Comrades, I shall have to make a few concluding remarks. First of all, I should like to respond to the question concerning dogma that was raised here. Marx and Engels said many times that our doctrine is not a dogma, but a guide to action{93}, and I think we must above all and foremost bear this in mind.

The doctrine of Marx and Engels is not a dogma that we memorize. It must be accepted as a guide to action. This we have always said, and I believe we have acted quite appropriately in this regard, never falling into opportunism, while modifying our tactics. But this in no way constitutes a departure from the doctrine and cannot in any way be called opportunism. I have said, and I shall say again and again, that this doctrine is not a dogma, but a guide to action.

Furthermore, in reply to Comrade Steklov's remark—with whom shall we agree, with the headquarters or with the masses?—I answer: first and foremost, of course, with the masses, and then with the headquarters, and when it comes to struggle with the headquarters, everything depends on the particular circumstances. I shall turn to this, but for now I practically see no possibility whatsoever of agreement with the Menshevik party and the Socialist Revolutionary party. We are told that to agree means to make some concession. What will you concede and how will you depart from the basic line? That would be renegacy, and if it is only in practice, then that is nothing new. Of course, we shall never concede our principles. It makes no sense to speak of this now. Fifteen years ago the disputes were about the basic line and principles—disputes which I unfortunately had to conduct mainly abroad rather than in Russia. But now the question concerns state power, and there can be no talk whatsoever of making any concessions regarding it. It is no accident that Wilson declared: our enemy now is world Bolshevism. The bourgeoisie of the entire world proclaim this. If they should march against us—this means they have recognized that Bolshevik power is not merely a Russian but a worldwide phenomenon. A Bolshevik would be contemptible and pathetic if he proposed to the bourgeoisie any kind of agreement. And when the revolutionary fire has spread to an entire series of countries, not a single capitalist bourgeois government will go along with this and cannot go along with it.

The Swiss bourgeoisie, when it came down to recent events, spoke openly: we are not Russians, we shall not surrender power to you. Captain Sadoul, who joined Bolshevism, writes that he is astonished observing the remarkable submissiveness of the Russian bourgeoisie, and declares that the French bourgeoisie would not act in the same way. There we shall see far greater rage, and civil war, if it develops, will assume the most ruthless forms; on this side of the matter, no questions can be raised.

The question has been completely resolved in practice by a year of proletarian dictatorship, and no peasant, no worker can conceivably come to the idea of agreement with the bourgeoisie. And as for the fact that agreement is nothing new, I completely agree. I only wished that we confer together on such questions.

Those circumstances which particularly drove the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and petty intellectsia away from us—the relentless struggle over the Brest Peace during the period of German imperialist advance—those circumstances have passed. But that even temporary successes of the Anglo-French will provoke new waverings in this intellectsia and petty democracy, which will begin to sow panic and desert, we know very well. We agree with them in order to achieve definite results and for definite practical work. This tactic cannot provoke either disputes or astonishment. But that it was not understood has been demonstrated by many, and even by such an influential member of the Moscow Soviet as Comrade Maximov. Comrade Maximov said that with Khinchuk one should not agree, but intelligently negotiate. When we issued the first decree on cooperatives in spring, and they presented us with ultimative demands, we made concessions to them. This is what we call agreement—otherwise this policy cannot be called anything else. And if every Soviet worker takes it as a rule, tells himself, and repeats to all comrades: with petty-bourgeois democracy intelligently negotiate, I shall consider myself satisfied.

In our work so far, especially in local work, we are still far too distant from being able to intelligently negotiate. On the contrary, we often fail to negotiate intelligently. We are reproached for this, though people do not understand that new construction is impossible without it. There is no genius who could build a new life without having learned to do so through construction. When we need to intelligently negotiate with practical workers, we do not know how. To set up a shop, one must know how to set it up. We need people who know their business. We Bolsheviks have had to apply our knowledge in this practical work very rarely. We have no shortage of agitators, but the most glaring shortage is a shortage of practical leaders, of organizers. And this continues to this day, despite having a year of experience behind us. With every person who is sufficiently experienced in this field, who puts forward the slogan of neutrality and good-neighborly relations, with each such person intelligently negotiate. If he knows how to set up a shop, distribute goods, if he can teach us anything whatever, if he is a practical man, that is a great acquisition.

Everyone knows that among the "friends" of Bolshevism, since our victory, there are many enemies. We often have elements attach themselves to us who are completely unreliable, fraudulent, who are politically unstable, who sell, betray, and defect. And we know this well, and it does not change us. It is historically inevitable. When the Mensheviks reproach us for having masses of hangers-on, dishonest, even in the general civic sense, elements among Soviet officials, we say to them: where are we to get better ones, how should we do it so that better people would immediately believe in us. There is no revolution that could at once be victorious and convince, at once compel belief in itself. It begins in one country, and in other countries they do not believe in it. Our revolution is considered a nightmare, chaos, and from our organized "chaotic" assemblies, called Soviets by us, nothing is expected in other countries. And this is entirely natural. We had to conquer much. And so when one says: one must intelligently negotiate with Khinchuk—he knows how to set up a shop, I say: negotiate with others too, take petty bourgeois who know how to do many things.

If we drive home this slogan: "negotiate," if we hammer it into heads in the localities, if we understand that a new class is waking to power, that people are taking up the administration of something which they have never undertaken before and who, naturally, make mistakes—we shall not be troubled. We know that one cannot govern without mistakes. But besides mistakes we observe clumsy use of power, merely as power, when people say: I have received power, I have decreed, and you must obey. We say: with regard to a whole range of petty-bourgeois democracy elements—professional unions, peasants, and cooperatives—do not pursue this slogan, now it is no longer needed. Therefore, it is more sensible to intelligently negotiate with petty-bourgeois democracy, especially with the intellectsia—this is our task. Of course, we shall negotiate on our platform, we shall negotiate as the power.

We say: is it true that you have moved from hostility to a position of neutrality and good-neighborly relations, is it true that you have ceased to be hostile? Otherwise we shall not close our eyes, we shall speak openly: war, then war, and we acted as in war. But if you have moved from hostility to neutrality, if you speak of good-neighborly relations—these words I took from statements by people not belonging to the communist camp, who yesterday were far closer to the White Guard camp—I say: since there are such people who are transitioning on such a broad scale from yesterday's hostility to today's neutrality and to good-neighborly relations, we must continue our propaganda.

Comrade Khmelnitsky is needlessly fearful that the Mensheviks conduct their propaganda in order to lead the life of the working class. We do not speak of Social Democrats who have not understood the socialist republic, we do not speak of them or of petty-bourgeois bureaucracy—there is an irreconcilable ideological struggle with the Mensheviks, an implacable war. To tell a Menshevik that he is a petty-bourgeois democrat is the greatest insult to him, and the more calmly you prove this to a Menshevik, the greater his fury. To think that we shall surrender from our own achieved position even one hundredth or one thousandth part—that is an error. We shall not yield the slightest fraction.

The examples that Comrade Schmidt cited proved that even a group of the proletariat which stood closer to the bourgeoisie (for instance, printers), petty-bourgeois officials, bourgeois bank employees who conducted operations in commercial and industrial establishments, lose a great deal from the transition to socialism. We have closed masses of bourgeois newspapers, we have nationalized banks, we have closed an entire series of paths by which bank employees enriched themselves by participating in speculation, but even in this camp we see wavering, we see that they are coming over to us. If Khinchuk is valued for the fact that he knows how to set up little shops, then the bank employee is valued for the fact that he knows the technique of monetary affairs, with which many of us, although we are familiar theoretically, show very great weakness in practical work. And I speak with such a person who knows this technique and who tells me that he has moved from yesterday's hostility to neutrality and good-neighborly relations. We say: with every person intelligently negotiate. And in the Soviets, if Comrade Maximov pursues this tactic which he, as an outstanding member of the presidium of the Moscow Soviet, spoke of with regard to the intellectsia and wavering petty bourgeoisie, I shall be completely and abundantly satisfied.

Further, the question of cooperatives. Comrade Steklov expressed himself thus: there is a bad smell from cooperatives. Comrade Maximov said regarding cooperatives: one should not write such decrees as the latest decree of the Council of People's Commissars. In the practical sphere we lacked unanimity. It is nothing new for us that with petty bourgeoisie, if they are not hostile to us, we must agree on such a note. If the old position proves to be bad, it must be changed when changed circumstances require it. That things have changed in this regard we clearly see. Cooperatives serve as a graphic example here. The cooperative apparatus is a supply apparatus, calculated not on the private initiative of capitalists, but on the mass participation of the working people themselves, and Kautsky, long before he went over to the renegades, was right in saying that socialist society is one great cooperative.

If we strive to establish control and practically organize the economy for hundreds of thousands of people, we must not forget that when socialists discuss this question, they point out that they may be able to use the leaders of trusts as experienced practical men. Now experience shows that petty-bourgeois elements have moved from hostility to neutrality. And at the same time we must understand that they know how to organize little shops. We do not deny: Khinchuk as an ideologist is thoroughly saturated with bourgeois prejudices, one can smell them all from him, but at the same time they possess practical knowledge. In terms of ideas we have all the guns on our side, and they have not a single one. But when they say that they are not hostile and are moving to neutrality, we must take into account that now hundreds and thousands of people less capable than Khinchuk are also intelligently negotiating. I say: we must know how to negotiate with them. In the sphere of practical construction they know more, they are more skilled, and we must learn from them. Let them learn from us about influencing the international proletariat, but we shall learn from them how to set up shops. We do not know how to do this. Here in every sphere we need technicians with specialized knowledge.

And regarding cooperatives I do not understand why there is a bad smell here. When we were pushing through the first decree on cooperatives, we invited for discussion in the Council of People's Commissars people who were not only non-communists but who stood far closer to the White Guard camp, we conferred with them, we asked them: can you accept this? They said: yes to this, but we cannot accept that. Of course, from an external or thoughtless point of view this was compromise with the bourgeoisie. Representatives of bourgeois cooperation were invited and at their direction several articles of the decree were struck out. For example, an article on free use and entry into the proletarian cooperative was struck out. This seemed to us quite acceptable, but they rejected our proposal.

We say that we must go the path of agreement with people who know far better than we do how to set up shops. In this we are not informed, but we in no way retreat from our struggle. When we issued the next such decree, Comrade Maximov said: one should not write such decrees, because it says there: to reopen closed cooperatives. This shows that among the workers of the Moscow Soviet, as with us, there are certain misunderstandings, and even for the sake of eliminating such misunderstandings one must arrange such meetings and conversations as today's. We pointed out that for the interests of the cause we intended to use not only trade unions in general, but also the union of commercial and industrial employees, and commercial and industrial employees have always been the mainstay of the bourgeois system. But since these people turn to us and say: we agree to live in good-neighborly relations, meet them cordially, take the outstretched hand—the hand will not fall off. We shall not forget that if tomorrow the Anglo-French imperialists strike, they will turn away and be the first to flee. But when this party, these bourgeois elements do not flee, we repeat: here we need rapprochement. Therefore we adopted the decree which was published on Sunday and which displeases Comrade Maximov—by this he demonstrates the application of old communist tactics, inapplicable to new circumstances. If we had written it yesterday and in response received a resolution from the Central Committee of employees{94}, we would have made fools of ourselves if we had said: you started at the wrong time, why are you writing when a turning point has begun, when the situation is changing.

Armed capitalists are waging war ever more extensively and persistently, and it is terribly important for us to utilize this, albeit temporary, turning point in practical construction. All power is in our hands. We can not close cooperatives, but we can reopen the closed ones, because we closed them when they served White Guard agitation. But every slogan tends to harden more than necessary. When a wave of closure and persecution of cooperatives swept across Russia—this was required by the conditions of the moment. But now it is not required. An apparatus very important, connected with the middle peasantry, an apparatus which unites scattered, dispersed layers of peasants. These Khinchuks do useful work, conducted by bourgeois elements. When these peasants and petty-bourgeois democrats say that they are moving from hostility to neutrality, to good-neighborly relations, we must say: this is precisely what we need. And come, good neighbors, let us negotiate intelligently with you. We shall assist you in every way, we shall realize your rights; we shall consider your claims, grant you whatever privileges you wish, but fulfill our assignments. If you do not do this, know that the entire apparatus of the Extraordinary Commission remains in our hands. If you cannot utilize your rights and do not fulfill our assignments, then the entire apparatus of State Control remains in our hands, and we shall regard you as violators of state will. You must give us an account down to the last kopeck, and violation of this will be punished as a violation of state will and state laws.

All this control remains in our hands, but now to attract these people to ourselves, even if only temporarily—this is a task which from the point of view of world politics is not gigantic, but is absolutely essential for us. It will strengthen our position in war. We have no decent rear. This will give us a moral victory, because it will show West European imperialism that it will encounter quite a serious resistance from us, and this cannot be ignored, because in every country there is its own internal working, proletarian opposition against invasion of Russia. That is why I believe, insofar as one can judge from Comrade Maximov's statement, we are feeling out a definite accord. If disagreements do appear, they are not so essential, because once it is recognized that it is necessary to intelligently negotiate with regard to all petty-bourgeois democracy, the intellectsia, the cooperators, with professional unions not yet recognizing us, without relinquishing power, if we firmly pursue this policy throughout the entire winter—we shall gain already a great plus for the entire cause of international revolution.

First published in 1929 in the 2nd–3rd editions of the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, vol. XXIII

Printed from the stenographic record