Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism

A POPULAR OUTLINE

I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES

The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid
concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises are one of
the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern production
censuses give most complete and most exact data on this
process.

In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more than 50
workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and
out of every 100 workers employed, this group of enterprises
employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense than the concentration
of workers, since labour in the large enterprises is much more
productive. This is shown by the figures on steam-engines and
electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in
the broad sense of the term, that is, including commerce,
transport, etc., we get the following picture. Large-scale
enterprises, 30,588 out of a total of 3,265,623, that is to say,
0.9 per cent. These enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a
total of 14,400,000, i.e., 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam
horse power out of a total of 8,800,000, i.e., 75.3 per cent, and
1,200,000 kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000,
i.e., 77.2 per cent.

Less than one-hundredth of the total number of enterprises
utilise more than three-fourths of the total amount of steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and seventy
thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers),
constituting 91 per cent of the total, utilise only 7 per cent of
the total amount of steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of
huge enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are
nothing.

In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one
thousand and more workers, nearly one-tenth (1,380,000)
of the total number of workers employed in industry, and they
consumed almost one-third (32 per cent) of the total amount of steam and electric
power. [1]

As we shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest
enterprises still more overwhelming, in the most literal sense of
the word, i.e., millions of small, medium and even some big
“proprietors” are in fact in complete subjection to some hundreds
of millionaire financiers.

In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United
States of America, the growth of the concentration of production
is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the
narrow sense of the word and classify enterprises according to the
value of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with
an output valued at one million dollars and over, numbered 1,900
(out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000
workers (out of 5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and the value of
their output amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000,
i.e., 38 per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding
figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per
cent) employing 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5
per cent) with an output valued at $9,000,000,000 (out of
$20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8 per cent). [2]

Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the
country was carried on by one-hundredth part of these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 258 branches of
industry. From this it can be seen that at a certain stage of its
development concentration itself, as it were, leads straight to
monopoly, for a score or so of giant enterprises can easily arrive
at an agreement, and on the other hand, the hindrance to
competition, the tendency towards monopoly, arises from the huge
size of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into
monopoly is one of the most important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we
must deal with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up
one possible misunderstanding.

American statistics speak of 3,000 giant enterprises in 250
branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen enterprises of
the largest scale for each branch of industry.

But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry are
there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very important
feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is
so-called combination of production, that is to say, the
grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry,
which either represent the consecutive stages in the processing of
raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into
pig-iron, the conversion of pig-iron into steel, and then,
perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)—or are auxiliary
to one another (for example, the utilisation of scrap, or of
by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).

“Combination,” writes Hilferding, “levels out the fluctuations
of trade and therefore assures to the combined enterprises a more
stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of
eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the effect of rendering
possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the
acquisition of superprofits over and above those obtained by the
‘pure’ (i.e,, non-combined) enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens
the position of the combined enterprises relative to the ‘pure’
enterprises, strengthens them in the competitive struggle in
periods of serious depression, when the fall in prices of raw
materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of
manufactured goods.” [3]

The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book
especially on “mixed,” that is, combined, enterprises in the
German iron industry, says: “Pure enterprises perish, they are
crushed between the high price of raw material and the low price
of the finished product.” Thus we get the following picture:
“There remain, on the one hand, the big coal companies, producing
millions of tons yearly, strongly organised in their coal
syndicate, and on the other, the big steel plants, closely allied
to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant
enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a
tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel
goods, employing

10,000 workers quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the typical
representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And
concentration goes on further and further. Individual enterprises
are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of
enterprises in one, or in several different industries, join
together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a
dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the German mining industry,
the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is
definitely proved; true, this applies to a country where industry
is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining
industry is ripe for expropriation.” [4]

Such is the conclusion which a bourgeois economist who, by way
of exception, is conscientious, had to arrive at. It must be noted
that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her
industries are protected by higher tariffs. But this is a
circumstance which only accelerates concentration and the
formation of monopolist manufacturers’ associations, cartels,
syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note that in
free-trade Britain, concentration also leads to monopoly, although
somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann
Levy, in his special work of research entitled Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts, based on data on British economic
development, writes as follows:

“In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high
technical level which harbour a monopolist tendency. This, for one
thing, is due to the great investment of capital per enterprise,
which gives rise to increasing demands for new capital for the new
enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to be the more important
point), every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the
gigantic enterprises that have been formed by concentration would
here produce such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it
could dispose of them only by being able to sell them profitably
as a result of an enormous increase in demand; otherwise, this
surplus

would force prices down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new enterprise and for the monopoly
combines.” Britain differs from other countries where protective
tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels in that monopolist
manufacturers’ associations, cartels and trusts arise in the
majority of cases only when the number of the chief competing
enterprises has been reduced to “a couple of dozen or so.” “Here
the influence of concentration on the formation of large
industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out
with crystal clarity.” [5]

Half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital, free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of
economists to be a “natural law”. Official science tried, by a
conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a
theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had proved that
free competition gives rise to the concentration of production,
which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to
monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. Economists are
writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse
manifestations of monopoly, and continue to declare in chorus that
“Marxism is refuted.” But facts are stubborn things, as the
English proverb says, and they have to be reckoned with, whether
we like it or not. The facts show that differences between
capitalist countries, e.g., in the matter of protection or free
trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of
monopolies or in the moment of their appearance; and that the rise
of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production,
is a general and fundamental law of the present stage of
development of capitalism.

For Europe, the time when the new capitalism definitely superseded the old can be established with fair precision; it
was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest
compilations on the history of the “formation of monopolies”, we
read:

“Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from
the period preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo
of the forms that are so common today; but all this undoubtedly
represents the prehistory of the cartels. The real beginning of
modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the sixties. The
first important period of development of monopoly commenced with
the international industrial depression of the seventies and
lasted until the beginning of the nineties.” “If we examine the
question on a European scale, we will find that the development of
free competition reached its apex in the sixties and seventies. It
was then that Britain completed the construction of her old-style
capitalist organisation. In Germany, this organisation had entered
into a fierce struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and
had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence.”

“The great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or
rather, the depression which followed it and which, with hardly
discernible interruptions in the early eighties, and the unusually
violent, but short-lived boom round about 1889, marks twenty-two
years of European economic history ... .. During the short boom of
1889-90, the system of cartels was widely resorted to in order to
take advantage of favourable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices up still more rapidly and still
higher than would have been the case if there had been no
cartels, and nearly all these cartels perished ingloriously in the
smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices
followed, but a new spirit reigned in industry; the depression was
no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted: it was
regarded as nothing more than a pause before another boom.

“The cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being
a transitory phenomenon, the cartels have become one of the
foundations of economic life. They are winning one field of
industry after another, primarily, the raw materials industry. At
the beginning of the nineties the cartel system had already
acquired in the organisation of the coke syndicate on the model of
which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel technique which has hardly been improved on. For the first time
the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the
crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron
industries at least—under the aegis of the cartels. And
while at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the
general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economic
life have been, as a general rule, removed from the realm of free
competition.” [6]

Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the
following: (1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of development
of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible,
embryonic stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873, a lengthy period of
development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are
not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. (3) The
boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of
1900-03. Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of
economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.

Cartels come to an agreement on the terms of sale, dates of
payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix
the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide
the profits among the various enterprises, etc.

The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in
1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000 firms participating. [7]

But it is generally recognised that these figures are underestimations. From
the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is
evident that even these 12,000 very big enterprises probably
consume more than half the steam and electric power used in the
country. In the United States of America, the number of trusts in
1900 was estimated at 185 and in 1907, 250. American statistics
divide all industrial enterprises into those belonging to
individuals, to private firms or to corporations. The latter in
1904 comprised 23.6 per cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e.,
more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the
country. These employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909, 75.6
per cent, i.e., more than three-fourths of the total wage-earners. Their output at these two dates was valued at
$10,900,000,000 and $16,300,000,000, i.e., 73.7 per cent and 79.0
per cent of the total, respectively.

At times cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven-
or eight-tenths of the total output of a given branch of
industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation
in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the total coal output of
the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated 95.4 per cent. [8]

The monopoly so created assures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of
technical production units of formidable magnitude. The famous
Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900: “It
has an authorised capital of $150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000
common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the
following dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36,
40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all,
$367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits
amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in
dividends, and the rest went to reserve capital. [9] “In 1907 the various
works of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than
210,180 people. The largest enterprise in the German mining
industry, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft, in 1908 had a
staff of 46,048 workers and office employees.” [10]

In 1902, the United
States Steel Corporation already produced 9,000,000 tons of
steel. [11]

Its output constituted in 1901, 66.3 per cent, and in 1908, 56.1
per cent of the total output of steel in the United
States. [12]

The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively.

The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts
states: “Their superiority over competitors is due to the
magnitude of their enterprises and their excellent technical
equipment. Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has devoted all
its efforts to the universal substitution of mechanical for manual
labour. With this end in view it has bought up all patents that
have anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and has spent
enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these patents at first
proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers
employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary
companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same
object in view, the trust has built its own foundries, machine
shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in
Brooklyn, employs on the average 300 workers; here experiments are
carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of
cigarettes, cheroots, snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes,
etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected.” [13] “Other trusts also
employ what are called development engineers whose business it is
to devise new methods of production and to test technical
improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big
bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions that raise
technical efficiency, or reduce cost of production.” [14]

In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical industry,
which has developed so enormously during these last few decades,
the promotion of technical improvement is organised in the same
way. By 1908 the process of concentration of production had
already given rise to two main “groups” which, in their way, were
also in the nature of monopolies. At first these groups
constituted “dual alliances” of two pairs of big factories, each
having a capital of from twenty to twenty-one million marks on the
one hand, the former Meister Factory in Hochst and the Casella
Factory in Frankfurt am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline
and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer Factory at
Elberfeld. Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the
other group, each concluded an agreement with yet another big
factory. The result was the formation of two “triple alliances,”
each with a capital of from forty to fifty million marks. And
these “alliances” have already begun to “approach” each other, to
reach “an understanding” about prices, etc. [15]

Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is
immense progress in the socialisation of production. In
particular, the process of technical invention and improvement
becomes socialised.

This is something quite different from the old free competition
between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with one
another, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has
reached the point at which it is possible to make an approximate
estimate of all sources of raw materials (for example, the iron
ore deposits) of a country and even, as we shall see, of several
countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates
made, but these sources are captured by gigantic monopolist
associations. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets
is also made, and the associations “divide” them up amongst
themselves by agreement. Skilled labour is monopolised, the best
engineers are engaged; the means of transport are captured—railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and
America. Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads directly to the
most comprehensive socialisation of production; it, so to speak,
drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into
some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from complete
free competition to complete socialisation.

Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private
property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised
free competition remains, and the yoke of a few monopolists on the
rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more
burdensome and intolerable.

The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially
devoted to “the struggle between the cartels and outsiders”, i.e.,
the capitalists outside the cartels. He entitled his work
Compulsory Organisation , although, in order to present
capitalism in its true light, he should, of course, have written
about compulsory submission to monopolist associations. It is
instructive to glance at least at the list of the methods the
monopolist associations resort to in the present-day, the latest,
the civilised struggle for “organisation”: (1) stopping supplies
of raw materials ... (“one of the most important methods of
compelling adherence to the cartel”); (2) stopping the supply of
labour by means of “alliances” (i.e., of agreements between the
capitalists and the trade unions by which the latter permit their
members to work only in cartelised enterprises); (3) stopping
deliveries; (4) closing trade outlets; (5) agreements with the
buyers, by which the latter undertake to trade only with the
cartels; (6) systematic price cutting (to ruin “outside” firms,
i.e., those which refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions
are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their
cost price; there were instances when the price of petrol was thus
reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); (7) stopping
credits; (8) boycott.

Here we no longer have competition between small and large,
between technically developed and backward enterprises. We see
here the monopolists throttling those who do not submit to them,
to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how this process is
reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:

“Even in the purely economic sphere,” writes Kestner, “a
certain change is taking place from commercial activity in the old
sense of the word towards organisational-speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant
whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all
to estimate the needs of the buyer, and who is able to discover
and, so to speak, ‘awaken’ a latent demand; it goes to the
speculative genius [?!] who knows how to estimate, or even only to
sense in advance, the organisational development and the
possibilities of certain connections between individual
enterprises and the banks. . . .”

Translated into ordinary human language this means that the
development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when, although
commodity production still “reigns” and continues to be regarded
as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined
and the bulk of the profits go to the “geniuses” of financial
manipulation. At the basis of these manipulations and swindles
lies socialised production; but the immense progress of mankind,
which achieved this socialisation, goes to benefit . . . the
speculators. We shall see later how “on these grounds” reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism
dream of going back to “free,” “peaceful” and “honest” competition.

“The prolonged raising of prices which results from the
formation of cartels,” says Kestner, “has hitherto been observed
only in respect of the most important means of production,
particularly coal, iron and potassium, but never in respect of
manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting
from this raising of prices has been limited only to the
industries which produce means of production. To this observation
we must add that the industries which process raw materials (and
not semi-manufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel
formation in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the
finished goods industry, but have also secured a dominating position over the latter, which did not exist under free
competition.” [16]

The words which I have italicised reveal the essence of the
case which the bourgeois economists admit so reluctantly and so
rarely, and which the present-day defenders of opportunism, led by
Kautsky, so zealously try to evade and brush aside. Domination,
and the violence that is associated with it, such are the
relationships that are typical of the “latest phase of capitalist
development”; this is what inevitably had to result, and has
resulted, from the formation of all-powerful economic monopolies.

I shall give one more example of the methods employed by the
cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or the chief sources
of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of monopolies
is particularly easy. It would be wrong, however, to assume that
monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is
impossible to corner the sources of raw materials. The cement
industry, for instance, can find its raw materials everywhere. Yet
in Germany this industry too is strongly cartelised. The cement
manufacturers have formed regional syndicates: South German,
Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230
to 280 marks a car-load, when the cost price is 180 marks! The
enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 to 16 per cent—and it
must not be forgotten that the “geniuses” of modern speculation
know how to pocket big profits besides what they draw in
dividends. In order to prevent competition in such a profitable
industry, the monopolists even resort to various stratagems: they
spread false rumours about the bad situation in their industry;
anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the
following: “Capitalists, don’t invest your capital in the cement
industry!”; lastly, they buy up “outsiders” (those outside the
syndicates) and pay them compensation of 60,000, 80,000 and even
150,000 marks. [17]

Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as to the means, from paying a “modest”
sum to buy off competitors, to the American device of employing
dynamite against them.

The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread
by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to place
capitalism in a favourable light. On the contrary, the monopoly
created in certain branches of industry increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production as a whole. The disparity between the development of agriculture
and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism in
general, is increased. The privileged position of the most highly
cartelised, so-called heavy industry, especially coal and
iron, causes “a still greater lack of co-ordination” in other
branches of industry—as Jeidels, the author of one of the
best works on “the relationship of the German big banks to
industry,” admits. [18] “The more developed an economic system is,” writes Liefmann, an
unblushing apologist of capitalism, “the more it resorts to risky
enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those which
need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to those which
are only of local importance.” [19]

The

increased risk is connected in the long run with a prodigious increase of capital, which, as it
were, overflows the brim, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the
extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise to
increasing elements of disparity between the various spheres of
national economy, to anarchy and crises. Liefmann is obliged to
admit that: “In all probability mankind will see further important
technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect
the organisation of the economic system”... electricity and
aviation.... “As a general rule, in such periods of radical
economic change, speculation develops on a large scale.”... [20]

Crises of every kind—economic crises most frequently, but not only these—in their turn increase very considerably
the tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this
connection, the following reflections of Jeidels on the
significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already
seen, marked the turning-point in the history of modern monopoly,
are exceedingly instructive:

“Side by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries,
the crisis of 1900 still found many plants organised on lines that
today would be considered obsolete, the ‘pure’ (non-combined)
plants, which were brought into being at the height of the
industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in demand
put these ‘pure’ enterprises in a precarious position, which did
not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all or only
affected them for a very short time. As a consequence of this the
crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry
than the crisis of 1873: the latter crisis also produced a sort of
selection of the best-equipped enterprises, but owing to the level
of technical development at that time, this selection could not
place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a
position of monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high
degree in the gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel
and electrical industries owing to their very complicated
technique, far-reaching organisation and magnitude of capital,
and, to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain
branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc.” [21]

Monopoly! This is the last word in the “latest phase of
capitalist development.” But we shall only have a very insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power and
the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take into
consideration the part played by the banks.

---
Notes:
[1]

Figures taken from Annalen des deutschen Reichs , 1911, Zahn
— Lenin

[2]

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912 , p. 202
— Lenin

[3]

Finance Capital , Russ. ed., pp. 286-87
— Lenin

[4]

Hans
Gideon Heymann, Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseiseugewerbe , Stuttgart, 1904, (S. 256, 278).

— Lenin

[5]

Hermann
Levy, Monopole, Kartelle und Trusts , Jena, 1909,
S. 286, 290,
— Lenin

[6]

Th. Vogelstein, “ Die finanzielle Organisation der kapitalistischen Industrie und die Monopolbildungen ” in
Grundriss der Sozialökonomik , VI. Abt., Tubingen,
1914. Cf., also by the same author: Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika ,
Bd. 1, Lpz., 1910.
— Lenin

[7]

Dr. Riesser, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland , 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149;
Robert Liefmann, Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation, 2. Aufl., 1910,
S. 25.
— Lenin

[8]

Dr. Fritz Kestner, Der Organisationszwang. Eine Untersuchung über die Kämpfe zwischen Kartellen und Aussenseitern , Berlin, 1912, S. 11.
— Lenin

[9]

R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanziertingsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen , 1. Aufl., Jena, 1909, S. 212.
— Lenin

[10]

Ibid ., S. 218.
— Lenin

[11]

Dr. S. Tschierschky, Kartell und Trust , Göttingen, 1903, S. 13.
— Lenin

[12]

Tr. Vogelstein, Organisationsformen , S. 275.
— Lenin

[13]

Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry , Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to
Dr. Paul Tafel, Die nordamerikanischen Trusts und ihre Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik , Stuttgart, 1913,
S. 48.
— Lenin

[14]

Dr. P. Tafel, ibid ., S. 49.
— Lenin

[15]

Riesser, op. cit., third edition, p. 547 et seq. The newspapers
(June 1916) report the formation of a new gigantic trust which
combines the chemical industry of Germany.
— Lenin

[16]

Kestner, op.cit., S. 254
— Lenin

[17]

L. Eschwege, “Zement” in Die Bank , 1909, S. 115
et. seq.
— Lenin

[18]

Jeidels, Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berüchsichtigung der Eisenindustrie , Leipzig, 1905, S. 271
— Lenin

[19]

Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften ,
S, 434.
— Lenin

[20]

Ibid , S. 465-66
— Lenin

[21]

Jeidels, op. cit., S. 108.
— Lenin