The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world capital. The right to use it as a refuge from Kolchak, and in general the right of residence in it, we can recognize only for those who actively participate in the war and help us in every possible way. From this flows our right and our obligation to universally mobilize the population for war—some for military work in the direct sense, some for all manner of auxiliary activities supporting the war.

The complete realization of this requirement demands ideal organization. But since our state organization is very far from perfection (which is entirely unsurprising, given its youth, novelty, and the exceptional difficulties of its development), to undertake on a broad scale, all at once, the realization of anything complete in this sphere, or even anything very extensive, would be the most harmful organizational adventurism.

But much partial progress toward the ideal in this regard can be accomplished, and the "initiative" of our party workers, our Soviet functionaries in this respect is far, far from sufficient.

Here it suffices to pose this question and draw the comrades' attention to it. There is no need to provide any concrete directives or proposals.

Let us note only that the petty-bourgeois democrats closest to Soviet power, calling themselves, as is customary, socialists—for example, certain of the "left" Mensheviks and the like—especially love to be indignant at what they consider the "barbaric" practice of taking hostages.

Let them rage, but war cannot be waged without this, and as danger intensifies, the use of this measure must be expanded and intensified in all respects. Not infrequently, for instance, Menshevik or yellow-press printers, railroad workers from the "administrative" class and secret speculators, kulaks, the propertied section of the urban (and rural) population and such elements treat the matter of defense against Kolchak and Denikin with infinitely criminal and infinitely brazen indifference, verging on sabotage. We must compile lists of such groups (or compel them themselves to form groups with collective responsibility) and not only assign them to trench work, as is sometimes practiced, but also impose upon them the most diverse and comprehensive material aid to the Red Army.

The fields of the Red Army soldiers will be better cultivated, the supply of Red Army soldiers with food, tobacco, and other necessary items will be better organized, the danger of the death of thousands and thousands of workers and peasants due to individual conspiracies and the like will be significantly diminished, if we apply this measure more widely, more comprehensively, and more skillfully.