Date: 1917
Source: ru:PSS/v31

The newspapers of April 16 publish the following resolution:

“Having deliberated upon the reports submitted by our comrades regarding the spread of disruptive propaganda cloaked in revolutionary, and often even social‑democratic, banners—particularly the propaganda disseminated by the so‑called ‘Leninists’—and deeming this propaganda no less harmful than any counterrevolutionary agitation emanating from the right, while at the same time recognizing that it is impossible to adopt repressive measures against such propaganda as long as it remains nothing more than mere propaganda, the Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers’ Deputies deems it absolutely essential to take every possible measure to counter this propaganda with our own propaganda and agitation. We must strive to ensure that our organizations are strong enough to meet, at any moment and from whatever quarter they may originate, any counterrevolutionary action with our own countermeasures. We express our firm desire that the Executive Committee, in order to combat this disruptive propaganda, launch a systematic campaign of agitation both in the press and, above all, within the military units.”

If we compare this resolution with the statement we cited earlier from the leading editorial of the Izvestia (dated April 17), which condemned “the dishonorable and abhorrent smear campaign,” we immediately see the political divide that has, in fact, taken shape on this very issue:

“Russkaya Volya,” as the organ of slander, and “Edinstvo” under Mr. Plekhanov, which merely echoes “this method of struggle,” are recognized as witnesses—and as “the cause of the People.”

By contrast, the Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers’ Deputies takes a different stance, explicitly declaring that “it is impossible to adopt repressive measures as long as the propaganda remains nothing more than propaganda.”

This is why we are reprinting the resolution of the Executive Committee in full and deem it highly useful to examine its substance in detail.

The resolution declares Lenin’s propaganda to be “no less harmful than any counterrevolutionary agitation emanating from the right.”

Let us now consider the essential differences between: 1) counterrevolutionary agitation from the right; 2) propaganda in support of the Provisional Government and its policies; and 3) our own propaganda.

The Right seeks the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the restoration of monarchy.

The Provisional Government had pledged to act in accordance with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

Our propaganda holds that all power in the state must pass exclusively into the hands of the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’, and other deputies—because these Soviets represent, by definition, the vast majority of the people. To this end, we seek to achieve, through “explanation” (as Lenin stated clearly and precisely in his theses from the very first day)[49], that the majority of the people come to understand the necessity of such a transfer of power.

Thus, the Right advocates for monarchical rule. The capitalists advocate for the rule of the capitalists (for the Provisional Government is, in essence, the government of the capitalists); they promise to act in accordance with the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

We aim to convince the majority of the people that power must reside solely in the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and other deputies.

It is perfectly clear that to describe our propaganda as “no less harmful than any counterrevolutionary agitation from the right” would be untenable—even from the standpoint of those who advocate an agreement with the Provisional Government. For the proponents of such an agreement are, at present, relying on the majority of the people! How then can they claim that our propaganda—propaganda that urges the majority to seize all power—is “just as harmful as the Right’s” agitation?

This is a blatant contradiction.

The Council of Soldiers’ Deputies can hardly sustain such a view held by its Executive Committee for much longer.

Let us move forward.

What, in essence, are the points of disagreement between us?

Primarily, there are three key issues:

(1) Land. We advocate that the peasants, acting on their own initiative and in accordance with the decisions of the majority of local peasants, should seize all land without delay—thereby increasing the production of grain and meat for the soldiers.

The Provisional Government, by contrast, favors “agreement” between the peasants and the landowners—that is, “agreement” between three hundred peasants and a single landowner.

Let us see whether the majority of the people will side with us or with the Provisional Government on this question.

(2) We advocate a republic in which, from top to bottom, there would be no police force, no standing army (for, in our view, the entire people should be armed in a universal manner), and no bureaucracy whose members enjoy lifelong tenure and receive privileged, bourgeois wages for their labor. We call for complete electivity, for the ability to remove all officials at any time, and for proletarian wages for all.

The Provisional Government, on the other hand, advocates the restoration of the traditional police force, the establishment of a standing army, and the maintenance of the conventional bureaucratic apparatus.

(3) The Provisional Government supports the continuation of the very war begun by Nicholas the Bloody. It seeks to uphold the secret, predatory treaties it has concluded—without consulting the will of the people, and even without publishing those treaties.

We oppose such a war, we oppose the ratification of these treaties, and we oppose their non‑publication.

We urge all peoples, without exception, to bring this war to an end not through violent means—i.e., through a truly democratic peace that grants freedom to all peoples and nationalities without exception—but through a peace that is genuinely free. We wish to demonstrate to the people that, in order to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion, it is indeed necessary—not through violent means—to transfer state power entirely and exclusively into the hands of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

For as long as power remains in the hands of the capitalists and landowners (Guchkov, Lvov, Milyukov), the war will, in practice, continue to be directed by the capitalists; all promises of a peace without annexations will remain nothing more than empty promises; the working masses around the world will inevitably lose faith in the government of the capitalists—and the war, therefore, will only drag on.

The question arises: what if, in Russia, power passes into the hands of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, while in Germany no such revolution occurs—one that would overthrow not only Wilhelm II but also the German Guchkovs and Milyukovs? (For if the German Nicholas II is replaced by German Guchkovs and Milyukovs, then with regard to the war, absolutely nothing will change.)

Our answer: power in the hands of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies will be the power of the majority of the people—and the majority consists of workers and the poorest peasants. They have no real stake in annexations; they will renounce them not in words but in deeds, and in practice they will cease to serve as guardians of capitalist profits.

Under such conditions, we are prepared to engage in revolutionary warfare against the capitalists of any country—for in reality, this will be a war waged against the interests of capital in general, rather than a war fought in defense of the interests of the capitalists of a single nation.

The question is: how, in practice, can we accelerate the process of peace—immediately, without delay—if it is impossible to end the war simply by driving bayonets into the ground?

Our answer: the war cannot be ended either by merely thrusting bayonets into the earth or by one-sided withdrawal on the part of a single belligerent. The practical, immediate means of hastening peace is—and can be—only one (apart from the victory of the workers’ revolution over the capitalists): the fraternization of soldiers at the front.

Immediate, energetic, comprehensive, and unconditional assistance from our side to the fraternization of soldiers on both sides of the conflict at the front.

Such fraternization has already begun. Let us help it along.

These are our views. We are firmly convinced that the majority of the people will not regard them as “no less harmful than any counterrevolutionary agitation from the right.”

“Pravda,” No. 35, May 1 (April 18), 1917. Signed: N. Lenin

Printed according to the text of the newspaper “Pravda.”