V. I. Lenin

Report On The Work Of The All-Russia Central Executive Committee And The Council Of People’s Commissars Delivered At The First Session Of The All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation [1]

February 2, 1920

Comrades, my report on the activities of the
Council of People’s Commissars and the All-Russia Central
Executive Committee, whose functions in periods between meetings
have been carried out by the Presidium of the All-Russia Central
Executive Committee, falls naturally into two main subdivisions—the first on foreign policy, the Soviet
Republic’s international position, and the second on internal development and our main economic tasks. Allow *me to
present to you in that order the main facts of our work during the
period under review, i.e., during the past two months.

As far as the Soviet Republic’s international position is
concerned, it has been determined in the main by the successes of
the Red Army. As you know, the last remnants of Kolchak’s
army in the Far East have been almost wiped out, while the rivalry
and enmity between Japan and America, nominally allies, are
becoming more and more obvious and prevent them from fully
developing their onslaught against the Soviet. Republic. After the
annihilation of Yudenich’s troops and after the capture, in
the South, of Novocherkassk and Rostov-on-Don in early January,
their main forces suffered so decisive a blow that the Soviet
Republic’s military position radically changed, and although
the war was not over, every country saw clearly that its former
hopes of crushing the military forces of the Soviet Republic had
collapsed.

Acknowledgement of this radical change in the Soviet
Republic’s international position was shown by the wireless
message to us (not delivered officially) of the decision of the
Allied Council adopted on January 16 to lift the blockade against
the Soviet Republic. The main section of the decision taken by the Council says... (reads). [2]

There is no need for me to criticise the diplomacy contained in
this formulation; it i so striking that it is not worth wasting
time saying that the attitude of the Allies to Russia remains
unchanged. If that is how the Allies understand their policy—that the lifting of the blockade does not change
it—then it shows how unsound their policy is. The importance
of this decision for us, however, is in its economic, not its
political, aspect. Lifting the blockade is a fact of major
international significance showing that a new stage in the
socialist revolution has begun. For the blockade was in fact the
principal, really strong weapon with which the imperialists of the
world wanted to strangle Soviet Russia.

At the last Congress of Soviets I had occasion to state and
expand the idea that the struggle against Soviet Russia had
resulted, not only in the workers and peasants of France, Britain
and other advanced countries forcing the imperialists to renounce
the struggle, but in the mass of the petty. bourgeoisie within
these countries becoming opponents of the blockade. And of course,
this opposition by the middle sections of the population in
countries like Britain and France was bound to influence
international imperialist policy. Knowing their brand of
diplomacy, we cannot expect them to act in a straightforward
manner, without any reservations, without wanting to restore the
past, or by some cunning trick or other return to their previous
policy, which they cannot pursue openly at the moment. It must be
said, however, that on the whole we have gained tremendous
victories, that we have even been able to deprive the Allies of a
weapon which only they possessed—the navy, despite the fact
that waverers tried to scare us by saying the navy was invincible. Nevertheless, the development of political relations
showed that even this invincible navy was in no fit state to fight
us. We, who were unable to put up any naval resistance, forced the
imperialist powers to abandon this weapon.

Of course, this change in policy on the international scene
does not have an immediate effect, but the fact remains that we
have now entered the sphere of world-wide international relations,
and this enables us to get support from the more advanced
countries. It is true that economically and financially these
countries are in a sorry plight, they are all going downhill, and
we cannot expect much from them; but with the opportunity to
develop our own industry, we can count on receiving machinery for
production, machinery for the restoration of our industry. And
above all, that which had cut us off completely, by means of the
blockade, from the advanced countries, has been broken down.

After the Allied Council had been forced to abandon this weapon
our victories in the field of international politics continued,
the greatest of them being that we succeeded in concluding peace
with Estonia. We received a communication from Joffe and Gukovsky
today saying: “Today, February 2, at 2 a.m. Moscow time,
peace was concluded between Russia and Estonia. The Estonian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Birk, arrived from Revel to sign the
document.”

Comrades, the text of this peace document which was discussed
at great length and is of tremendous importance has been sent by
messenger who should arrive tomorrow morning, but we have now
received the exact text by telegraph, and it will be distributed
tomorrow. It will be discussed and ratified. This document is of
the highest importance to us. The peace treaty between Russia and
Estonia is of epoch-making significance. We have succeeded in
concluding a peace treaty with a government which is also becoming
democratic and whose relations with us will now be stable, but
which up to now has been supported by the whole imperialist
world. Therefore we must regard this as an act of tremendous
historical importance.

We know that people who stand between imperialism and democracy
usually go over to one side or the other. So you see, we have
undoubtedly gained a victory, because peace has been concluded,
and this government must now proceed against our enemy. The
theoretical significance of this fact is that in the imperialist
epoch the whole world is split into a vast number of big and small
states, the small states being absolutely helpless, an insignificant group compared to the rich powers which completely
dominate a number of small, weak states. Imperialism is the epoch
in which the division of the whole world takes place, when the
whole of the world’s population is divided into a minority
of exploiting, oppressor countries, and a majority of countries
with small, weak populations that exist in a state of colonial
dependence on the minority.

When we won peace with Estonia we proved that we were able to
go forward as a proletarian and communist state. How have we done
this? We have shown all the belligerent Entente powers who are
opposed to peace that the sympathy we are able to evoke among our
opponents and bourgeois governments, the sympathy of a small
country, is more powerful than all that military oppression, all
that financial aid and all those economic ties which link that
small country to the powerful world states. The Entente has seen
that it is not only when we use force that we are able to win; we
are in a position to refute the lie and slander spread against us
by the bourgeois governments of the world when they say the
Bolsheviks retain power by force alone. What was it that enabled
us to prevail over the combined forces of world imperialism in
regard to Estonia, a country which had always suffered violence at
the hands of the Russia of the tsars and landowners? It was our
proving our ability to renounce, in all sincerity, the use of
force at the appropriate moment, in order to change to a peace
policy, and so win the sympathy of the bourgeois government of a
small country, regardless of all the support given it by
international capital. This is a fact of historical significance. Estonia is a small country, a small republic, but
she is oppressed economically and militarily in a thousand and one
ways by world imperialist capital, so much so that her entire
population comes under this oppression. And this peace now proves
that we can, in spite of our exhaustion, weakness and disarray,
gain the upper hand over the whiteguard army with its imperialist
backing. The powerful Entente knows how to reply to force with
even more triumpliant force, but this peace proves that we do not
have to resort to force to win the sympathy and support of the
bourgeoisie.

A most difficult international problem has arisen here. The
rate of capitalist development in different countries varies; this
development takes place under different conditions, in various
ways and by various means. A socialist republic in one country
exists alongside all the capitalist countries of the world and
causes their bourgeoisie to waver. From this they concluded that
our position was a hopeless one; we had defeated the whiteguards
by force, but what, they asked, were we going to do about the rest
of the world? We shall defeat that too. The peace with Estonia
proves that this is no empty phrase. The entire pressure of
international capital was overcome in that area where our
rejection of the use of force was recognised to be sincere. “Don’t make peace with the Bolsheviks,
otherwise we shall conquer you by starvation; we shall give you
neither financial nor economic aid,” said world capital, And
Estonia proved to be one of the small, formally independent
countries which said to herself, “We rely more on the fact
that the Bolsheviks are able to live in peace with other, weaker
nations, even with a bourgeois government, than we do on the whole
powerful democratic countries of the Entente.”

Democracy is most clearly manifested in the fundamental
question of war and peace. All the powers are preparing a fresh
imperialist war, and this is seen daily by the workers of the
world. Any day now America and Japan will hurl themselves at each
other; Britain grabbed so many colonies after her victory over
Germany that the other imperialist powers will never resign
themselves to this. A new fanatical war is being prepared, and the
people are aware of this. And just at this moment Russia, with her
huge forces, who is accused of intending to fling those forces
against a small state as soon as she has finished with Yudenich,
Kolchak and Denikin—Russia has concluded a democratic peace
with Estonia. Furthermore, the terms of the peace treaty provide
for a number of territorial concessions on our part which do not
completely correspond to the strict observance of the principle of
self-determination of nations, and prove in practice that the
question of frontiers is of secondary importance to us; the
question of peaceful relations, however, the question of our
ability to await the development of the conditions of life of each
nation, is not only an important question of principle, it is also
a matter in which we have succeeded in winning the confidence of
nations hostile to us. It is no accident that we have achieved
this in relation to Estonia; it is evidence that the weak
proletarian republic, existing in isolation and apparently
helpless, has begun to win to its side countries dependent on the
imperialist states—and they constitute the vast majority. That is why our peace with Estonia is of such great
historical significance. No matter how the Entente strives to
start a war—even if it succeeds in turning peace once again
into war—the fact will remain, firmly established in history, that despite all the pressure of international capital we
were able to inspire greater confidence in a small country ruled
by the bourgeoisie than the so-called democratic, but in reality
predatory, imperialist bourgeoisie.

We by chance came to possess some very interesting documents
showing how our policy compared with that of the allegedly
democratic, but in actual fact predatory, powers of the whole
world, which please permit me to read to you. These documents were
furnished by a whiteguard officer or official named Oleinikov who
was commissioned by one whiteguard government to hand over some
highly important documents to another. But he handed them over to
its instead. [3] (Applause.) It proved possible to send these documents to Russia, and I shall read them to you,
although it will take some time to do so. Nevertheless, they are
very interesting for they very clearly reveal the hidden springs
of policy. The first document is a telegram to Minister Gulkevich
from Sazonov:

Paris, October 14, 1919, No. 668.

S. D. Saonov conveys his respects to Konstantin Nikolayevich,
and has the honour to enclose for his information copies of a
telegram from B. A. Bakhmetev, No. 1050, and a telegram from
I. I. Sukin, No. 23, on the situation in the Baltic Provinces.

Then comes a more interesting document—a telegram from
Washington dated October 12:

Received October 12, 1919. File No. 3346.

Bakhmetev to the Minister.

Washington, October 11, 1919, No. 1050.

Further to my telegram No. 1045.

(In code) The State Department acquainted me verbally with the
instructions given to Gade. He is appointed the Commissar of the
American Government in the Baltic Provinces of Russia. He is not
accredited to any Russian Government. His mission is to observe
and inform. His behaviour must not lead the local population to
expect that the American Government could agree to support
separatist trends going beyond autonomy. On the contrary, the
American Government trusts that the population of the Baltic
Provinces will help their Russian brothers in their work of
general state importance. The instructions are based on the
interpretation of the agreement of the Allied governments with
the Supreme Ruler as outlined in my memorandum of June 17 to the
government. Gade has been given extracts from the recent
speeches of the President in which he fulminates against
Bolshevism.

So, the American Government intimates that its representative
can issue any kind of instructions but may not support independence, i.e., may not guarantee the independence of these
states. This is what directly or indirectly came to light, and
Estonia could not be kept in ignorance of the fact that she was
being deceived by the Great Powers. Of course, everyone could have
guessed this, but now we have the documents and they will be
published:

Received October 12, 1919. File No, 3347

Sukin to the Minister.

Omsk, October 9, 1919, No. 28.

(In code) Knox has given the Supreme Ruler the message of the
British War Office in which the latter warns of the inclination
of the Baltic states to conclude a peace with the Bolsheviks who
guarantee them immediate recognition of their independence. At
the same time the British War Office raises the question of the
advisability of paralysing this pledge by satisfying, in its
turn, the wishes of the states indicated. We replied to Knox by
referring to the principles outlined in the Note of the Supreme
Ruler to the Powers on June 4, and, in addition, we pointed out
that the conclusion of a peace between the Baltic states and the
Bolsheviks would be undoubtedly fraught with danger since this
would permit the release of part of the Soviet forces and would
clear the way to the infiltration of Bolshevism in the West. The
mere fact that they are ready to talk peace is in our opinion
evidence of the utter demoralisation of the parties of these
self-governing entities which cannot protect themselves from the
penetration of aggressive Bolshevism.

Expressing the conviction that the Powers could not approve of the further
spread of Bolshevism, we pointed to the necessity of withdrawing
all aid from the Baltic states since this would be a real means
of exerting influence by the Powers, and is more advisable than
competition in promises with the Bolsheviks, who now have
nothing to lose.

In transmitting the above, I would request you to make similar representations in Paris and London; we are
making a special approach to Bakhmetev.

Received October 9, 1910. File No. 3286, Sablin to the Minister.

London, October 7, 1919, No. 677.

(In code) In a letter to Guchkov, the Director of Military
Operations of the War Office, to whom Guchkov made an offer of
our shipping in order to facilitate the delivery of supplies to
Yudenich by the British, states that in the opinion of the War
Office Yudenic.h has all that he requires at the moment, and
that Britain is experiencing some difficulty in providing
further supplies. He adds, however, that as we have shipping, we
could arrange supplies for Yudenich on a commercial basis,
providing we obtain credits. At the same time General Radcliffe
admits that Yudenich’s army must be properly equipped since it is “the only force among the Baltic states able
to engage in active operations against the
Bolsheviks”.

Minister to Bakhmetev in Washington.

Paris, September 30, 1919, No. 2442.

(In code) From a strictly confidential Swedish source I learn
that the American envoy in Stockholm. Morris, is talking about
growing sympathy in America towards the Bolsheviks and of
intentions to cease aid to Kolchak in order to enter into
contacts with Moscow in the interests of American trade. Such
statements on the part of an official representative make a
strange impression.

Received October 5, 1919. File No. 3244

Bakhmetev to the Minister.

Washington, October 4, 1919, No. 1021.

Further to your telegram No. 2442.

(In code) The State Department informed me in confidence that it
is true that the envoy in Stockholm, Morris, and particularly
Hapgood in Copenhagen, are well known for their Left sympathies,
but that they have no influence or authority here, and that the
government is obliged to admonish them from time to time,
categorically pointing out that American policy is one of
undeviating support of our government in the struggle against
the Bolsheviks.

Here are all the documents which we shall publish and which
clearly show how the battle went on around Estonia, how the
Entente, Britain and France, together with Kolchak and America,
all brought pressure to hear on Estonia with the one aim of
preventing the signing of a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, and
how the Bolsheviks, pledging themselves to territorial concessions
and guaranteeing independence, won this trial of strength. I state
that this victory is of gigantic historical significance, because
it has been gained without the use of force. This victory over
world imperialism is a victory that is bringing the Bolsheviks the
sympathy of the whole world. This victory by no means denotes that
universal peace will be concluded immediately; but it does show
that we represent the peace interests of the majority of the
world’s population against the imperialist war-mongers. Such
an assessment of the situation has induced bourgeois Estonia, an
opponent of communism, to conclude peace with us. Since we, a
proletarian state, a Soviet republic, are concluding a peace
treaty, since we are acting in a spirit of peace towards bourgeois
governments oppressed by the great magnates of imperialism, we
must be able to decide from this how our international policy is
to be shaped.

The main task we set ourselves is to defeat the exploiters and
to win to our side the waverers—this is a task of historic
significance. Among the waverers are a whole number of bourgeois
states which, as bourgeois states, detest us, but which, on the
other hand, as oppressed states, prefer peace with us. This
explains the peace with Estonia. This peace is, of course, only a
first step, and its influence will only be felt in the future, but
that it will be felt is a fact. Up to now we have negotiated with
Latvia only through the Red Cross, [4] and the same is true
of our negotiations with the Polish Government. I repeat—the
peace with Estonia is bound to influence events because the basis
is identical; the same attempts are being made to goad Latvia and
Poland into making war on Russia as were made in the case of
Estonia. Perhaps these attempts will prove successful, and since
war with Poland is possible, we must be vigilant, but we are
certain—this has been demonstrated by our main achievements—that we can conclude peace and make concessions
which permit the development of any form of democracy. This is now
especially important because the Polish question is particularly
acute. We have received a number of communications indicating that
apart from bourgeois, conservative, landowning Poland, apart from
the pressure being exerted by all capitalist parties in Poland,
all the Entente powers are doing their utmost to incite Poland to
make war against us.

As you know, the Council of People’s Commissars has issued an appeal to the working people of Poland. [5] We are
going to ask you to endorse this appeal as a means of fighting
that campaign of calumny in which Polish landowning circles are
engaged. We shall submit an additional text of an appeal to the
working people of Poland. This appeal will be a blow to the
imperialist powers, who are doing their utmost to incite Poland
against us; for us the interests of the majority of the people
take first place.

I shall now acquaint you with a telegram intercepted by us
yesterday, which illustrates the attempts of American capital to
present us in a certain light and thereby drag us into a war with
Poland. The telegram says (reads). I have said and heard
nothing of the sort, but they are able to lie because it is not
for nothing that they spend their money on spreading lying rumours
that have a definite aim. Their bourgeois government guarantees
them this. (Continues reading the telegram.) This telegram was sent from Europe to America and was paid for out of
capitalist funds; it serves as a shameless means of provoking a
war with Poland. American capital is doing its utmost to bring
pressure to bear on Poland and does this unashamedly, making it
appear that the Bolsheviks want to finish with Kolchak and Denikin
in order to throw all their “iron troops” against
Poland.

It is important that we should here and now endorse the
decision of the Council of People’s Commissars, and then we
must do what we did previously in relation to other states, and
also what we did in regard to the troops of Kolchak and
Denikin. We must immediately appeal to the Polish people and
explain the real state of affairs. We know full well that this
method of ours has a most positive effect in tending to disrupt
the ranks of our enemy. And in the end, this method will lead on
to the path we need, the path on to which it has led the working
population of all countries. This policy must make a definite
beginning—no matter how difficult this may prove—and once a beginning is made, we shall carry it through to
completion.

I must mention that we have been pursuing the same policy in
respect of all other countries. We invited Georgia and Azerbaijan
to conclude an agreement against Denikin. They refused, pleading
non-interference in the affairs of other countries. We shall see
how the workers and peasants of Georgia and Azerbaijan regard
this.

This policy has been applied even more cautiously in respect of
the Western nations than in dealing with the nations of Russia. It
involved such countries as Latvia, Estonia, Poland and, on the
other hand, a number of Eastern countries whose developmental
level is the same as that of most of those colonial countries
which constitute the majority of the world’s population. They are kept down by Britain, who continues to hold
colonial slaves under her sway. Our policy in relation to
West-European countries has been very cautious—it will take
some time for them to get over their own Kerensky period—but
our policy in the East must be even more cautious and patient, for
here we are dealing with countries that are much more backward,
are under the oppressive influence of religious fanaticism, are
imbued with greater distrust of the Russian people, and for
decades and centuries were oppressed by the tsarist government’s capitalist and imperialist policy, by the
policy conducted towards these nations by Russia as the dominant
nation.

We have granted autonomy to the Bashkir Republic. [6]

We must found an autonomous Tatar Republic. [7] We shall
continue the same policy in relation to all the Eastern peoples,
and say to ourselves that we, who are faced by a huge front of
imperialist powers, we, who are fighting imperialism, represent an
alliance that requires close military unity, and any attempt to
violate this unity we regard as absolutely impermissible, as a
betrayal of the struggle against international imperialism. However, in implementing this policy we must be even
more cautious. For if the European countries have to go through a
Kerensky period, in the countries that are at a lower developmental level there are even greater elements of distrust,
and it will require more time to influence them. We support the
independence and sovereignty of these countries. We appeal to
their working people. We say: unity of the military forces is
imperative; any deviation from this unity is impermissible.

We are confident that, by systematically pursuing our policy of
close alliance, we shall achieve greater success than before in
our relations with the peoples of the East. And our success is
already great. The Soviet Republic enjoys tremendous popularity
among all the Eastern peoples for the same reason that made it
possible for us to conclude a peace treaty with a small Western
state, because they see in us an unswerving fighter against
imperialism, because ours is the only republic which is waging a
war against imperialism and is capable of utilising every
situation without the use of force, and which is also able to gain
a victory by renouncing the use of force.

Needless to say, a far more perfected variety of this policy is
being implemented in relation to the Ukrainian Republic. Here the
problem has been simplified by the prior conclusion of an
agreement between the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and
the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet
Republic. [8] On the basis of this agreement, which implies a close federation of both republics in the struggle
against the imperialist countries, we are building an ever closer
alliance. As a result of their bitter experience of
Denikin’s rule, the mass of Ukrainian peasants and workers
are becoming convinced that only the closest alliance between the
Ukraine and the Russian Republic will be really invincible in the
face of international imperialism, and that at the time of
struggle against imperialism there is nothing to be gained by the
separation of the Ukrainian state, since imperialism will take
advantage of every division to crush Soviet power. Such a division
is criminal. Our policy is taking deep root in the Ukraine, and we
are confident that the forthcoming All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets
of Workers and Peasants will officially endorse this policy. These
are the few remarks to which I must limit myself on the question
of the international situation. I shall ask this session to
endorse all the practical proposals I have to make (I have
enumerated them) on behalf of the Council of People’s
Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

In passing on to the work of internal development I must first
deal with certain measures taken by our government, and then
proceed to the most important matter of all—the change-over
to a new course, the transition from military tasks to those of
state organisation.

In regard to our internal policy for the two months under
review, among the main measures which more or less stand out from
a number of current tasks, the following decision requiring the
endorsement of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee is of
particular importance. This is the decision to abolish the death
penalty. As you know, immediately after the main victory over
Denikin, after the capture of Rostov, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the
People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, who is in charge of
the Cheka, submitted a proposal to the Council of People’s
Commissars, and had it endorsed in his own department, that the
passing of all death sentences by the Cheka be abolished. When
bourgeois democracy in Europe does all in its power to spread the
lie that Soviet Russia is predominantly terrorist, when this lie
is spread about us by bourgeois democracy and by the socialists of
the Second International, when Kautsky writes a special book
entitled Terrorism and Communism in which he declares that communist power is based on terrorism, then you can well
imagine the kind of lies spread on this subject. In order to
refute this lie we have decided on the step taken by Comrade
Dzerzhuiisky, endorsed by the Council of People’s
Commissars, and which now needs the approval of the All-Russia
Central Executive Committee.

We were forced to use terror in response to the terror employed
by the Entente, when the mighty powers of the world flung their
hordes against us, stopping at nothing. We could not have lasted
two days had we not replied to these attempts of officers and
whiteguards in a merciless fashion. This meant the use of terror,
but this was forced on us by the terrorist methods of the
Entente. But as soon as we had gained, a decisive victory, even
before the end of the war, immediately after the capture of
Rostov, we renounced capital punishment, and have therefore proved
that we intend to carry out our own programme as we had
promied. We say that the use of violence arises from the need to
crush the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists.
When this is accomplished we shall renounce all extraordinary
measures. We have proved this in practice. And I think, I hope,
and I am confident that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee
will unanimously endorse this measure of the Council of
People’s Commissars and will implement it in such a way that
it will be impossible to apply the death penalty in
Russia. Needless to say, any attempt by the Entente to resume
methods of war will force us to reintroduce the former terror; we
know that we are living in a time of the law of the jungle, when
kind words are of no avail. This is what we had in mind, and as
soon as the decisive struggle was over, we immediately began to
abolish measures which all other powers apply without any time
limit having been set.

Further, I should like to refer to the discussion on
Workers’ Inspection. There is to be a special report on this
subject, and it would be wrong of me to dwell too long on it. The
most important problem confronting us here is that of drawing the
mass of people into administrative work. This is a more acute
problem than the task of large-scale development. You will be
presented with detailed plans, and when you have discussed and
amended them, you will understand that this development must
continue with far greater participation by the mass of the
workers. This is our main task, with which it is extremely
difficult to get to grips in the existing chaos, but nevertheless
we are approaching it steadily.

There is another question before us—the question of the
co-operatives. We have set ourselves the task of uniting the whole
population in co-operatives that differ from those previously
existing and which at best embraced only the upper sections of the
population.

Socialism would be impossible if it did not make use of the
technical knowledge, culture and the apparatus created by
bourgeois, capitalist civilisation. Part of this apparatus is the
co-operative movement whose growth is all the greater the higher
the level of capitalist development in a country. We have set our
co-operative movement the task of embracing the whole country. Up
to now the co-operative movement involved only top sections and
benefited those able to pay their dues. The working people,
however, were unable to make use of its services. We have resolutely broken
with this type of co-operative, but not so that the cooperative
movement as such is completely wiped out, for in March and April
1918 we set the co-operatives the task of drawing in the whole
population. If there are any co-operators who value the ideas of
the founders of the co-operative movement (the old aims of
co-operation were to satisfy the needs of the working people),
they will sympathise with this aim. We are certain that we have
the sympathy of the majority of the members of the co-operative
organisations, although we are by no means under the illusion that
we have won to our side the majority of the leaders, who subscribe
to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views, who see co-operation
merely as another form of capitalist economy and as the notorious
freedom of trade which means fortunes for the few and ruin for the
majority. Instead of this, we announced the country-wide task of
the co-operatives to really begin catering for the working people
so that they embrace the whole population. This could not be
accomplished at once. We have set ourselves this aim and have
worked systematically, and will go on working, to achieve it, so
that ultimately all the population will be united in cooperatives;
and we can say with certainty that the whole of the Soviet
Republic, perhaps in a few weeks, or in a few months, will become
one great co-operative of working people. After this the
development of independent activity by the working people, their
participation in state development will proceed along even broader
lines.

In accomplishing this, we have decided that all types, not only
consumers’, but producers’, credit, and other cooperatives should, by appropriate stages and with due care, be
amalgamated into a Central Union of Consumers’ Societies. We
are confident that our steps in this direction will meet with the
approval of the Central Executive Committee and functionaries in
the localities who, after the formal amalgamation of the
co-operatives, will, by their work of economic development, into
which they will draw the majority of the workers and peasants,
achieve what we regard as one of the major tasks—that of
making the co-operative movement another prime factor in the
struggle against red tape, this legacy from the old capitalist
state, a struggle which our programme also declares to be of the highest
importance. We shall carry on this struggle in all offices and
departments by every means and, incidentally, through the
amalgamation of the co-operatives and by shifting the appeal from
the bourgeois top people in the co-operatives to the genuine
working people, who must all undertake independent work in
co-operative organisation.

From among the problems of internal development I now wish to
refer to what has been done in the sphere of agriculture. In order
to place land tenure on a proper basis, the People’s
Commissar for Agriculture in July 1919 issued a circular on
measures against the frequent redistribution of allotted
land. This circular was published on July 1 in Izvestia
and was included in the Collection 0/ Statutes and Decrees of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government.
This circular is important because it meets the many suggestions
and demands of the peasants who pointed out that the frequent
reallotment of the land in conditions of small-scale farming
prevented better labour discipline and the higher productivity of
labour. This view is shared by the Council of People’s
Commissars which has instructed the Commissariat of Agriculture to
work out a draft decree on reallotment procedures. This draft will
be considered shortly. Similarly, the People’s Commissariat
of Agriculture has set itself the task of implementing a number of
urgent measures to restore livestock and farm equipment. In this
connection the systematic efforts of local officials themselves
are extremely important, and we hope that the members of the
All-Russia Central Executive Committee will bring the appropriate
pressure to bear on the authorities and render assistance, so that
these measures of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture
can be put into effect in the shortest space of time.

I shall now turn to the last, and in reality, the most important problem of our development—the problem of the
labour armies and the labour mobilisation of the population. The
most difficult task in the sharp turns and changes of social life
is that of taking due account of the peculiar features of each
transition. How socialists should fight within a capitalist
society is not a difficult problem and has long since been
settled. Nor is it difficult to visualise advanced socialist
society. This problem has also been settled. But the most
difficult task of all is how, in practice, to effect the
transition from the old, customary, familiar capitalism to the new
socialism, as yet unborn and without any firm foundations. At best
this transition will take many years, in the course of which our
policy will be divided into a number of even smaller stages. And
the whole difficulty of the task which falls to our lot, the whole
difficulty of politics and the art of politics, lies in the
ability to take into account the specific tasks of each of these
transitions.

We have only just solved—though not yet fully—the problem of the war in its principal and basic features. Our main
task was to repel at all costs the attack of the whiteguards. Everything for the war effort, we said, and this was
the correct policy. We are fully aware that it caused unparalleled
hardships in the rear such as cold, famine and devastation. But
the very fact that the Red Army which, incidentally, is
appreciated in the way shown by the examples I have read out to
you—has resolved this problem in a most backward country
proves that new forces do exist in the country. Otherwise the
creation of this model army, and its victory over far better
equipped armies, would have been inconceivable. But now we have
geared the entire state apparatus to this task and have succeeded
in surmounting the specific features of the problem—the
subordination of everything to the war effort—the situation
demands a swift and sharp change in policy. We have not yet
finished the war. We must maintain our military readiness intact,
we must destroy Denikin’s troops, we must show the landowners and capitalists of every country that if they want to
deal with Russia by war, they will meet the same fate as Kolchak
and Denikin. We must not take a single step, therefore, which
would weaken our military strength. At the same time, however, we
must switch the whole country on to a different course,
reconstruct its whole mechanism. We can no longer gear everything
to the war effort, and we have no need to, because in the main the
problem of the war has been solved.

The task of the transition from war to peaceful development
arises in such peculiar conditions that we cannot disband the
army, since we have to allow, say, for the possibility of an
attack by that selfsame Poland or any of the powers which the
Entente continues to incite against us. This specific feature of
the problem of not being able to reduce our military forces, yet
at the same time having to switch the whole of the Soviet state
machine which is geared to war on to the new course of peaceful
economic development, demands exceptional attention. It is the
type of problem that general formulas, the general provisions of a
programme, general communist principles cannot cope with, but
which requires that the specific features of the transition from
capitalism to communism be taken into consideration, the
transition from the position of a country whose whole attention
has been concentrated on the war, to the position of a country
which has won a decisive military victory and must go on to solve
economic questions by military methods, because the situation, as
you all realise, is extremely grave. The end of the winter will
bring, has already brought, the working people unbelievable
hardships—cold, famine, devastation. We must overcome this
at all costs. We know that we can do this. It has been proved by
the enthusiasm of the Red Army.

If, up to the present, we were able to battle on, surrounded on
all sides and cut off from the richest areas of grain and coal,
now that we possess a]! this, now that it is possible to solve the
problems of economic development jointly with the Ukraine, we can
solve the main problem—to acquire large quantities of grain
and foodstuffs, deliver them to the industrial centres so that
industrial development can begin. We must concentrate all our
efforts on this task. It is inadmissible to allow ourselves to be
diverted from it to any other practical task. It has to be solved
by military methods, with absolute ruthlessness and by the
absolute suppression of all other interests. We know that a whole
number of perfectly legitimate demands and interests will go by
the board, but if it were not for these sacrifices, we should not
have won the war. The situation now demands that we make a sharp
and, swift turn towards the creation of a basis for peaceful
economic development. This basis must be the acquisition of great
stocks of food and their transportation to the central region; it
is the task of the railways to deliver raw materials and
provisions. From August 1917 to August 1918 we collected 30
million poods of grain, in the second year 110 million,
and now in five months 90 million have been collected by our
Commissariat of Food, collected by socialist, not capitalist
methods, by compulsory delivery of grain by the peasants at fixed
prices, and not by selling on the free market—and this means
that we have found the way. We are certain that it is the correct
way and that it will enable us to achieve results which will
ensure tremendous economic development.

All our forces must be dedicated to this task, all our military
forces, which came to the fore in war-time organisation, must be
switched on to this new path. This is the specific situation, the
specific transition, which engendered the idea of labour armies
and led to the law on the creation of the first labour army in the
Urals and of the Ukrainian labour army. It was followed by the law
on the utilisation of the army reserves for civilian labour and
the decree issued by the Soviet government on the Committees for
Labour Conscription. [9] All these laws will be outlined to you
by a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in a
fully detailed report. I naturally cannot trespass on this ground
because the special report will throw sufficient light upon it. I
only emphasise its significance in relation to our general policy,
the significance of this transition which confronts us with its
specific tasks, for which we must redouble our efforts like
soldiers, to organise them so that we can lay in large stocks of
food and deliver them to the industrial centres. To achieve this
we must at all costs create labour armies, organise ourselves like
an army, reduce, even close down a whole number of institutions so
that in the next few months, no matter what happens, we can
overcome transport dislocation, and emerge from this desperate
situation of cold, famine and impoverishment brought by the end of
winter. We must and can get out of this situation. When the
All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorses all the measures
connected with labour conscription and the labour armies, when it
has succeeded in instilling these ideas in the broad mass of the
population and demands that they be put into practice by local
officials—we are absolutely convinced that then we shall be
able to cope with this most difficult of tasks, while not in the
least degree weakening our military readiness.

We must at all costs, without weakening our military readiness,
switch the Soviet Republic on to the new course of economic
development. This task must be accomplished in the next few weeks,
possibly months. Every Soviet or Party organisation must do
everything in its power to end the transport dislocation and
increase the grain stocks.

Then, and only then, shall we have a basis, a sound basis for
industrial development on a wide scale, for the electrification of
Russia. In order to prove to the population, and in particular to
the peasants, that our extensive plans in this field are not
fantasies, but are borne out by and based on technology and
science, I think we should adopt a resolution—1 hope the
Central Executive Committee will endorse it—recommending
that the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat of
Agriculture jointly draft a plan for the electrification of
Russia.

Thanks to the aid of the State Publishing House and the energy
of the workers at the former Kushnerev Printing Works, now the
17th State Printing Works, I succeeded in getting
Krzhizhanovsky’s pamphlet The Main Tasks of the Electrification of Russia published at very short notice, and
tomorrow it will be distributed to all members of the All-Russia
Central Executive Committee. This pamphlet of Comrade
Krzhizhanovsky’s, who works in the Electro Technical
Sub-Department of the Supreme Economic Council, summarises what
has already been achieved and raises questions, the popularisation
of which, not the practical application, is now one of the most
important tasks.

I hope that the Central Executive Committee will adopt this
resolution which, in the name of the Central Executive Committee,
instructs the Supreme Economic Council and the People’s
Commissariat of Agriculture to work out in the course of the next
few months—our practical tasks during this period will be
different—with the aid of scientists and engineers a broad
and complete plan for the electrification of Russia. The author of
this pamphlet is absolutely correct in choosing as its motto the
saying: “The age of steam is the age of the bourgeoisie, the
age of electricity is the age of socialism.” We must have a
new technical foundation for the new economic development. This
new technical foundation is electricity, and everything will have
to be built on this foundation, but it will take many long
years. We shall not be afraid of working ten or twenty years, but
we must prove to the peasants that in place of the old separation
of industry from agriculture, this very deep contradiction on
which capitalism thrived and which sowed dissension between the
industrial and agricultural workers, we set ourselves the task of
returning to the peasant the loan we received from him in the form
of grain, for we know that paper money, of course, is not the
equivalent of bread. We must repay this loan by organising
industry and supplying the peasants with its products. We must
show the peasants that the organisation of industry on the basis
of modern, advanced technology, on electrification which will
provide a link between town and country, will put an end to the
division between town and country, will make it possible to raise
the level of culture in the countryside and to overcome, even in
the most remote corners of the land, backwardness, ignorance,
poverty, disease and barbarism. We shall tackle the problem as
soon as we have dealt with our current, basic task, and we shall
not allow ourselves to be deflected for a single moment from the
fundamental practical task.

In the next few months all our energies must be concentrated on
food deliveries and the extension of our resources of food
supplies. There must not be the slightest departure from this. At
the same time let the scientists and technicians produce a
long-term plan for the electrification of all-Russia. [10] Let the
links which we have established with the outside world, with
capitalist Europe, that gateway which we made for ourselves by
concluding peace with Estonia, serve to provide us immediately
with essential technical aid. When, in the next few months, we
have solved the basic problems of transport and food supplies,
when we have solved the problem of labour conscription, on which
problems we shall wholly concentrate all our energies, not
allowing ourselves to be deflected from this by anything else for
a few months—when we have accomplished this we shall prove
that we can go on with developmental tasks that will last many
years and put the whole of Russia on to an advanced technological
footing, abolishing the division between town and country, and
making it possible to conquer completely and decisively the
backwardness of the countryside, its scattered economy and its
ignorance, from which stem all the stagnation, all the backwardness, all the oppression that have existed up to now. And
in this matter, that of the peaceful struggle on the bloodless
front of the reorganisation of industry, we shall, if we employ
all our military skill and all our energy, and concentrate all our
forces on the fulfilment of this task, achieve success that will
be even more decisive, even more glorious, than those we have won
in the military field. (Applause.)

Endnotes

[1]
The first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation, was held in Moscow, February
2-7, 1920. The agenda of the session was the following: report of
the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.; international situation;
economic policy in connection with the organisation of labour and
supplies; labour mobilisation and utilisation of the Army;
transport; food problem; Workers’ and Peasants’
Inspection; peace negotiations with Estonia, and other questions. On February 2, Lenin delivered a report on the work of
the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People’s
Commissars. The session endorsed the Rules for Workers’ and
Peasants’ Inspection, according to which the People’s
Commissariat of State Control was to be reorganised into
workers’ and peasants’ inspection with the enrolment of broad masses of workers and peasants into this work. The
session passed a resolution on “Transport” which stated that the restoration of transport and improvement of its
work were the primary task of the Soviet government.

Another resolution underscored the tremendous importance of the
electrification of the economy. The session endorsed the appeal to the Polish people and resolved to ratify the peace treaty with Estonia.

[2]
Lenin read the report published in the central newspapers of
January 18, 1920, that the governments of the Entente countries
intended to lift the blockade and sanction trade with Soviet
Russia. The decision passed by the Allied Council on January 16,
1920 stressed however that these measures did not mean any change
in the policy of the Allied governments towards the Soviet
Government.

[3] Oleinikov, the whiteguard officer
mentioned, was carrying documents from S. D. Sazonov in Paris,
through Sweden to Yudenich. He came over to the side of the
revolution and handed the documents over to the Soviet authorities. The persons mentioned in the documents were: Sazonov,
Foreign Minister in the tsarist government and Kolchak’s
government and the representative of Kolchak and Denikin in Paris;
Gulkevich, Kolchak’s envoy in Sweden; Bakhmetev, Kolchak’s ambassador in Washington; Sukin, head of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kolchak’s government in Omsk;
Sablin, Kolchak’s chargé d’affaires in London; Knox, an English general, the British representative to Kolchak’s
government.

[4]
Lenin refers to the Red Cross negotiations on an exchange of
prisoners, the return of refugees, and so on.

[5]
Lenin refers to the Declaration of the Council of People’s
Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. addressed to the Government of Poland
and the Polish people on January 28, 1920.

The Poland of the bourgeoisie and landowners depended entirely on the imperialists of the Entente. At the
instigation of the British and French governments she made
preparations for a criminal war against the young Soviet
Republic. The Soviet Declaration stated that the policy of the
R.S.F.S.R. in respect of Poland proceeded from the principle of
the right of nations to self-determination and unreserved
recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic
of Poland. The Soviet Government confirmed that it had no
aggressive designs against Poland. On February 2, 1920, a meeting
of the First Session of the All-Russia Central Executive
Committee, Seventh Convocation, endorsed an appeal to the Polish
people. This appeal exposed the lies spread by the imperialist
powers that Soviet Russia intended annexing parts of Poland, and
stressed the Soviet Government’s unwavering effort to achieve peace and establish friendly, good-neighbourly relations
with independent Poland.

[6] The Bashicir Autonomous Soviet Republic was formed by an agreement between the central
Soviet authorities and the Bashkir Government. The agreement
confirmed the formation of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic
in conformity with the Soviet Constitution and defined its
boundaries and administrative division.The agreement was published
in Izvestia No. 63, March 23, 1919.

[7] The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic
was formed on May 27, 1920; the decree of the All-Russia Central
Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars on the formation of the
republic was signed by Lenin and Kalinin. p. 325

[8] See Note 53.

[9] Lenin refers to a number of government decrees
aimed at combating the economic disruption and at rehabilitating
the national economy. The decision to use the Third Army, renamed
the First Revolutionary Army of Labour, on the labour front in the
Urals was adopted by the Council of People’s Commissars on
January 15, 1920. The Statute of the Ukrainian Soviet Army of
Labour was adopted by the Council of People’s Commissars of
the R.S.F.S.R. in agreement with the All-Ukraine Revolutionary
Committee on January 21. The decision to make use of the reserve
army forces of the Republic to improve the railway transport in
the area served by the Moscow-Kazan Railway was passed by the
Council of Defence on January 23. The decree on labour conscription and the Statute of the Committees for Labour
Conscription were adopted by the Council of People’s
Commissars on January 29, 1920.

[10]
The plan for the electrifidation of all Russia was the first scientifically based, long-term state plan for the
rehabilitation and development of the economy of the Soviet
Republic. It was elaborated by the State Commission for the
Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) in 1920 on Lenin’s instructions. The plan was calculated for 10 to 15 years and
provided for the building of 20 thermal power stations (Kizel,
Kashira, Shterovka and others) and 10 hydropower stations (on the
l)nieper, Svir, Volkhov and other rivers); total planned capacity
was 1.5 million kw. The total yearly output of electric power was
to be 8,800 million kwh; in 1913 Russia produced 1,900 million
kwh. The plan envisaged rational, proportionate deployment of
industry throughout the country. It envisaged an increase of
80-100 per cent in industrial output over the 1913 level, and a
huge increase over the 1920 level. The GOELRO plan was in the main
completed by 1931. The output of electric power in the
U.S.S,R. reached 10,700 million kwh, which was twenty times more
than in 1921.