V. I. Lenin

Questions To Delegates To The Army Congress On The
Demobilisation Of The
Army [1] (1) Is the likelihood of the Germans starting an offensive
in the near future great or small— (a) from the viewpoint of the physical and technical
possibility of a winter offensive; (b) from the viewpoint of the mood of the mass of the
German soldiers; is that mood capable of preventing an offensive, or at least of retarding it?

(2) Can it be assumed that the Germans, if we immediately break off peace negotiations, and if their troops
immediately take the offensive, are capable of inflicting a
decisive defeat upon us? Will they be able to take Petrograd?

(3) Is it to be feared that the news of the peace negotiations having been broken off will result in
widespread anarchist sentiments in the army and in desertions from
the front, or may we be confident that the army will staunchly
hold the front even after the receipt of such news?

(4) Would our army be capable, from the military viewpoint, of resisting a German offensive, if it began
on January 1? If not, when would our army be in a position to
resist a German offensive?

(5) In the event of a swift German advance, could our army retire in good order and preserve its
artillery, and if so. could the Germans’ advance into the
heart of Russia be held up for long?

(6) General conclusion: from the point of view of the state of the army, should we strive to drag out the
peace negotiations, or would it be preferable to break them off
immediately in revolutionary fashion, because of the Germans
annexationist policy and as a decisive and firm step which would
prepare the ground for a possible revolutionary war?

(7) Should we at once undertake intensive agitation against the Germans’ annexationist policy and for a
revolutionary war?

(8) Would it be possible at very short notice (5-10 days, say) to arrange a canvass of fairly wide
sections of the army at the front with a view to obtaining fuller
replies to the above questions in more suitable form?

(9) Is it to be hoped that the dissensions with the Ukrainians will weaken, or even yield place to a firm
consolidation of forces when they hear of the Germans’ annexationist demands, or it may be expected that the Ukrainians
will take advantage of the Great Hussians’ greater difficulties to step up the struggle against them?

(10) If the army could vote would it be in favour of immediate peace on annexationist (loss of the occupied
regions) and economically very harsh terms for Russia, or would it
favour the maximum effort for a revolutionary war, i.e.,
resistance to the Germans?