32.

THESES ON THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
SITUATION.
[13 May 1918]

I.

It has been pointed out repeatedly in the Bolshevik press and acknowledged in official resolutions of the organs of the highest Soviet power [that there exists] extreme * instability in the international position of the Soviet Republic, surrounded by imperialist powers.

Over the past few days — that is, in the first third of May 1918 — the political situation has become extraordinarily acute both on account of external and internal causes:

First, the direct offensive of counter-revolutionary troops (Semenov and others) has intensified, with Japanese assistance in the Far East, and in connection with this, a number of signs pointed to the possibility of agreement by the entire anti-German imperialist coalition on a program of presenting Russia with an ultimatum: either wage war against Germany or [face] a Japanese invasion with our assistance.

Second, in German policy generally, the military party has gained the upper hand since Brest; it could, from moment to moment, now also gain the upper hand on the question of an immediate general offensive against Russia — that is, completely reject the other policy of the bourgeois-imperialist circles of Germany, which strive for new annexations in Russia but, for the time being,** for peace with it rather than for a general offensive against it.

* In the manuscript Lenin corrected this from "extreme."
—Ed.
** "For the time being" was inserted above, apparently during review of the theses.
—Ed.

THESES ON THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SITUATION

Third, the restoration of bourgeois-landlord monarchism in Ukraine with the support of Cadet-Octobrist elements of the all-Russian bourgeoisie and with the assistance of German troops could not but intensify the struggle against counter-revolution among you, could not but inspire plans, lift the spirits of our counter-revolution.

Fourth, the food crisis has become extremely acute and has led in many places to outright famine both as a consequence of our being cut off from Rostov-on-Don and as a consequence of the efforts of the petty bourgeoisie and capitalists generally to undermine the grain monopoly, in the face of insufficiently firm, disciplined, and ruthless resistance by the ruling class — that is, the proletariat — to these strivings, efforts, and attempts.

II.

The foreign policy of Soviet power must in no way be altered. Our military preparation is not yet complete, and therefore the general slogan remains as before: maneuver, retreat, wait, continuing this preparation with all our might.

While in no way renouncing [in principle] military agreements in general with one imperialist coalition against another in such cases where such an agreement, without undermining the foundations of Soviet power, could strengthen its position and paralyze the onslaught against it by some imperialist power, we cannot at the present moment enter into a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition. For what has real importance for it is the withdrawal of German troops from the West — that is, the advance of many Japanese corps into the interior of European Russia, and this condition is unacceptable as a complete collapse of Soviet power. If such an ultimatum were presented to us by the Anglo-French coalition, we would refuse it, because the danger of Japanese movement can be paralyzed with fewer difficulties (or can be delayed for a longer period of time) than the danger of occupation by the Germans of Petrograd, Moscow, and the greater part of European Russia.*

* Before the bracket at the beginning of this paragraph and after the bracket at the end of it there is a notation by Lenin: "Not for publication." —Ed.