# The Crisis Has Come to a Head{95}
Source: PSS vol 34

I

There is no doubt that the end of September brought about the most profound turning point in the history of the Russian Revolution—and, by all appearances, in the history of the global revolution as well.

The worldwide workers’ revolution began with the solitary acts of individuals who, with selfless courage, stood forth to represent all that remained of honest, upright “socialism,” which in reality had long since degenerated into social-chauvinism. Liebknecht in Germany, Adler in Austria, McLane in England—these are among the most renowned names of those heroic lone fighters who took upon themselves the arduous task of becoming the forerunners of a global revolution.

The second stage in the historical preparation for this revolution was marked by widespread mass ferment, which manifested itself both in the form of splits within official parties and in the publication of clandestine periodicals, as well as in the eruption of street demonstrations. Protests against the war grew ever more intense—as did the number of victims of government repression. Prisons in countries famed for their supposed legality, even for their ostensible freedom—Germany, France, Italy, England—began to fill with dozens, then hundreds, of internationalists, opponents of war, and advocates of the workers’ revolution.

Now came the third stage, which may be regarded as the eve of revolution. The mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy—and especially the outbreak of military uprisings in Germany{96}—are unmistakable signs of a great turning point, hallmarks of the revolutionary eve on a global scale.

The front page of the newspaper “Workers’ Path,” No. 30, October 20 (7), 1917, featuring V. I. Lenin’s article “The Crisis Has Come to a Head” (Reduced)

There is no doubt that there had been isolated instances of mutiny within the German armed forces before; yet these incidents were so minor, so fragmented, so weak that they could easily be suppressed, silenced—and therein lay the key to preventing the spread of contagious, large-scale mutinous activity. Finally, however, a movement emerged within the navy that could no longer be quelled or hushed up—even despite the unprecedentedly elaborate and painstakingly enforced strictures of the German military–penal regime.

Doubt is impossible. We stand on the threshold of a world proletarian revolution. And since we, the Russian Bolsheviks, are the only ones among all proletarian internationalists across the globe to enjoy relatively vast freedom, to operate an open party, to publish a dozen or so newspapers, to have the support of the capital’s Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, and to command the majority of the popular masses during times of revolution, it is indeed fitting—and indeed necessary—to apply to us the words: To whom much is given, of him much will be required.

II

In Russia, the pivotal moment of the revolution is beyond dispute.

In a peasant country, under a revolutionary, republican government that enjoys the backing of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties—parties that until yesterday still held sway over the petty-bourgeois democratic milieu—a peasant uprising is growing.

It seems incredible, but it is a fact.

And we Bolsheviks are not at all surprised by this fact; we have always maintained that the infamous “coalition” government with the bourgeoisie is a government that has betrayed democracy and the revolution—a government of imperialist slaughter, a government that seeks to shield capitalists and landowners from the people.

In Russia, thanks to the deception perpetrated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, there remains—and will continue to remain, even under a republic and in the midst of revolution—a government of capitalists and landowners, operating side by side with the Soviets. Such is the bitter, grim reality. What, then, is so surprising if, in Russia, amid the unprecedented calamities inflicted upon the people by the protracted imperialist war and its aftermath, a peasant uprising has begun and is steadily gaining momentum?

What, then, is so surprising if the opponents of the Bolsheviks—the leaders of the official Socialist-Revolutionary Party—those very same leaders who had consistently supported the “coalition,” who until the very last days—or perhaps the very last weeks—still enjoyed the support of the majority of the people, who continue to denounce and persecute the “new” Socialist-Revolutionaries who have come to recognize the betrayal of the peasants’ interests through the coalition’s policies—what, then, is so surprising when these leaders of the official Socialist-Revolutionary Party write on September 29th in the editorial column of “The People’s Cause,” their official organ:

“…Almost nothing has been done thus far to abolish those oppressive relations that still prevail in the countryside, particularly in central Russia… The law on the regularization of land relations in the countryside, long since submitted to the Provisional Government and even passed through such a rigorous vetting process as the Legal Council, has hopelessly stalled in some bureaucratic office… Are we not right to assert that our republican government is far from having cast off the old habits of tsarist administration, that Stolypin’s iron grip still makes itself felt in the methods employed by revolutionary ministers?”

Thus speak the official Socialist-Revolutionaries! Consider this: supporters of the coalition are forced to admit that, seven months into the revolution in a peasant country, “almost nothing has been done to eliminate the bondage” of the peasants, the subjugation of the peasantry by the landlords! These Socialist-Revolutionaries are compelled to label their colleague Kerensky—and his entire band of ministers—as Stolypinists.

Can one find a more eloquent testimony from the camp of our adversaries, confirming not only that the coalition has collapsed, not only that the official Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have borne with Kerensky, have become a party hostile to the people, hostile to the peasantry, counterrevolutionary—but also that the entire Russian Revolution has reached a turning point?

A peasant uprising in a peasant country, directed against the government of Kerensky, the Socialist-Revolutionary Nikitin and Gvozdev, the Mensheviks, and other ministers representing the interests of capital and the landed gentry! The suppression of this uprising by military means, carried out by the republican government.

Can one, in the face of such facts, still remain a sincere advocate of the proletariat while denying that a crisis has come to a head, that the revolution is undergoing its greatest turning point, and that a victory of the government over the peasant uprising would now amount to the final burial of the revolution—a decisive triumph for the Kornilovists?

III

It is self-evident that if, in a peasant country, after seven months of democratic republicanism, matters could descend to the point of a peasant uprising, then this irrefutably demonstrates the nation-wide collapse of the revolution, the depth of its crisis—now reaching an unprecedented intensity—and the approach of counter‑revolutionary forces to the very brink.

This is self-evident. In the face of a fact as stark as a peasant uprising, all other political symptoms—even those that might seem to contradict the looming national crisis—would carry absolutely no weight whatsoever.

Yet all the symptoms, on the contrary, point unmistakably to the fact that a national crisis has indeed come to a head.

After the agrarian question, in the life of Russia as a whole, the national question assumes particularly great significance—especially for the petty-bourgeois masses of the population. And we see that at the “Democratic” Conference, rigged by Mr. Tsereteli and his allies, the “national” faction, in terms of radicalism, slips into second place, yielding only to the trade unions—and ranking above the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in terms of the percentage of votes cast against the coalition (40 out of 55). From Finland, Kerensky’s government—the government that had suppressed the peasant uprising—withdraws revolutionary troops in order to bolster the reactionary Finnish bourgeoisie. In Ukraine, conflicts between Ukrainians in general, and Ukrainian troops in particular, with the government are growing ever more frequent.

Let us turn next to the army, which, in wartime, holds an exceptionally crucial position in the entire fabric of state life. We have witnessed the complete defection of both the Finnish troops and the Baltic Fleet from the government. We see the testimony of Officer Dubasov, a non‑Bolshevik who speaks on behalf of the entire front—and who, in his revolutionary fervor, outstrips even the Bolsheviks themselves—declaring that the soldiers will no longer fight.{97} We see government reports indicating that the soldiers’ mood is “nervous,” and that there can be no guarantee of “order” (that is, of these troops’ willingness to participate in the suppression of the peasant uprising). Finally, we observe the voting results in Moscow: out of seventeen thousand soldiers, fourteen thousand cast their ballots for the Bolsheviks.

This vote in the elections to the district councils in Moscow stands as one of the most striking indicators of the profound shift in the nation-wide mood. It is widely known that Moscow is more petty‑bourgeois than St. Petersburg. It is also a well‑established and incontrovertible fact that the Moscow proletariat maintains incomparably stronger ties with the countryside—cultivating rural sympathies and maintaining close proximity to the sentiments of the rural peasantry.

And yet in Moscow, the share of votes for the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks drops from 70 percent in June to just 18 percent. The petty bourgeoisie has turned away from the coalition; the people have turned away from it—there can be no doubt about this. The Kadets have strengthened their position, rising from 17 percent to 30 percent—but they remain a minority, a hopeless minority, despite the obvious defection to their ranks of “right‑wing” Socialist Revolutionaries and “right‑wing” Mensheviks. Meanwhile, “Russkiye Vedomosti”{98} report that the absolute number of votes for the Kadets has fallen from 67,000 to 62,000. Only the Bolsheviks have seen their vote total rise—from 34,000 to 82,000. They secured 47 percent of the total votes cast. There can be no shadow of doubt that, together with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, we now hold the majority—not only in the Soviets, but also in the army, and throughout the country.

Among the symptoms that bear not only symptomatic but also highly real significance, we must also count the fact that the railway workers’ and postal service employees’ armies—of immense economic, political, and military importance—continue to be locked in acute conflict with the government.{99} Even the defense-minded Mensheviks are dissatisfied with their own Minister Nikitin, while the official Socialist Revolutionaries refer to Kerensky and his colleagues as “Stolypinists.” Is it not clear that any “support” the government receives from the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, if it carries any weight at all, can only be negative in nature?

IV

……..

V

Yes, the leaders of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing a correct tactic of defending the bourgeoisie and the landowners. And there is not the slightest doubt that if the Bolsheviks had allowed themselves to be trapped by constitutional illusions, by a “faith” in the Congress of Soviets and in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, by “expectations” regarding the Congress of Soviets, and so forth—there is no doubt that such Bolsheviks would have proved to be pitiful betrayers of the proletarian cause.

They would have betrayed the cause, for by their conduct they would have abandoned the German revolutionary workers who had launched an uprising in the navy. Under such circumstances, to “wait” for the Congress of Soviets and the like is tantamount to betraying internationalism, to betraying the cause of the international socialist revolution.

For internationalism does not consist merely in empty phrases, in expressions of solidarity, or in resolutions—it consists in action.

The Bolsheviks would have betrayed the peasantry, for to tolerate the government’s suppression of the peasant uprising—government whose policies even “The Cause of the People” compares to those of the Stolypins—means to doom the entire revolution, to destroy it once and for all, irreversibly. They cry out about anarchism and the growing indifference of the masses: how could the masses not be indifferent to elections when the peasantry has been driven to revolt, while the so‑called “revolutionary democracy” patiently endures the military suppression of that very revolt?!

The Bolsheviks would have betrayed democracy and freedom, for to allow the suppression of the peasant uprising at such a critical juncture means to permit the rigging of the elections to the Constituent Assembly—indeed, in exactly the same way—and even more crudely and blatantly—than the “Democratic Conference” and the “Pre‑Parliament” were rigged.

The dialectics have reached a critical juncture. The entire future of the Russian Revolution hangs in the balance. The very honor of the Bolshevik Party is called into question. The entire future of the international workers’ revolution for socialism is at stake.

The crisis has come to a head…

September 29, 1917.

Up to this point may be printed; the remainder is to be distributed among members of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Moscow Committee, and the Soviets.

VI

So what is to be done? We must “speak the truth,” to acknowledge that within the Central Committee and at the higher echelons of the Party there exists a current—or a line of thought—favoring the postponement of the Soviet Congress, opposing the immediate seizure of power, and rejecting an immediate uprising. This current or line of thought must be overcome{100}.

Otherwise, the Bolsheviks will forever disgrace themselves and cease to exist as a party.

For to let such a moment slip by and to “wait” for the Soviet Congress is sheer idiocy—or, worse still, outright betrayal.

It is a complete betrayal of the German workers. Are we really to wait for their revolution to begin?! Then even the Liberdans will claim to be “supporting” it. But their revolution cannot begin while Kerensky, Kishkin, and the like remain in power.

It is a complete betrayal of the peasantry. To allow the two capital-based Soviets to suppress a peasant uprising means to forfeit—and justly forfeit—all remaining trust among the peasants; it means reducing ourselves in the eyes of the peasantry to the same level as the Liberdans and other scoundrels.

To “wait” for the Soviet Congress is sheer idiocy, for it means letting weeks slip by—and today, weeks, even days, are decisive. It means cowardly renouncing the seizure of power, since on November 1–2, such an undertaking will become impossible (both politically and technically: the Cossacks will be mobilized in a most foolish manner for the day of the “appointed”[19] uprising).

To “wait” for the Soviet Congress is idiocy, for the Congress will bring nothing—and can bring nothing!

What about its “moral” significance? How astonishing!! What “significance” can resolutions and conversations with the Liberdans possibly hold, when we know full well that the Soviets stand with the peasantry and that the peasant uprising is being crushed?! By doing so, we reduce the Soviets to the role of mere idle chatterers. First defeat Kerensky, then convene the Congress.

The victory of the uprising is now assured for the Bolsheviks: 1) we can[20] (if we do not “wait” for the Soviet Congress) strike suddenly from three directions—Petrograd, Moscow, and the Baltic Fleet; 2) we possess slogans that guarantee us broad support: Down with the government that crushes the peasant uprising against the landlords! 3) we hold the majority in the country; 4) the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are utterly disintegrated; 5) we have the technical capacity to seize power in Moscow—which could even be launched preemptively, striking the enemy with the element of surprise; 6) we have thousands of armed workers and soldiers in Petrograd, capable of seizing the Winter Palace, the General Staff, the telephone exchange, and all major printing houses in an instant; if they cannot drive us out of these positions—and if agitation within the army takes hold in such a way that it becomes impossible to resist this government of peace, of peasant land, and so forth—then we shall prevail.

Had we struck immediately, suddenly, from three directions—Petrograd, Moscow, and the Baltic Fleet—we would have had a ninety-nine percent chance of emerging victorious with fewer casualties than on July 3–5, for no troops would march against the government of peace. Even if Kerensky already commands “loyal” cavalry units and the like in Petrograd, with a double-pronged attack and the army’s growing sympathy for us, Kerensky would be forced to surrender. If, even under such favorable odds as we face now, we fail to seize power, then all talk of handing power over to the Soviets becomes nothing but lies.

To refrain from seizing power now, to “wait,” to engage in empty rhetoric within the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to confine ourselves to “struggles for organs” (the Soviets), to “struggles for the Congress”—such a course means condemning the revolution to ruin.

Seeing that the Central Committee has continued to ignore my appeals along these lines since the beginning of the Democratic Conference; seeing that the Central Organ systematically expunges from my articles any reference to such glaring errors committed by the Bolsheviks—such as the shameful decision to participate in the Pre‑Parliament, the decision to grant the Mensheviks a seat on the Presidium of the Soviet, and so on and so forth—I am compelled to perceive in this a subtle hint of the Central Committee’s unwillingness even to discuss this issue—a subtle attempt to silence me, and a veiled suggestion that I withdraw from the scene.

I am therefore compelled to submit a request to resign from the Central Committee—as I now do—and to retain the freedom to agitate among the lower ranks of the Party and at the Party Congress itself.

For I am firmly convinced that if we “wait” for the Soviet Congress and let this moment slip by, we will doom the revolution.

September 29.

P.S. A whole series of facts has shown that even the Cossack troops will not march against the government of peace! And how many of them are there? Where are they? And will not the entire army, in turn, dispatch detachments to fight on our side?

Published: Chapters I–III and V on October 20 (7), 1917, in the newspaper “Rabochiy Put,” No. 30; Chapter VI was first published in 1924.

Printed here: Chapters I–III according to the newspaper text, Chapters V–VI according to the manuscript.