The Council of Defense considers that the formation of special shock units should not be carried out, with the exception of special cases by decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
Chairman of the Council of Defense
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Printed according to proto- col No. 32 of the meeting of the
Council of Defense, April 28
1919
14672
ON THE URGENT TRANSPORT OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
(RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE, APRIL 29, 1919)*
The threat of Kolchak to the Volga obliges us to take urgent measures to remove petroleum products from the threatened reach and to ensure the timely passage of petroleum products intended for the upper piers through the threatened reach.
For the successful implementation of these tasks, it is prescribed:
1) The Main Petroleum Committee shall immediately send its representatives to the Volga piers to drain petroleum products into barges and conduct vessels with petroleum products;
2) Glavvod shall provide the necessary tank vessels and tugs in agreement with Glavkonneft;
3) All military and civil authorities shall fully assist the representatives of Glavkonneft and in no way hinder their orders for the loading and movement of ships.
Those who fail to comply with this decree are subject to the judgment of the military-revolutionary tribunals according to the laws of wartime.
Chairman of the Council of Defense
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
* The original, signed by V. I. Lenin, contains his notes:
"Approved by the Council of Defense on April 29. Do not publish."

1919

RESOLUTION AND NOTES ON A TELEGRAM
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11TH ARMY
May 2, 1919
To the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic:
this is very important; it is necessary to leave a part of the 33rd division and immediately
obtain an archival telegram about this from the Commander-in-Chief
to Astrakhan.
Lenin
Some terrible misunderstanding is occurring with the dispatch of the 33rd division, which needs to be clarified immediately, because, precisely fulfilling the order of the Commander-in-Chief, we will leave the army front without troops in a few days and will be forced to: 1) cease all operations on the Black Market and Kizlyar,
2) abandon the capture of Guryev and Rakusha, where there is oil, 3) put the fleet in a hopeless situation, since, in addition to the landing party of 400 people already sent to capture Petrovsk, we will not only be unable to provide troops to hold Petrovsk and defend the fleet's base, but we will even leave the only rear and main base of the fleet in Astrakhan without sufficient protection...
The calculation of the possibility of quickly forming the 34th division was based on the reinforcements promised by marching companies, just as it was assumed that the 33rd division would be fully staffed. Meanwhile, neither reinforcement nor supply has yet been received, therefore, the possibility of forming the 34th division is now not guaranteed in any way and cannot replace both parts of the 33rd division for operations on the coast and landings...
Telegram A? 1844 of April 28 gave the XI army the opportunity to leave a certain minimum number of troops, but the following telegram again puts the army in a hopeless situation. Once again confirming the precise execution of the order of the Commander-in-Chief, requiring* the dispatch of the 33rd division by the specified date, namely April 25, and that there can be and will be no slightest delay in the dispatch, this is clear.
NB
Yes!