We must now examine yet another very important aspect of imperialism, one that is, for the most part, insufficiently appreciated in most discussions on this subject. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist Hilferding is that here he took a step backward compared with the non-Marxist Hobson. We refer to the parasitism characteristic of imperialism.

As we have seen, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is *capitalist* monopoly, i.e., monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity production, and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction with this general environment. Nevertheless, like any monopoly, it inevitably engenders a tendency toward stagnation and decay. Insofar as monopoly prices are established, even temporarily, the incentive to technical, and consequently to all other, progress, to movement forward, disappears to a certain extent; furthermore, the economic possibility arises of artificially retarding technical progress. For example, in America, a certain Owens invented a bottle-making machine which revolutionised bottle production. The German bottle-manufacturers' cartel purchased Owens's patents and shelved them, delaying their application. Of course, monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for very long, eliminate competition from the world market (this, incidentally, is one of the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is nonsense). Of course, the possibility of reducing the costs of production and increasing profits through the introduction of technical improvements operates in favour of changes. But the *tendency* toward stagnation and decay, inherent in monopoly, continues in its turn to operate, and in certain branches of industry, in certain countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.

The monopoly ownership of particularly extensive, rich, or well-situated colonies operates in the same direction.

Furthermore. Imperialism is an immense accumulation in a few countries of money capital, reaching, as we have seen, 100–150 billion francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather a stratum, of *rentiers*, i.e., persons living by "clipping coupons"—persons completely detached from participation in any kind of enterprise—persons whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still further intensifies this complete detachment from production of the rentier stratum, and stamps an imprint of parasitism upon the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.

"In 1893," writes Hobson, "the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom."[164] Let us recall that by 1915 this capital had increased approximately two and a half times. "Aggressive imperialism," we read further in Hobson, "which costs the taxpayer so dear and has so little significance for the manufacturer and trader... is a source of great profits for the capitalist who seeks to invest his capital"... (in English, this concept is expressed by one word: "investor"—rentier) ... "The entire annual income Great Britain derives from all her foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated by the statistician Giffen at £18 million (about 170 million rubles) for 1899, calculated at 2½ per cent on a total turnover of £800 million." Great as this sum is, it cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain. What explains it is the sum of £90–100 million, representing the income from "invested" capital, the income of the rentier stratum.

The income of the rentiers is five times the income from foreign trade in the most "trading" country in the world! This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.

The concept of the "rentier state" (Rentnerstaat), or usurer state, therefore becomes common usage in the economic literature on imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a gigantic majority of debtor states. "Among the investments of capital abroad," writes Schulze-Gaevernitz, "those that fall to politically dependent or allied countries occupy first place: England lends to Egypt, Japan, China, South America. Her navy plays the role of bailiff in case of emergency. England's political power protects her from the indignation of her debtors."[165] Sartorius von Waltershausen in his work *The National-Economic System of Capital Investment Abroad* holds up Holland as the model "rentier state" and points out that England and France are now becoming such states.[166] Schilder considers that five industrial states are "definitely pronounced creditor countries": England, France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. He does not place Holland among them only because she is "scarcely industrial."[167] The United States is a creditor only in relation to America.

"England," writes Schulze-Gaevernitz, "is gradually growing over from an industrial state into a creditor state. Despite the absolute increase in industrial production and industrial exports, the relative importance for the entire national economy of incomes from interest and dividends, from issues, commissions, and speculation, is increasing. In my opinion, it is precisely this fact that is the economic basis of the imperialist upsurge. The creditor is more firmly bound to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer."[168] Regarding Germany, the editor of the Berlin journal *Die Bank*, A. Lansburgh, wrote in 1911 in an article entitled "Germany—a Rentier State" the following: "In Germany, people readily laugh at the inclination to turn into rentiers observable in France. But they forget that, insofar as the bourgeoisie is concerned, German conditions are increasingly resembling French conditions."[169]

The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot but be reflected both in all the socio-political conditions of the given countries in general, and in the two fundamental trends in the working-class movement in particular. In order to demonstrate this as graphically as possible, let us give the floor to Hobson, who is the most "reliable" witness, since he cannot be suspected of partiality toward "Marxist orthodoxy," and, on the other hand, is an Englishman who knows well the state of affairs in the country richest in colonies, financial capital, and imperialist experience.

Describing, under the vivid impression of the Anglo-Boer War, the connection between imperialism and the interests of the "financiers," the growth of their profits from contracts, supplies, etc., Hobson wrote: "The capitalists are the directors of this definitely parasitic policy; but the same motives act upon special categories of workers. In many towns, the most important branches of industry depend on government orders; the imperialism of the centres of the metallurgical and shipbuilding industry depends to a considerable degree on this fact." Two kinds of circumstances, in the author's opinion, weakened the strength of the old empires: 1) "economic parasitism" and 2) the composition of the army from dependent peoples. "The first is the custom of economic parasitism, whereby a dominant state uses its provinces, colonies, and dependent countries to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence." For the economic possibility of such bribery, in whatever form it is carried out, monopolistically high profit is necessary—we shall add on our own behalf.

Regarding the second circumstance, Hobson writes: "One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the heedlessness with which Great Britain, France, and other imperialist nations embark upon this path. Great Britain has gone furthest of all. Most of the battles by which we conquered our Indian Empire were fought by our troops composed of natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, large standing armies are under the command of Britons; almost all the wars connected with our subjugation of Africa, with the exception of its southern part, have been waged for us by natives."

The prospect of partitioning China elicits from Hobson the following economic assessment: "The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character which parts of these countries already possess: the south of England, the Riviera, the most frequented by tourists and those populated by the wealthy parts of Italy and Switzerland, namely: a small cluster of rich aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional employees and traders, and with a larger number of domestic servants and workers in the transport industry and in the industry engaged in the final finishing of manufactured goods. The chief branches of industry would disappear, and mass food products, mass semi-finished goods, would flow in as tribute from Asia and Africa." "Here are the possibilities which a broader union of Western states, a European federation of great powers, opens before us: far from advancing the cause of world civilisation, it could signify a gigantic danger of Western parasitism: to set apart a group of advanced industrial nations, the upper classes of which receive an enormous tribute from Asia and Africa and, with this tribute, maintain large tamed masses of employees and servants, engaged no longer in the production of mass agricultural and industrial products, but in personal service or secondary industrial work under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who are ready to brush aside such a theory" (one should have said: prospect) "as unworthy of consideration, ponder the economic and social conditions of those districts of modern Southern England which have already been brought to such a state. Let them consider what a vast extension of such a system would become possible if China were subjected to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, 'investors' of capital, and their political and commercial-industrial employees, pumping profits out of the greatest potential reservoir the world has ever known, in order to consume these profits in Europe. Of course, the situation is too complex, the play of world forces too difficult to gauge, to make this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable. But the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe at the present time are moving in this direction, and, if they meet no resistance, if they are not diverted to another path, they are working toward precisely such a consummation of the process."[170]

The author is quite right: had the forces of imperialism met no resistance, they would indeed have led to this. The significance of the "United States of Europe" in the present-day, imperialist environment is evaluated here correctly. One should only add that within the working-class movement as well, the opportunists, who are now temporarily victorious in most countries, are "working" systematically and persistently in precisely this direction. Imperialism, signifying the partition of the world and the exploitation not only of China, signifying monopolistically high profits for a handful of the richest countries, creates the economic possibility of bribing the upper strata of the proletariat and thereby feeds, shapes, and strengthens opportunism. One must merely not forget those forces that counteract imperialism in general and opportunism in particular, which the social-liberal Hobson naturally cannot see.

The German opportunist Gerhard Hildebrand, who was expelled from the party in his day for defending imperialism, and today could be a leader of the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany, aptly supplements Hobson by preaching a "United States of Western Europe" (without Russia) for the purpose of "joint" actions... against the African Negroes, against the "great Islamist movement," for maintaining a "strong army and navy," against the "Japanese-Chinese coalition,"[171] and so forth.

Schulze-Gaevernitz's description of "British imperialism" shows us the same features of parasitism. The national income of England approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898, while income "from abroad" during that time increased ninefold. If the "merit" of imperialism is the "education of the Negro to labour" (coercion is unavoidable...), the "danger" of imperialism consists in the fact that "Europe will throw the physical labour—first agricultural and mining, and later the heavier industrial—onto the shoulders of the dark-skinned humanity, and will itself rest content in the role of rentier, perhaps thereby preparing the economic, and subsequently the political, emancipation of the red-skinned and dark-skinned races."

An ever-growing portion of the land in England is withdrawn from agricultural production and used for sport, for the amusement of the rich. Of Scotland—the most aristocratic hunting and other sporting ground—it is said that "she lives on her past and on Mr. Carnegie" (the American billionaire). On horse races and fox hunts alone, England spends £14 million annually (about 130 million rubles). The number of rentiers in England amounts to about one million. The percentage of the productive population is declining:

| Year | Population of England | Productive workers | % of population |
|------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1851 | 17.9 million | 4.1 million | 23% |
| 1901 | 32.5 million | 4.9 million | 15% |

And, speaking of the English working class, the bourgeois researcher of "British imperialism at the beginning of the 20th century" is compelled to systematically draw a distinction between the "upper stratum" of workers and the "proletarian lower stratum proper." The upper stratum supplies the mass of members of cooperatives and trade unions, sporting societies, and numerous religious sects. The electoral law is adapted to its level—a law which in England is "still sufficiently restricted to exclude the proletarian lower stratum proper"!! In order to embellish the condition of the English working class, it is customary to speak only of this upper stratum, which constitutes a minority of the proletariat: for example, "the question of unemployment is primarily a question concerning London and the proletarian lower stratum, with whom politicians reckon little..."[172] One should have said: with whom bourgeois politicos and "socialist" opportunists reckon little.

Among the peculiarities of imperialism connected with the range of phenomena we are describing is the decrease in emigration from imperialist countries and the increase in immigration (influx of workers and settlement) into these countries from more backward countries with lower wages. Emigration from England, as Hobson notes, has been falling since 1884: it amounted to 242,000 in that year and 169,000 in 1900. Emigration from Germany reached its maximum in the decade 1881–1890: 1,453,000, falling in the following two decades to 544,000 and to 341,000. On the other hand, the number of workers arriving in Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia, etc., grew. According to the 1907 census, there were 1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 were agricultural workers.[173] In France, workers in the mining industry are "to a considerable extent" foreigners: Poles, Italians, Spaniards.[174] In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe occupy the worst-paid jobs, while American workers provide the highest percentage of those rising to overseers and obtaining the best-paid work.[175] Imperialism has a tendency, among the workers as well, to single out privileged categories and to split them off from the broad mass of the proletariat.

It must be noted that in England, the tendency of imperialism to split the workers and strengthen opportunism among them, to engender a temporary decay of the working-class movement, manifested itself much earlier than the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. For two major distinguishing features of imperialism have been present in England since the mid-19th century: vast colonial possessions and a monopoly position on the world market. Marx and Engels systematically, over the course of several decades, traced this connection between opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist peculiarities of English capitalism. Engels wrote, for instance, to Marx on October 7, 1858: "The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeoisified, so that this most bourgeois of all nations apparently wants to bring matters ultimately to the point of having a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. Of course, for a nation that exploits the whole world, this is to a certain extent justifiable."{150} Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter of August 11, 1881, he speaks of the "worst English trade unions, which allow themselves to be led by men bought by the bourgeoisie, or at least paid by it."{151} And in a letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy? The same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there is only a Conservative and a Liberal-Radical one, and the workers quite comfortably share, along with them, in England's colonial monopoly and her monopoly on the world market."[176] (The same was stated by Engels in print in his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, 1892.){152}

Here the causes and effects are clearly indicated. Causes: 1) exploitation of the whole world by the given country; 2) its monopoly position on the world market; 3) its colonial monopoly. Effects: 1) the bourgeoisification of part of the English proletariat; 2) a part of it allows itself to be led by men bought by the bourgeoisie, or at least paid by it. The imperialism of the early 20th century completed the partition of the world among a handful of states, each of which now exploits (in the sense of extracting super-profit) a part of the "whole world" only slightly smaller than that exploited by England in 1858; each occupies a monopoly position on the world market, thanks to trusts, cartels, finance capital, and creditor-debtor relations; each possesses, to a certain degree, a colonial monopoly (we have seen that of the 75 million sq. km. of all the colonies in the world, 65 million, i.e., 86 per cent, are concentrated in the hands of six powers; 61 million, i.e., 81 per cent, are concentrated in the hands of three powers).

The difference in the present situation lies in economic and political conditions which could not but intensify the irreconcilability of opportunism with the general and fundamental interests of the working-class movement: imperialism has grown from its embryo into a dominant system; capitalist monopolies have taken first place in the national economy and in politics; the partition of the world has been carried to its conclusion; and, on the other hand, instead of the undivided monopoly of England, we now see a struggle among a small number of imperialist powers for participation in the monopoly, a struggle which characterises the entire beginning of the 20th century. Opportunism now cannot prove completely victorious in the working-class movement of any one country for a long series of decades, as opportunism proved victorious in England in the second half of the 19th century, but it has finally matured, over-matured, and rotted in a number of countries, merging completely with bourgeois politics as social-chauvinism.[177]