V. I.

Lenin

The term compromise in politics implies the surrender of
certain demands, the renunciation of part of one’s demands, by
agreement with another party.

The usual idea the man in the.street has about the Bolsheviks,
an idea encouraged by a press which slanders them, is that the
Bolsheviks will never agree to a compromise with anybody.

The idea is flattering to us as the party of the revolutionary
proletariat, for it proves that even our enemies are compelled to
admit our loyalty to the fundamental principles of socialism and
revolution. Nevertheless, we must say that this idea is
wrong. Engels was right when, in his criticism of the Manifesto of
the Blanquist
Communists [1] (1873), he ridiculed their declaration: “No
compromises!” [2]
This, he said, was an empty phrase, for compromises are often unavoidably forced upon a
fighting party by circumstances, and it is absurd to refuse once
and for all to accept “payments on account” [3]
The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare that it is
impossible to renounce all compromises, but to be able,
through all compromises , when they are unavoidable, to
remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its
task of paving the way for revolution and educating the mass of
the people for victory in the revolution.

To agree, for instance, to participate in the Third and Fourth
Dumas was a compromise, a temporary renunciation of revolutionary
demands. But this was a compromise absolutely forced upon us, for
the balance of forces made it impossible for us for the time being
to conduct a mass revolutionary struggle, and in order to prepare
this struggle over a long period we had to be able to work even from
inside such a “pigsty”. History has proved that this approach to the question by the Bolsheviks as a party
was perfectly correct.

Now the question is not of a forced, but of a voluntary
compromise.

Our Party, like any other political party, is striving after
political domination for itself . Our aim is the dictatorship of
the revolutionary proletariat. Six months o.f revolution have
proved very clearly, forcefully and convincingly that this demand
is correct and inevitable in the interests of this particular
revolution, for otherwise the people will never obtain a
democratic peace, land for the peasants, or complete freedom (a
fully democratic republic). This has been shown and proved by the
course of events during the six months of our revolution, by the
struggle of the classes and parties and by the development of the
crises of April 20–21, June 9–10 and 18–19, July 3–5 and August
27–31.

The Russian revolution is experiencing so abrupt and original a
turn that we, as a party, may offer a voluntary compromise—true, not to our direct and main class enemy, the
bourgeoisie, but to our nearest adversaries, the “ruling”
petty-bourgeois-democratic parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries
and Mensheviks.

We may offer a compromise to these parties only by way of
exception, and only by virtue of the particular situation, which
will obviously last only a very short time. And I think we should
do so.

The compromise on our part is our return to the pre-July demand
of all power to the Soviets and a government of S.R.s and
Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.

Now, and only now, perhaps during only a few days or a week
or two, such a government could be set up and consolidated in a
perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure the
peaceful advance of the whole Russian revolution, and provide
exceptionally good chances for great strides in the world movement
towards peace and the victory of socialism.

In my opinion, the Bolsheviks, who are partisans of world
revolution and revolutionary methods, may and should consent to
this compromise only for the sake of the revolution’s peaceful
development—an opportunity that is extremely rare in history
and extremely valuable, an opportunity that only occurs once in a
while.

The compromise would amount to the following: the Bolsheviks,
without making any claim to participate in the government (which
is impossible for the internationalists unless a dictatorship of
the proletariat and the poor peasants has been realised), would
refrain from demanding the immediate transfer of power to the
proletariat and the poor peasants and from employing revolutionary
methods of fighting for this demand. A condition that is
self-evident and not new to the S.R.s and Mensheviks would be
complete freedom of propaganda and the convocation of the
Constituent Assembly without further delays or even at an earlier
date.

The Mensheviks and S.R.s, being the government bloc, would then
agree (assuming that the compromise had been reached) to form a
government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, the
latter taking over all power locally as well. This would
constitute the “new” condition. I think the Bolsheviks would
advance no other conditions, trusting that the revolution would
proceed peacefully and party strife in the Soviets would be
peacefully overcome thanks to really complete freedom of
propaganda and to the immediate establishment of a new democracy
in the composition of the Soviets (new elections) and in their
functioning.

Perhaps this is already impossible? Perhaps. But if there is
even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realising this
opportunity is still worth while.

What would both “contracting” parties gain by this “compromise”, i.e., the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the
S.R. and Menshevik bloc, on the other?
If neither side gains anything, then the compromise must be recognised as impossible,
and nothing more is to be said. No matter how difficult this
compromise may be at present (after July and August, two months
equivalent to two decades in “peaceful”, somnolent times),
I think it stands a small chance of being realised. This chance
has been created by the decision of the S.R.s and Mensheviks not
to participate in a government together with the Cadets.

The Bolsheviks would gain the opportunity of quite freely
advocating their views and of trying to win influence in the
Soviets under a really complete democracy. In words, “everybody” now concedes the Bolsheviks this freedom. In
reality, this freedom is impossible under a bourgeois government
or a government in which the bourgeoisie participate, or under any
government, in fact, other than the Soviets. Under a Soviet
government, such freedom would be possible (we do not say it would
be a certainty, but still it would be possible). For the sake of
such a possibility at such a difficult time, it would be worth
compromising with the present majority in the Soviets. We have
nothing to fear from real democracy, for reality is on our side,
and even the course of development of trends within the S.R. and
Menshevik parties, which are hostile to us, proves us right.

The Mensheviks and S.R.s would gain in that they would at once
obtain every opportunity to carry out their bloc’s programme with
the support of the obviously overwhelming majority of the people
and in that they would secure for themselves the “peaceful”
use of their majority in the Soviets.

Of course, there would probably be two voices heard from this
bloc, which is heterogeneous both because it is a bloc add because
petty-bourgeois democracy is always less homogeneous than the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

One voice would say: we cannot follow the same road as the
Bolsheviks and the revolutionary proletariat. It will demand too
much anyway and will entice the peasant poor by demagogy. It will
demand peace and a break with the Allies. That is impossible. We
are better off and safer with the bourgeoisie; after all, we have
not parted ways with them but only had a temporary quarrel , and
only over the Kornilov incident. We have quarrelled, but we shall
make it up. Moreover, the Bolsheviks are not “ceding” us
anything, for their attempts at insurrection are as doomed to
defeat as was the Commune of 1871.

The other voice would say: the allusion to the Commune is very
superficial and even foolish. For, in the first place, the
Bolsheviks have learnt something since 1871; they would not fail
to seize the banks, and would not refuse to advance on
Versailles. Under such conditions even the Commune might have been
victorious. Furthermore, the Commune could not immediately offer
the people what the

Bolsheviks will be able to offer if they come to power, namely, land to the peasants, an immediate offer of
peace, real control over production, an honest peace with the
Ukrainians, Finns, etc. The Bolsheviks, to put it bluntly, hold
ten times more “trumps” than the Commune did. In the second
place, the Commune, after all, means a strenuous civil war, a
set-back to peaceful cultural development for a long time to come,
an opportunity for all sorts of MacMahons and Kornilovs to operate
and plot with greater ease—and such operations are a menace to
our whole bourgeois society. Is it wise to risk a Commune?

Now a Commune is inevitable in Russia if we do not take power
into our own hands, if things remain in as grave a state as they
were between May 6 and August 31. Every revolutionary worker and
soldier will inevitably think about the Commune and believe in it;
he will inevitably attempt to bring it about, for he will argue:
“The people are perishing; war, famine and ruin are spreading. Only the Commune can save us. So let us all perish, let
us die, but let us set up the Commune.” Such thoughts are
inevitable with the workers, and it will not be as easy to crush
the Commune now as it was in 1871. The Russian Commune will have
allies throughout the world, allies a hundred times stronger than
those the Commune had in 1871.... Is it wise for us to risk a
Commune? I cannot agree, either, that the Bolsheviks virtually
cede us nothing by their compromise. For, in all civilised
countries, civilised ministers value highly every agreement with
the proletariat in war-time, however small. They value it very,
very highly. And these are men of action, real ministers. The
Bolsheviks are rapidly becoming stronger, in spite of repression,
and the weakness of their press.... Is it wise for us to risk a
Commune?

We have a safe majority; the peasant poor will not wake up for
some time to come; we are safe for our lifetime. I do not believe
that in a peasant country the majority will follow the extremists. And against an obvious majority, no insurrection is
possible in a really democratic republic. This is what the second
voice would say.

There may also be a third voice coming from among the supporters of Martov or Spiridonova, which would say:

I am indignant, “comrades”, that both of you, speaking about the
Commune and its likelihood, unhesitatingly side with its
opponents. In one form or another, both of you side with those who
suppressed the Commune. I will not undertake to campaign for the
Commune and I cannot promise beforehand to fight in its ranks as
every Bolshevik will do, but I must say that if the Commune does
start in spite of my efforts, I shall rather help its defenders
than its opponents.

The medley of voices in the “bloc” is great and inevitable, for a host of shades is represented among the
petty-bourgeois democrats—from the complete bourgeois, perfectly eligible for a post in the government, down to the
semi-pauper who is not yet capable of taking up the proletarian
position. Nobody knows what will be the result of this medley of
voices at any given moment.

*     * *
The above lines were written on Friday, September 1, but due to
unforeseen circumstances (under Kerensky, as history will tell,
not all Bolsheviks were free to choose their domicile) they did
not reach the editorial office that day. After reading Saturday’s
and today’s (Sunday’s) papers, I say to myself: perhaps it is
already too late to offer a compromise. Perhaps the few days in
which a peaceful development was still possible have passed
too . Yes, to all appearances, they have already passed. [4]
In one way or another, Kerensky will abandon both the S .R. Party and the
S.R.s themselves, and will consolidate his position with the aid
of the bourgeoisie without the S.R.s, and thanks to their
inaction.... Yes, to all appearances, the days when by chance the
path of peaceful development became possible have already
passed. All that remains is to send these notes to the editor with
the request to have them entitled: “Belated
Thoughts”. Perhaps even belated thoughts are sometimes not
without interest.