Reply To The Debate On The Report

On Concessions Delivered To The R.C.P.(B.) Group

At The Eighth Congress Of Soviets

December 21

Comrades, I have received quite a few notes and shall briefly
answer those to which no replies have yet been given. But first let me read
to you a note of an informative nature, which I think is characteristic:

At the Arzamas uyezd congress, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, a
non-Party peasant declared the following concerning concessions, which we
communicate to you as a characteristic sign: “Comrades, we are
delegating you to the All-Russia Congress and declare that we, peasants,
are prepared to endure hunger and cold and do our duty for another three
years but don’t sell Mother-Russia in the form of concessions!”

I think it would be very useful to quote this note in the official report
to the

Congress, [1] and it ought to be done because it shows a side of the question which the
capitalists overlook, and in connection with which we have no need whatever
to conceal the fact that there is a danger here, and we have to be on our
guard against it. I have already mentioned that these reminders sharpen the
attention of the workers and peasants. The fact that such reminders are
coming from the midst of the illiterate peasantry is of special importance,
as it stresses a task which is of exceptional importance at the present time-1 mean about your having to examine the
bills tabled in the Council of People’s Commissars for rendering
assistance to peasant farming. We must learn to convince the non-Party
peasants, win them over to our side and make them self-dependent. A note
like this shows that we have every chance of achieving tremendous success
here, and we shall achieve it.

Here is another note:

Won’t the capitalist concessionaires set the proletarian masses
against the Soviet government, seeing that the economic crisis and chaos we
are living through make it impossible for us to satisfy the needs of the
workers the way the capitalists can?

I have said already that in the advanced countries, in most of them,
the workers are better provided for than ours, yet the Russian workers in
all the advanced countries are all eagerness to come to Soviet Russia,
although they are well aware of the hardships the workers have to
bear.

Won’t the Russian Ryabushinskys and the rest of the pack put in an appearance together with the English and American
capitalists?

This has a bearing on the note which asks whether the concessionaires
will be exterritorial. Of course not, we shall never grant them
exterritoriality. This is granted only to ambassadors, and even then on
definite conditions. If Ryabushinsky banks on hiding himself from the
proper authorities, I think he is mistaken.

Next, comrades, I want to tell you that Comrade Lezhava reports:
“Vanderlip has presented a mandate from about a dozen big
syndicates. This has been verified by our special authorities here. It has
already been corroborated by Krasin in London, who has checked up on the
seriousness of the groups for whom Vanderlip is acting.”

For the benefit of those comrades who ask why the agreement has not
been published, I repeat that its publication is not to our advantage,
because the capitalists, who are fighting among themselves, think there are
far worse things in that agreement. The hullabaloo about it in the press
bears this out. Let them go on believing it, we have no intention whatever
of disillusioning them. Those who wish to familiarise themselves with this
agreement have every possibility of doing so. Besides, 1 mentioned that
the agreement will come into force after the new president of the United States
of America has been sworn in. Our Party congress will be held in

February. [3] Consequently, the Party will have every opportunity of
controlling and deciding things.

Please explain, if you can, for how long Kamchatka has been let (or is proposed to be let) and is there an economic, apart from a
political, advantage in this for the R.S.F.S.R. and in what form?

Kamchatka has not been let and cannot be let until March. The economic
gain is that according to the draft agreement they are obliged to give us a
share of the mineral wealth which they will extract.

In granting concessions do we not thereby admit the durability of the
capitalist states and do we not consider our thesis concerning the
earliness of .a world revolution to be incorrect?

Bukharin has replied to this. It is not a question of our admitting
their durability; the point is that gigantic forces are driving them to the
brink. Our existence and speedy release from the critical situation and
famine are a gigantic force and a factor of revolution more powerful than
those farthings—a mere crumb from the point f view of world economy-which
they will get from us. An extra hundred or thousand machines and
locomotives are of tremendous importance to us, for it will mean that
transport repairs, which Trotsky planned over a period of four and a half
years and reduced to three and a half, will be reduced by another
year. Reducing the economic chaos and famine by a year is of colossal
importance to us.

What if Japan, to prevent us letting Kamchatka to
America, goes and occupies it with her troops and declares it her own?

As a matter of fact she is in possession of Kamchatka right now, and if
she could she would do it, but she can’t because she is afraid of
America.

Where will the capitalist get his labour force? Will he
bring it with him? Hardly. If he is going to employ Russian workers, not
only will these be under the thumb of the capitalist, but it will upset our
labour market, and this, in turn, will upset our integrated economic
plan.

I can’t see how our economic plan will be upset by our workers
going there to work. They won’t be able to go there apart from the trade unions, apart from our economic organisations and our
Party. The workers at the advanced capitalist enterprises will train our
workers in the best methods of production. In submitting to capitalist
conditions of work, our workers will subordinate them to our code of labour
laws or to special restrictive agreements, and will not hesitate to quit if
the conditions are bad. If the conditions are unfavourable, the workers
will quit. Some comrades are afraid that the conditions will be good,
others, that they will be bad. We shall look out, just like our workers and
peasants, and take proper measures.

In granting concessions, when the concessionaires start
working, will the activities of the R.C.P. in organising communist cells
among those employed on the concession territory be open or only illegal?

Here is a wrong idea of concessions and concessionaires. The,
concessionaire is not an authority. He does not get any territory other
than that to be used for economic exploitation. All government bodies and
all courts of law remain only in the hands of the R.S.F.S.R.

Should unemployment in America force a revolution, won’t our concessions be helping America to cope with this crisis,
that is, hold up the revolution.

That argument has been disproved by Comrade Bukharin.

If the international bourgeoisie gets to know of the
Soviet government’s tactics in concessions, what will the position
of the Soviet government be? Won’t this be bad for us?

On the contrary, everyone in Europe has heard about the concessions,
and the hullabaloo about it there only goes to show that the bourgeoisie is
worried. They are anxious not to be late. All those capitalists who do not
want to risk having dealings with Russia are now beginning to realise that
they are lagging behind while the more enterprising people are getting
in. And we are taking advantage of the contradictions among the
capitalists.

Are there any plans or projects for concessions on large
industrial enterprises in Moscow and in the centre generally? There is talk
about three such concessions in Moscow, Yaroslavl and Lubertsi.

I know nothing about such concessions. There is an American factory in
Lubertsi which has not been nationalised and never was, but there is no concession there. The only concession in the
centre, which the S.E.C. comrades have spoken of as being possible, is a
concession to the German chemists for developing dye works and letting one
factory to them. In the Council of People’s Commissars all were
agreed it was possible, but this talk has had no practical
consequences.

Germany is so far ahead of our country that during the imperialist war
even the advanced countries found them-selves in difficulties when the
German chemical industry stopped supplying them. To get our chemical
industry going we must be prepared to pay the German chemists well. The
best way to learn is to grant the Germans a con-cession on one of our
factories. No schools or lectures will help as much as practical work at a
factory, where the workers can be trained in six months and then made to
build another factory like it next door. To fear that the Germans of a
single factory will do something to us, considering their international
situation, is ridiculous. There were no differences of opinion in the
C.P.C. In point of principle it is acceptable. Unfortunately, this question
has not had practical results. I must stress the fact that we talk a great
deal about concessions, but so far we have not succeeded in granting a
single one. We shall consider it a great success if we manage to grant at
least one, and you will see the concrete conditions of the concession.

Further.

What countries can be granted concessions? Can we give a
concession to Poland?

We believe they can be granted to all countries, Poland included.

Couldn’t the capitalists use the concessions to avert crises at home and thus stave off a social revolution?

If the capitalists could avert crises at home, then capitalism would
he everlasting. They are decidedly blind pawns in the general mechanism-the
imperialist war has shown that. Every month proves that the crisis of
capitalism is deepening, disintegration throughout the world is spreading
farther and farther, and Russia is the only country where an upswing towards a durable and serious improvement has started.

To sow dissension among the workers the concessionaires
may place their workers in better conditions.

This won’t increase dissension among our people, we have grown
;much stronger.

Will trade union groups be organised on the concessionaire’s territory?

The concessionaires get economic exploitation, the authorities and laws
remain Soviet ones.

Can you outline the conditions guaranteeing us against the danger of the Soviet state system being distorted and a capitalist
set-up being introduced?

These conditions are the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. If a contracting party
breaks them we have the right to cancel the agreement.

What is the gist of the tentative draft agreement with the American imperialists covering a concession on Kamchatka?

I said that the term of the concession is 50-60 years. We get a share
of the produce, they the right to set up a military and naval base at the
inlet near which there is an oil deposit.

You say that granting concessions to the capitalists of
oppressed countries like Germany is more important than for other
countries. But if the capitalists of oppressed countries use the
concessions to improve their country’s economic position, don’t you think
this will stave off the revolution in that country?

The international situation as regards revolution revolves around
Soviet Russia’s struggle against the rest of the world, the capitalist
countries. To strengthen Soviet Russia and make her invincible-that is what
matters most as far as the struggle of the oppressed and colonial countries
is concerned.

What role in concessions does Turkestan cotton play?

So far there is no question of granting a concession on Turkestan
cotton. This question was not discussed.

Will concessions be granted for the rehabilitation of industrial
enterprises and for taking over railways?

Such exigencies are ruled out. The railways are a single integrated
enterprise.

Has there been any question of concessions on slaughter-houses?

Not that I have heard of.

The protests against concessions in the local areas stand
clearly revealed, not as healthy sentiments at all, but as patriotic
feeling among a strong petty-bourgeois section of the countryside and among
the urban middle classes.

The patriotism of a person who is prepared to go hungry for three years
rather than surrender Russia to foreigners is genuine patriotism, without
which we could not hold out for three years. Without this patriotism we
would not have succeeded in defending the Soviet Republic, in doing away
with private property and now getting as much as 300 million poods by means
of the food surplus-appropriation system. This is the finest revolutionary
patriotism. As for the kulaks being prepared to go hungry for three years
to keep out the foreign capitalists, from whom they have something to
gain-that is untrue. It is not the kulaks who are concerned, it is the
non-Party middle peasant.

Isn’t there a risk that in view of a possible war between
America and Japan there is a likelihood of a serious attack on Soviet
Russia by Japan? What shall we do then? Shall we fight off Japan in
alliance with imperialist America, using her assistance as a real force?

Of course we shall-we have often said that an alliance with one
imperialist state against another to consolidate the socialist republic is
not objectionable in point of principle. An attack by Japan on Soviet
Russia is much more difficult now than it was a year ago.

Please explain the Allies’ policy towards Turkey and our
relation-ships.

It is rather awkward, of course, to deal openly with this question in
an official speech, as relations here are extremely confused. Everything
here depends on the intricate play of relations in bourgeois Georgia,
which is on the verge of catastrophe. The comrades who are interested in
this will, I am sure, derive great benefit from the report by Comrade
Meshcheryakov, Editor of Pravda, who has returned from Georgia, where he
spent several weeks, if not months, and has collected highly interesting material on this Menshevik
realm. Georgia is on the verge of disaster. The Turkish attack was planned
against us. The Allies were making a pitfall for us, but fell into it
themselves, because we have received Soviet Armenia.

The men at the top in Turkey are Cadets, Octobrists, Nationalists, who
are prepared to sell us to the Allies. But that is an extremely difficult
thing to do, because feeling among the Turkish people against the savage
oppression by the Allies is running very high, and sympathy towards Soviet
Russia is growing in proportion as we help the independent Azerbaijan
Republic to carry out proper liberation of the Moslem peasants, who have
driven out the landowners, but are afraid to take the land, and will
shortly stop being afraid; when they do take the land the Turkish landowner
won’t last long.

We personally have been and will be peaceful in the extreme in the
Caucasus, and for the information of our Caucasian comrades, we shall be
very careful to avoid anything that may involve us in war. Our peaceful
policy so far has been so felicitous, that the Allies are getting nervous,
have started taking decisive steps against us, but are only getting them
against themselves.

What is going to happen next to Georgia?

Even the Mohammedan Allah doesn’t know that, but if we show
self-restraint we have something to gain without running any risk.

We are asked whether there were any other concession objects besides
Kamchatka. There have been no other concessions with Vanderlip.

Regarding press hand-outs. We can’t do that, first because the
printing-works are busy, and secondly so as not to make this material
available to people abroad, where there is a desire to torpedo this
undertaking of ours. So far we haven’t got a single concession, a single
agreement, and we must first get an agreement before speaking about
dangers. We have nothing so far and are acting semi-legally.

How will things stand with concessions and with works and
buildings erected by concessionaires in the event of a) their violating
the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. b) war breaking out with a country of which the
concessionaire is a subject, and c) with others?

In the event of an agreement being violated the concessionaire will be
prosecuted under the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. In the event of war the
concession agreement is broken and the property passes into the possession
of the R.SF.S.R. in accordance with military procedure.

The Russian bourgeoisie, who have escaped abroad, will be
able to take part in the exploitation of concessions with their
capital. Won’t this lead to the old bosses coming back under the guise of
foreign capital?

If an old boss takes a ride through the northern forests of European
Russia under the guise of foreign capital we have nothing to fear. You will
find many an old boss in the centre of Moscow. We have a thousand times
less reason to fear a situation in which we shall have a list of all
visiting foreigners, than those bosses who are operating at our
enterprises and who, unfortunately, have not been registered yet.

You have pointed out and underlined the political significance of concessions. That is understandable. But what the provinces
are most worried about is this: with concessions there will be trade
relations. What threats and dangers to the Republic does this imply in the
sense of disintegration and the blowing up of the Soviet system from within
(perhaps increased profiteering, etc.) and what precautions can we take
against it?

I have already spoken about that. We had a tremendous threat of
profiteering in the shape of

Sukharevka, [4] with which we waged a constant struggle. We understand, of course, that with the abolition of Sukharevka
profiteering still remains, it remains wherever there is a small
proprietor, and we have tens of millions of such proprietors. That is where
the real danger lies, and not in big capital, which will be hedged around
on all sides with special supervisions. It should not be forgotten that we
shall have an agreement which we can always cancel at the risk-our greatest
danger-of having to pay damages.

What is the position with regard to tsarist debts? Will
the Allies agree to any transactions unless these debts are paid?

England already agrees not to demand the debts from us, since we have
proposed the draft of a trade agreement to them. Under that draft trade
deals are now starting and under it we are not obliged to repay debts. I
say, England agrees, but France does not. And so we tell France that in principle we do not refuse. The exact amounts of payments will be discussed
at a conference, at which we intend to say: you, too, are responsible for
the losses you have caused us by your intervention. An ad hoc commission is
working on this question, and an initial estimate puts the figure at ten
thousand million in gold.

| First published in 1963 in the journal Kommunist No. 6 | |
| --- | --- |
| Printed from the shorthand record | |