17244
TELEGRAM TO THE SERDOBSK EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
April 21, 1919
I order immediately to quarter the administration of the head of military procurement of the 1st Army. I point out the inadmissibility of your refusal
to accommodate, as proposed by the front, the military procurement, on the work
of which the supply of the army depends*.
Lenin
Printed from the original, signed by
V. I. Lenin.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC**
April 23, 1919
This is very timely, precisely in line with what was decided yesterday.
It is necessary immediately:
* The telegram of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front of April 20 to
V. I. Lenin reported: “Despite our orders, the Serdobsk Uyezd Executive Committee refused to quarter the
administration of the head of military procurement of the 1st Army in Serdobsk, which puts the front in an extremely difficult position.
The arrived echelons have clogged the station, depriving it of the ability
to receive and dispatch trains. The army has been deprived of a procurement apparatus for over a week."
** The instructions were written by Lenin on the report of the Commander-in-Chief, in
which it was reported: “Our opponents have united, they have established
a common command and created complete one-man management in actions. We,
however, are acting completely differently: the RSFSR, as it were, has split its military
unity into two halves—into western and eastern, at the same
time also fragmented its military power.
In the western half of the RSFSR, a number of Soviet Republics have been formed, which have now
acquired a certain physiognomy of separate autonomy in matters
of warfare.
Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians-Belarussians, Ukrainians are creating
their armies, their People's Commissariat of Military Affairs apparatuses, each of which acts with
its own specific characteristics...

1919
1) to compose a text of a directive from the Central Committee to all "nationals"
on military unity (merger);
2) to give it to the press for a series of articles;
3) on Universal Military Training (take 100%, not 75%) immediately, today
itself, to prepare a draft decree;
4) to calculate: 24,000 command personnel. If we take
1 per 10, it means we can create an army of 2,400,000.
Check and take as a norm immediately for the Central
Administration of Supply of both Russia and
Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Front consists of parts of numerous Ukrainian
formations. At the head of many parts are obvious and hidden atamans
and batkos.
On paper, the Ukrainian army is quite numerous, but it has no organization, it was created on irregular principles...
In terms of the number of citizens in the territory of the western half of the RSFSR,
there are more than 50%, about 50 million people...
The eastern half of the RSFSR accounts for about 40% of the population
of the Republic, numbering up to 35 million citizens. On these 35 million
Great Russian people now lies the conduct of the war in two
main and decisive theaters of military operations: against the troops of Admiral Kolchak in the East and against the troops of General Denikin and the Don
Cossacks in the south. Thus, the smaller half of the citizens of the RSFSR
has been burdened with the greatest and unbearable military labor, which may bring
us untold disasters, for the eastern half of the Republic may
find itself face to face with an unbearable task.
I am extremely concerned about the question of when we will be able to return to
the former integrity of our military camp, on the idea of which the Red Worker-Peasant
Army of the RSFSR was founded, created, grew, and triumphed.
The further fate of the revolution depends on the outcome of the battles on
the Southern and Eastern Fronts.
It is necessary to send the maximum strength of the entire RSFSR to
these fronts.
Our victory on the Southern and Eastern Fronts will give the entire territory of the former Russian Empire into the hands
of the Soviet authorities, therefore, a temporary setback on the Western Front will not affect the ultimate result...
The above-mentioned fragmentation of the armed forces of the RSFSR into national
armies at this crucial moment is in all respects inappropriate and extremely harmful to our success.
In addition to all of the above, it should be noted that the military
strain of the eastern half of the RSFSR is weakened by the vast organization
of Universal Military Training, which absorbs a huge mass of command personnel
and political figures.


42518
DRAFT DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON MILITARY UNITY
May 1919
Taking into account:
1) that the RSFSR is forced, in alliance with the fraternal Soviet
Republics of Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and
Belarus, to wage a defensive struggle against the common
enemy—world imperialism and the Black Hundred and White Guard counter-revolution supported by it;
2) that a necessary condition for the success of this war is
a unified command of all detachments of the Red Army and the strictest centralization in the disposal of all the forces and resources
of the socialist republics, in particular, of the entire apparatus
of military supply, as well as railway transport, as the most important material factor of the war, which is of paramount importance not only for the execution of military operations, but also for the supply of the Red Army
with combat and material property and food.
The Central Committee of the RCP has resolved:
1) To recognize as absolutely necessary for the entire duration of the socialist
defensive war the unification of the entire matter of supply
of the Red Army under the unified leadership of the Defense
Council and other central institutions of the RSFSR;
2) to recognize as absolutely necessary for the entire duration of the socialist
defensive war the unification of the railway
If we compare the number of command personnel (instructors) in Universal Military
Training and the number of such in the reserve parts of the Red Army, it turns out
that in the reserve parts throughout the Republic, the number of command
personnel is 5,350 people, while in Universal Military Training there are 24,000 of them.
Such a ratio in the number of command personnel is absolutely detrimental
to the success of the organization and formation of the army: the reserve parts
prepare reinforcements for parts operating in the current critical
moment at the front, while Universal Military Training prepares contingents for
the distant future.
In view of the foregoing, I consider it necessary:
1) All territories formed in the western half of the RSFSR,
Soviet republics friendly to us, should be transformed into military districts
with their subordination to the Council of the All-Russian General Staff, into the composition of which (i.e.,
Council) to include all People's Commissars of Military Affairs with their stay in Moscow.
2) To temporarily liquidate Universal Military Training, instructing the Council of the All-Russian General Staff
to distribute its command personnel and political figures among
the reserve parts of the Eastern Front.
3) To bring all reserve parts under the authority of the All-Russian General Staff to the authorized strength with an addition of 25%.”