Date: 1918
Source: ru:PSS/v36

Comrades, let me begin with a few relatively minor remarks—starting from the end. Comrade Bukharin, toward the conclusion of his speech, went so far as to compare us to Petliura. If he truly believes that to be the case, then how can he possibly remain in the same party as we do? Is this not mere rhetoric? Of course, if that were really so, we would not be sitting together in the same party. The fact that we are united proves that we agree with Bukharin on nine-tenths of the issues. To be sure, he did add a few revolutionary platitudes about our alleged intention to betray Ukraine. I am convinced that there is no need to dwell on such obvious trivialities. Let me turn now to Comrade Ryazanov—and here I wish to point out that just as an exception occurring once every ten years only serves to confirm the rule, so too did he inadvertently utter a profoundly serious statement. (Applause.) He said that Lenin was “yielding ground” in order to buy time. This is almost a philosophical reflection. On this occasion, it turned out that Comrade Ryazanov had stumbled upon a perfectly serious—and indeed, deeply insightful—statement: “I wish to yield ground to the actual victor, in order to gain time.” That is the whole essence of the matter, and nothing more. All the rest is merely talk: the necessity of revolutionary war, the rise of the peasantry, and so forth. When Comrade Bukharin portrays the situation as though there could be no disagreement whatsoever regarding the possibility of war, and declares, “Ask any military man” (as I have recorded from his own words)—when he frames the question in such a way that he actually asks “any military man”—then I will answer him: that “any military man” turned out to be a French officer with whom I had the opportunity to converse.{13} This French officer, looking at me with eyes full of suspicion—after all, I had sold Russia to the Germans—said, “I am a royalist; I am a staunch supporter of the monarchy, and in France I favor Germany’s defeat—not that you should think I support Soviet power—how could anyone possibly think that, when he is a monarchist—but I was in favor of your signing the Treaty of Brest, because it was necessary.” There you have it: “Ask any military man.” Any military man ought to have said what I said: we had to sign the Treaty of Brest. If, in light of Bukharin’s speech, it now appears that our differences have greatly diminished, that is only because his supporters have hidden the core issue of contention.

When Bukharin now denounces us for having demoralized the masses, he is absolutely right—except that he is condemning himself, not us. Who was responsible for introducing this muddle into the Central Committee? You, Comrade Bukharin. (Laughter.) Why don’t you shout “No!”—for truth will ultimately prevail: we are within our own comradely family, we are gathered at our own congress; there is nothing to hide, and we must speak the truth. And the truth is this: there were three distinct currents within the Central Committee. On February 17, Lomov and Bukharin did not cast their votes. I requested that the voting record be reproduced and made available—any member of the Party may come to the Secretariat, if they so choose, and review the vote—the historic vote of January 21—which shows that while they wavered, we did not waver at all. We said, “Let us make peace at Brest—there is no better option—so that we may prepare for revolutionary war.” Today, we have already gained five days to evacuate Petrograd. Now, a proclamation has been issued by Krylenko and Podvoisky,{14} who were not among the Leftists and whom Bukharin had disparaged, claiming that they were “dragging Krylenko along,” as if we had invented the notion that Krylenko had been reporting to us. We fully agree with this assessment; after all, it was the military who proved what I had been saying, while you excuse yourselves by insisting that the Germans would not advance. How can one compare this situation to October, when the issue was not one of technique? No—unless you wish to reckon with the facts, then reckon with the fact that our disagreements centered on the question of whether it was permissible to launch a war when it was clearly disadvantageous. When Comrade Bukharin began his closing remarks with the thunderous question, “Is war possible in the near future?” he surprised me greatly. I answer without hesitation: war is possible—but now we must make peace. There is no contradiction here. After these brief remarks, I will turn to more detailed responses to the previous speakers. With regard to Radek, I must make an exception. But there was another speech—by Comrade Uritsky. What was there, beyond Canossa{15}, “treachery,” “retreat,” “compromise”? Well, what is that supposed to mean? Is this not the very kind of criticism you find in the newspapers of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries? Comrade Bubnov read to us a statement submitted to the Central Committee by members of the Tsekist faction—who considered themselves extremely left-wing—and who staged a full-scale demonstration before the entire world: “The conduct of the Central Committee deals a blow to the international proletariat.” Is that not mere rhetoric? “To demonstrate helplessness before the entire world!” What, exactly, are we demonstrating? That we proposed peace? That the army fled? Did we not prove that to launch a war against Germany now, without first accepting the Treaty of Brest, would mean showing the world that our army is sick, that it does not wish to fight? It is utterly empty when Bubnov claims that this wavering was entirely our doing—it was, in fact, because our army was ill. At any rate, we needed to grant ourselves a respite. Had we followed the correct strategy, we would have had a month of breathing space; but since you pursued the wrong strategy, we have only five days of respite—and that is still a good outcome. The history of warfare shows that, to halt an army fleeing in panic, sometimes even just a few days are sufficient. Whoever refuses to take up the devilish peace now is a man of rhetoric, not of strategy. That is where the real tragedy lies. When Tsekists write to me, “demonstrating helplessness,” “treachery”—these are the most harmful, the most vacuous of childish phrases. We demonstrated our helplessness by attempting to fight when it was impossible to fight, when an offensive against us was inevitable. As for the Pskov peasants, we will bring them to the Congress of Soviets so that they may recount how the Germans treat them, so that they may foster the psychological shift whereby a soldier once gripped by panic-stricken flight begins to recover and says, “Yes, now I understand that this is not the war the Bolsheviks promised to end—it is a new war that the Germans are waging against Soviet power.” Then healing will begin. But you pose a question that cannot be answered. No one knows how long the respite will last.

Next, I must address the position of Comrade Trotsky. In his work, we must distinguish between two distinct phases: when he initiated negotiations at Brest, skillfully using them for propaganda purposes, we were all in complete agreement with Comrade Trotsky. He quoted part of our conversation, but I would add that we had agreed between ourselves to hold firm until the Germans issued an ultimatum—and after the ultimatum, we would surrender. The Germans deceived us: out of seven days, they stole five.{16} Trotsky’s tactic, which aimed to prolong the negotiations, was sound; it became misguided only when the state of war was officially declared over and peace remained unsigned. I had proposed, quite explicitly, that we should sign the peace treaty. We could not have obtained a better settlement than the Treaty of Brest. It was clear to everyone that we would have had a month of respite—and that we would not have lost. Since history has proven otherwise, there is no need to dwell on that now—but it is rather amusing that Bukharin says, “Time will tell whether we were right.” I was right, because I had written about this as early as 1915: “We must prepare to wage war—it is inevitable, it is underway, it is coming.”[2] But we should have sought peace, instead of indulging in empty posturing. Even more importantly, we should have sought peace, knowing full well that war was coming—and now, at the very least, we are facilitating the evacuation of Petrograd; we have indeed made that task easier. That is a fact. When Comrade Trotsky puts forward new demands—“Promise that you will not sign peace with Vinnichenko”—I say that under no circumstances will I assume such an obligation.{17} If the Congress were to adopt such a commitment, neither I nor any of my comrades, none of us, would take responsibility for it. To do so would mean abandoning the clear line of maneuvering—retreating when we can, advancing when necessary—instead tying ourselves down once again with a formal resolution. In war, one must never allow oneself to be bound by formal considerations. It is absurd not to know military history, not to understand that a treaty is a means of rallying strength—I have already referred to Prussian history. Some people, quite naively, imagine that to sign a treaty is to sell oneself to Satan, to go straight to hell. It is simply laughable when military history makes plain, beyond all doubt, that signing a treaty in the face of defeat is itself a means of gathering strength. History has seen instances where wars followed one after another—and we have forgotten all that; we see that an old war is transformed into…[3]. If you wish, bind yourselves forever with formal considerations, and then hand over positions of responsibility to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.{18} We will not take responsibility for that. There is not the slightest hint of a desire to split the Party. I am convinced that life itself will teach you. March 12 is not far off—you will receive a wealth of new material.{19}

Comrade Trotsky argues that this would constitute betrayal in the truest sense of the word. I contend that this view is utterly mistaken.[4] To illustrate this concretely, let us consider the following example: two men are walking when ten assailants attack them—one fights, the other flees—that is betrayal; but what if two armies each number one hundred thousand, and against them stand five armies? One army is surrounded by two hundred thousand, while the other must march to its aid—but it knows that three hundred thousand are positioned in such a way as to set a trap: can it afford to march to the rescue? No, it cannot. This is not betrayal, not cowardice—it is simply a change in scale that alters all calculations; every military commander knows this—this is not a matter of personal judgment: by acting in this way, I preserve my own army; let them take the others prisoner—if I renew my forces, I have allies waiting in the wings; I wait, and my allies will arrive. Only in this way can one reason; but when political considerations are mixed with military ones, all that remains is rhetoric. One cannot conduct politics in this manner.

We have done everything that could be done. By signing the treaty, we have preserved Petrograd—at least for a few more days. (Let the secretaries and stenographers not dare to put that in writing.) The treaty stipulates that we withdraw our troops from Finland—troops that are, by all accounts, unfit for combat—but we are not prohibited from importing weapons into Finland. Had Petrograd fallen just a few days earlier, panic would have swept through the city, and we would have been unable to evacuate anything. Yet in these five days, we have helped our Finnish comrades—though I will not say how many, for they know that best themselves.

The claim that we betrayed Finland is the most childish of all platitudes. In fact, we helped Finland precisely by retreating in time before the Germans. Russia will never perish if Petrograd falls—Comrade Bukharin is right a thousand times over on that point—but if we were to maneuver in the Bukharin style, we might well ruin a great revolution. (Laughter.)

We have betrayed neither Finland nor Ukraine. No conscientious worker will ever reproach us for that. We are helping in whatever way we can. We have not taken away, nor will we take away, a single good man from our ranks. If you say that Hoffman will catch us, will close in on us—of course he may succeed; I have no doubt about that—but how many days it will take him—neither he nor anyone else knows. Moreover, your assumptions about catching us, about closing in on us, are based on calculations of the balance of political forces—a topic I will discuss further.

Having established why I absolutely cannot accept Trotsky’s proposal—that politics must not be conducted in this way—I must say that Radek provided a striking example of how far our comrades at this congress had moved away from the rhetoric that had, in fact, persisted with Uritsky. I cannot in any way accuse him of engaging in rhetoric in that speech. He said, “There is not the slightest trace of betrayal, not the slightest trace of shame, because it is clear that you retreated before overwhelming military force.” This is an assessment that completely undermines Trotsky’s entire position. When Radek said, “With clenched teeth, we must prepare our forces,” that is the truth—and I fully agree: not by boasting, but by clenching our teeth, we must prepare.

Clench your teeth, do not boast—prepare your forces. Revolutionary war will come; on that point, we have no disagreement. Our disagreement concerns the Treaty of Tilsit—should we sign it or not? Worst of all is the fact that our army is ill—and that is why the Central Committee must adopt a firm, unified line, rather than allowing for disagreement or a middle-of-the-road approach, as Comrade Bukharin advocated. I am not painting rosy pictures when I speak of the respite; no one knows how long the respite will last—and I do not know either. It is laughable to try to squeeze from me some precise estimate of how long the respite will endure. Thanks to the maintained supply lines, we are helping both Ukraine and Finland. Let us use the respite to maneuver, to retreat.

One can no longer tell the German worker that the Russians are being capricious—now it is clear that German–Japanese imperialism is on the rise, and that will become evident to everyone; beyond the desire to strangle the Bolsheviks, the Germans also seek to strangle the West—everything has become intertwined, and in this new war, we must learn—and indeed, we must be able to—maneuver effectively.

Turning to Comrade Bukharin’s speech, I note that when he runs out of arguments, he resorts to Uritsky’s ideas and declares, “The treaty is slandering us.” Here, arguments are unnecessary: if we were truly slandered, we should have gathered our papers and fled—but although we have been “slandered,” I do not believe our positions have been shaken. Comrade Bukharin attempted to analyze the class basis of our positions, but instead he told a joke about a late Moscow-based economist. When we discovered that our tactics were linked to petty trade, it was—honestly, it’s laughable—to forget that the relationship of the class as a whole—of the class, not of petty traders—shows us that the Russian bourgeoisie and all its lackeys—the Delonovites and Novozhiznentsy{20}—are throwing everything they have into dragging us into this war. After all, you fail to emphasize this class-based fact. To declare war on Germany now would mean succumbing to the provocation of the Russian bourgeoisie. This is nothing new—because it is the most reliable path—though I do not say “absolutely reliable”; nothing is ever absolutely reliable—still, it is the most reliable way to throw us off course now. When Comrade Bukharin said that, in the end, “life will show that we will recognize the revolutionary war”—he was celebrating an easy victory, for we had predicted the inevitability of revolutionary war back in 1915. Our disagreements lay in the question of whether the Germans would advance—or not; in whether we should have declared the state of war terminated; in whether, in the interests of revolutionary war, we should have retreated physically, ceding territory in order to buy time. Strategy and politics prescribe the most abhorrent of peace treaties. Once we embrace this tactic, all our differences will vanish.

A brief summary was published on March 19 (6), 1918, in the newspaper “Rabochye-Krest’yanskii Nizhegorodskii Listok,” No. 54.