V. I.

Lenin

Three Crises [1]

The more violent the slander and lies against the Bolsheviks
these days, the more calmly must we, while refuting the lies and
slander, reflect upon the historical interrelation of events and
the political, i.e., class, significance of the revolution’s
present course.

To refute the lies and slander, we only have to refer again to
Listok “Pravdy” of July 6, and to call the reader’s attention especially to the article printed below which gives
documentary evidence that on July 2 the Bolsheviks campaigned
against the demonstration (as admitted by the
Socialist-Revolutionaries’ paper). The article indicates that on
July 3 the popular mood exploded into action and the demonstration
started against our advice. It shows that on July 4, in a leaflet
(reprinted by the Socialist-Revolutionary paper Dyelo Naroda ), we called for a peaceful and
organised demonstration, that on the night of July 4 we
passed a decision to call off the demonstration. Slanderers,
continue your slander! You can never refute these facts and their
decisive significance in every connection!

Let us turn to the question of the historical interrelation of
the events. When, as early as the beginning of April, we opposed
support for the Provisional Government, we were attacked by both
the S.R.s and the Mensheviks. But what has reality proved?

What have the three political crises proved — April 20 and
21, June 10 and 18, July 3 and 4?

They have proved, in the first place, that the masses are
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the bourgeois policy of
the Provisional Government’s bourgeois majority.

It is rather interesting to note that the ruling
Socialist-Revolutionaries’ newspaper, Dyelo Naroda , despite its marked hostility to the Bolsheviks, is compelled to
admit, in its July 6 issue, the deep economic and political causes
of the action of July 3 and 4. The stupid, crude, infamous lie
that this action was artificially created, that the Bolsheviks
campaigned in favour of action, will daily be more and more exposed.

The common cause, the common origin, the deep common root of
the three above-mentioned political crises is clear, especially if
we look at them in their interrelation, as science demands that
politics be looked at. It is absurd even to think that three such
crises could be produced artificially.

In the second place, it is instructive to grasp what each one
of them had in common with the others, and what was its specific
features.

What is common to all three is a mass dissatisfaction overflowing all bounds, a mass resentment with the bourgeoisie and
their government. Whoever forgets, ignores or underestimates this essence of the matter , renounces the
ABC of socialism concerning the class struggle.

Let those who call themselves socialists, who know something
about the character of the class struggle in European revolutions,
think about the class struggle in the Russian revolution.

These crises are peculiar in the ways they manifested themselves. The first (April 20–21) was stormy and spontaneous,
and completely unorganised. It led to Black Hundreds firing on the
demonstrators and to unprecedentedly savage and lying accusations
against the Bolsheviks. After the outburst came a political
crisis.

In the second case, the demonstration was called by the
Bolsheviks, and was canceled after a stern ultimatum and direct
ban by the Congress of Soviets; then, on June 18, came a general
demonstration in which the Bolshevik slogans clearly predominated. As the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks
themselves admitted on the evening of June 18, a political crisis
would certainly have broken out had it not been for the offensive
at the front.

The third crisis broke out spontaneously on July 3 despite the
Bolsheviks’ efforts on July 2 to check it. Reaching its climax on
July 4, it led to a furious outburst of counter-revolution on July 5 and 6. The vacillation of the S.R.s and Mensheviks expressed
itself in Spiridonova and a number of other S.R.s declaring for
the transfer of power to the Soviets, and in the Menshevik
internationalists, previously opposed to it, voicing the same
idea.

The last, and perhaps the most instructive, conclusion to be
drawn from considering the events in their interconnection is that
all three crises manifested some form of demonstration that is new
in the history of our revolution, a demonstration of a more
complicated type in which the movement proceeds in waves, a sudden
drop following a rapid rise, revolution and counter-revolution
becoming more acute, and the middle elements being eliminated for
a more or less extensive period.

In all three crises, the movement took the form of a demonstration . An anti-government demonstration —
that would be the most exact, formal description of events. But
the fact of the matter is that it was not an ordinary demonstration; it was something considerably more than a
demonstration, but less than a revolution. It was an outburst of
revolution and counter-revolution together , a sharp, sometimes almost sudden elimination of the middle elements, while
the proletarian and bourgeois elements made a stormy appearance.

In this respect it is extremely typical that, for each of these movements, the middle elements blame both of the
specific class forces — the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie. Look at the S.R.s and Mensheviks. They lean over
backwards to frantically shout that, by their extremes, the
Bolsheviks are helping the counter-revolution. At the same time,
however, they admit again and again that the Cadets (with whom
they form a bloc in the government) are counter-revolutionary. "Our urgent task is to draw a line," wrote
Dyelo Naroda yesterday, "to dig a deep moat between ourselves and all the Right elements, including
Yedinstvo , which has gone militant" (with which, we may
add, the S.R.s formed a bloc during the elections).

Compare that with today’s (July 7) issue of Yedinstvo ,
in which Plekhanov’s editorial is compelled to state the
indisputable fact that the Soviets (i.e., the S.R.s and

Mensheviks) will "think over the matter for a fortnight" and that,
if power were to pass to the Soviets, "it would be tantamount to
victory for Lenin’s supporters". "If the Cadets don’t stick to the
rule—the worse, the better...," says Plekhanov, "they themselves will have to admit that they have made a big mistake
[by withdrawing from the Cabinet], making the work of Lenin’s
supporters easier.”

Isn’t that typical? The middle elements blame the Cadets for
making the Bolsheviks’ work easier, and the Bolsheviks for making
the Cadets’ work easier! Is it so hard to guess that if we
substitute class names for political ones we have before us the
dreams of the petty bourgeoisie about the disappearance of the
class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? Isn’t
the petty bourgeoisie complaining about the class struggle between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? Is it really so hard to guess
that no Bolsheviks in the world could have “created” even a single
"popular movement", let alone three movements, if the deepest
economic and political causes had not set the proletariat into
action? Is it so difficult to guess that no Cadets and monarchists
combined could have called forth any movement "from the Right" if
it had not been for the equally deep causes that make the
bourgeoisie as a class counter-revolutionary?

Both we and the Cadets were blamed for the April 20-21 movement
— for intransigence, extremes, and for aggravating the situation. The Bolsheviks were even accused (absurd as it may be)
of the firing on Nevsky. When the movement was over, however,
those same S.R.s and Mensheviks, in their joint, official organ,
Izvestia , wrote that the "popular movement" had "swept
away the imperialists, Milyukov, etc.", i.e., they praised the movement!! Isn’t that typical? Doesn’t it
show very clearly that the petty bourgeoisie do not understand the
workings, the meaning, of the class struggle between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie?

The objective situation is this. The vast majority of the
country’s population is petty-bourgeois by its living conditions
and more so by its ideas. But big capital rules the country,
primarily through banks and syndicates. There is an urban
proletariat in this country, mature enough to go its own way, but
not yet able to draw at once the majority of the semi-proletarians
to its side. From this fundamental, class fact follows the
inevitability of such crises as the three we are now examining, as
well as their forms.

In future the forms of crises may, of course, change, but the
substance of the issue will remain the same even if, for instance,
the S.R. Constituent Assembly meets in October. The S.R.s have
promised the peasants:
(1) to abolish private landownership; (2)
to transfer the land to the working people; (3) to confiscate the
landed estates and transfer them to the peasants without
compensation. These great reforms can never be realised without
the most decisive revolutionary measures against the bourgeoisie,
measures that can only be taken when the poor peasants join the proletariat, only when the banks and the
syndicates are nationalised.

The credulous peasants, believing for a time that these
beautiful things can be achieved by compromising with the
bourgeoisie, will inevitably be disappointed and
. . . “dissatisfied” (mildly speaking) with the sharp class
struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the
implementation of the promises of the S.R.s. So it was, and so it
will be.