TELEGRAM TO G. E. ZINOVIEV.
Petrograd
Smolny
To Zinoviev
July 7, 1919
It has been fully established that only Petrograd can supply the workers needed for the cartridge factories. We must, at all costs, compel the…
…cannon and pipe factory to deliver immediately all the workers that have been requested. Delay is unacceptable—indeed, criminal—since without cartridges we are doomed. Push with all your might and ensure that the order is carried out.
Lenin.
TELEGRAM TO V. V. OSINSKY.
Tula
To the Executive Committee, Osinsky
To the Commissar of the Arms and Cartridge Factories
August 20, 1919
Do not engage in any form of compulsory mobilization of workers for tasks related to the arms and cartridge factories, for weapons and cartridges are of paramount importance. [06] Please report on implementation. [8i-2j]
Lenin, People’s Commissar for Defense.
1. V. V. Osinsky (Obolensky) served as Chairman of the Tula Council Executive Committee in August 1919.
2. K. Orlov was the Commissar of the Tula Arms Factories.
* Printed from a typewritten copy. No. <>•

QUESTIONS OF DEFENSE

LETTER TO S. I. GUSEV
September 16, 1919
Comrade Gushev! After carefully studying Sklyansky’s letter (on the state of affairs as of September 15) and reviewing the reports, I am convinced that our Revolutionary Military Council of the Russian Republic is working poorly.
To intensify efforts—and then to intensify them again—is poor tactics. In the end, it leads only to complacency.
In reality, we are mired in stagnation—almost on the brink of collapse.
On the Siberian Front, they placed some scoundrel named Ol’derog and a woman… and “settled down” into a false sense of security. What insolence! And soon we began to suffer defeats. If vigorous measures are not taken, we will hold the RVC responsible for this failure. To let victory slip through our fingers—that is sheer recklessness.
Take Mamontov, for example. It seems that one delay follows another: the troops advancing from the north toward Voronezh were late; the transfer of the 21st Division to the south was delayed; the delivery of machine guns was delayed; communications were delayed. Whether the Supreme Commander traveled alone to Orel or accompanied by you, the task remained undone. Despite the longstanding and explicit demand of the Central Committee, no proper liaison was established with Selivachev, nor was adequate oversight over him ever implemented.
As a result, we find stagnation under Mamontov—and stagnation under Selivachev as well (instead of the “victories” promised in childish drawings, day after day—do you remember those little sketches you showed me? And I told you: you’ve forgotten about the enemy!).
If Selivachev flees or if his division commanders turn traitor, the RVC will bear the blame, for it slept while it should have acted, contenting itself with soothing words rather than taking decisive action. We need to send the most capable, the most energetic commissars southward—not sleepy bureaucrats.
We are also lagging behind in terms of troop formation. We are letting autumn slip away, while Denikin will triple his forces, acquiring tanks and much more besides. This simply will not do. We must transform sluggish, inert work into dynamic, living action.
Please reply to me (via L. A. Fotieva).
Lenin.
It seems that our RVC “commands” without truly caring—or perhaps without even wanting—to monitor implementation. If this is a shared failing across the board, then in military affairs it is nothing short of ruinous.

The letter is dated September 16, 1919—a time of acute crisis, the most severe phase of the Civil War, when Denikin launched an offensive along the entire front and advanced toward Kursk. (Kursk fell to Denikin on September 21.) There was no effective military leadership in the operations, despite the fact that the Revolutionary Military Council—headed by L. D. Trotsky—was supposed to provide such guidance. This letter was cited by K. E. Voroshilov in his report delivered at the anniversary session held on Red Army Day, February 23, 1933 (from the collection “15 Years of the Red Army”). Voroshilov’s address at the solemn anniversary meeting on February 23, 1933, in the Bolshoi Theatre, published in Pravda on March 5, 1933, issue 63.
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Selivachev’s group comprised the 8th and 13th Armies; by September 1, the group had reached Kupyansk, but was then forced to begin a retreat.
3. L. A. Fotieva served as Secretary of the Council of People’s Commissars.