V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:PSS/v42; en:MT;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

Comrades, it is with great pleasure, although, I confess, with surprise, that I have seen the tremendous interest aroused by the question of concessions. Cries are heard from all sides, and mainly from below. They ask: how is this so? We drove out our own exploiters, and now we are inviting foreign ones?

Why these cries give me pleasure is understandable. Obviously, if a cry of apprehension has come from below, a fear that the old capitalists might be brought back, if this cry has been raised over such a tenth-rate act as the decree on concessions, it means that the realisation of how dangerous capitalism is, and how great the danger of underestimating the struggle against it, is still very, very strong. That, of course, is excellent, and all the more excellent because the apprehensions come, as I have already said, from below. As for the decree, the comrade chairman has already pointed out that it did not give a clear understanding of the questions. That is indeed so, but the fact is that clarity was not the task of the decree. Its task was to lure the foreign capitalists. And it is obvious that when you want to lure them, you do not speak as you would before a Party meeting. Pravda, however, printed precisely what should not have been printed. At a Party meeting I cannot remain Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and speak as I do to foreign capitalists. At Party meetings we say what foreign capitalists should not hear. Pravda is printed not only for Party members, but also for abroad. I am very grateful to Comrade Stepanov, who has already published a refutation concerning my speech.{47} To avoid being placed in such a position in future, I request that what is said at Party meetings should not be printed, and if it is printed, then only after triple censorship and after the speech has been edited by someone who well understands what should and what should not be said to foreign capitalists. After this brief introduction, I shall permit myself to proceed to the substance of the matter—the question of concessions. I shall begin my exposition with political considerations.

The fundamental point in the question of concessions, from the standpoint of political considerations—and there are both political and economic considerations here—the fundamental point in the question of concessions, from the standpoint of political considerations, is the rule which we have not only theoretically assimilated but also practically applied, and which will be a fundamental rule for us for a long time, until the final victory of socialism throughout the world, namely: we must make use of the antagonisms and contradictions between the two imperialisms, between the two groups of capitalist states, setting them against each other. Until we have conquered the whole world, until we remain, from the economic and military standpoint, weaker than the rest of the capitalist world, we must adhere to the rule: we must be able to utilise the contradictions and antagonisms between the imperialists. If we had not adhered to this rule, we would long ago, to the delight of the capitalists, all have been hanging from various aspen trees. We had the basic experience in this respect when we concluded the Brest Treaty. One should not conclude that treaties can be like Brest or Versailles. That is not true. There may be a third treaty, advantageous for us.

Brest is significant because for the first time on a gigantic scale, amidst immense difficulties, we were able to utilise the contradictions between the imperialists in such a way that socialism ultimately gained. At the time of Brest there were two gigantically strong groups of imperialist predators: the German-Austrian and the Anglo-American-French. They were engaged in a furious struggle which was to decide the fate of the world for the immediate future. If we held out, being a military zero, having nothing and going entirely downhill in the depths of economic disintegration, if we held out, this miracle happened only because we correctly utilised the discord between German and American imperialism. We made a huge concession to German imperialism, and by making a concession to one imperialism, we at once shielded ourselves from the persecution of both imperialisms. Germany could not engage in strangling Soviet Russia either economically or politically; she had other things to do. We gave her the Ukraine, from which she could take as much grain and coal as she wanted, of course, if she knew how to take them, if she possessed the vital strength to take them. Anglo-Franco-American imperialism could not attack us because we had first offered it peace. Now a thick book by Robins is coming out in America, in which he relates that we had negotiations with Lenin and Trotsky, and had their consent to conclude peace. Although they helped the Czechoslovaks and drew them into intervention, being occupied with their own war, they could not interfere.

It turned out, it might have seemed, something like a bloc of the first socialist republic with German imperialism against the other imperialism. But we concluded no bloc with them, we did not cross any line that would undermine or discredit the socialist power, but we utilised the discord between the two imperialisms in such a way that, in the end, both lost. Germany got nothing from the Brest Peace except a few million poods of grain, and brought Bolshevik disintegration into Germany. We, however, gained time, during which the Red Army began to take shape. Even the gigantic calamities in the Ukraine proved curable, though at a difficult and heavy price. The rapid collapse of Soviet power in Russia, which our opponents had counted on, did not follow. The very time that history gave us for a respite we used to strengthen ourselves so that we could not be taken by military force. We gained the tempo, we gained a little time, and only gave up a great deal of space for it. At that time, I recall, there was philosophising that in order to gain time, one must give up space. The philosophers’ theory of time and space was precisely applied practically and politically; we gave up a lot of space, but we gained such time as enabled us to grow stronger. After that, when all the imperialists wanted to wage a big war against us, it turned out—they could not; they had neither the means nor the strength for a big war. We did not sacrifice fundamental interests then; we sacrificed secondary ones and preserved the fundamental ones.

Here, incidentally, arises the question of opportunism. Opportunism consists in sacrificing fundamental interests for the sake of temporary, partial advantages. That is the crux of the matter, if we take the theoretical definition of opportunism. Many have gone astray here. It was precisely in the Brest Peace that we sacrificed the secondary interests of Russia, from the standpoint of socialism, as they are understood in a patriotic sense; we made gigantic sacrifices, but still they were secondary sacrifices. The Germans hated England with all their hearts. They also hated the Bolsheviks, but we lured them, and they fell for it. They kept assuring us that they would not go as far as Napoleon had gone, and indeed, they did not reach Moscow, but they went to the Ukraine and came to grief there. They thought they had learned a lot from Napoleon, but in reality it turned out differently. We, however, gained a great deal.

The example of the Brest Peace taught us much. At the present time we are between two enemies. If we cannot defeat both, we must be able to arrange our forces so that they fight each other, just as, whenever two thieves fight, an honest man gains by it, but as soon as we are strong enough to overthrow the whole of capitalism, we will immediately seize it by the scruff of the neck. Our forces are growing, and very rapidly. If in relation to the Brest Peace this is a lesson we shall never forget and which is richer in conclusions than any propaganda or preaching, now we have gained in the sense that we have stood on our own feet. We are surrounded by imperialist states which hate the Bolsheviks with all their hearts, which spend colossal sums of money, ideological forces, press forces, etc., and which, nevertheless, have been unable to overcome us militarily for three years, although we are infinitely weak in the military-economic sense. We have not one-hundredth of the strength that the combined imperialist states possess, and yet they are unable to strangle us. They cannot strangle us because their soldiers do not obey; their workers and peasants, tired of war, do not want war with the Soviet Republic. Such is the situation now, and we must proceed from it. What it will be in a few years is unknown, since the Western powers are resting from the war each year.

Beginning with the Second Congress of the Third International, we have become firmly established in the imperialist countries not only ideologically, but also organisationally. In all countries there are now nuclei which are carrying on independent work and will continue to do so. That is done. But the speed, the tempo of the development of the revolution in the capitalist countries is much slower than with us. It was obvious that when the peoples obtained peace, the revolutionary movement would inevitably slow down. Therefore, without guessing about the future, we cannot at present stake on this tempo changing to a rapid one. Our task is to decide how we are to act at the present time. People live in a state, and every state lives in a system of states which are in a system of a certain political equilibrium relative to each other.

If we take into account that the capitalists have bought up the vast majority of the richest sources of raw material throughout the earth, or, if not bought up, have politically seized them, since equilibrium exists on a capitalist basis, we must be able to reckon with this, we must be able to utilise it. We cannot wage war against the present Entente. The work of our agitation is done and is being done splendidly, we are confident of this. Politically, we must utilise the disagreements between the opponents, and only the deep disagreements, explained by the deepest economic causes. If we try to utilise petty, accidental disagreements, we will find ourselves in the position of a petty politician and a cheap diplomat. But nothing serious can be played on that. There are a huge number of diplomats who play on this; they play for a few months, make a career, and then go flying.

Are there fundamental antagonisms in the present capitalist world that must be utilised? There are three basic ones which I should like to name. The first, closest to us, is the relations between Japan and America. War is being prepared between them. They cannot live peacefully on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, although these shores are separated by 3,000 versts. This rivalry indisputably follows from the relations of their capitalisms. There exists a gigantic literature devoted to the question of the future Japanese-American war. That war is being prepared, that it is inevitable, is beyond doubt. The pacifists try to evade this question, to gloss it over with general phrases, but for anyone who studies the history of economic relations and diplomacy, there cannot be a shadow of doubt that the war is economically ripe and politically being prepared. You cannot take a single book devoted to this question without seeing the maturing of war. The land is divided. Japan has seized a colossal number of colonies. Japan has 50 million people, and she is comparatively weak economically. America has 110 million people, she has no colonies, although she is many times richer than Japan. Japan has seized China, which has 400 million population and the richest coal deposits in the world. How can she hold on to this thing? It is ridiculous to think that a stronger capitalism will not take away from a weaker capitalism everything the latter has plundered. In such a situation, can the Americans remain indifferent? Can one leave strong capitalists side by side with weak capitalists and think that they will not take away? What would they be good for then? But in such a situation, can we remain indifferent and only say, as communists: “we will propagate communism inside these countries”? That is correct, but it is not all. The practical task of communist policy is the task of utilising this enmity, setting them against each other. Here a new situation arises. If you take two imperialist countries: Japan and America—they want to fight, they will fight for supremacy in the world, for the right to plunder. Japan will fight to continue plundering Korea, which she plunders with unheard-of brutality, combining all the latest inventions of technology and purely Asiatic tortures. Recently we received a Korean newspaper telling what the Japanese are doing. Here is a combination of all the methods of tsarism, all the latest improvements of technology, with a purely Asiatic system of torture, with unheard-of brutality. But the Americans want to tear this tasty morsel of Korea away. Of course, defence of the fatherland in such a war would be the greatest crime, a betrayal of socialism. Of course, supporting one country against another would be a crime against communism, but we communists must use one country against another. Are we not committing a crime against communism? No, because we do this as a socialist state, carrying on communist propaganda and compelled to utilise every hour granted to it by circumstances in order to grow stronger with maximum speed. We have begun to grow stronger, but we are growing stronger very slowly. America and other capitalist countries are growing in their economic and military power devilishly fast. However much we gather our forces, we will grow incomparably more slowly.

We must utilise the situation that has arisen: that is the whole essence of the Kamchatka concessions. Vanderlip came to us, a distant relative of the well-known multi-millionaire, if we are to believe him, but since our counter-intelligence in the Cheka, which is excellently organised, has unfortunately not yet captured the Northern States of America, we have not yet established the kinship of these Vanderlips ourselves. Some say there is no kinship at all. I do not presume to judge that: my knowledge is limited to the fact that I have read a book by Vanderlip, not the one who was with us, but the one who is described as such a grandee that all kings and ministers received him with great honours, from which one must conclude that his moneybag is very tightly stuffed, and he reasoned with them in the tone in which people speak to each other at a meeting, like ours, and where he calmly talked about how to restore Europe. If the ministers spoke to him respectfully, it means that Vanderlip has connections with the multi-millionaires: his book shows the point of view of a businessman who knows nothing else, who, observing Europe, says: “Perhaps it won’t work out, and everything will go to the devil.” This book is full of hatred for Bolshevism. He also talks about how to establish business relations. A most interesting book, and in terms of agitation better than any other communist books, because the final conclusion is that “I am afraid this patient cannot be cured! although we have a lot of money and means to cure him.”

Vanderlip brought with him a letter to the Council of People’s Commissars. This letter is very interesting, for with the extraordinary frankness, cynicism and rudeness of an American kulak, he says: “We are very strong in 1920; our fleet will be even stronger in 1923, however, our strength is hindered by Japan, and we will have to fight her, and we cannot fight without kerosene and without oil. If you sell us Kamchatka, I guarantee you that the enthusiasm of the American people will be so great that we will recognise you. The election of a new president in March will give our party victory. If, however, you lease Kamchatka, then I declare that there will be no such enthusiasm.”{48} This is almost the literal content of his letter. Before us is completely naked imperialism, which does not even consider it necessary to clothe itself in anything, thinking that it is magnificent as it is. When such a letter was received, we said to ourselves: we must grab hold of it with both hands. That he is economically right is proved by the fact that the Republican Party in America is on the eve of victory. For the first time in the history of America, people in the South were found who voted against the Democrats. So it is clear that before us is an economically correct argument of an imperialist. Kamchatka belonged to the former Russian Empire. That is true. To whom it belongs at present is unknown. It seems to be the property of a state called the Far Eastern Republic, but the very boundaries of this state are not precisely established.{49} True, some documents on this subject are being written, but, firstly, they are not yet written, and secondly, they are not yet approved. In the Far East, Japan dominates, which can do whatever it wants there. If we give Kamchatka, which legally belongs to us, but is actually seized by Japan, to America, it is clear that we will gain. That is the basis of my political reasoning, and, relying on it, we immediately decided to conclude a treaty with America without fail. Of course, we must bargain, because no merchant will respect us if we do not bargain. Therefore, Comrade Rykov began to bargain, and we wrote a draft treaty. But when it came to signing, we declared: “Everyone knows who we are, but who are you?” It turned out that Vanderlip could not give us a guarantee, then we said that we are accommodating. After all, this is only a draft, and you yourself said that it will come into force when your party gains the upper hand, and it has not yet gained the upper hand, and therefore we will wait. And this is what happened: we wrote a draft treaty, which has not yet been signed, which gives Kamchatka—a huge territory of the Far East and North-East Siberia—to the Americans for 60 years with the right to establish a naval port in that port which is open all year round, where there is oil and coal.

The draft treaty does not oblige us to anything; we can say at any moment that there are ambiguities and refuse. In that case, we will only lose time talking with Vanderlip and a small amount of paper, but we have already gained. It is enough to take the European reports to see that we have gained. From Japan there is not a single piece of news that does not speak of the greatest anxiety over the expected concessions. Japan declares: “We will not tolerate this, it violates our interests.”—Please, defeat America, we will not object to that. We have already set Japan against America, to put it crudely, and thereby achieved an advantage. We have also gained in relation to the Americans.

Who is Vanderlip? We have not established who, but in the capitalist world it is proved—telegrams are not sent all over the world about ordinary citizens. And when he left us, telegrams poured in from all over the world. So he told that he had obtained a profitable concession, and began to praise Lenin everywhere. This is humorous in nature, but allow me to say that in this humour there is a bit of politics. Vanderlip, when he finished all the talks here, wished to have a meeting with me. I consulted with representatives of the relevant departments and asked whether I should receive him. They say: “Let him go away more satisfied.” Vanderlip comes, we talk about all these matters, and when he began to tell that he had been in Siberia, that he knew Siberia, that he came from workers, like most American multi-millionaires, etc., that they value only the practical, that they, when they look, only then value—I answered him: “Here you are, practical people, look at what the Soviet system is, and introduce it in your country.” He looked at me, surprised at this turn of the conversation, and said to me in Russian (the whole conversation was in English): “Perhaps.” I ask with surprise, where does this knowledge of the Russian language come from. “Why, I travelled a large part of the Siberian regions on horseback at the age of 25.” And from the realm of humour I will also cite Vanderlip’s remark. When we began to say goodbye, he says: “I will have to say in America that Mr. Lenin (Mr. in Russian is ‘gospodin’), that Mr. Lenin has no horns.” I did not understand immediately, as I generally understand English poorly. “What did you say? Repeat.” He—a lively old man, gestures to his temples and says: “No horns.” The interpreter was there, says: “Yes, exactly that.” In America everyone is sure that there must be horns here, i.e., the whole bourgeoisie says that I am marked by the devil. “And now I will have to say that there are no horns,” said Vanderlip. We parted very courteously. I expressed the hope that on the basis of friendly relations between the two states, not only would a concession be concluded, but mutual economic assistance would develop normally. Everything in that tone. And then came telegrams about the stories of Vanderlip, who had arrived from abroad. Vanderlip compared Lenin with Washington and Lincoln. Vanderlip asked me for a portrait with an inscription. I declined, because when you give a portrait, you write: “To Comrade So-and-So,” and you cannot write “To Comrade Vanderlip.” To write to that Vanderlip with whom we are concluding a concession is also impossible, because the concession will be concluded by the government when it comes into force. How to write—I do not know. To give my portrait to a known imperialist would be illogical. Nevertheless, such telegrams came: from this it is clear that in imperialist politics this whole story played a certain role. Harding—the person who was elected president, but who will take office only in March of next year—when news of the Vanderlip concessions appeared, issued an official denial that “I know nothing, I am not in communication with the Bolsheviks, I have heard nothing about any concessions.” This was during the elections, and during the elections to admit that you have dealings with the Bolsheviks might, goodness knows, lose you votes. Therefore, he officially denied it. They sent these reports to all the newspapers which attack the Bolsheviks; they are entirely in the pay of the imperialist parties. The political advantages from the side of America and Japan are absolutely clear to us. This report is important because it shows concretely what concessions, on what terms we want to conclude. Of course, this cannot be told in the press. This can only be told at a Party meeting: in the press we should not conceal this deal, it is advantageous, we should not say a single word that would hinder the conclusion of such a deal, for it means a huge advantage for us and a weakening of both American and Japanese imperialism in relation to us.

This whole deal means diverting imperialist forces from us—while the imperialists sit and sigh and wait for the opportune moment to strangle the Bolsheviks, we are postponing that moment. When Japan was being drawn into the Korean adventure, the Japanese said to the Americans: “Of course, we can defeat the Bolsheviks, but what will you give us for that? China? We will take it anyway, and here we are to go ten thousand versts to beat the Bolsheviks, while the Americans are in our rear. No, politics is not conducted that way.” Even then the Japanese would have defeated us in a few weeks if there had been a double-track railway and American transport assistance. We were saved by the fact that Japan, while gobbling up China, could not move westwards, across the whole of Siberia, with America in her rear, and did not want to pull chestnuts out of the fire for America.

We would be saved even more if the imperialist powers found themselves at war. If we are forced to tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalist thieves, each of whom is sharpening a knife against us, our direct duty is to turn these knives against each other. When two thieves fight, honest people gain. The other advantage is purely political: even if this concession does not materialise, the mere draft of a concession will bring advantage. The economic advantage: it will give part of the products. If the Americans began to receive part of the products, that would be advantageous. In Kamchatka there is such an amount of oil and ore that we are certainly unable to develop.

I have pointed out to you one imperialist contradiction which we are obliged to utilise, that between Japan and America; another is between America and the rest of the capitalist world. Almost the entire capitalist world of the “victors” emerged from the war with gigantic profits. America is strong, everyone now owes her, everything depends on her, she is more and more hated, she robs everyone, and she robs in a very original way. She has no colonies. England emerged from the war with gigantic colonies, France too. England offered America a mandate over one of the plundered colonies—they now speak in such language—but she did not take it. Obviously, the American merchants reason somehow differently. They saw that the war, both in relation to ruin and in relation to the mood of the workers, plays a very definite role, and came to the conclusion that it was not profitable for them to accept a mandate. But it is clear that they will not allow this colony to be used by other states. All bourgeois literature testifies to the growth of hatred against America, and in America voices are growing for entering into an agreement with Russia. America had a treaty with Kolchak about recognising Kolchak and supporting him, but here they already got their fingers burnt once and only got loss and disgrace. Thus, we have before us the greatest state in the world, which by 1923 will have a fleet stronger than the English, but this state meets with ever-increasing hatred from other capitalist countries. We must take this trend of circumstances into account. America cannot come to terms with the rest of Europe—that is a fact proved by history. No one has described the Versailles Treaty as well as Keynes, the English representative at Versailles, did in his book. In this book he ridiculed Wilson and the role he played in the Versailles Treaty. Wilson there turned out to be a complete fool, whom Clemenceau and Lloyd George twisted like a pawn. Thus, everything indicates that America cannot come to terms with other countries, because there is the deepest economic discord between them, because America is richer than the others.

Therefore, we will consider all questions of concessions from this angle: the slightest possibility of increasing the discord between America and the rest of the capitalist world—grab hold of it with both hands. America inevitably stands in contradiction with the colonies, and if she tries to touch them more deeply, she will help us tenfold. In the colonies, indignation is seething, and when you touch them, whether you want to or not, whether you are rich or not—and the richer you are, the better—but you will help us, and the Messrs. Vanderlips will fly. That is why this discord is the fundamental consideration for us.

And we have a third discord between the Entente and Germany. Germany is defeated, crushed by the Versailles Treaty, but she possesses gigantic economic possibilities. Germany is the second country in the world in terms of the degree of economic development, if America is considered the first. Specialists even say that in the electrical industry she is higher than America, and you know that the electrical industry has gigantic importance. In the breadth of application of electricity, America is higher, but in technical perfection, Germany stands higher. And such a country has been saddled with the Versailles Treaty, which she cannot live with. Germany, one of the strongest, most advanced capitalist countries, cannot bear the Versailles Treaty, and Germany must seek an ally against world imperialism, being herself imperialist, but crushed. That is the situation we must utilise. Everything that increases the antagonism between America and the rest of the Entente, between the whole Entente and Germany, we must utilise from the point of view of concessions. Therefore, we must try to lure them; therefore, the brochure which Milyutin promised to bring and which he has brought and will circulate, contains decrees of the Council of People’s Commissars, written so as to lure the present objects of concessions.{50} Maps with explanations are appended to this book. We will translate this book into all languages and push it in every way, with the calculation of specially attracting Germany against England, because for Germany a concession will be a means of salvation. America—against Japan, the whole Entente—against America, the whole of Germany—against the Entente.

These are the three intertwinings that hopelessly confuse the whole game of the imperialists. That is the whole point. And that is why, from the political point of view, one must be with all one’s soul—or one does not need a soul—but with all one’s calculation, one must be for concessions.

Now I pass to economics. When we touched upon Germany, we have already approached economics. Germany cannot exist economically after the Versailles peace, and not only Germany alone, but all the defeated countries, like Austria-Hungary in its former dimensions, although part of it has passed into the victorious states, but it cannot exist under the Versailles Treaty. In Central Europe this is the largest association with gigantic economic and technical power. From the economic point of view, they are all necessary for the restoration of the world economy. If you read carefully and re-read the decree of November 23 on concessions, you will see that we emphasise the importance of the world economy and do so deliberately. This is an indisputably correct point of view. For the restoration of the world economy, Russian raw materials must be used. It is impossible to do without this use; this is economically correct. This is recognised by the purest bourgeois who studies economics and looks from a purely bourgeois point of view; this is recognised by Keynes, who wrote the book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace.” And Vanderlip, who travelled all over Europe as a financial magnate, also recognises that it is impossible to revive the economy because there turned out to be too little raw material in the whole world, since the war had plundered it. He says that we must rely on Russia. And now Russia appears before the whole world, she declares: we undertake to restore the international economy—here is our plan. This is economically correct. The Soviet power has grown stronger during this time, and not only has it grown stronger itself, but it comes forward with a plan for restoring the entire world economy. The connection of the international economy with the plan of electrification is scientifically correctly established. With our plan we will certainly attract not only the sympathy of all workers, but also of sensible capitalists, regardless of the fact that for them “these terrible Bolshevik terrorists,” etc.; therefore our economic plan is correct, and all the petty-bourgeois democracy, reading this plan, will waver towards us, because the imperialists have already fought each other, and here a plan is put forward against which technicians and economists can say nothing. We pass to the realm of economics and offer a positive programme of construction before the whole world, develop those perspectives which are built on economic foundations and which Russia regards not as a selfish centre destroying all other economies, the economies of other countries, as was the case before, but Russia which offers to restore economies from the point of view of the whole world.

We transfer the question to an anti-capitalist plane. We come forward and say—we undertake to build the whole world on rational economic foundations, and that this is correct—there is no doubt. There is no doubt that if we set to work properly with modern machines, with the help of science, we can immediately restore the entire world economy.

Here we are carrying out a kind of production propaganda when we say to the masters: “You are good for nothing, gentlemen capitalists; while you are ruining yourselves, we are building in our own way, so isn’t it time, gentlemen, to agree with us.” To which all the capitalists of the world must answer, though scratching themselves: “Well, perhaps it is time, let’s sign a trade treaty.”

The English have already written one draft and sent it to us.{51} It is being discussed, and here a new era begins. They have already failed in war and must now fight in the economic sphere. This is quite understandable to us. We never dreamed that—we have fought, and peace will come, and the socialist calf will embrace the capitalist wolf. No. The fact that you have to fight us in the economic sphere is a huge progress. We have put before you a world programme, considering concessions from the point of view of the world national economy. This is economically indisputable. Not a single engineer, not a single agronomist, raising the question of the national economy, will be able to reject this. And many capitalists say: “Without Russia there will be no stable system of capitalist states,” but we come forward with such a programme as builders of the world economy according to a different plan. This has enormous propagandist significance. Even if not a single concession is given to us—I consider this quite possible—even if from all this noise about concessions there results only a certain number of Party meetings, decrees, but not a single concession results, we will still have gained something. Not to mention the fact that we have put forward a plan for building the economy, we are attracting to our side all the states that have been ruined by the war. At the Third Congress of the Communist International I said that the whole world is divided into oppressed nations and ruling nations.[3] The oppressed nations constitute no less than 70 per cent of the entire population of the earth. The Versailles peace added a hundred or 150 million people to them.

We now really come forward not only as representatives of the proletarians of all countries, but also as representatives of the oppressed peoples. Recently a journal of the Communist International appeared under the title “The Peoples of the East.”{52} The Communist International issued for the peoples of the East such a slogan: “Workers of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!” Someone among the comrades asked: “When did the Executive Committee order the slogans to be changed?” I really cannot recall that. Of course, from the point of view of the “Communist Manifesto” this is incorrect, but the “Communist Manifesto” was written under completely different conditions, but from the point of view of present-day politics it is correct. Relations have become acute. All Germany is seething, all Asia is seething. You have read how the revolutionary movement is taking shape in India. In China there is a furious hatred of the Japanese, the same of the Americans. In Germany there is such a seething hatred of the Entente, which will be understandable only if you look at the hatred of the German workers for their capitalists; they have made Russia, as a result, the direct representative of the entire mass of the oppressed population of the earth; the peoples are being taught by the course of events to look upon Russia as a centre of attraction. Recently a Menshevik newspaper in Georgia wrote: “There are two forces on earth: the Entente and Soviet Russia.” What are the Mensheviks? They are people who keep their nose to the wind. When we were weak internationally, they shouted: “Down with the Bolsheviks.” When we began to grow stronger, they shouted: “We are neutral.” When we repulsed our enemies, they say: “Yes, there are two forces here.”

In the decree on concessions we come forward in the name of all humanity with an economically impeccable programme for restoring the economic forces of the world on the basis of utilising all raw materials, wherever they may be. It is important for us that there should be no hunger anywhere. You, capitalists, do not know how to eliminate it, but we do. We come forward as representatives of 70 per cent of the earth’s population. This will have its effect. However the matter with the draft may turn out, it remains economically indisputable. The economic side of the concession has significance regardless of whether it is concluded or not.

I pass to the next point. The concession creates new dangers. I point to what I said at the beginning of my speech, namely, that a cry is heard from below, from the working masses: “Do not give in to the capitalists, they are a clever, cunning lot.” It is pleasant to hear this, because you see a huge mass growing which will fight the capitalists tooth and nail. In the articles of Comrade Stepanov, which he calculated pedagogically (first I will give all the arguments against concessions, and then say that they must be accepted, but some readers, before they get to the good part, might stop reading, convinced that concessions are not needed), there are correct thoughts, but when he says that concessions should not be given to England because Lockhart will come, I disagree. We dealt with him then when the Cheka was an emerging institution, not having the solidity it now has. And if after three years of war we cannot catch spies, then we must say that such people should not undertake to govern the state. We are solving immeasurably more difficult tasks. For example, now in the Crimea there are 300,000 bourgeoisie. This is a source of future speculation, espionage, all kinds of help to the capitalists. But we are not afraid of them. We say that we will take them, distribute them, subdue them, digest them.

To say after this that foreigners who will be attached to certain concessions are dangerous to us, or that we will not be able to keep an eye on them, is ridiculous. There was no need to start all this, no need to undertake to govern the state. Here is a purely organisational task, on which it is not worth dwelling long.

But, of course, it would be the greatest mistake to think that concessions mean peace. Nothing of the kind. Concessions are nothing but a new form of war. Europe has been at war with us, and now the war is passing into a new plane. Previously the war was waged in the sphere in which the imperialists were infinitely stronger, in the military sphere. If you count the number of guns, machine-guns they have and we have, the number of soldiers our government and theirs can mobilise—we would certainly have been crushed in two weeks. However, we held out in this sphere, and we undertake to fight further, passing to economic war. We definitely say that next to the concession piece, the concession square, there will be our square, then again their square; we will learn from them how to set up model enterprises, placing our own alongside. If we cannot do this, then there is nothing to talk about. Equipment according to the latest word of technology at the present moment is not an easy task, and we must learn this, learn in practice, because no schools, universities, courses can achieve this, and therefore we give concessions in a chessboard pattern: come and learn right here.

Economically, concessions are of gigantic benefit to us. Of course, by creating settlements, they will bring with them capitalist habits, they will demoralise the peasantry