V. I. Lenin

It might be argued that this is no time to deal with history. Certainly, this kind of assertion would be permissible
if a particular question from the past were not inseparably and
directly connected in practice with the present. The question of
the unfortunate peace, the exceptionally harsh peace is,
however, such a burning question that it calls for elucidation. I am therefore publishing my theses on this subject
that were read at a meeting of about sixty of the leading
Petrograd Party functionaries on January 8, 1918.

Here are these theses:

January 7, 1918.

Theses On The Question Of The Immediate Conclusion Of A Separate
And Annexationist Peace [1]

1. The position of the Russian revolution at the present moment
is such that nearly all the workers and the vast majority of the
peasants undoubtedly side with Soviet power and the socialist
revolution which it has started. To that extent the socialist
revolution in Russia is assured.

2. At the same time, the civil war, provoked by the frantic
resistance of the wealthy classes, who realise full well that
they are faced with the last and decisive fight for the
preservation of private ownership of the land and means of
production, has not yet reached its climax. The victory of
Soviet power in this war is assured, but some time must
inevitably elapse, no little exertion of effort will inevitably
be required, a certain period of acute economic dislocation and
chaos, which accompany all wars, and civil war in particular, is
inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is
crushed.

3. Furthermore, this resistance, in its less active and
non-military forms—sabotage, the hire of declassed elements
and agents of the bourgeoisie, who worm their way into the ranks
of the socialists in order to ruin their cause, and so on and so
forth—has proved so stubborn and capable of assuming such
diversified forms, that the fight against it will inevitably
require some more time, and, in its main forms, is hardly likely
to end until several months have passed. And unless this passive
and covert resistance of the bourgeoisie and its supporters-is
definitely crushed the socialist revolution cannot succeed.

4. Lastly, the organisational problems of the socialist
transformation of Russia are so immense and difficult that their
solution—in view of the numerous petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the socialist proletariat, and of the
latter's low cultural level—will also require a fairly long
time.

5. All these circumstances taken together are such as to make it
perfectly clear that for the success of socialism in Russia a
certain amount of time, several months at least, will be
necessary, during which the hands of the socialist government
must be absolutely free to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie
first in our own country and to launch far-reaching mass
organisational work on a wide scale.

6. The position of the socialist revolution in Russia must form
the basis of any definition of the international tasks of our
Soviet power, for the international situation in the fourth year
of the war is such that it is quite impossible to predict the
probable moment of outbreak of revolution and overthrow of any
of the European imperialist governments (including the
German). That the socialist revolution in Europe must come, and
will come, is beyond doubt. All our hopes for the final
victory of socialism are founded on this certainty and on this
scientific prognosis. Our propaganda activities in general, and
the organisation of fraternisation in particular, must be
intensified and extended. It would be a mistake, however, to
base the tactics of the Russian socialist government on attempts
to determine whether or not the European, and especially the
German, socialist revolution will take place in the next six
months (or some such brief period). Inasmuch as it is quite
impossible to determine this, all such attempts, objectively
speaking, would be nothing but a blind gamble.

7. The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have by
now—January 7, 1918—made it perfectly clear that the war party has undoubtedly gained the upper hand in the German
Government (which has the other governments of the Quadruple
Alliance at its beck and call) and has virtually already
presented Russia with an ultimatum (and it is to be expected,
most certainly to be expected, that any day now it will be
presented formally). The ultimatum is as follows: either the
continuation of the war, or a peace with annexations, i.e.,
peace on condition that we surrender all the territory we have
occupied, while the Germans retain all the territory they have occupied and impose upon us an indemnity (outwardly
disguised as payment for the maintenance of prisoners)—an
indemnity of about three thousand million rubles , payable over a number of years.

8. The socialist government of Russia is faced with the
question—a question whose solution brooks no delay—of whether to accept this peace with annexations now, or to
immediately wage a revolutionary war. In fact, no middle course
is possible. No further postponement can now be achieved, for we
have already done everything possible and impossible to
deliberately protract the negotiations.

9. On examining the arguments in favour of an immediate
revolutionary war, the first argument we encounter is that a
separate peace at this juncture would, objectively speaking, be
an agreement with the German imperialists, an "imperialistic
deal", and so forth, and that, consequently, such a peace would
mean a complete break with the fundamental principles of
proletarian internationalism.

This argument, however, is obviously incorrect. Workers who lose
a strike and sign terms for the resumption of work which are
unfavourable to them and favourable to the capitalists, do not
betray socialism. The only people who betray socialism are those
who secure advantages for a section of the workers in exchange
for profit to the capitalists; only such agreements are
impermissible in principle.

He betrays socialism who calls the war with German imperialism a defensive
and just war, but actually receives support from the
Anglo-French imperialists, and conceals secret treaties
concluded with them from the people. He does not in the least
betray socialism who, without concealing anything from the
people, and without concluding any secret treaties with the
imperialists, agrees to sign terms of peace which are unfavourable to the weak nation and favourable to the
imperialists of one group, if at that moment there is no
strength to continue the war.

10. Another argument in favour of immediate war is that, by
concluding peace, we objectively become agents of German
imperialism, for we afford it the opportunity to release troops
from our front, we surrender to it millions of prisoners of war,
and so on. But this argument too is manifestly incorrect, for a
revolutionary war at the present juncture would, objectively
speaking, make us agents of Anglo-French imperialism, by
providing it with forces which would promote its aims. The
British bluntly offered our Commander-in-Chief, Krylenko, one
hundred rubles per month for every one of our soldiers provided
we continued the war. Even if we did not take a single kopek
from the Anglo-French, we nevertheless would be helping them,
objectively speaking, by diverting part of the German army.

From that point of view, in neither case would we be entirely
escaping some sort of imperialist bond, and it is obvious that
it is impossible to escape it completely without overthrowing
world imperialism. The correct conclusion from this is that the
moment a socialist government triumphed in any one country,
questions must be decided, not from the point of view of whether
this or that imperialism is preferable, but exclusively from the
point of view of the conditions which best make for the
development and consolidation of the socialist revolution which
has already begun.

In other words, the underlying principle of our tactics must not be,
which of the two imperialisms it is more profitable to aid at
this juncture, but rather, how the socialist revolution can be
most firmly and reliably ensured the possibility of consolidating itself, or, at least, of maintaining itself in one
country until it is joined by other countries.

11. It is said that the German Social-Democratic opponents of
the war have now become "defeatists" and are requesting us not
to yield to German imperialism. But we recognised defeatism only
in respect of one's own imperialist bourgeoisie, and we
always discountenanced victory over an alien imperialism,
victory attained in formal or actual alliance with a "friendly"
imperialism, as a method impermissible in principle and
generally wrong.

This argument is therefore only a modification of the previous
one. If the German Left Social-Democrats were proposing that we
delay concluding a separate peace for a definite period, and guaranteed revolutionary action in Germany within
this period, the question might assume a different aspect for us. Far from saying this, however, the German Lefts
formally declare: "Hold out as long as you can, but decide the
question from the point of view of the state of affairs in the
Russian socialist revolution, for we cannot promise you
anything positive regarding the German revolution."

12. It is said that in a number of Party statements we actually
"promised" a revolutionary war, and that by concluding a
separate peace we would be going back on our word.

That is not true. We said that in the era of imperialism a
socialist government had to "prepare for and wage " a revolutionary war; we said this in order to combat abstract
pacifism and the theory that "defence of the fatherland" must be
completely rejected in the era of imperialism. and, lastly to
combat the purely selfish instincts of a part of the soldiers,
but we never gave any pledge to start a revolutionary war
without considering whether it is possible to wage it at a given
moment.

Unquestionably, even at this juncture we must prepare for a revolutionary war. We are carrying out this promise,
as we have, in general, carried out all our promises that could
be carried out at once: we annulled the secret treaties, offered
all peoples a fair peace, and several times did our best to drag
out peace negotiations so as to give other peoples a chance to
join us.

But the question whether it is possible to carry on a revolutionary
war now , immediately , must be decided exclusively from the point of view of whether material
conditions permit it, and of the interests of the socialist
revolution which has already begun.

13. Summing up the arguments in favour of an immediate
revolutionary war, we have to conclude that such a policy might
perhaps answer the human yearning for the beautiful, dramatic
and striking, but that it would totally disregard the objective
balance of class forces and material factors at the present
stage of the socialist revolution now under way.

14. There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely in no
condition at the present moment, and will not be for the next
few weeks (and probably for the next few months), to beat back a
German offensive successfully; firstly, owing to the extreme
fatigue and exhaustion of the majority of the soldiers, coupled
with the incredible chaos in the matter of food supply,
replacement of the overfatigued, etc.; secondly, owing to the
utter unfitness of the horses and the consequent inevitable ruin
of our artillery; and, thirdly, owing to the absolute impossibility of defending the coastline from Riga to Revel,
which affords the enemy a very certain chance of seizing the
rest of Lifland, and then Estland, and of outflanking a large
part of our forces, and finally, of capturing Petrograd.

15. Further, there is not the slightest doubt that the peasant
majority of our army would at the present juncture unreservedly
declare in favour of a peace with annexations and not in favour
of an immediate revolutionary war; the socialist reorganisation
of the army, the merging of the Red Guard detachments with it,
and so on, have only just begun.

With the army completely democratised, to carry on war in
defiance of the wishes of the majority of the soldiers would be
a reckless gamble, while to create a really staunch and
ideologically stable socialist workers' and peasants' army will,
at the very least, require months and months.

16. The poor peasants in Russia are capable of supporting the
socialist revolution led by the working class, but they are not
capable of agreeing to fight a serious revolutionary war
immediately, at the present juncture. To ignore the objective
balance of class forces on this issue would be a fatal error.

17. Consequently, the situation at present with regard to a
revolutionary war is as follows:

If the German revolution were to break out and triumph in the
coming three or four months, the tactics of an immediate
revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist revolution.

If, however, the German revolution does not occur in the next
few months, the course of events, if the war is continued, will
inevitably be such that grave defeats will compel Russia to
conclude an even more disadvantageous separate peace, a peace,
moreover, which would be concluded, not by a socialist government, but by some other (for example, a bloc of the
bourgeois Rada and Chernov's followers, or something similar). For the peasant army, which is exhausted to the limit
by the war, will after the very first defeats—and very likely within a-matter of weeks, and not of
months—overthrow the socialist workers' government.

18. This being the state of affairs, it would be absolutely
impermissible tactics to stake the fate of the socialist
revolution, which has already begun in Russia, merely on the
chance that the German revolution may begin in the immediate
future, within a matter of weeks. Such tactics would be a
reckless gamble. We have no right to take such risks.

19. The German revolution will by no means be made more
difficult of accomplishment as far as its objective premises are
concerned, if we conclude a separate peace. Probably chauvinist
intoxication will weaken it for a time, but Germany's position
will remain extremely grave, the war with Britain and America
will be a protracted one, and aggressive imperialism will be
fully and completely exposed on both sides. A socialist Soviet
Republic in Russia will stand as a living example to the peoples
of all countries, and the propaganda and revolutionising effect
of this example will be immense. There—the bourgeois system
and a fully exposed predatory war between two groups of
marauders. Here—peace and a socialist Soviet Republic.

20. In concluding a separate peace we free ourselves as much as is possible at the present moment from both hostile
imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and
warfare which hamper concerted action on their part against us,
and for a certain period have our hands free to advance and to
consolidate the socialist revolution. The reorganisation of
Russia on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
the nationalisation of the banks and large-scale industry,
coupled with exchange of products in kind between the towns and the small-peasant consumers' societies, is quite
feasible economically, provided we are assured a few months in
which to work in peace. And such a reorganisation will render
socialism invincible both in Russia and all over the world, and
at the same time will create a solid economic basis for a mighty
workers' and peasants' Red Army.

21. A really revolutionary war at this juncture would be a war
waged by a socialist republic against the bourgeois countries,
with the aim—an aim clearly defined and fully approved by
the socialist army—of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in other
countries. However, we obviously cannot set ourselves this aim at the present moment. Objectively, we would
be fighting now for the liberation of Poland, Lifland and
Courland. But no Marxist, without renouncing the principles of
Marxism and of socialism generally, can deny that the interests
of socialism are higher than the interests of the right of
nations to self-determination. Our socialist republic has done
all it could, and continues to do all it can to give effect to
the right to self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine,
etc. But if the concrete situation is such that the existence of
the socialist republic is being imperilled at the present moment
on account of the violation of the right to self-determination
of several nations (Poland, Lifland, Courland, etc.), naturally
the preservation of the socialist republic has the higher
claim.

Consequently, whoever says, "We cannot sign a humiliating,
atrocious, etc., peace, betray Poland, and so forth", does not
realise that by concluding peace on the condition that Poland is
liberated, he would only be strengthening German imperialism
against Britain, Belgium, Serbia and other countries still further. Peace on the condition of the liberation of
Poland, Lifland and Courland would be a "patriotic" peace
from the point of view of Russia , but would by no means
cease to be a peace with the annexationists , with the
German imperialists.

January 21, 1918. The following should be added to the above theses:

22. The mass strikes in Austria and Germany, and, subsequently,
the formation of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in Berlin and
Vienna, and, lastly, beginning from January 18-20, armed clashes
and street fighting in Berlin—all this should be regarded
as evidence of the fact that the revolution in Germany has
begun.

This fact offers us the opportunity, for the time being, of
further delaying and dragging out the peace negotiations.

---
Notes:
[1] A
discussion of the question of war and peace was held by the
Central Committee on January 11 (24), 1918, following a speech
by Lenin, who was opposed by the Left Communists and
Trotsky. Some of them—Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov (Oppokov)—supported Trotsky's proposal for a "neither war
nor peace" attitude. Stalin, Sergeyev (Artyom) and Sokolnikov
favoured peace. The Left Communists did not expect the "revolutionary war now" slogan to go through (only two voted for
it), and so voted for Trotsky's proposal, which received 9 votes
to 7 against. In the hope of overcoming the resistance to the
conclusion of peace within the Central Committee and winning
over the section of the masses which followed the advocates of a
revolutionary war, Lenin motioned the proposal that the talks
should be delayed in every possible way, and this was passed by
12 votes to one.

N. Lenin