[1919, January 1 or 2]

Comrade Bryukhanov, Could it not be entrusted to a capable and knowledgeable person to sort through these documents, draw up a conclusion-request, etc.?

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TELEGRAM TO V. N. YAKOVLEVA

January 2, 1919

Petrograd, Gorokhaya, 2

To Yakovleva

I repeat my demand for your immediate departure. 1. I censure the delays. Leave a deputy—anyone you wish, for instance Sergeyev.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Lenin

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DIRECTIVE TO THE SECRETARY

[January 2, 1919]

Ask Chubar what he wants. Let him write clearly. And what is "Gomzy"?

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TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE EASTERN FRONT

[January 3, 1919]

To Commander of the 5th Army, Bugulma, Arzamas, Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front

Urgently ascertain the whereabouts of the families of responsible Soviet workers: Tsyurupa, Bryukhanov, Eltsin, Yuryev, Dudkin, Arkhangelsk. Render them necessary assistance if required. Telegr­aph detailed reports immediately upon clarification. The wives and sisters of the above-named persons were declared hostages in Ufa. The White Guards threatened to abduct them. The Bryukhanov family lives on Pushkin Street, 49; the Tsyurupa family on Ilyinsky Street, 81.

A. Lenin
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

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MEMORANDUM TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

[January 3-4, 1919]

I have already told Schlichter that this is absolutely unacceptable. He wants to become the Ukrainian Commissar of Food Supply—I said that this is permissible only provided it does not hinder our work. Discuss this.

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DIRECTIVE TO THE SECRETARY

[January 11, 1919]

Send to Chicherin: has it been used for publication?

TELEGRAM
Copy
Moscow, Metropol, To Chicherin, copy to Inorosta

4/1—10 o'clock, 12 hrs. Dvinsk

The newspaper of the Soldiers' Soviet of the German 10th Army publishes an excerpt from one of the Berlin newspapers in which is cited an order from the English Admiralty to the German fleet. Here it is: 1) all vessels under red flags are to be sunk without warning, 2) vessels without officers are to be treated according to the laws of wartime, 3) upon capture of a naval officer engaged in Bolshevik propaganda, the entire crew of the given vessel is to be shot by court-martial of the naval court. Gopner.

I await reports and a response from Chicherin.

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TELEGRAM TO G. E. ZINOVIEV

January 6, 1919

Petrograd
Smolny
To Zinoviev

Send Markov to Moscow immediately. I request that this final decision be carried out at once.

Lenin

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TELEGRAM TO I. V. STALIN AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY

January 11, 1919

To Glazov. To Stalin and Dzerzhinsky

Immediately communicate your thoughts regarding changes in the situation—use cipher if necessary. Send a courier. We consider it extremely important that you both remain until complete order is established in all affairs. This is absolutely necessary.

Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO V. I. NEVSKY AND NOTATIONS ON THE TELEGRAM OF V. N. KSANDROV

[January 1919, not later than the 12th]

To Nevsky:

It is necessary to keep Ksandrov in Simbirsk until complete success of 180 wagons per day.

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ASSIGNMENT TO E. M. SKLYANSKY AND K. I. LANDER

[January 13-14, 1919]

To Sklyansky and Lander:

Organize immediately the strictest investigation. Report to me on its execution.

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TELEGRAM TO THE TAMBOV DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

January 16, 1919

Tambov
District Executive Committee
To Chairman of the Commune Commission
Mikhailov

From your exposition I conclude that Azanchevskayadoes agrees to transfer to social security, where everything will be arranged for her. If she agrees, I have no objection to the transfer. If she does not agree, please telegraph me.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

[January 19, 1919]

To Bryukhanov:

Where is Schlichter? In my opinion, do not "hand him over"—keep him in Ukraine.

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RESOLUTION ON THE STATEMENT OF AUTHORIZED AGENTS FOR FOOD PROCUREMENT

I consider Bryukhanov's answer correct. Those dissatisfied may, of course, lodge an appeal—to the Council of People's Commissars. I will add that on the Volga-Bugulma railroad, a specially authorized representative is working with all his might to bring grain exports to 160 wagons per day (there are millions of puds there).

January 21, 1919

Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO G. I. PETROVSKY

[January 23, 1919]

To Petrovsky:

I request that you appoint an audit in agreement with Bryukhanov.

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MEMORANDUM TO G. I. PETROVSKY

To Petrovsky: I request that you appoint an audit.

January 24, 1919

Lenin

I also request that you publish (and circulate a circular letter to the volosts) regarding the prosecution of Dukhovshchikov.

Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

[January 24, 1919]

To Sklyansky

For review urgently (in my opinion, Gay should go to Chelyabinsk).

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TELEGRAM TO G. E. ZINOVIEV

January 25, 1919

Petrograd
Smolny
To Zinoviev

I request that you summon Mikhail Veniaminovich Kobetsky, Vasilievsky Island, 6th Line, 43, Apartment 12. Help him obtain a foreign passport and ascertain his political orientation. Previously he was a Bolshevik, and I saw him in Copenhagen. If he has remained a Bolshevik, telegr­aph me—I will give him a commission.

Lenin

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TELEGRAM TO VORONEZH

[January 27-28, 1919]

Voronezh
Revolutionary Military Council, To Rozengolts.
To Chairman of the Province Executive Committee
Kartashov.
To Rector of Voronezh University (copies to Moscow, Commissariat of Education, to Pokrovsky. Military Commissariat, to Sklyansky)

By decision of the Council of Defense, in revocation of the decision of Stalin's commission regarding the freeing of the University building from hospital use and other institutions located in it, a commission consisting of Rozengolts, Kartashov, and the Rector of the University is assigned to investigate the question of the possibility of locating the hospital and other units and institutions situated in the University in another building. In the absence of other suitable buildings, investigate the possibility of the University making room and accommodating the hospital as well in its building. Telegraph the commission's conclusion.

Chairman of the Council of Defense
Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

[February 4, 1919]

To Bryukhanov:

Is this in addition to the thousands you sent to Tashkent, or contrary to your order?

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ASSIGNMENT TO D. I. KURSKY

[February 4, 1919]

To Kursky:

I request that you appoint an investigation and report the result to me.

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TELEGRAM TO THE VOLOGDA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

February 10, 1919

Vologda
Cheka, copy to the Province Executive Committee

I have received a petition from the children of Mikhailov, who is ill, brought from the hospital at Severodvinsk. They ask for his release. Report your conclusion.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Lenin

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MEMORANDUM TO A. N. VINOKUROV AND E. M. SKLYANSKY

[February 10, 1919]

Comrade Vinokurov and Sklyansky

If possible, I would request assistance.

Lenin

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LETTER TO E. K. TARGONSKAYADKRENT

February 14, 1919

To Elizaveta Targonskayadkrent

Dear Elizaveta (forgive me, I do not know your patronymic) Targonskayadkrent!

Forgive me for not answering your first letter—I do not remember if I received it. I received the second, and I sent an inquiry to Zinoviev in Petrograd. I fear you are mistaken when you write that Dobrovolsky is not a hostage. I fear that he is a hostage, and if so, it will be difficult to do anything. But I nevertheless asked the Petrograd comrades to consider whether it would be possible to release him on bail.

Accept my assurances of respect and devotion.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

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DIRECTIVE TO THE SECRETARY

[February 18, 1919]

To Peterse: by telephone

I request information as to what the matter is about and whether the case will go to trial.

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DIRECTIVES TO E. M. SKLYANSKY AND V. N. PODBELSKY AND NOTATION ON A TELEGRAM

February 19, 1919

To Sklyansky: forbid this game with telegrams.

February 20, 1919

To Sklyansky: forbid this game with telegrams. What is the point of this?

February 20, 1919

To Podbelsky: forbid such collective telegrams.

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MEMORANDUM TO K. I. LANDER

[February 19 or 20, 1919]

To Lander:

Controllers are abusing telegrams. Moderate them.

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MEMORANDUM TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV AND NOTATIONS ON THE TELEGRAM FROM THE BOARD OF THE MALTSEV DISTRICT

[February 20, 1919]

To Bryukhanov:

Have you managed to do something, and what exactly?

Moscow, Council of People's Commissars, to Lenin
Received 20/II

Telegram
Moscow, Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, Chemical Division, Metals Division, Chief Glass [Administration],
copy to Maltsev Board, Commissariat of Food Supply, Council of People's Commissars, Lenin

The extremely insufficient provision of foodstuffs to the Maltsev district has completely ceased. The insignificant reserves of vegetable products from our own harvest of last year, due to the absence of imported products, have been consumed. There are absolutely no non-rationed products in the district. The specter of death from starvation hangs over the workers. The workers are exhausted to the extreme. During work they fall into fainting spells at the machine, at the vat during the pouring of hot iron into their hands. There have been cases of death in the factory during work. Deaths from starvation, apart from epidemics, are increasing. Under such conditions, it is impossible to continue living, let alone working. In order to preserve the lives of the workers and precious fuel, we beseech you to direct to the Maltsev district from actual reserves of rationed and non-rationed products in amounts equaling the full state ration, at least for one month, while we complete our assignments. The absence of comradely support from the center will inevitably provoke a wave of hunger rebellions. Factories and mills will not be able to continue work. The workers of the Maltsev district have bravely endured and brought themselves to complete exhaustion, all this time remaining at their machines and working. Before the board stands a dilemma—either close the factory or provision it with food. Urgently discuss the situation. Telegraph regarding decisions taken.

Government Board of the Maltsev District
Dynin

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MEMORANDUM TO E. STANG

To Comrade Stang

The Presidium requests that Comrade Stang participate in today's meeting as the fifth member of the Presidium.

F. Platten
Lenin
Albert
March 2, 1919
Klinger

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MEMORANDUM TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

[Between March 3 and 15, 1919]

To Sklyansky

I request that you endeavor to satisfy the request and give me your response immediately.

Lenin

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DIRECTIVE TO THE SECRETARY AND MEMORANDUM TO G. V. CHICHERIN

[March 8, 1919]

Ask Chicherin if he did not answer Bela Kun regarding the Ukrainian writer. If he did not answer, let him answer at once.

To Chicherin

Bela Kun today by radio telegram informs me that he has not received an answer. Consequently, it is necessary to repeat your response.

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MEMORANDUM TO L. D. TROTSKY

March 14, 1919

To Trotsky:

What is this? How is this? We have in our rear—where is this?—disarmed Cossacks???

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MEMORANDUM TO L. B. KRASIN

[Not earlier than March 17, 1919]

Do not be excessively hasty and do not begin with ultimatums: final decisions have not yet been made. It is necessary to think it over and understand it thoroughly. I am not inclined toward ultimatums, but when the matter of transport is handed over to the disposal of such elementary politicians as Zhukov and Avanesov, it will be impossible to conduct the business, and this is not only my opinion.

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SPEECH ON THE MILITARY QUESTION AT THE VIII CONGRESS OF THE RCP(b)

MARCH 21, 1919

Comrades, I have endeavored to study carefully the disagreements that have emerged in the two groups, in the two different proposals from the military section, which have led to passionate speeches and to an extraordinary heightening of tension in the section work, even to the point of one part walking out—a walkout which, of course, is incorrect. In studying these theses, I must first of all dismiss the notion that everything is going well with us. There can be no question of this. That our situation is threatening now and will remain threatening further—Comrades Okulov and Aralov, who work in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, have told you this. There was no doubt whatsoever about this in the Central Committee when we made the decision that Comrade Trotsky would not be at the congress but rather where the situation is dangerous. We understood what damage we were inflicting on the party congress, but we said: the situation is threatening. But let us see how the criticism of these shortcomings goes beyond the bounds of permissible criticism. Here is paragraph 6 of the first part of the theses which have been proposed on behalf of Comrade Smirnov (reads). Yes, comrades, if one rises to such pathos, if you have spoken of autocratic-serf-like arrangements, then there is nothing surprising that passions have become so heightened. Is it possible to speak in such a manner within a party of Communists? When I had occasion to converse with Comrade Smirnov, who was telling me about the state of affairs, he complained about this very charter. I have not seen this charter with my own eyes, but I spoke with comrades, and they told me: they force one to render honor. I confess, I was frightened. I was frightened and began asking. I began asking comrades who work in the military department: how is this, tell me; is it not possible to obtain the charter. We have a tremendous shortcoming here—I searched for this charter for more than a week and only just now obtained it. (Applause.) And having obtained it, I read paragraph 16 (reads).

I read this point. It struck my eye. Since I am not only not a military specialist but not a military person either—this struck my eye, since I happened to encounter it practically. When I heard that this point restores autocratic-serf-like arrangements in that a commander, addressing a subordinate, places his hand to his hat—in my opinion, this is absolutely wrong. Apart from this point, I read none of the others. If Comrade Sokolnikov says that it needs to be corrected, there is no doubt that this is necessary; there are certainly particular shortcomings. But to reach such a conclusion from this—to speak of autocratic-serf-like arrangements and the old army—well, gentlemen, if you have reached this conclusion, something is not right. If you write such things and at the beginning speak of dealing with the middle peasant—you do not want to deal with the middle peasant, you want to pour water on the mill of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Please, where else would they find such suitable material—autocratic-serf-like arrangements. Here it is plainly evident that you have overdone something in the theses, that something is wrong with you. No one denies the shortcomings. No one defends the charter. Further, in paragraph 10 we read (reads).

How can this be? It turns out we did wrong to establish the Council of Defense alongside the Revolutionary Military Council—what kind of accusation is this? The Council of Defense has never, not once, interfered with operational operations—its task is to accelerate—we process twenty to thirty questions there concerning the provisioning of the Red Army with food. And this accusation that alongside the Revolutionary Military Council there exists the Military Commissariat—well, it is headed by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. Here the ends clearly have not been brought together. The lining is not right. You are not writing what you think. When Comrade Goloshchekin spoke here, he said: the policy of the Central Committee is not being carried out by the military department. If you lodge such accusations, if you, speaking as a responsible orator at a party congress, can accuse Trotsky of not carrying out the Central Committee's policy—this is a crazy accusation. You will not bring a shred of proof. If you prove this, then neither Trotsky is suitable nor the Central Committee. What kind of party organization is it when it cannot achieve that its policy be carried out? This is an incredible triviality. Not one serious member of the congress thinks this.

We have had disagreements, errors—no one denies this. When Stalin was shooting people in Tsaritsyn, I thought this was an error, thought that people were being shot incorrectly, and the documents which Comrade Voroshilov cited—they show what a mass of heroism there was in the 10th Army and, in particular, in the conduct of Comrade Voroshilov—they revealed our error. My error was revealed, and I had telegraphed: be careful. I made an error. That's what we all do. Of course, it would have been better if we had shot Krasnov when Dybenko signed the peace treaty at Smolny. This was, of course, an error. The credit of the Tsaritsyn comrades is that they uncovered this Alekseyev conspiracy. There were disagreements between Stalin and me. Stalin proved his point, and no one will draw from this the conclusion that the Central Committee's policy is not being carried out in the military department. This is an accusation that casts a large shadow over the entire military department and over the Central Committee. You do not want to say this, but you meant to say this. The lining here is plain to everyone. First, about the second part of this paragraph 10. "As a result, there is a constant shortage..." Do you think we do not know this? At every meeting of the Central Committee on every major question of strategy—there has not been once when there was not a meeting of the Central Committee, or of the Central Committee Bureau—not once has there been a time when we did not decide the fundamental questions of strategy. For instance, a closed meeting here—if the West is threatened, they move to the North, suddenly—by measure, neither there nor there are there sufficient reserves. We need to proceed from the fact that we must hold out for the coming months, knowing that the enemy cannot hold out long. When we are accused here that as a result of incorrect policy there is a constant shortage of reserves—this is absurd and nonsensical. We suffer immensely from this, but when there are no reserves, we always transfer from one front to another. There have been cases when we have had to decide in the Central Committee: not a single military unit is to be touched on the South, whatever danger may threaten elsewhere.

I must add regarding the question of the middle peasant. Of course, a policy of ideological influence is necessary, but it cannot be sufficient, since the proletarian part of the army is not large. Here we need iron discipline. But if you will say that this is autocratic-serf-like arrangement, and protest against a commander rendering honors, you will not get an army in which the middle peasant will fight. Without iron discipline, without discipline effected, by the way, by the proletariat over the middle peasant, nothing can be done. We need to do everything to attract this middle peasant, but to think that by putting forward theses on autocratic-serf-like discipline, because a commander places his hand to his hat, to think that by conducting the matter in such a way we can create this army from the middle peasant—this means cutting the branch on which everything rests. Otherwise, except by iron discipline, nothing can be done here.

When we in section read and Comrade Safarov here comments (reads). Comrade Safarov ridicules Sokolnikov in this, saying that he found traits of syndicalism here. This cannot be done in an army where centralization is needed. You have corrected something here, but you still left the ending. How can one accept such theses after this? Or take section 10. What was there before the correction (reads)?

Collective command, then. This is absolutely staggering, a complete return to partisanship. You corrected it so that you threw this out, but voted in the old manner. That part of the minority walked out—this is not good, this is a violation of discipline which cannot be approved. But that you introduce such a point deliberately and can vote for it, can gather 37 votes for it—this is more than not good. This is not only not good, but it conceals danger. What is the matter here? What is the whole lining? The lining is that the old partisanship lives in you, and this sounds in all the speeches of Voroshilov and Goloshchekin. When Voroshilov spoke of the tremendous merits of the Tsaritsyn army in the defense of Tsaritsyn, of course Comrade Voroshilov is absolutely right, such heroism is difficult to find in history. This was indeed a tremendously outstanding piece of work. But Voroshilov himself, speaking just now, cited such facts as indicate that there were terrible traces of partisanship. This is an indisputable fact. Comrade Voroshilov says: we had no military specialists and we had 60,000 casualties. This is terrible. In the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, the heroism of the Tsaritsyn army will occupy a great place, but 60,000 casualties—and they got by without military specialists. On the one hand, section 10, which says: military specialists under collective command, that is to say, get rid of them; on the other hand—the speech of Comrade Voroshilov, who says: we got by without military specialists and we had 60,000 casualties. The heroism of the Tsaritsyn army will enter the masses, but to say, we got by without military specialists, is this a defense of party policy? The Central Committee is guilty in that the party line is not being carried out. Comrade Voroshilov is guilty in that he does not want to give up this old partisanship. That it is connected with a historically necessary period—this is true. He says: in Ukraine we got by without specialists. That is the error of Pyatakov and Bubnov, that Pyatakov and Bubnov approve of partisanship. We have spoken of this. One must understand that when an uprising for Soviet power is taking place, partisanship is necessary. But is it possible to transfer these conditions of a country in which an uprising for Soviet power is only taking place to our conditions? It is completely natural that it is not. And Comrade Voroshilov forgets this and completely undermines his own theses. It is time to get rid of these remnants of partisanship, which were necessary in a particular period. Such statements indicate that these comrades have not yet crawled out of partisanship, and the entire error of the opposition consists in this: that you, being connected with this partisanship by your experience, being connected with this partisanship by those traditions of heroism which will be remembered, you do not want to understand that now a different period has begun. Now regular army must take first place; we must transition to a regular army with military specialists.

When you, on the one hand, say in your theses — we support military specialists — and on the other hand you speak of collective command, you contradict yourselves. You speak of the fact that military specialists change sides, desert. Did we not say in the draft program that they are permeated with bourgeois worldview and that our task is to suppress every counterrevolutionary encroachment. Everyone knows this. I am astonished at how you view the matter from the perspective of your own provincial bell-tower. You say: we heroically defended Tsaritsyn. That is true. But once you come out with this on the tribune and speak to the congress, you violate the entire party line and the entire party program; you defend the old partisan warfare.

When you propose theses that are wholly directed against military specialists, you violate the entire general party tactics. This is the source of the disagreement. But such unfounded accusations that you advance, speaking of the establishment of autocratic-feudal discipline, are worthless. Incidentally, Goloshchyokin even said that this dead weight is ruining us. Well, you know, this is such a denial of bourgeois culture and technique itself that I do not know what to say. We say in the program that military specialists must be attracted, and you say they must be utilized. One can utilize them even under collective command. No, that is not so. They will command, and we will place our people alongside them. And we know from experience that this leads to successful results. Comrade Voroshilov went so far in monstrous things that he destroyed Okulev's army. This is monstrous. Okulev was conducting the line of the Central Committee; Okulev reported to us that partisan warfare had persisted there. Okulev proved this with objective facts. One can lay down 60,000 men, but from the perspective of our general line, can we give up 60,000? (Voroshilov: "And how many did we kill?"). I fully know that you killed many, but Comrade Voroshilov, that is precisely the trouble — all your attention is directed to this Tsaritsyn. In terms of heroism, this is an enormous fact, but in terms of party line, in terms of understanding the tasks we have set ourselves, it is clear that we cannot give up 60,000 and that perhaps we would not have had to give up these 60,000 if there had been specialists there, if there had been a regular army with which one has to reckon. This is the historical transition from partisan warfare to regular army; it has been discussed in the Central Committee dozens of times, and here people say that we must abandon all this and turn back. Never, and under no circumstances. We have lived through the period of partisan warfare. Perhaps in some places, even in Siberia, there will still be an epoch of partisan warfare, but for us that epoch is already outlived, and if here they speak of returning to partisan warfare, then we say in the most decisive manner: never and never! (Applause.)

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[Note at bottom]

Printed from stenographic record

¹ The speech on the military question at the VIII Congress of the RCP(b) was delivered by V. I. Lenin on March 21, 1919 at a closed plenary session of the congress. The basic propositions of the military policy of the Communist Party were worked out by V. I. Lenin and formulated by him in his report to the Central Committee at the VIII Congress (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 38, pp. 131-150), in his speeches at the congress, in the program of the RCP(b) adopted by the congress, and were made concrete in the theses and report of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the military question. G. Ya. Sokolnikov delivered a report at the congress on the military situation and military policy.

At the congress, against the line of the Central Committee on the military question, there spoke the so-called "military opposition," which included former "left communists" (V. M. Smirnov, G. I. Safarov, G. L. Pyatakov, and others); there were also people who had no connection to oppositional groupings. V. M. Smirnov delivered a counter-report at the congress, in which he set forth the views of the "military opposition," which opposed the building of a regular Red Army, the introduction of iron discipline in the army, and denied the necessity of attracting old military specialists. In his report, Smirnov insisted that bourgeois military specialists not be entrusted with command posts, but be limited to consultative functions. On the other hand, he proposed granting military commissars broader rights in operational control of the army, which in essence led to the establishment of collegial command of troops. He subjected the new military regulations to sharp criticism, which in his view created privileges for the command staff. The platform of the "military opposition" reflected in considerable measure, in military policy, the views of the "left communists," who in the first half of 1918 had spoken against the attraction of old specialists to the work of socialist construction, against the establishment of strict discipline in all the work of the party and state.

Because of the large number of delegates who had registered to speak in the debate, the congress decided to transfer the debate to the meetings of the military section, in which 85 delegates took part. At three sessions of the section, 23 delegates spoke. In the speeches of a number of delegates at the congress, both those who had participated in the "military opposition" and those who stood on the positions of the Central Committee, the activities of military institutions were sharply criticized, as were the actions of L. D. Trotsky.

On the evening of March 21, the discussion of the military question was transferred to a closed plenary session of the congress. At the beginning of the session, a report on the military situation of the country was heard from S. I. Aralov, a member of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic. Representatives of the opposition spoke here as well, defending their erroneous line. With profound substantiation of the party line in the construction of a regular, strictly disciplined army, V. I. Lenin spoke at the congress. Lenin's speech produced a deep impression on the congress delegates.

At the congress, 174 delegates voted for the resolution of the Central Committee; 95 delegates voted for the resolution of the "military opposition." In order to achieve a unanimous decision on the military question, the congress elected a conciliation commission, which included three representatives of the majority (G. E. Zinoviev, B. P. Pozern, and I. V. Stalin) and two from the opposition (G. I. Safarov and E. M. Yaroslavsky). The resolution on the military question worked out by the conciliation commission, based on Leninist positions, was unanimously adopted by the congress (with one abstention).

² Some of the congress delegates who had spoken in defense of the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on military policy left the sessions of the military section during the point-by-point discussion of the theses of the "military opposition." At the session of the section, the opposition's theses were adopted as the basis by majority vote. Supporters of the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) demanded that the discussion be transferred to the plenary of the congress. This demand was rejected, which caused them to leave.

³ Here are meant the theses of the "military opposition," proposed by V. M. Smirnov at the session of the military section.

⁴ Before the congress, L. D. Trotsky had submitted a petition to the Central Committee to send himself and all military delegates of the congress to the front, in connection with the worsening situation on the Eastern and other fronts. Against this proposal, delegates from front party organizations spoke out. This question was discussed at a plenum of the Central Committee, which recognized the participation of delegates from the front at the congress as necessary. Trotsky was permitted to leave for the front and he did not participate in the work of the congress.

⁵ Here and below, the text of documents cited by V. I. Lenin in stenographic record is not given.

⁶ In paragraph six of the theses, V. M. Smirnov subjected to sharp criticism the forms of relationships between commander and subordinate introduced by the military regulation (see note 7) and called them "survivals of autocratic-feudal order."

⁷ The speech concerns the "Regulation of Internal Service," approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on November 29, 1918.

⁸ In the "Regulation of Internal Service," in § 10 the following was recorded: "In case of the commander's address on service to a subordinate not standing in formation, the commander, having his headgear on, always brings his hand to it and immediately drops it, to which the subordinate answers him, also bringing his hand to his headgear and dropping it. The same rule is observed in case of the subordinate's address on service to the commander."

⁹ In paragraph ten of the theses, V. M. Smirnov, criticizing the activities of military institutions, wrote that alongside the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic there exist a number of other central institutions — the Defense Council, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs, and others, that there is no precise distribution of their functions and their work exhibits lack of coordination and parallelism.

¹⁰ In connection with the fact that there have been attempts on the part of individual persons and organs of the press to present the policy of the military department as expressing the views of individual of its responsible workers, which in essence was a denial of the guiding role of the party in the state, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted a special resolution in December 1918. In it, in particular, it was said: "In view of the fact that in certain circles of the party the opinion is spreading that the policy of the military department is a product of the personal views of individual comrades or of a separate group — and such statements penetrate the pages of the party press — the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party considers it necessary in the most categorical form to reaffirm what could not have been in doubt for the most responsible and experienced workers in the party, namely, that the policy of the military department, like that of all other departments and institutions, is conducted on the firm basis of the general directives given by the party through its Central Committee and under its direct control" ("The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents. 1917-1968." M., 1969, p. 35).

In the speech on the military question at the VIII Congress of the party, V. I. Lenin again emphasized that all basic questions of military strategy were discussed and decided in the Central Committee of the RCP(b).

However, the so-called "military opposition" that spoke at the congress repeated accusations against the Central Committee to the effect that its policy was not being carried out in the military department. V. I. Lenin decisively rejected these absurd accusations and deeply substantiated the proposition about the guiding role of the party in relation to the military department. Clearly distinguishing between the policy on military questions collectively worked out by the party and its practical implementation, V. I. Lenin emphasized at the congress that in the activities of the military department there are many shortcomings, for which Trotsky, as chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic, bore primary responsibility. In particular, he ignored the role of party organizations in the troops, treated experienced military party workers with contempt, bowed before old military specialists, etc.

The Central Committee systematically controlled the activities of the military department and Trotsky who stood at its head, correcting the distortions of party military policy that he permitted. Thus, the first plenum of the Central Committee after the VIII Congress of the party noted in its decision that sharp criticism from congress delegates was a "serious warning" to Trotsky. In the resolution of a subsequent meeting of the party's Central Committee it was said: "point out to Comrade Trotsky the necessity of the most careful possible attitude toward communist workers at the front, without complete comradely solidarity with whom it is impossible to carry out the policy of the Central Committee in military affairs" ("History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," vol. 3, book 2, p. 279). The Central Committee of the party, as is known, rejected Trotsky's proposal to stop the offensive against Kolchak in the spring of 1919 and gave a directive for a decisive offensive of the forces of the Eastern Front up to the complete defeat of Kolchak's army.

¹¹ After the suppression of the Kerensky-Krasno mutiny, rank-and-file Cossacks through their delegates expressed willingness to lay down their arms. On November 1(14), 1917, a Soviet delegation headed by P. E. Dybenko signed an agreement with them on the cessation of struggle and arrest of the ringleaders of the mutiny. Kerensky managed to escape. Krasnov was arrested and brought to Smolny. Having given his word not to act against Soviet power, Krasnov was set free. However, he did not keep his word and soon appeared as one of the organizers of the White Guard counterrevolution in the Don region.

¹² In this point, the speech concerns the demand of V. M. Smirnov for the introduction in the army of collective command of troops until the creation, as he wrote, of a command staff fully reliable both in military and in political respects.

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NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

March 24, 1919

Comrade Dzerzhinsky!

Comrade V. Adoratsky is a Bolshevik whom I have known for more than 10 years. He deserves trust unconditionally.

Please be so kind as to arrange for an inquiry to be made and give me an answer tomorrow¹.

Greetings! Your Lenin

¹ V. V. Adoratsky worked during this period in the Commissariat of Enlightenment.

V. V. Adoratsky appealed to V. I. Lenin with a request to give permission to his wife's sisters, N. M. Sapozhnikova and V. M. Sapozhnikova, to move from Samara to Kazan and to provide them with the opportunity to work there in their specialty.

F. E. Dzerzhinsky gave an instruction to provide N. M. and V. M. Sapozhnikov with the right of residence in Kazan, and also that they, as people without means, were not subject to an extraordinary tax.

Having received a reply from F. E. Dzerzhinsky, V. I. Lenin made notations on his note and the letter of V. V. Adoratsky: "to archive."

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NOTE TO A. LOMOV

[Late March, 1919]

I would advise you to continue negotiations, and at the same time transmit all information to the Central Committee (it would be most convenient to send it to Krestinsky, as a member of the Organization Bureau and Politburo).

¹ A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov) — during 1918-1921, member of the presidium and deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. He reported to V. I. Lenin that a representative of the Central Committee of the party of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries had approached him with a proposal to reach an agreement with Soviet power. Lomov was asking whether he should conduct these negotiations, and then direct the representative of the Socialist Revolutionaries to the Central Committee of the party.

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NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

[April 8, 1919]

Telegram
Commissariat of Railways, copy to the Chairman of the Council of Defense of the Republic, Comrade Lenin.

Ryazhsk, Morshansk, Syzran, Kuznetzk — executive committees

Despite repeated categorical demands of the railway administration concerning the fulfillment of the decree on labor obligation of November 3 of last year, the decision of the Council of Defense of December 25 of last year, and telegrams from the Chairman of the Council of March 20 of this year, No. TsMA/330 82/90, the Ryazhsk, Morshansk, Kuznetzk, and Syzran executive committees are not sending labor force for clearing continuing snowdrifts, opening ditches and channels for the passage of approaching spring waters, and cleaning stations of contaminated snow, which places the road in an extremely critical position and a hopeless one regarding possible interruption of movement due to washout of the roadway and structures and the development of individual diseases.

I request the Council of Defense to exert influence for the fulfillment of the decree on labor obligation.

Commissar Kudryavtzev

To Dzerzhinsky: should we not arrest one or two members of each executive committee?

¹ On the document there is a notation, apparently made by a secretary's hand, from which it is evident that V. I. Lenin's instruction to F. E. Dzerzhinsky was carried out and that telegrams were sent concerning the arrest of those guilty to those district executive committees which are listed in the telegram of railway commissar Kudryavtzev.

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NOTATION ON A TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM I. KISELEV

[April, not later than 14, 1919]

I knew him (distantly) in Switzerland. He was an ardent Plekhanovite. Find out about his work from Steklov.

Kiselev requests at least railway work in Kharkov (he was a railwayman there).

¹ I. Kiselev, who worked during that period in the editorial office of "Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee," was appealing to V. I. Lenin with a request for permission to leave for work in Ukraine.

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EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH L. B. KRASIN

[April 14, 1919]

Do you know this? Do you support it?

Have not yet received telegrams. I support it entirely.

Commission an inspection. Report on Monday — April 21.

¹ L. B. Krasin — member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

² In writing the note published here, V. I. Lenin was responding to a postal-telegram from the department of supply and distribution of fuel of the Council of the National Economy. The latter had addressed the Council of Defense with a request to cancel the requisition of firewood carried out by the administration of the northern railways. The firewood belonged to an electrical station serving the Expedition for the Production of State Papers and enterprises working for defense.

At the meeting of the Council of Defense on April 21, 1919, according to the report of L. B. Krasin on the lifting of the requisition of firewood from the said electrical station, a decision was made — to reject the petition.

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NOTE TO M. I. KALININ

Kalinin, I ask you to arrange an inspection and to help¹.

14/IV [1919]

Lenin

¹ The instruction to the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin, V. I. Lenin wrote on a telegram from peasants of the village of Kartashikha of the Knyagininsk district of Nizhny Novgorod province. The peasants complained of the extremely difficult situation that had arisen for them with grain, of the incorrect actions of food detachments that came to the village, the absence of seeds for sowing the grain area beaten by hail, acute shortage of fodder for livestock, and asked for assistance.

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ON A PETITION FOR RED ARMY MAN M. D. TSYGANKOV

I support the petition of the Administration, inasmuch as I personally know Tsygankov as an absolutely reliable person, and we have too few of such people.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

April 17, 1919

¹ The matter concerns the submission of a petition to the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic concerning the retention of Red Army man M. D. Tsygankov in the position of commandant at the Administration of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars.

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DIRECTIVE TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

[April 20, 1919]

To Sklyansky:

support¹

¹ Written on a telegram from G. Ya. Sokolnikov, member of the Revolutionary War Council of the Southern Front. In the telegram he reported on the situation on the Southern Front, that the units of Makhno's brigade operating there were not combat-ready and were unreliable. Sokolnikov wrote that Makhno was waging a struggle against communists, the population was groaning under the plunder of his bands. He raised the question of the necessity of removing the decomposed units of Makhno's brigade and providing reinforcements for the Southern Front in order to ensure an advance to Rostov and its capture.

V. I. Lenin, simultaneously with the directive to E. M. Sklyansky, sent a telegram to G. Ya. Sokolnikov, in which he proposed to work out practical directives to ensure the quickest capture of Rostov and the strengthening of the Southern Front and reported that these directives would be carried out through the Central Committee (see Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, p. 283).

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NOTES TO M. I. FRUMKIN

[April 28, 1919]

Comrade Frumkin. What have you done? And what should be done?

And who is responsible for this? Who should be held accountable for the delay?

¹ M. I. Frumkin — member of the collegium of the Commissariat of Food, deputy people's commissar of food.

² V. I. Lenin received a telephone message from the Moscow district transport department of the Extraordinary Commission. It reported that eight cars of meat arrived on the Moscow-Kazan railway addressed to the Commissariat of Food, of which the latter had been informed as early as April 23. However, by April 28, the cars had not been fully unloaded. The transport department of the Extraordinary Commission was raising the question of taking urgent measures.

³ M. I. Frumkin, answering V. I. Lenin's notes, reported that he had issued a timely instruction concerning the unloading of meat and its dispatch to cold storage, and that, having received notice from the transport department of the Extraordinary Commission, the Commissariat of Food had sent its representative to the railway to take urgent measures. He wrote that he would determine specifically who was guilty of the delay in unloading.

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NOTE TO A. LOMOV

[April 30, 1919]

To Lomov: Have you checked? What are you doing?

¹ V. I. Lenin wrote the note to A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov) on a telegram from Petrograd, which reported on the catastrophic situation of city motor transport due to shortage of fuel. The city motor transport, the telegram said, was on the eve of coming to a stop.

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INSTRUCTION TO M. I. FRUMKIN
AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH N. N. KRESTINSKY

[May 2, 1919]

To Frumkin for a report at the Council of Defense on Monday.

NOTE OF N. N. KRESTINSKY

I agree to granting such authority to Eliava.

Kr.

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

I agree.

Draft the text.

Lenin

¹ V. I. Lenin wrote the instruction to M. I. Frumkin on a telegram from Samara, received on May 2, 1919, from N. P. Bryukhanov, authorized representative of the Council of Defense. Bryukhanov requested urgent discussion of the possibility of his replacement, as he was to return to Moscow for work in the Commissariat of Food. Further, he wrote that the situation in Samara and the Samara-Orenburg region, in connection with proximity to the front, requires maximum exertion of effort for the evacuation of valuables to the right bank of the Volga; that the carrying out of this work should be conducted under the direction of a person entrusted with broad authority by the Council of Defense, and he put forward the candidacy of Sh. Z. Eliava, who had arrived from Samara — a member of the revolutionary war council of the Eastern and Turkestan fronts.

After exchanging notes with N. N. Krestinsky, Lenin wrote of his agreement with the candidacy of Eliava and the sending of an appropriate telegram. This question was not discussed at a meeting of the Council of Defense.

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NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN

It has been decided to submit to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

Draft a response to Nansen.

(We will not accept a truce: should we not publish Bullitt's proposal?² to unmask Wilson and justify our refusal).

May 4, 1919

Lenin

¹ The note is a reply to a report from the people's commissar of foreign affairs G. V. Chicherin that a letter dated April 17, 1919, from the Norwegian scholar and famous Arctic researcher F. Nansen had been received in the name of V. I. Lenin. It was received by radio on May 4, 1919. In his letter, F. Nansen set forth the text of his appeal to the heads of four Allied powers (USA, England, France, Italy) with a proposal to create a commission to organize assistance to Russia with food products and medicines, and their reply. In the reply of the leaders of the Allied powers (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando), this assistance was conditional upon the suspension of military operations on the territory of Russia; moreover, it was not stated that this condition would be binding for the powers conducting a policy of intervention with respect to the Soviet republic.

On May 6, 1919, V. I. Lenin wrote remarks on the draft response to F. Nansen, prepared by G. V. Chicherin and M. M. Litvinov (see Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, pp. 304-306).

On May 7, 1919, a radiogram from G. V. Chicherin was sent to F. Nansen. In it, in accordance with V. I. Lenin's instructions, the attitude of the Soviet government toward F. Nansen's proposal was set forth and the policy of imperialist countries, which had imposed a bloody war on Soviet Russia, bringing untold suffering to the masses of the people, was exposed (see "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR," vol. II, 1958, pp. 154-160). The plan put forward by F. Nansen was not carried out.

² The speech concerns proposals emanating from U.S. President Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, transmitted through American diplomat W. Bullitt. In March 1919, he came to Soviet Russia to clarify the conditions on which the Soviet government would agree to conclude a peace with the Allied countries and White Guard governments on the territory of Russia. The Soviet government agreed to conduct negotiations on the proposed conditions, but introducing, however, substantial amendments to them. The text of the peace proposal, worked out by the representative of the U.S. government, Bullitt, and the government of the RSFSR, was published in the newspaper "Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee," No. 110, May 23, 1919 (see "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR," vol. II, 1958, pp. 91-95). Soon after Bullitt's departure from Soviet Russia, Kolchak managed to achieve some successes on the Eastern Front, and the imperialist governments, hoping for the defeat of the Soviet state, refused negotiations on peace. Wilson forbade the publication of the draft agreement brought by Bullitt, and Lloyd George, speaking in parliament, declared that he had nothing to do with negotiations with the Soviet government.

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NOTE TO N. A. EMELYANOV

[May 4, 1919]

Nikolai Aleksandrovich! Yesterday I sent a gift to your wife to the station from N. K.² (a box), but the chauffeur could not find your car. In the evening, before you go home, telephone me and go yourself to take the gift.

Greetings! Your Lenin

¹ N. A. Emelyanov — a worker, party member since 1904. During this period he worked at Soviet work in the town of Sestroretsk. In July and August 1917, at the assignment of the party, he sheltered V. I. Lenin in Razliv from the persecution of the bourgeois Provisional Government. On the reverse of the note, V. I. Lenin wrote: "To N. A. Emelyanov."

² Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya.

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NOTE TO N. K. EMELYANOVA

[1919, May, later than 4]

To Comrade N. K. Emelyanova

I would be very glad to see you. I saw N. A. Emelyanov. I am now occupied with a meeting. Write how long you will be in Moscow, where you have settled, if you have settled. I would like for you to meet as well with Nadezhda Konstantinovna.

Greetings! Lenin

¹ N. K. Emelyanova — wife of N. A. Emelyanov.

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SPEECH AT THE FIFTH EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS
OF THE MOSCOW DISTRICT SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

May 17, 1919 (The leader of the Russian and international proletariat V. I. Lenin enters the hall. Initially separate, then quickly merging, prolonged applause breaks out. Greetings are heard: "Long live the leader of the world proletariat!")

Comrades! It is extremely difficult, extremely hard for us to live through this time. We have had to close some factories and plants; we have had to mobilize the Volga fleet for the needs of the front, but a turning point has come.

In a brief, graphic speech, he sketches the situation on all fronts. Pointing out the reasons for the ever-increasing decomposition of Kolchak's and other bands, as well as the growth of revolutionary movement of the proletariat of other countries, he explains the maneuvers of imperialist predators, seeking to hold back our offensive on the Eastern Front. He sets the task of exerting every effort so that our offensive is not halted. This is the last difficult half-year. The international situation for us has never been so favorable as it is now.

Turning to the question of the attitude of the RCP toward the middle peasantry, Comrade Lenin proves that the first task was to defeat the large predators, bankers, factory owners, landowners, and then long, persistent struggle with small predators, kulaks, candidates for landowners. He proves that the middle peasantry in its millions does not belong to the exploiters and therefore they can be and must be our friends, our allies in this extremely difficult struggle for a socialist state. He proves that only through the union of laboring peasants and workers is it possible to defend the conquests of the social revolution... It is more advantageous for a peasant to be in a union with workers than with anyone else; therefore, the conscious peasant will enter into a union with workers. He dwells at length and in detail on the reasons why all the weight of organizational and constructive work and revolutionary struggle has fallen and rested on the shoulders of the proletariat. When the peasantry, due to its dispersedness, whose horizons so far did not extend beyond their own hut, their own village, could not comprehend organizational collective construction and the necessity of struggle. When the intelligentsia, partly from inertia, partly due to bourgeois habits, education, and tendency toward the bourgeoisie, partly not believing in the possibility of restructuring the state on socialist foundations, withdrew from construction — more than that, even consciously opposed, sabotaged, thereby delaying the cause of liberation.

The moment has come when, in the interests of all humanity, an exertion of all the strength of the laboring masses is necessary. He dwells on the errors and abuses of communists, partly having repelled and set the peasantry against themselves, sometimes due to being overburdened with work, the impossibility of timely control in local areas, sometimes due to the insufficient preparation of young comrades drawn into responsible work, and sometimes simply ill-intentioned persons with deliberately selfish goals who have wormed their way into the ranks of the communists. But measures are being taken; discipline and education are growing.

He dwells on the reasons for the relatively rapid restoration of industrial life due to the organization of the proletariat and the concentration of means of production available, as opposed to the agricultural sphere, where conditions are not such — the absence of an adequate quantity and quality of means of production, tractors, etc., where especially persistent, lengthy struggle with ignorance and inertia is needed, where model, exemplary farms are needed, where organization of cooperatives, associations, communes, etc., is needed.

Rapidly concluding with an appeal for persistent, lengthy work, the most serious attitude toward the tasks set, to prolonged applause he leaves the congress.

Printed from protocol record

¹ The Fifth Extraordinary Congress of the Moscow District Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies took place in Moscow (Sadovo-Sukharevskaya St., building 11) on May 16 and 17, 1919. It was attended by 206 delegates, of whom: 36 communists, 20 sympathizers, and 150 non-party members. On the agenda of the congress were questions: on the current moment, on attitude toward the middle peasantry, reports from the localities, on the re-election of Soviets. The main task of the congress was to explain to the laboring masses the decisions of the VIII Congress of the RCP(b) on work in the village, on attitude toward the middle peasantry, on the transition from a policy of neutralization of the middle peasantry to a solid alliance with it. In the reports and in the decisions adopted by the congress, the task was set of drawing the middle peasantry into socialist construction, of carrying out socialist transformations in the village: the creation of large model Soviet farms, the organization of collective farms, agricultural associations and cooperatives for joint cultivation of land. The decisions also set the task of rendering assistance to small peasant farms with seeds for sowing, in the repair of equipment, with fertilizer.

On May 17, V. I. Lenin arrived at the congress. Warmly received by the congress delegates, he delivered a speech, which is being published for the first time, from the protocol record.

The congress elected a new composition of the executive committee of the Soviets. In conclusion, the congress sent greetings to V. I. Lenin, the Petrograd proletariat, and the struggling proletariat of Hungary.

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TELEGRAM TO K. K. YURENEV

May 26, 1919

Simbirsk or at the location of
Member of the Revolutionary War Council of the Southern Front
Yurenev

Tell Kayurov that I received his letter of May 16.

Thank you. Please write more often. I fully agree with him. I very much ask you to look after Kayurov's family and to telegraph me what you have done for it and where Kayurov himself is? Be more attentive to him.

S. S. Kamenev has again been appointed Commander of the Eastern Front².

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin

¹ V. N. Kayurov — worked during this period in the political section of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front. What he wrote to V. I. Lenin in his letter of May 16, 1919, has not been established.

² S. S. Kamenev — Commander of the Eastern Front from September 1918 to July 1919. When the question arose of replacing S. S. Kamenev as Commander of the Eastern Front, members of the Revolutionary War Council of the Eastern Front S. I. Gusev, M. M. Lashevich, and K. K. Yurenev sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) in objection to this. On this, see also V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, pp. 316-317, 328. S. S. Kamenev was again appointed Commander of the Eastern Front on May 25, 1919. In July 1919, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic.

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REPLY BY DIRECT WIRE
TO G. N. MELNICHANKSY

[1919, May, not later than 30]

Kharkov

To Comrade Melnichanksy

I will inquire of Sklyansky right now. We will probably give the answer by telegraph. Regarding weapons, we probably will not be able to provide them.

Lenin

Printed from telegraph blank

¹ In a conversation by direct wire, in which G. N. Melnichanksy, a member of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense from the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, took part, the discussion concerned a plan of military workers of Ukraine to create, subordinate to the Southern Front, a Revolutionary War Council of the Donbas Front composed of the 2nd Ukrainian, 8th, and 13th Armies, and the question was also raised of sending weapons. On June 1, V. I. Lenin, on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee, sent telegrams to Kharkov to V. I. Mezhluk, K. E. Voroshilov, G. N. Melnichanksy, F. A. Artem, and G. N. Kaminsky (see Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, pp. 332-333), in which it was reported that the Politburo of the Central Committee decisively rejected the outlined plan. They set the task of strengthening the Ukrainian army and indicated that weapons and uniforms were sufficient locally. "If one eliminates chaos, endless meetings, and disputes over precedence, everything can be obtained," — Lenin wrote in one of the telegrams.

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NOTE TO L. M. KARAKHAN

[June 2, 1919]

Comrade Karakhan!

I am sending back the abridged radio message from Chicherin². I agree.

I ask you to distribute this to our newspapers and to "Rosta" as an example of retouching.

Lenin

¹ L. M. Karakhan — deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs.

² The speech concerns an extract from the report of member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Food A. I. Svidersky at the session of the Council of People's Commissars on May 27 on the state of grain requisitions and plans for the food campaign until the new harvest, intended for transmission by radio abroad. The Council of People's Commissars, based on Svidersky's report, adopted a resolution:

"a) Entrust Comrade Svidersky to publish his report on the state of grain requisitions, supported by numerical data.

b) Extract from this article, after its appearance in the press, a brief report with numerical data and transmit it by radio abroad."

The article by A. I. Svidersky was published in the newspaper "Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee," Nos. 118 and 119, June 3 and 4, 1918. The extract from the manuscript of this article for transmission by radio was submitted to V. I. Lenin. Having become acquainted on June 2 with the extract from the article, Lenin instructed his secretary to telephone Rosta so that they would report in writing on June 3 how many newspapers and cities the extract had been transmitted to, and also to G. V. Chicherin so that the extract would be transmitted by radio in German, French, and English (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, pp. 333-334).

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TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

[June 3, 1919]

To Comrade Trotsky

Are you fully informed of the situation on the Southern Front? What are you undertaking? Where are you going?¹ I would consider it useful to send Minin² to Tsaritsyn now for work on its defense. What is your opinion of this?

Lenin

Printed from the text written by E. M. Sklyansky on a telegraph blank

¹ L. D. Trotsky — Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic, was at that time in Kharkov.

² S. K. Minin — member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. At the proposal of V. I. Lenin, the joint meeting of the Politburo and Organization Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on June 18, 1919, adopted the decision to second S. K. Minin to Tsaritsyn as a member of the Revolutionary War Council, into the 10th Army defending the city, in which he had worked before, until the beginning of October 1918.

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NOTE TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

June 6, 1919

To Sklyansky

Saprorov's Proposals¹:

1) Free those with large families, the last worker in the family

(concerning military conscription of war prisoners² and ages 25-30 and above)

2) Organize from them detachments for combating desertion (placing responsibility on them).

¹ T. V. Saprorov — Chairman of the Moscow District Executive Committee.

² The matter apparently concerns the resolution of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense "On the Conscription of Military Service of Soldiers of the Disbanded Old Army, Who Have Returned or Are Returning from Captivity" of May 12, 1919 (see "Collected Laws and Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Government," 1919, No. 19, May 30, art. 229, p. 252).

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TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

[June 11, 1919]

In cipher

To Trotsky

I agree to your arrival on two conditions: first, maximum speed of return, so as not to leave the South without supervision; second, that maximum and absolutely maximum energy is assured in the South without you, so that we are not strangled from the South.

Lenin

¹ L. D. Trotsky was at that time in Kozlov.

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NOTE BY DIRECT WIRE TO L. D. TROTSKY

[June 11, 1919]

To Trotsky

In connection with Stalin's and Zinoviev's last telegram¹, it would be best if both you and they come to Moscow as soon as possible, either Friday the 13th or Saturday the 14th, notify immediately when you will be there, so we can call them and others to the plenum².

Lenin

¹ V. I. Lenin's note to L. D. Trotsky was transmitted in cipher by direct wire to Kozlov on June 12, 1919.

² In the telegram to V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin and G. E. Zinoviev proposed holding a joint meeting of the Organization Bureau and Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), to which they would be able to come, and postponing the plenum of the Central Committee. I. V. Stalin — member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), member of the Revolutionary War Council of the Western Front, was at that time in Petrograd. G. E. Zinoviev — member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet.

³ The plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) took place on June 15. It discussed the question of replacements in the highest command staff and strengthening of the revolutionary war councils, on the Eastern Front, and other questions. I. V. Stalin and G. E. Zinoviev were not present at the plenum.

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NOTE TO L. B. KRASIN

[Not earlier than June 15 — not later than June 17, 1919]

Kolegaev has been decided (in the CC) to be removed from there and appointed to Centrovoensnab².

Reach agreement with Krestinsky about Vladimirov (I am for it) and with Sklyansky³.

¹ L. B. Krasin — Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for Supply of the Red Army.

² A. L. Kolegaev was Chairman of the Special Food Commission of the Southern Front (Oprodkom) until June 1919; then, by decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the party of June 15, 1919, was appointed to Centrovoensnab.

³ N. N. Krestinsky — member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). M. K. Vladimirov — member of the collegium of the Commissariat of Food. By decisions of the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) of June 19 and the Council of People's Commissars of June 20, 1919, he was appointed in place of A. L. Kolegaev as member of the Revolutionary War Council of the Southern Front and Chairman of the Special Food Commission of this front.

E. M. Sklyansky — deputy chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic.

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LETTER TO P. I. STUCHKA

June 19, 1919

Comrade Stuchka!

In the matter concerning Tregubov² and his activities, it would seem an additional investigation is required: is it true, as stated by the VIII Department of the People's Commissariat of Justice (No. 723), that he is conducting counterrevolutionary speeches?

Do you agree to investigate and verify this precisely? I ask you to answer me on this.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

¹ P. I. Stuchka — deputy people's commissar of justice of the RSFSR.

² The matter apparently concerns I. M. Tregubov, who was a member and leader of the religious labor commune-community "Sober Life," which existed at that time in Moscow.

---

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

June 19, 1919

Kyiv

Council of People's Commissars, Rakovsky

Tell Makhlevsky's wife² that her husband is in Moscow. He is well and waiting for her. Telegraph a reply³.

Lenin

¹ Kh. G. Rakovsky — Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine.

² Julyan Makhlevsky — prominent figure in Polish and international workers' movement. On June 19, 1919, having crossed the Polish front, he came to Moscow from Poland, to which he had fled in the spring of 1919 from Germany due to the deadly danger threatening him there from the forces of Noske for illegal revolutionary work as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, which he had been conducting in the Ruhr area. In Poland, Makhlevsky, with the knowledge of the Polish Communist Party, proposed to the government of Pilsudski to begin peace negotiations with the Soviet government.

Makhlevsky's wife — Bronislava Makhlevskaya. After her arrival in 1918 from Berlin to Moscow, she worked in the Commissariat for Polish National Affairs under the People's Commissariat for Affairs of Nationalities, directing the cultural and educational work of the commissariat.

³ The telegram from V. I. Lenin was received in Kyiv that same day. A reply from Kh. G. Rakovsky to V. I. Lenin could not be found.

---

NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY
AND UNDERLININGS ON A TELEPHONE MESSAGE
FROM PETROGRAD

To Dzerzhinsky: I ask you to arrange an investigation and send me the reply².

6/7/[1919] Lenin

Telephone Message No. 1 from the Moscow Department of the Petrograd Food Commissariat
to Comrade Lenin

On June 21, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission arrested the representative to the Commissariat of Food from the Petrograd Commissariat of Food and from the chief of supply of the Petrograd Military District, Comrade Vinogradov. Given the extraordinary importance of the functions performed by Vinogradov, there is a necessity either for his speedy release or for his replacement by another person; therefore, we, as official representatives of the Petrograd Commissariat of Food and the Petrograd Military District, are appealing to you with a request both for the acceleration of consideration of the case of Vinogradov and for immediate acquaintance of us with the investigation, materials, and the situation in this case.

On the above, Comrade Badaev is also appealing to you with an insistent request on behalf of whom we are authorized to make this statement. We ask you not to refuse to inform us in the future by telephone at No. 2-60-42 or 5-75-73.

Representative of the Petrograd Military District Ivan Labuzhinskiy
Petrograd Food Commissariat Dukelskiy

¹ F. E. Dzerzhinsky — Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Sabotage, and Speculation with the Council of People's Commissars (the Cheka).

² On June 30, 1919, a reply was sent to V. I. Lenin from the Cheka on the case of V. M. Vinogradov, in which it was reported that Vinogradov was accused of espionage in favor of Japan in 1913 and, according to the decision of the presidium of the Cheka of June 27, 1919, was placed in a concentration camp for two years. On July 31, 1919, the case of V. M. Vinogradov was reviewed and he was released.

---

NOTE TO L. P. SEREBRYAKOV
AND RESOLUTION ON A LETTER FROM B. G. KOZLOVSKIY

[Later than June 25, 1919]

To read here?

I will read it. Do you vouch for the author?

[NOVEMBER, NO LATER THAN 12, 1919]

To Stasova

2 for transmission to Serebryakov.

1 This concerns a letter from military specialist, Petrograd Province Military Commissar, member of the Petrograd Defense Committee B. G. Kozlovskii to the secretary of the CC RCP(b) L. P. Serebryakov dated June 25, 1919 regarding the situation in military institutions in Petrograd, his dissatisfaction with the work, with a request to recall him from Petrograd to any other work. For V. I. Lenin's letters to B. G. Kozlovskii on this matter, see the present collection, p. 172.

2 E. D. Stasova — secretary of the CC RCP(b).

1919

NOTE TO THE SMALL SOVNARKOM

To the Small Council of the SNK

This is a statement by comrade Shternberg, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army (strangely, unsigned by him). I request the Small Council to consider it.

26/VI [1919]

Lenin

1 In speaking of "the statement of comrade Shternberg," V. I. Lenin has in mind a draft decree of the SNK written by P. K. Shternberg concerning the allocation of 1-54 months' salary for the period of occupation by the Whites to workers and employees of nationalized enterprises in the area of deployment of the 2nd Army. Lenin's note is written on the reverse of this draft.

The draft decree was discussed and passed unanimously at a session of the Small SNK on June 27, 1919.

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA

June 27, 1919

To the Revolutionary Military Council
West Front
By cipher
Smilga member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic
member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the West Front

I hope you received notification of the plenum for July 3.

2 You must come. Telegraph me whether you will definitely arrive.

Lenin

1 I. T. Smilga — member of the CC RCP(b).

2 This refers to the plenum of the CC RCP(b) held on July 3-4, 1919, at which military and other questions were discussed. The central place in the plenum's work was occupied by discussion of the military situation and a series of measures to strengthen the fronts. The plenum once again confirmed the correctness of the military policy conducted by the Soviet government since the time of the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets and approved by the Eighth Congress of the RCP(b). The plenum made a series of changes in the supreme command of the Republic's military forces and in the command of certain fronts and armies. A series of decrees were passed on general and party mobilizations, on the reduction of work in People's Commissariats not directly serving the army, and others.


ANNOTATIONS ON THE TELEGRAM FROM V. M. GITTIS,
K. A. MEKHONOSH IN AND G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV
AND NOTE TO E. M. SKLYANSKII

[June 28, 1919]

...Our four divisions of front reserve are undermanned 80-90% (underlined by V. I. Lenin here and below) in respect of personnel, horses, wagons and harnesses. In view of the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from June 8 no. 991, mobilization in the Orel and Kharkov districts can be carried out only with preliminary agreement with the All-Russian General Staff.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the South Front contacted the latter on this matter June 20 no. 3051 — yay. Thereafter on June 24 by direct wire the Chief of Staff transmitted to the Chief of the All-Russian General Staff our requirement, which was then transmitted by telegram June 24 no. 3219 — may. After this on June 27 another telegram was sent repeating [the request] and asking when the requested mobilization could be expected to be carried out. There has been no answer to this day. The Revolutionary Military Council of the South Front, in view of the extreme importance and urgency of the question, categorically insists on its rapid resolution.

No. 3352/may. Revolutionary Military Council of South Front V. Gittis, K. Mekhonosh in,
Sokolnikov

To Sklyanskii: this means someone is guilty of the delay (20/VI—24/VI—27/VI). Who? An investigation is necessary.

1 Lenin's note is written on a copy of a telegram from members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front V. M. Gittis, K. A. Mekhonosh in and G. Y. Sokolnikov dated June 27, 1919 to the Council of Labor and Defense.

RESOLUTION ON THE TELEGRAM
FROM M. M. LASHEVICH AND K. K. YURENEV

[July 1, 1919]

Telegram
Only Lenin, Moscow, Kremlin
To Lenin copy Predrevvoensoviet Trotskii at location, copy Serpukhov, Gusev
Simbirsk July 1, at 22 hours June 30 the glorious units of the Third Army took Perm. Units took Kungur. We request the allocation to the 3rd Army

1919

of a reward in the amount of a month's salary equal to other armies for the valiant campaign from Glazov to Perm.

Revolutionary Military Council Lashevich, Yurenev

I fully agree

2. Lenin

1 M. M. Lashevich and K. K. Yurenev — members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. From November 1918 to March 1919 M. M. Lashevich was commander and from August 1918 to February 1919 was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army.

2 In presenting the telegram to V. I. Lenin, E. M. Sklyanskii, deputy chairman of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, wrote on it: "If you agree, we will confirm it on behalf of the Council of Defense."

In response to the telegram from M. M. Lashevich and K. K. Yurenev, V. I. Lenin sent a congratulatory telegram to the troops of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 51, p. 3).

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY

[July 2, 1919]

Call Stalin and Smilga

2 (they are at Dzerzhiński's apartment in the Kremlin) [and inform them] about the telegram I gave them today concerning (about Serdobsk) Saratov?

3; you must absolutely coordinate with Headquarters, with Serpukhov and
obtain swift and energetic measures. Write down their response

4. One cannot wait for Gusev

5; let Smilga immediately coordinate with Serpukhov

6. Speak yourself with Gusev and tell him that I demand extreme measures at once no matter what: Serpukhov must give me a telephonogram today itself about what has been done

7.

1 These instructions were given by V. I. Lenin to SNK secretary L. A. Fotieva during a session of the Council of Defense on July 2, 1919.

2 I. V. Stalin — member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

I. T. Smilga — member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

3 V. I. Lenin's telegram to I. V. Stalin and I. T. Smilga from July 2, 1919 has not been found. Apparently it was written in connection with a copy of the enciphered telegram received by him from Commander-in-Chief I. I. Vatsetis and member of the RVSR S. I. Gusev to Commander of the Eastern Front S. S. Kamenev from July 2, 1919 concerning the abandonment of Tsaritsyn by troops of the Southern Front and the emerging threat to the rear of the right flank of the Eastern Front and to Saratov from the Denikinists. The command of the Eastern Front was proposed to strengthen the right flank of the front with the most combat-capable troop units and to prepare necessary reserves for their transfer to the Saratov area and other points threatened by the enemy.

4 In response to Lenin's first note, L. A. Fotieva replied: "The telegram will be transmitted to Gusev, who was supposed to be here at 8 o'clock but has not yet arrived. As for measures, this will also be told to Gusev.

Smilga is on his way to Dzerzhiński's, where Stalin will soon be. I spoke with Stalin; he promised to have a serious talk with Gusev and to carry everything out today.

He says that Smilga looks at things from the point of view of eternity."

5 S. I. Gusev — member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, commissar with the Chief of Field Staff at Supreme Headquarters, located in Serpukhov.

6 In response to this, L. A. Fotieva informed V. I. Lenin: "Stalin gave incorrect information. Gusev is sitting with Smilga right now and the telegram was transmitted to him 20 minutes ago."

7 Having carried out this instruction, L. A. Fotieva wrote to V. I. Lenin: "Stalin will call Smilga right now."

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH N. N. KRESTINSKY

[July, not earlier than 3 — not later than 15, 1919]

I am very undecided. If you really want to, perhaps [we should] send 2-3 of ours conditionally, so that, having heard everyone, they could decide whether to speak and how to speak

1. Previously I was opposed to permitting it, but the experience of Golosov's report and the speeches of Sosnovskii and Mgeladze on it are favorable. It would be possible to send Lunacharskii, Sosnovskii and perhaps Bukharin, so that they speak not listed on the playbills, but like Sukhanov.

The Mensheviks are playing dirty, and we need to beat their faces in thoroughly for this.

1 This refers to one of the meetings or gatherings organized by the Mensheviks in Moscow after the legalization of the Menshevik party by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 30, 1918.

At one of such meetings held before June 14, 1919, N. Sukhanov and other Menshevik leaders spoke.

At a meeting on July 3, 1919, a report was given by the Menshevik G. Golosov (B. I. Nikolaevskii), who had just returned from Siberia, to which he had been sent in 1918 by the CC of the Menshevik party. In his report, Golosov told of the atrocities and outrages of the Kolchakists in Siberia, of which he had been a witness, that not only workers but also peasants, even kulaks and patriotically-minded intellectuals were rising up against Kolchak, that a revolutionary explosion was ripening in Siberia and that a workers' uprising had begun in the Urals. The speaker was forced to acknowledge that all of Siberia awaits the arrival of the Red Army and the Bolsheviks. Everyone is ready for any sacrifice in order to restore Soviet power. Such statements by the Mensheviks were merely a masquerade. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that F. Dan, who was chairing this meeting, during Golosov's report demonstratively organized a collection of funds in favor of Menshevik members of the Constituent Assembly.

At this meeting, in order to expose the Mensheviks, a number of Bolsheviks were present, including L. S. Sosnovskii, editor of the newspaper Bedpota, and journalist I. V. Mgeladze (I. Vardin). They spoke at the meeting with an exposé of Menshevik attempts to "adapt to the growing sentiment spreading everywhere" (Izvestiya of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, no. 144, July 4 and no. 145, July 5, 1919).

V. I. Lenin, speaking with a report "On the Current Situation and the Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power" at a joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions and factory-plant committees of Moscow on July 4, gave a proper evaluation of Golosov's report at the Menshevik meeting (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 39, pp. 38-39).

NOTE TO A. I. SVIDERSKII

AND DRAFT DECREE
OF THE CC RCP(b)

[1919, July, not later than 15]

I agree. Gather the signatures of Central Committee members: Krestinsky, Kamenev and others.

In the press, discussion of the question of raising fixed prices on grain and other foodstuffs

2 should not be permitted and this question should not be touched upon.

Lenin

1 A. I. Sviderskii — member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply.

2 Due to food difficulties, the Soviet government was forced from the second half of 1919 to raise fixed prices on grain and in connection with this to establish ceiling prices on industrial goods. To prepare this question, a special commission was created. The commission's report (made by V. P. Milyutin) was discussed at a session of the SNK on July 22, 1919. At the session V. I. Lenin wrote a note to V. P. Milyutin, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, and P. I. Popov, chairman of the Central Statistical Administration, asking them to calculate approximately how much money per month would be needed if grain prices were increased (by 3 or 5 times), as well as prices on industrial products for peasants, while selling grain and industrial products to workers and employees at old prices, increasing their wages and salaries by 10% (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 51, pp. 19-20). In accordance with these instructions from Lenin, the SNK instructed the commission to carry out a general calculation of increased fixed prices conditionally at three times, and the People's Commissariat of Food Supply and Supreme Council of the National Economy on the basis of these calculations to present proposals on fixed prices to the SNK by July 24, 1919. The SNK at its July 24 session adopted in principle V. P. Milyutin's proposals. It was decided not to publish them. A decree was also passed to discuss at the SNK on July 31 measures so that workers and employees would pay for grain and products at prices from the first half of 1919, as well as regarding the exact quantity of industrial products to be sold and prices for them. Having discussed these questions, on July 31 the SNK decreed that sale prices for food and industrial goods for workers and employees remain those which had been in effect before this. The People's Commissariat of Food Supply and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy were instructed by no later than September 1, 1919 to publish fixed prices on food and industrial goods listed by V. P. Milyutin for the entire year.

LETTER TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

July 19, 1919

To the People's Commissars of Posts [and Telegraph] of Railways
of Food Supply
Military

I request that you receive the bearer, comrade Yushkin, one of the best workers of the 5th Army, a Petrograd worker and party member, and render him every assistance in his matter.

Chairman, Council of Defense V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

1 The letter was written by V. I. Lenin during a conversation with P. Yushkin, whom he received on the basis of a letter from I. N. Smirnov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front, dated July 10, 1919. On Yushkin's draft concerning the organization of a commission with the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army for sending food parcels to Red Army families in starving provinces, V. I. Lenin made the note: "Yushkin's draft (V Army) 19/VII" (Central Party Archive, Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CC CPSU).

TELEGRAM TO I. V. STALIN

To the Revolutionary Military Council
West Front, Stalin

There are increasingly indications that Petrograd is in extreme danger. Try to accelerate reinforcements. Should you not personally conduct heroic measures there?

Lenin
August 1, 1919, 9:30 p.m.

Printed from deciphered telegraph form

ANNOTATIONS ON THE NOTE FROM V. I. NEVSKII
AND NOTE TO A. I. SVIDERSKII

[August 8, 1919]

To the People's Commissar for Enlightenment comrade Lunacharskii
August 8, 1919

In view of the transfer of the Central School of Soviet and Party Work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to your jurisdiction, we request that you render every possible and urgent assistance in obtaining the necessary foodstuffs to improve the nutrition of cadets, among whom marked emaciation is observed, illnesses of scurvy, anemia and general exhaustion.

Total number of cadets — 1100 people. In recent days 7 cases of scurvy illness have been registered.

The cadets are engaged in intensive work, 8-10 hours a day, but the administration dispenses only seedlings in enormous quantities, dried vegetables; has completely deprived [them of] flour, butter, potatoes and other products necessary for maintaining health. Because of this the school is unable to provide any quality nutrition whatsoever.

All attempts undertaken by the school administration to obtain products have thus far proved unsuccessful, and if you, comrade Lunacharskii, do not come to the aid of the school in this matter, then further work is unthinkable.

School Director V. Nevskii
Secretary Kokozhanava

To comrade Sviderskii!
Urgent measures of assistance are necessary. Report to me exactly (no later than tomorrow) how much you will provide

1. 

1 The note was written by V. I. Lenin on the report note from V. I. Nevskii to A. V. Lunacharskii dated August 8, 1919. V. I. Lenin received it along with a letter from A. V. Lunacharskii addressed to him requesting assistance in supplying foodstuffs to the cadets of the school.

NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN

[August 22, 1919]

Highly esteemed Vladimir Ilyich!

We are sending you your interview once again. In a few hours Good is leaving; we would be very grateful if you would return the interview right now.

With comradely greetings Georgii Chicherin

There are no objections or remarks whatsoever.

Lenin

1 Lenin granted an interview to William T. Good, English educator, public figure and journalist, professor, who came to Moscow as correspondent of the English bourgeois-liberal newspaper The Manchester Guardian, on August 20, 1919 (in English). The interview was published in the named newspaper on October 21, 1919, in no. 22838.

In the interview, Lenin answered Good's questions about the Soviet government's attitude toward William Bullitt's proposals to the Paris Conference, about the Soviet Republic's attitude toward small nationalities, concerning the guarantees that the Soviet government was ready to give regarding propaganda in Western countries. To Good's question whether Lenin wanted to make any general statement, Lenin replied "that the most important thing he should say is that the Soviet system is the best system and that English workers and working peasants would accept it if they became acquainted with it," and expressed the hope "that after the conclusion of peace the English government would not prevent the publication of the text of the Soviet Constitution." "...Morally," Lenin says, "the Soviet system has already won even now and... proof of the correctness of this assertion is the persecution of Soviet literature in free democratic countries." As a farewell, Lenin gave Good his photograph with an inscription in English and Russian: "Aug. 20, 1919 V. Ulyanov (Lenin) 20/8 1919 Wladimir Oulianoff (Lenin)."

Having reviewed the text of his interview with William T. Good, Lenin urgently sent it to G. V. Chicherin by secret courier.

When Lenin reviewed the text of his interview with Good for the first time, it was not possible to establish.

The interview was first published in Russian in the newspaper Izvestiya, no. 30, February 5, 1960 (see "Memoirs of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in Five Volumes. Vol. 5. Memoirs of Contemporaries from Abroad." Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp. 243-245).

LETTER TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

August 23, 1919

Comrade Dzerzhinsky!

1) On the attached paper, i.e., on this operation

1, you must focus special attention. Quickly and energetically and broadly you must seize [them].

2) The newspaper "Narod"

2 has close ties with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. Without closing it, you must track them down

3. Your Lenin

1 The "attached paper" is a report from the Cheka of August 22, 1919 about the uncovering of a central counterrevolutionary organization "National Center" and about forthcoming operations for the arrest of members of this organization.

2 "Narod" — an SR newspaper, came out weekly starting August 17, 1919 in Moscow.

3 In the night of December 27-28, 1919 the Cheka carried out a series of arrests among Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, including members of the Central Committee of this party. Thus a decisive blow was struck against the Right Socialist-Revolutionary party, which had been operating illegally and pursuing the goal of overthrowing Soviet power.

LETTER TO E. M. SKLYANSKII

September 6 [1919], 7:50 a.m.

Comrade Sklyanskii! Could the Council of Defense be postponed to Friday morning? If in no way possible, then send me a telephonogram on Monday (and no later than Tuesday) about this

1. Coordinate, please, with all members of the Council of Defense: if possible, I would request, as an exception, Friday morning, 11 a.m. — 4 p.m.

Your Lenin

The SNK will be P.S. Answer me on Monday or Tues- on Thursday day in any case by telephonogram

2.

1 The Politburo of the CC RCP(b) at its session of September 6, 1919 decided to grant Lenin a vacation of 1-2 weeks with sessions of the SNK and Council of Defense held once a week during this time.

2 Lenin's request was granted. The session of the Council of Defense took place on Friday, September 12, 1919.

NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

To Dzerzhinsky: in my opinion, release [him] (if there is no evidence)

1, taking two more guarantors, whom one can punish for escape.

Send a copy of this to M. N. Pokrovskii

2.

September 9 [1919]

Lenin

1 This concerns Professor S. I. Sazonov, who taught physics and chemistry at the 1st Pedagogical Institute and the Institute of Preschool Education in Petrograd, who was arrested along with other scholars in connection with their former membership in the Cadet party. Scientists asked for Sazonov to be released under their guarantee — V. A. Stroyev, A. P. Pinkevich, employees of the Academy of Sciences, and Professor N. M. Knipovich — in a telegram from Petrograd to N. K. Krupskaya as a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment. By a decision of the board of the Petrograd Province Cheka of September 18, 1919, S. I. Sazonov was released.

2 M. N. Pokrovskii — deputy people's commissar for enlightenment.

NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

To Comrades Dzerzhinsky (or Ksenofontov)

1 or Mantsev

2 (Moscow Cheka)

In case of any misunderstanding I hereby certify that the bearer, comrade Vladimir Alexandrovich Obukh

3, came to me for treatment of his wife and is returning home to Moscow with my chauffeur, comrade Gile

4.

September 14, 1919

Chairman, SNK V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

1 I. K. Ksenofontov — member of the board and deputy chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Sabotage and Speculation under the SNK (Cheka).

2 V. N. Mantsev — chairman of the Moscow Extraordinary Commission (Moscow Cheka).

3 V. A. Obukh — party member from 1894, doctor, from 1919-1929 headed the Moscow Department of Public Health. He participated in treating V. I. Lenin and members of his family. The note concerns his trip to Gorky, where V. I. Lenin was spending his vacation together with N. K. Krupskaya.

4 S. K. Gile — V. I. Lenin's chauffeur from 1917 to 1924.

NOTE TO D. I. KURSKII

Comrade Kurskii! I request that you examine this case

1 and submit your conclusion to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

2.

September 18 [1919]

Lenin

1 This concerns the case of D. D. Makhlina, sentenced by the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal to 15 years imprisonment for assisting a spy organization.

This note was written by V. I. Lenin on the petition of D. D. Makhlina's brother L. D. Makhlin addressed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars requesting the conditional release of Makhlina under his responsibility and guarantee.

2 Having examined the case of D. D. Makhlina, People's Commissar of Justice D. I. Kurskii concluded that until the end of the civil war she could not be released, since her guilt in assisting a spy organization was fully established. His conclusion on this was sent to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on October 8, 1919.

On the basis of this conclusion, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee rejected L. D. Makhlin's petition.

NOTE TO M. F. VLADIMIRSKII

Comrade Vladimirskii! A mother's complaint regarding slander, persecution and arrest of her son (a former military cadet and then several times running for chairman of the Karachev Executive Committee).

I request that you appoint an investigation (you can count on my summons of it)

1 and report to me on the outcome.

September 23 [1919]

Lenin

1 The note was written by V. I. Lenin on a letter from schoolteacher A. Antonova from the village of Molodovoe, Karachev district, Oryol Province, requesting assistance in securing the release of her son M. T. Antonov, former chairman of the Karachev Executive Committee, accused by local authorities of criminal activity expressed in the purchase of cloth and imprisoned in the Oryol prison. In her letter (on six large pages), V. I. Lenin made numerous underlinings while reading it.

2 In connection with V. I. Lenin's note, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, signed by Deputy People's Commissar M. F. Vladimirskii and Deputy Head of the Administration Department N. N. Chistyakov, on September 25, 1919, sent a telegram to the Oryol Province Executive Committee with a proposal to urgently investigate at Lenin's request the reasons for Antonov's arrest and imprisonment in prison and to immediately send the NKVD material concerning his activities.

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY

[September 30, 1919]

Make a copy and tomorrow (October 1) send [it] to Frunze

2 (through Sklyanskii), while Frunze is still here, with a note from me that I am requesting a review and recommend Chugurin as an excellent party member.

Lenin

1 The instruction was written by V. I. Lenin on a letter from I. D. Chugurin and A. S. Kuklin, working in the political department of the 4th Army, dated August 28, 1919, to N. K. Krupskaya. The letter reported on the difficult situation of the army, conducting an offensive on Guryev through steppe and sandy territory and experiencing a shortage of water. "But the main thing that is dangerous for us," the letter stated, "is that there is no uniforms, no boots... There is no change of underclothing, and Red Army soldiers go about in now upper, now lower garments... You see that in recent times it has moved forward, 2/3 don't have bayonets... Political work under these conditions is very difficult, since Red Army soldiers often demand uniforms instead of words... We now need literature in the Tatar language... We must have literature, this in the Tatar language, musical instruments, for which comrades have been sent. They need help..."

In reading the letter, Lenin underlined the quoted passages of the text.

An extract from the letter of Chugurin and Kuklin by Lenin's instruction was sent on October 7, 1919 to the Central Press and the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment.

2 M. V. Frunze — commander of the Turkestan Front.

NOTE TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky! Should one not publicize and publish an appeal from you + from the Orgburo (+ from me, if you like)?

September 30 [1919]

Lenin

1 The note was written by V. I. Lenin on a telegram addressed to him from G. E. Zinovyev, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, dated September 30, 1919, regarding the first results of political mobilization of responsible workers for the Southern Front. This work was conducted in accordance with the decree of the plenums of the CC RCP(b) of September 21 and 26, 1919, adopted on V. I. Lenin's proposal. "...Today the first group of 40 people is leaving," the telegram stated. "This includes the most responsible workers of Petrograd — members of the Petersburg Committee, members of the presidium of the Soviet and Council of Trade Unions. Tomorrow the second group of 70 people is leaving, the day after — the rest. Among them some district committees in their entirety. Those going to the front are being replaced by new ones. In all districts there is a wave of volunteerism, we have to refuse people. The city-wide meeting of active workers held today expressed unanimous readiness to immediately send large groups of active workers to the Southern Front. Such is the decision of trade union boards."

2 Such an appeal in the press could not be found. In the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, nos. 221 of October 4, 1919, an article by V. I. Lenin was published titled "The Example of Petrograd Workers" (see V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, vol. 39, pp. 206-208).

LETTER TO B. G. KOZLOVSKII

October 2, 1919

Comrade Kozlovskii!

Comrades Serebryakov and Rosengolts told me about you. Apparently, with the departure of the latter

1 you may find yourself, so to speak, "alone." Then I request that you write to me directly with an account of the situation and requests.

Inform [me] of receipt of this letter

2.

With comradely greetings, Lenin

1 This refers to A. P. Rosengolts's departure from Petrograd, where he was from June 30 to September 30, 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 7th Army, to the 13th Army, to which he was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council from October 7, 1919.

2 See on this the note of V. I. Lenin to L. P. Serebryakov and the resolution on the letter of B. G. Kozlovskii (present collection, p. 158).

ON A SAFE-CONDUCT CERTIFICATE TO N. V. KORZLINSKII

[October 9, 1919]

I hereby confirm this certificate

2, and likewise declare that searches in the given apartment

3 are permissible only with special authorization from the Cheka.

Chairman, SNK V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Printed from manuscript

My resolution on the reverse in the lower left corner of October 9, 1919 under no. 10016 retains its force for 1921 as well.

June 27, 1921

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Printed from typescript signed by V. I. Lenin