which I would propose to the commission (if it is decided to elect a commission) not as a replacement for the Moscow resolution and the Central Committee letter, but as a supplement to them as material[25]. The Moscow Committee resolution gives, it seems to me—and in this almost everyone agrees—a correct exposition of the question. I shall permit myself to read these few lines, to say a little about them. Here is this supplement: "The extraordinarily grave situation of the Soviet republic in the first years of its existence, the extreme devastation and the greatest military danger made inevitable the singling out of 'shock' (and therefore in fact privileged) departments and groups of workers. This was inevitable, for it was impossible to save a devastated country without concentrating forces and means on such departments and such groups of workers, without the strengthening of which the imperialists of the entire world would certainly have crushed us and would not have permitted even the beginning of our Soviet republic's transition to economic construction…."

Concerning the specialists, we heard here very heated attacks. In the speech of comrade Kutozov there ran the truth that the Soviet Russian proletariat has not seen improvement in its situation, but has seen, on the contrary, often a worsening. This is fair. But one must understand that, for example, in Vienna, where there is no Soviet government, this worsening is the same, and together with it moral degradation a hundred times greater. But the masses cannot understand this. It is understandable that they ask us: what then have we obtained in the course of two years? And it is understandable that discontent with the specialists spreads so widely. It is understandable that the struggle over the question of whether or not specialists are necessary stood in the forefront. But one must not forget that without them we would not have obtained our army. Without this we would have been in such a position as Hungary and the Finnish workers found themselves. This is how the question stands. Without these specialists we would not have taken those elementary steps which permitted us to rise to a certain height—and I spoke of this in my political report—we would not have taken them. If we had not succeeded in organizing matters with the specialists, we would not have this, we could not have moved forward. But now, when we have taken them into our hands, harnessed them, when we know that they will not run away from us, but on the contrary all are running to us, now we shall achieve the result that democratization in the party and army will rise. I continue reading (reads the resolution)…

First point (reads)[26]. Here is an addition. Comrade Tomsky said, referring to something we ourselves have said more than once—it is necessary to advance the middle elements, the top is exhausted, give us the middle elements. This did not succeed in being carried through immediately, but it will succeed after a new, perhaps twentieth, attempt. Without this the cause of Soviet Russia would be hopeless. But we know that it is not hopeless, because we have new growing elements. If the first attempts failed, we shall repeat subsequent ones.

Second point (reads)[27]. Here was posed a question not devoid of venom: will freedom of criticism correspond to freedom to eat peaches?{112} I have one measure from among possible guarantees, on the basis of proposals made by the commission. At such moments, when the country is in danger, when Kolchak reached the Volga and Denikin reached Orel, no freedoms whatsoever can exist. One must not regret this. But the military situation is bad even now, we all see how military fortune is changeable. We must place this question on the order of the day. But to swear that in moments of military danger we shall not act differently is impossible. Then there will be need again for the greatest tension and no talk of this sort: only hold firm, strain all your forces. We do not at all renounce this, and so long as we do not have Italian victory, we too must not renounce it. There is my answer about peaches.

Third point (reads)[28]. Here comrade Preobrazensky raised the question, which Zinoviev also raised: is regulation fitting and what should be understood by it? I leave it open, because in the commission this question will be detailed further. There it will become clear: should regulation be understood as detailed points or as the creation of special institutions.

Fourth point (reads)[29]. Here the comrade reporter indicated that this question was raised by the commission, but the majority rejected it. It seems to me—I raise it only on my own behalf—it seems to me that one should not reject it, but if not to accept it immediately, then in any case to think it over first. It was pointed out here that in the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee there lie 500 complaints. The Orgburo must distribute tens of thousands of people. Furthermore, there is not a single member of the Orgburo who is not buried under several Soviet positions. Under such conditions one must work with unknown quantities, and under such conditions one cannot solve the question otherwise than by inspiration, which permits only experienced people to decide correctly, and even they frequently make mistakes. Taking such conditions into account, we wish to find people with no less than 15 years of service, who would enjoy the trust of the party, would be distinguished by impartiality, and would help in this matter and at the same time in respect to independence would stand higher than the Orgburo, having been elected at the congress. It seems to me this step can be taken. To slow the work of the Central Committee, to halt decisions—this is impossible. There is no special security for this and one cannot propose it. In the German workers' party there was a control commission even before. To what extent it will be possible in our military situation—one cannot guarantee. But in any case we are in a position to take this step, and the Central Committee has taken this path.

In the Central Committee letter it is said: "…at all provincial committees there must be organized, from the most impartial comrades enjoying universal trust, special party commissions, to which corresponding complaints must be submitted." Here it speaks of impartial comrades. For combat activity—both military, economic, and organizational—very often absolutely necessary are passionate people, because without great passion they will not display great exertion and will not solve the urgent successive task in an exhausted country. Here, on the contrary, one needs people who perhaps do not possess high administrative qualities, but who do possess great life experience. Whether we shall find them throughout all Russia in the provinces, I doubt this, and if the experience of commissions at provincial committees, which it is now proposed to create and which you will create—if this experience proves unsuccessful, do not decide that our entire undertaking has collapsed. It is possible that throughout the provinces we shall not find a sufficient number of comrades able to stand firm from congress to congress. But if we do not find them in the provinces, then in the center we can find seasoned comrades with life experience. And I think we should not refuse this institution.

One may say: where are the guarantees that this institution can exist? We are in conditions of desperate civil war, when generally speaking there cannot be either broad freedom of criticism, etc. We have no time for this; we must strain all our forces to end the war. If military conditions had developed otherwise, there would be a different situation. Under present conditions we cannot guarantee much; and we directly say that in order practically to regulate this question, one cannot rely on the Central Committee, for it is buried and over-buried with work. I do not know whether a single member of the Central Committee will be found—I can judge by myself—who does not feel himself in debt, as if drowning in unexecuted numerous matters or matters executed hastily. I cannot imagine a more realistic guarantee of the fulfillment of this matter than the creation of this commission, this group of comrades, which could concentrate entirely on this matter and which could be confident that it will be completely autonomous in dealing with that matter into which not a single member of the Central Committee, nor the Orgburo, nor the Politburo, is able to penetrate. Perhaps we do practically penetrate it in that we take steps forward, in that we have an increase in grain procurement from 60 million to 260 million puds,—but this turned out to be insufficient to have a non-exhausted Red Army; in order not to have workers who say: "what have we received from the Red Army, we are starving"; and in order not to have completely tattered upper ranks to whom the middle elements do not come to the aid. But we nonetheless took this step—this means that even on this scale of desperate exhaustion, this mass scale of exhaustion is beginning to diminish, and there is beginning that period when we can move from discussion of the question of a crust of bread to the higher tasks that stand before us and the resolution of which we shall all unconditionally undertake.

Published for the first time, from stenographic record