Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism

A POPULAR OUTLINE

III. FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY

“A steadily increasing proportion of capital in industry,”
writes Hilferding, “ceases to belong to the industrialists who
employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of
the banks which, in relation to them, represent the owners of
the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to sink an
increasing share of its funds in industry. Thus, to an ever
greater degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, i.e., capital in money
form, which is thus actually transformed into industrial
capital, I call ‘finance capital’.” “Finance capital is
capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists.” [1]

This definition is incomplete insofar as it is silent on one
extremely important fact—on the increase of concentration
of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration is leading, and has led, to monopoly. But
throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two
chapters preceding the one from which this definition is taken,
Hilferding stresses the part played by capitalist monopolies.

The concentration of production; the monopolies arising
therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such is the history of the rise of finance capital and
such is the content of that concept.

We now have to describe how, under the general conditions of
commodity production and private property, the “business
operations” of capitalist monopolies inevitably lead to the
domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be noted that
German—and not only German—bourgeois scholars, like Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and others, are all
apologists of imperialism and of finance capital.

Instead of revealing the “mechanics” of the formation of an oligarchy, its
methods, the size of its revenues “impeccable and peccable,” its
connections with parliaments etc., etc., they obscure or gloss
over them. They evade these “vexed questions” by pompous and
vague phrases, appeals to the “sense of responsibility” of bank
directors, by praising “the sense of duty” of Prussian officials, giving serious study to the petty details of
absolutely ridiculous parliamentary bills for the “supervision”
and “regulation” of monopolies, playing spillikins with
theories, like, for example, the following “scholarly” definition, arrived at by Professor Liefmann:
“ Commerce is an occupation having for its object the collection, storage and supply of goods .” [2] (The
Professor’s bold-face italics.) . . . From this it would follow
that commerce existed in the time of primitive man, who knew
nothing about exchange, and that it will exist under socialism!

But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the
financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all capitalist
countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature
has sprung up, written from the bourgeois point of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture
and criticism—petty-bourgeois, naturally—of this oligarchy.

Paramount importance attaches to the “holding system,” already
briefly referred to above. The German economist, Heymann,
probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes
the essence of it in this way:

“The head of the concern controls the principal company
(literally: the “mother company”); the latter reigns over the
subsidiary companies (“daughter companies”) which in their turn
control still other subsidiaries (“grandchild companies”),
etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small
capital to dominate immense spheres of production. Indeed, if
holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to
control a company, the head of the concern needs only one
million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And
if this ‘interlocking’ is extended, it is possible with one
million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million,
etc.” [3]

As a matter of fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to
own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order to direct
its affairs, [4] since in practice a certain number of small, scattered shareholders find it impossible to attend
general meetings, etc. The “democratisation” of the ownership of
shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist
so-called “Social-Democrats” expect (or say that they expect)
the “democratisation of capital,” the strengthening of the role
and significance of small scale production, etc., is, in fact,
one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial
oligarchy. Incidentally, this is why, in the more advanced, or
in the older and more “experienced” capitalist countries, the
law allows the issue of shares of smaller denomination. In
Germany, the law does not permit the issue of shares of less
than one thousand marks denomination, and the magnates of German
finance look with an envious eye at Britain, where the issue of
one-pound shares (= 20 marks, about 10 rubles) is permitted.
Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and “financial kings”
in Germany, told the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that “the
one-pound share is the basis of British imperialism.” [5]

This merchant has a much deeper and more “Marxist” understanding of
imperialism than a certain disreputable writer who is held to be
one of the founders of Russian
Marxism [21] and believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain
nation....

But the “holding system” not only serves enormously to increase
the power of the monopolists; it also enables them to resort
with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat
the public, because formally the directors of the “mother
company” are not legally responsible for the “daughter company”,
which is supposed to be “independent”, and through the medium of which they can “pull off” anything .

Here is an example taken from the German review, Die Bank ,
for May 1914:

“The Spring Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago
as being one of the most profitable enterprises in
Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per
cent to nil. It appears that the Board, without consulting the
shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of its ‘daughter companies’, the Hassia Company, which had a
nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital
of the ‘mother company’, was never mentioned in its balance-sheets. This omission was quite legal and could be
hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any
point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who
as the responsible head had signed the false balance-sheets,
was, and still is, the president of the Kassel Chamber of
Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia
Company long afterwards, when it had been proved to be a
mistake”... (the writer should put this word in inverted
commas) ... “and when Spring Steel shares dropped nearly 100
per cent, because those in the know were getting rid of them....

“ This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards
of Directors are willing to undertake risky transactions with a
far lighter heart than individual businessmen. Modern methods of
drawing up balance-sheets not only make it possible to conceal
doubtful undertakings from the ordinary shareholder, but also
allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of
unsuccessful speculation by selling their shares in time when
the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he
does....

“The balance-sheets of many joint-stock companies put us in mind
of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible
inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath
it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document. [Palimpsests are parchment documents from which the
original inscription has been erased and another inscription
imposed.] “The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making
balance-sheets indecipherable is to divide a single business
into several parts by setting up ‘daughter companies’—or
by annexing them. The advantages of this system for various
purposes—legal and illegal—are so evident that big companies which do not employ it are quite the
exception.” [6]

As an example of a huge monopolist company that extensively
employs this system, the author quotes the famous General
Electric Company (the A.E.G., to which I shall refer again later
on). In 1912, it was calculated that this company held shares in
175 to 200 other companies, dominating them, of course, and thus
controlling a total capital of about 1,500 million marks . [7]

None of the rules of control, the publication of balance-sheets,
the drawing up of balance-sheets according to a definite form,
the public auditing of accounts, etc., the things about which
well-intentioned professors and officials—that is, those
imbued with the good intention of defending and prettyfying
capitalism—discourse to the public, are of any avail; for
private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from
buying, selling, exchanging or hypothecating shares, etc.

The extent to which this “holding system” has developed in the
big Russian banks may be judged by the figures given by
E. Agalid, who for fifteen years was an official of the
Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914, published a book, not
altogether correctly entitled Big Banks and the World Market. [8]

The author divides the big Russian banks into two main groups: (a) banks that come under the
“holding system,” and (b) “independent” banks—“independence” however, being arbitrarily taken to mean
independence of foreign banks. The author divides the first group into three subgroups: (1) German holdings, (2)
British holdings, and (3) French holdings, having in view the “holdings” and domination of the big foreign banks of the
particular country mentioned. The author divides the capital of
the banks into “productively” invested capital (industrial and
commercial undertakings), and “speculatively” invested capital
(in Stock Exchange and financial operations), assuming, from his
petty-bourgeois reformist point of view, that it is possible,
under capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from
the second and to abolish the second form.

Here are the figures he supplies:

| BANK ASSETS (According to
Reports for October-November 1912 000,000 rubles |
| --- |
| | Capital Invested |
| Groups of Russian banks | Productively | Speculatively | Total |
| a 1) | Four banks: Siberian
Commercial, Russian , International, and Discount
Bank.... | 413.7 | 859.1 | 1,272.8 |
| a 2) | Two banks: Commercial and Industrial,
and Russo-British | 239.3 | 169.1 | 408.4 |
| a 3) | Five banks: Russian-Asiatic,
St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don, Union Moscow, Russo- French Commercial | 711.8 | 661.2 | 1,373.0 |
| | (11 banks) Total ..............a) = | 1,364.8 | 1,689.4 | 3,054.2 |
| b) | Eight banks: Moscow
Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg),
Bank of Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow
Discount, Moscow Commercial, Moscow Private....... | 504.2 | 391.1 | 895.3 |
| | (10 banks) Total .......... | 1,869.0 | 2,080.5 | 3,949.5 |

According to these figures, of the approximately 4,000 million
rubles making up the “working” capital of the big banks,
more than three-fourths , more than 3,000 million, belonged to banks which in reality were only “daughter
companies” of foreign banks, and chiefly of Paris banks (the
famous trio: Union Parisienne, Paris et Pays-Bas and
Société Générale), and of Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two
of the biggest Russian banks, the Russian (Russian Bank for
Foreign Trade) and the International (St. Petersburg
International Commercial Bank), between 1906 and 1912 increased
their capital from 44 to 98 million rubles, and their reserves
from 15 million to 39 million “employing three-fourths German
capital.” The first bank belongs to the Berlin Deutsche Bank
“concern” and the second to the Berlin
Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is deeply indignant at
the majority of the shares being held by the Berlin banks, so
that the Russian shareholders are, therefore, powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims
the cream; for example, the Berlin Deutsche Bank, before placing
the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market,
kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and then sold them
at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their
nominal value, “earning” a profit of nearly six million rubles, which
Hilferding calls “promoter’s profits.”

Our author puts the total “capacity” of the principal
St. Petersburg banks at 8,235 million rubles, well over 8,000
million, and the “holdings,” or rather, the extent to which
foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows: French
banks, 55 per cent; British, 10 per cent; German, 35 per
cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235 million
rubles of functioning capital, 3,687 million rubles, or over 40
per cent, fall to the share of the Produgol and Prodamet
syndicates [22] and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and
cement industries. Thus, owing to the formation of capitalist
monopolies, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also
made enormous strides in Russia.

Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a
virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits
from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans,
etc., strengthens the domination of the financial oligarchy and
levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of
monopolists. Here is an example, taken from a multitude of
others, of the “business” methods of the American trusts, quoted
by Hilferding. In 1887, Havemeyer founded the Sugar Trust by
amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted
to 6,500,000 dollars. Suitably “watered,” as the Americans say,
the capital of the trust was declared to be 50 million dollars. This “overcapitalisation” anticipated the monopoly
profits, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation
anticipates its monopoly profits in buying up as many iron ore
fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust set up monopoly
prices, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per
cent dividend on capital “watered” sevenfold, or about 70 per cent on the capital actually invested at the time the trust was formed! In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust
amounted to 90 million dollars. In twenty-two years, it had
increased its capital more than tenfold.

In France the domination of the “financial oligarchy” ( Against the Financial Oligarchy in France, the title
of the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was
published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly
different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a
relative, but an “absolute monopoly” in the issue of bonds. In
reality, this is a “trust of big banks.” And monopoly ensures
monopoly profits from bond issues. Usually a borrowing country
does not get more than 90 per cent of the sum of the loan, the
remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks and other middlemen. The
profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400
million francs amounted to 8 per cent; out of the Russian (1904)
loan of 800 million francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent;
and out of the Moroccan (1904) loan of 62,500,000 francs it
amounted to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its
development with petty usury capital, is ending its development
with gigantic usury capital. “The French,” says Lysis, “are the
usurers of Europe.” All the conditions of economic life are
being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary population, and stagnant industry,
commerce and shipping, the “country” can grow rich by usury. “Fifty persons, representing a capital of eight million
francs, can control 2,000 million francs deposited in four banks.” The “holding system,” with which we are already
familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks,
the Société Générale for instance, issues
64,000

bonds for its “daughter company,” the Egyptian Sugar
Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150 per cent, i.e., the bank
gains 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company
were found to be fictitious, the “public” lost from 90 to 100
million francs. “One of the directors of the Société
Générale was a member of the board of directors of the
Sugar Refineries.” It is not surprising that the author is
driven to the conclusion that “the French Republic is a
financial monarchy”; “it is the complete domination of the
financial oligarchy; the latter dominates over the press and the
government.” [9]

The extraordinarily high rate of profit obtained from the issue
of bonds, which is one of the principal functions of finance
capital, plays a very important part in the development and
consolidation of the financial oligarchy. “There is not a single
business of this type within the country that brings in profits
even approximately equal to those obtained from the floatation
of foreign loans,” says Die Bank . [10] “No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those
obtained from the issue of securities!” According to the
German Economist , the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial stock were as follows:

| | Per Cent |
| --- | --- |
| 1895.............. | 38.6 |
| 1896.............. | 36.1 |
| 1897.............. | 66.7 |
| 1898.............. | 67.7 |
| 1899.............. | 66.9 |
| 1900.............. | 55.2 | “In the ten years from 1891 to 1900, more than a thousand
million marks were ‘earned’ by issuing German industrial
stock.” [11]

During periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance
capital are immense, but during periods of depression, small and
unsound businesses go out of existence, and the big banks
acquire “holdings” in them by buying them up for a mere song, or
participate in profitable schemes for their “reconstruction” and
“reorganisation.” In the “reconstruction” of undertakings which
have been running at a loss, “the share capital is written down,
that is, profits are distributed on a smaller capital and
continue to be calculated on this smaller basis. Or, if the
income has fallen to zero, new capital is called in, which,
combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring
in an adequate return.” “Incidentally,” adds Hilferding, “all
these reorganisations and reconstructions have a twofold
significance for the banks: first, as profitable transactions;
and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the
companies in difficulties.” [12]

Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund was
founded in 1872. Share capital was issued to the amount of
nearly 40 million marks and the market price of the shares rose
to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend for its first
year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a trifle of
something like 28 million marks. The principal sponsor of this
company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so
successfully attained a capital of 300 million marks. Later, the
dividends of the Union declined to nil; the shareholders had to
consent to a “writing down” of capital, that is, to losing some
of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of “reconstructions,” more than 73 million marks were written off
the books of the Union in the course of thirty years. “At the
present time, the original shareholders of the company possess
only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares” [13] but the
banks “earned something” out of every “reconstruction.”

Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing
big towns is a particularly profitable operation for finance
capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly
of ground-rent and with monopoly of the means of communication,
since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of
selling it profitably in lots, etc., is mainly dependent on good
means of communication with the centre of the town; and these
means of communication are in the hands of large companies which
are connected with these same banks through the holding system
and the distribution of seats on the boards. As a result we get
what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a contributor to Die Bank who has made a special study of real estate business
and mortgages, etc., calls a “bog.” Frantic speculation in
suburban building lots; collapse of building enterprises like
the Berlin firm of Boswau and Knauer, which acquired as much as
100 million marks with the help of the “sound and solid”
Deutsche Bank—the latter, of course, acting through the
holding system, i.e., secretly, behind the scenes—and got
out of it with a loss of “only” 12 million marks, then the ruin
of small proprietors and of workers who get nothing from the
fictitious building firms, fraudulent deals with the “honest”
Berlin police and administration for the purpose of gaining
control of the issue of cadastral certificates, building
licences, etc., etc. [14] “American ethics,” which the European professors and
well-meaning bourgeois so hypocritically deplore, have, in the
age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every
large city in any country.

At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the
formation of a “transport trust,” i.e., of establishing
“community of interests” between the three Berlin transport
undertakings: the city electric railway, the tramway company and
the omnibus company. “We have been aware,” wrote Die Bank , “that this plan was contemplated ever since it became
known that the majority of the shares in the bus company had
been acquired by the other two transport companies.... We may
fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that
by uniting the transport services, they will secure economies,
part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question
is complicated by the fact that behind the transport trust that
is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can
subordinate the means of transportation, which they have
monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To
be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need
only recall that the interests of the big banks that encouraged
the formation of the Electric Railway Company were already
involved in it at the time the company was formed. That is to
say: the interests of this transport undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests. The point is that
the eastern line of this railway was to run across land which
this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself and for several
partners in the transactions when it became certain the line was
to be laid down.” [15]

A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of
millions, inevitably penetrates into every sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all other
“details.” In German economic literature one usually comes
across obsequious praise of the integrity of the Prussian
bureaucracy, and allusions to the French Panama scandal [23] and to
political corruption in America. But the fact is that even
bourgeois literature devoted to German banking matters constantly has to go far beyond the field of purely banking
operations; it speaks, for instance, about “the attraction of
the banks” in reference to the increasing frequency with which
public officials take employment with the banks, as follows:
“How about the integrity of a state official who in his
innermost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the
Behrenstrasse?” [16] (The Berlin street where the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated.)
In 1909, the publisher of Die Bank , Alfred Lansburgh, wrote an
article entitled “The Economic Significance of Byzantinism,” in which he
incidentally referred to Wilhelm II’s tour of Palestine, and to “the
immediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway,
that fatal ‘great product of German enterprise’, which is more responsible
for the ‘encirclement’ than all our political blunders put
together”. [17] (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII to isolate Germany and surround her with an
imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1911, Eschwege, the
contributor to this same magazine to whom I have already
referred, wrote an article entitled “Plutocracy and
Bureaucracy,” in which he exposed, for example, the case of a
German official named Völker, who was a zealous member of
the Cartel Committee and who, it turned out some time later,
obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, the Steel
Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced this
bourgeois author to admit that “the economic liberty guaranteed
by the German Constitution has become in many departments of
economic life, a meaningless phrase” and that under the existing
rule of the plutocracy, “even the widest political liberty
cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree
people.” [18]

As for Russia, I shall confine myself to one example. Some years
ago, all the newspapers announced that Davydov, the director of
the Credit Department of the Treasury, had resigned his post to
take employment with a certain big bank at a salary which,
according to the contract, would total over one million rubles
in the course of several years. The Credit Department is an
institution, the function of which is to “co-ordinate the
activities of all the credit institutions of the country” and
which grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow
amounting to between 800 and 1,000 million rubles.” [19]

It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership
of capital is separated from the application of capital to
production, that money capital is separated from industrial or
productive capital, and that the rentier who lives entirely on
income obtained from money capital, is separated from the
entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the
management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance
capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this
separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance
capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance
of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means that a
small number of financially “powerful” states stand out among
all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may
be judged from the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of
all kinds of securities.

In the Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute ,
A. Neymarck [20]

has published very comprehensive, complete and comparative figures covering the issue of
securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted
in part in economic literature. The following are the totals he
gives for four decades:

| TOTAL ISSUES IN FRANCS PER
DECADE (000,000,000) |
| --- |
| 1871-80.............. | 76.1 |
| 1881-90............. | 64.5 |
| 1891-1900......... | 100.4 |
| 1901-10............ | 197.8 |

In the 1870s the total amount of issues for the whole world was
high, owing particularly to the loans floated in connection
with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company-promotion boom
which set in in Germany after the war. On the whole, the
increase was relatively not very rapid during the three last
decades of the nineteenth century, and only in the first ten
years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase of almost
100 per cent to be observed. Thus the beginning of the twentieth
century marks the turning-point, not only in the growth of
monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts), of which we have
already spoken, but also in the growth of finance capital.

Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current
in the world in 1910 at about 815,000 million francs. Deducting
from this sum amounts which might have been duplicated, he
reduces the total to 575,000-600,000 million, which is distributed among the various countries as follows (I take
600,000 million):

| FINANCIAL SECURITIES CURRENT
IN 1910 (000,000,000 francs) |
| --- |
| Great Britain | 142 | Holland | 12.5 |
| United States | 132 | Belgium | 7.5 |
| France | 110 | Spain | 7.5 |
| Germany | 95 | Switzerland | 6.25 |
| Russia | 31 | Denmark | 3.75 |
| Austria-Hungary | 24 | Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc. | 2.5 |
| Italy | 14 |
| Japan | 12 |

From these figures we at once see standing out in sharp relief
four of the richest capitalist countries, each of which holds
securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100,000 to
150,000 million francs. Of these four countries, two, Britain
and France, are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we
shall see, possess the most colonies; the other two, the United
States and Germany, are capitalist countries leading in the
rapidity of development and the degree of extension of capitalist monopolies in industry. Together, these four
countries own 479,000 million francs, that is, nearly 80 per
cent of the world’s finance capital. In one way or another,
nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less the
debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries,
these four “pillars” of world finance capital.

It is particularly important to examine the part which the
export of capital plays in creating the international network of
dependence on and connections of finance capital.

---
Notes:
[1]

R. Hilferding, Finance Capital , Moscow, 1912 (in
Russian), pp. 338-39.
— Lenin

[2]

R. Liefmann, op. cit., S. 476.
— Lenin

[3]

Hans
Gideon Heymann, Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe Stuttgart, 1904, S. 268-69.
— Lenin

[4]

Liefmann, Beteiligungsgesellschaften , etc., S. 258 of the first edition.
— Lenin

[5]

Schulze-Gaevernitz in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik , V, 2, S. 110.
— Lenin

[6]

L. Eschwege, “Tochtergesellschaften” in Die Bank , 1914,
S.545
— Lenin

[7]

Kurt
Heinig, “Der Weg des Elecktrotrusts” in Die Neue Zeit ,
1912, 30. S. 484
— Lenin

[8]

E. Agahd, Grossbanken und Weltmarkt. Die wirstschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der Grossbanken im Weltmarkt unter Berüchsichtigung ihres Einflusses auf Russlands Volkswirtscahft und die deutsche-russichen Beziehungen,
Berlin, 1914
— Lenin

[9]

Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie financière en France , 5 ed. Paris, 1908, pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.
— Lenin

[10]

Die Bank , 1913, No. 7, S. 630.
— Lenin

[11]

Stillich, op. cit., S. 143, also W. Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. jahrhundert, 2. Aufl., 1909, S. 526,
Anlage 8.
— Lenin

[12]

Finance Capital , p. 172.
— Lenin

[13]

Stillich, op. cit., S. 138 and Liefmann, op. cit., S. 51.
— Lenin

[14]

In
Die Bank , 1913, S. 952, L. Eschwege, Der Sumpf ; ibid ., 1912, 1, S. 223 et seq.
— Lenin

[15]

“Verkehrstrust” in Die Bank , 1914, 1, S. 89.
— Lenin

[16]

“Der Zug zur Bank” in Die Bank , 1909, 1, S. 79.
— Lenin

[17]

ibid ., S. 301.
— Lenin

[18]

ibid ., 1911, 2, S. 825; 1913, 2, S. 962.
— Lenin

[19]

E. Agahd, op. cit., S. 202.
— Lenin

[20]

Bulletin de l’institut international de statistique ,
t. XIX, livr. II, La Haye, 1912. Data concerning small states,
second column, are estimated by adding 20 per cent to the 1902
figures.
— Lenin

[21]


[22]


[23]