There is no need to dwell at length on the political situation. The political question is now directly approaching the military question. It is all too clear that Kerensky has attracted the Kornilovites; he has no one else to lean on. In Moscow they have seized the Kremlin, but the outlying districts, where the workers and the poorest population generally live, are not in their power. At the front, no one supports Kerensky. Even vacillating elements, such as the members of the railway union, are speaking out in favour of the decree on peace and on land.

The vast majority of the peasants, soldiers and workers stands for the policy of peace.

This is not a policy of the Bolsheviks; it is not a “party” policy at all, but the policy of the workers, soldiers and peasants, i.e. of the majority of the people. We are not carrying out the Bolshevik programme, and in the land question our programme has been taken wholly from the peasant mandates.

But it is our fault that the S.R.s and Mensheviks left. They were offered a share of power, but they want to wait until the struggle with Kerensky is over.

We invited everyone to participate in the government. The Left S.R.s{16} declared that they wanted to support the policy of the Soviet government. They did not even venture to declare their disagreement with the programme of the new government.

In the provinces they believe newspapers like *Delo Naroda*{17}. Here everyone knows that the S.R.s and Mensheviks left because they remained in the minority. The Petrograd garrison knows this. It knows that we wanted a Soviet coalition government. We did not exclude anyone from the Soviet. If they did not want joint work, so much the worse for them. The soldier and peasant masses will not follow the Mensheviks and S.R.s. I have no doubt that at any workers’ and soldiers’ meeting nine-tenths will speak out in our favour.

Kerensky’s attempt is just as pitiful an adventure as Kornilov’s attempt. But the moment is now difficult. Energetic measures are necessary to put the food supply in order and to end the disasters of the war. We cannot wait, and we cannot tolerate Kerensky’s uprising for a single day. If the Kornilovites organise a new offensive, they will be answered as the uprising of the cadets was answered today. Let the cadets blame themselves. We took power almost without bloodshed. If there were casualties, they were only on our side. The whole people desired precisely the policy that the new government is pursuing. It did not take that policy from the Bolsheviks, but from the soldiers at the front, from the peasants in the countryside and from the workers in the cities.

The decree on workers’ control is to appear within a few days. I repeat: the political situation has now been reduced to a military one. We cannot tolerate a victory for Kerensky: then there would be neither peace, nor land, nor freedom. I have no doubt that the Petrograd soldiers and workers, who have only just completed a victorious uprising, will be able to suppress the Kornilovites. We had shortcomings. There is no denying this. Because of this we lost something. But these shortcomings can be eliminated. Without losing a single hour, a single minute, we must organise ourselves, organise a headquarters; this must be done today. Once organised, we shall be able to secure victory in a few days, perhaps even sooner.

The government, created by the will of the workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies, will not tolerate the Kornilovites’ mockery of it.

The task of policy and the military task: organisation of a headquarters, concentration of material forces, provision of everything necessary for the soldiers; this must be done without losing a single hour, a single minute, so that everything proceeds just as victoriously from now on as it has done so far.