DRAFT DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON MILITARY UNITY
May 1919
Taking into consideration:
1) that the RSFSR is compelled, in alliance with the fraternal Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Belarus, to wage a defensive struggle against the common enemy—world imperialism and the Black Hundreds and White Guard counterrevolution it supports;
2) that a prerequisite for the success of this war is unified command over all units of the Red Army and the strict centralization of all forces and resources under the control of the socialist republics, particularly the entire apparatus of military supply—as well as railway transportation, which, as the most critical material factor in warfare, holds paramount importance not only for the execution of military operations but also for supplying the Red Army with combat and non-combat equipment, as well as food and provisions.
The Central Committee of the RCP resolved:
1) To recognize, without reservation, that for the duration of the socialist defensive war, the entire matter of supplying the Red Army must be brought under the unified leadership of the Council of Defense and other central organs of the RSFSR;
2) To recognize, without reservation, that for the duration of the socialist defensive war, railway transportation must be unified.
If one compares the number of commanding officers (instructors) in the All‑Soviet Military Training Program with the number of such officers in the reserve units of the Red Army, it becomes clear that in the reserve units across the entire territory of the Republic, the number of commanding officers totals 5,350, whereas the All‑Soviet Military Training Program boasts 24,000.
This ratio among commanding officers is utterly detrimental to the successful organization and formation of the army: while the reserve units prepare reinforcements for the units currently engaged on the front lines in this critical moment, the All‑Soviet Military Training Program is tasked with training contingents for the distant future.
In light of all that has been set forth, I deem it necessary:
1) To transform all territories formed in the western half of the RSFSR—namely, the Soviet republics friendly to us—into military districts, subordinating them to the All‑Russian General Staff Council, into whose composition (that is, the Council’s) all People’s Commissars of War are to be incorporated, with their headquarters located in Moscow.
2) To temporarily liquidate the All‑Soviet Military Training Program, entrusting the All‑Russian General Staff Council with the task of redistributing its commanding officers and political cadres among the reserve units of the Eastern Front.
3) To bring all reserve units under the jurisdiction of the All‑Russian General Staff up to full strength, with an additional 25% allocation.

In 1919, to place railway transportation and the administration of the railway network throughout the territories of the fraternal Socialist Republics under the guidance and supervision of the People’s Commissariat for Railways of the RSFSR;
3) To declare incompatible with the interests of defense the existence, within the fraternal Soviet Republics, of separate supply agencies for the Red Army and of distinct railway commissariats—and to insist that, for the duration of the war, these bodies be reorganized into departments of the Red Army’s supply agencies of the RSFSR and of the People’s Commissariat for Railways of the RSFSR, placed under the direct jurisdiction and complete subordination of the central supply organs of the Red Army of the RSFSR and of the People’s Commissariat for Railways of the RSFSR;
4) To declare null and void all decrees pertaining to the supply of the Red Army and to railway transportation or to the administration of the railway network, since they are at odds with the resolutions and decrees governing the supply of the Red Army of the RSFSR, as well as the management of railway transportation and the railway network of the RSFSR.
Lenin. Stalin