V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:LS/v34;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

RESOLUTION AND NOTES ON A TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11TH ARMY

May 2, 1919

To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic:

This is v e r y important; we must l e a v e a part of the 33rd Division and i m m e d i a t e l y obtain an a b s o l u t e l y p r e c i s e telegram to this effect from the Commander-in-Chief to Astrakhan.

Lenin

There is some terrible misunderstanding about the dispatch of the 33rd Division, which must be cleared up immediately, because, by carrying out the Commander-in-Chief’s order exactly, in a few days we shall leave the army front without troops and will be compelled: 1) to stop all operations against Cherny Rynok and Kizlyar, 2) to abandon the capture of Guryev and Rakusha, where there is oil, 3) to place the fleet in a hopeless position, since, apart from the landing detachment of 400 men already sent to capture Petrovsk, we shall not only be unable to provide troops to hold Petrovsk and defend the fleet base, but shall even leave the only rear and main base of the fleet in Astrakhan without adequate protection...

The calculation that the 34th Division could be quickly formed was based on promised reinforcements of marching companies, just as it was intended to bring the 33rd Division up to full strength. Meanwhile, neither reinforcements nor supplies have been received so far, and therefore the possibility of forming the 34th Division is still in no way assured, and it cannot replace both parts of the 33rd Division for operations on the coast and for landings...

Telegram No. 1844 of April 28 gave the possibility of leaving the 11th Army a certain minimum number of troops, but the very next telegram again places the army in a hopeless position. While once again confirming the exact execution of the Commander-in-Chief’s order, which requires* the dispatch of the 33rd Division within the specified time, namely April 25, and that not the slightest delay in dispatch can be
and will not be allowed*—it is clear.

NB
Yes!

By the specified date of May 10 the entire division will be transferred to the concentration area,—at the same time I inform you that the dispatch of the division has diverted us precisely at the moment when operations were beginning and has inevitably disrupted our plan. The absence of precise instructions from the Field Staff places the army in an utterly impossible position and gives grounds for accusing us of inactivity.

The situation now is as follows: 1) The fleet has begun operations, occupied the very important base and strategic point—Fort Alexandrovsky—and is proceeding to move on Petrovsk. 2) The landing detachment is already at sea; established communication with Petrovsk and Baku makes it possible to coordinate actions with our organisations; the political situation in Baku and Daghestan demands our immediate
offensive, which we have begun. 3) The advance on Kizlyar obliged and made it possible immediately to develop a possible operation in this direction, and this was begun. Fully realising the necessity of reinforcing the Eastern Front, especially since the situation on its right flank sets a direct task for the 11th Army, at the same time it is
Yes!
absolutely necessary to leave in the 11th Army a part of the 33rd Division, namely the first brigade, specially selected for its personnel and trained for landing operations and for carrying out the tasks assigned...