V. I.

Lenin

At last there has appeared in Germany, illegally, without any
adaptation to the despicable Junker censorship, a
Social-Democratic pamphlet dealing with questions of the war!
The author, who evidently belongs to the “Left-radical” wing of
the Party, signs himself
Junius [3] (which in
Latin means junior) and gave his pamphlet the title: The Crisis of Social-Democracy . Appended are the
“Theses on the Tasks of International Social-Democracy,” which
have already been submitted to the Berne I.S.C. (International
Socialist Committee) and published in No. 3 of its
Bulletin ; the theses were drafted by the “International” group, which in the spring of 1915 published one
issue of a magazine under that title (with articles by Zetkin,
Mehring, R. Luxemburg, Thalheimer, Duncker, Ströbel and others),
and which in the winter of 1915-16 convened a conference of
Social-Democrats from all parts of
Germany [4] at which these theses were adopted.

The pamphlet, the author says in the introduction dated January
2, 1916, was written in April, 1915, and published “without any
alteration”. “Outside circumstances” prevented it from being
published earlier. The pamphlet is devoted not so much to the
“crisis of Social-Democracy” as to an analysis of the war, to
refuting the legend of its being a war for national liberation,
to proving that it is an imperialist war on the part of Germany
as well as on the part of the other Great Powers, and to a
revolutionary criticism of the behaviour of the official
party. Written in a very lively style, Junius’ pamphlet has
undoubtedly played and will play an important role in the
struggle against the ex-Social-Democratic Party of Germany,
which has deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie and the
Junkers, and we heartily greet the author.

To the Russian reader who is familiar with the Social-Democratic
Literature published abroad in Russian in 1914-16, Junius’
pamphlet offers nothing new in principle. But in reading this
pamphlet and comparing the arguments of this German revolutionary Marxist with what has been stated, for example, in
the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party (September-November, 1914)

in the Berne resolutions (March, 1915)

and in the numerous commentaries on them, it becomes dear that Junius’ arguments are
very incomplete and that he commits two errors. Proceeding to
criticise Junius’ faults and errors we must strongly emphasise
that we do so for the sake of self criticism, which is so
necessary for Marxists, and of submitting to an all-round test
the views which must serve as the ideological basis of the Third
International. On the whole, Junius’ pamphlet is a splendid

Marxian work, and in all probability its defects are, to a
certain extent, accidental.

The chief defect in Junius’ pamphlet, and what marks a definite
step backward compared with the legal (although immediately
suppressed) magazine, international , is its silence regarding the connection between social-chauvinism (the author
uses neither this nor the less precise term social-patriotism)
and opportunism. The author rightly speaks of the “capitulation”
and collapse of the German Social-Democratic Party and of the
“treachery” of its “official leaders,” but he goes no further
than this. The International, however, did criticise the “Centre,” i.e., Kautskyism, and quite properly
poured ridicule on it for its spinelessness, its prostitution of
Marxism and its servility to the opportunists. This magazine
also began to expose the role the opportunists are really playing by making known, for example, the very important
fact that on August 4, 1914, the opportunists came forth with an
ultimatum, with their minds made up to vote for the war
credits under any circumstances. Neither in Junius’ pamphlet nor
in the theses is anything said about opportunism or about
Kautskyism! This is wrong from the standpoint of theory, for it is impossible to explain the “betrayal” without linking
it up with opportunism as a trend with a long history, the history of the whole Second International. It is a mistake
from the practical-political standpoint, for it is impossible to
understand the “crisis of Social-Democracy” or overcome it
without making clear the meaning and the role of two trend s : the avowedly
opportunist trend (Legien, David etc.) and the masked opportunist trend (Kautsky and Co.). This is a step backward
compared with the historic article by Otto Ruhle in
Vorwärts of January 13, 1916, in which he directly and openly pointed out that a split in the Social-Democratic Party
of Germany was inevitable (the editors of the
Vorwärts answered him by repeating honeyed and hypocritical Kautskyist phrases, for they were unable to advance
a single material argument to disprove the assertion that there
were already two parties in existence, and that these two parties could not be reconciled). It is astonishingly
inconsistent, because the international thesis No. 12 directly states that it is necessary to create a “new”
International, owing to the “treachery” of the “official
representatives of the Socialist Parties of the leading
countries” and their “adoption of the principles of bourgeois
imperialist politics.” Clearly, to suggest that the old
Social-Democratic Party of Germany, or parties which tolerate Legien, David and Co, would participate in a “new”
International is simply ridiculous.

We do not know why the international group took this step backward. A very great defect in revolutionary Marxism in
Germany as a whole is its lack of a compact illegal organisation
that would systematically pursue its line and educate the masses
in the spirit of the new tasks; such an organisation would also
have to take a definite stand towards opportunism and
Kautskyism. This is all the more necessary now, since the German
revolutionary Social-Democrats have been deprived of their last
two daily papers: the one in Bremen ( Bremen = Burger-zeitung ), [5] and the one in Brunswick
( Volksfreund ), [6] both of which have gone over to the Kautskyists. That the “International Socialists
of Germany” (I.S.D.) group alone remains at its post is
definitely clear to everybody.

Some members of the international group have evidently slipped once again into the morass of unprincipled

Kautskyism. Ströbel , for instance, went so far as to make obeisance, in the Neue Zeit, to Bernstein and
Kautsky! And only the other day, on August 15, 1916, he had an
article in the papers entitled “Pacifism and Social-Democracy,”
in which he defends the most vulgar type of Kautskyian pacifism. Junius, however, strongly opposes Kautsky’s fantastic
schemes for “disarmament,” “abolition of secret diplomacy”
etc. Perhaps there are two trends in the international group: a revolutionary trend and a trend wavering in the
direction of Kautskyism.

The first of Junius’ erroneous postulates, the first is
contained in the International group’s thesis No. 5:
“In the epoch (era) of this unbridled imperialism, there can be
no more national wars. National interests serve only as an
instrument of deception, to deliver the masses of the toiling
people into the service of their mortal enemy, imperialism....”
This postulate is the end of thesis No. 5, the first part of
which is devoted to the description of the present war as an imperialist war. The repudiation of national wars in
general may either be an oversight or a fortuitous over-emphasis
of the perfectly correct idea that the present war is an imperialist war and not a national war. But as the opposite
may be true, as various Social-Democrats mistakenly repudiate all national wars because the
present war is falsely represented to be a national war, we are obliged to deal with this mistake.

Junius is quite right in emphasising the decisive influence of the “imperialist
background” of the present war, when he says that behind Serbia there is Russia, “behind Serbian nationalism there
is Russian imperialism”; that even if a country like Holland
took part in the present war, she too would be waging an
imperialist war, because, firstly, Holland would be defending
her colonies, and, secondly, she would be an ally of one of the
imperialist coalitions. This is indisputable in relation to the present war. And when Junius lays
particular emphasis on what to him is the most important point:
the struggle against the “phantom of national war, which at
present dominates Social-Democratic policy” (p. 81, Junius’
pamphlet), we cannot but agree that his reasoning is correct and
quite appropriate.

But it would be a mistake to exaggerate this truth; to depart
from the Marxian rule to be concrete; to apply the appraisal of
the present war to all wars that are possible under imperialism;
to lose sight of the national movements against imperialism. The only argument that can be used in defence of
the thesis: “there can be no more national wars” is that the
world has been divided up among a handful of “Great” imperialist
powers, and, therefore, every war, even if it starts as a
national war, is transformed into an imperialist war and affects the interests of one of the imperialist Powers or
coalitions (p. 81 of Junius’ pamphlet).

The fallacy of this argument is obvious. Of course, the
fundamental proposition of Marxian dialectics is that all
boundaries in nature and society are conventional and mobile,
that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under certain conditions be transformed into its opposite. A
national war can be transformed into an imperialist war, and
vice versa . For example, the wars of the Great French
Revolution started as national wars and were such. They were
revolutionary wars because they were waged in defence of the
Great Revolution against a coalition of counter-revolutionary
monarchies. But after Napoleon had created the French Empire by
subjugating a number of large, virile, long established national
states of Europe, the French national wars became imperialist
wars, which in their turn engendered wars for national liberation against Napoleon’s imperialism.

Only a sophist would deny that there is a difference between
imperialist war and national war on the grounds that one
can be transformed into the other. More than once, even
in the history of Greek philosophy, dialectics have served as a
bridge to sophistry. We, however, remain dialecticians and
combat sophistry, not by a sweeping denial of the possibility of
transformation in general, but by concretely analysing a
given phenomenon in the circumstances that surround it and in its development.

It is highly improbable that this imperialist war of 1914–16
will be transformed into a national war, because the class that
represents progress is the proletariat, which, objectively, is striving to transform this war into civil war
against the bourgeoisie; and also because the strength of both
coalitions is almost equally balanced, while international
finance capital has everywhere created a reactionary bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that such a
transformation is impossible : if the European proletariat were to remain impotent for another twenty years;
if the present war were to end in victories similar to those achieved by Napoleon, in the subjugation of a number of
virile national states; if imperialism outside of
Europe (primarily American and Japanese) were to remain in power
for another twenty years without a transition to socialism, say,
as a result of a Japanese-American war, then a great national
war in Europe would be possible. This means that Europe would be
thrown back for several decades. This is improbable. But it is not impossible, for to picture
world history as advancing smoothly and steadily without
sometimes taking gigantic strides backward is undialectical,
unscientific and theoretically wrong.

Further, national wars waged by colonial, and semi-colonial
countries are not only possible but inevitable in the epoch of imperialism. The colonies and semi-colonies (China,
Turkey, Persia) have a population of nearly one billion,
i.e., more than half the population of the earth. In these countries the movements for national liberation are either
very strong already or are growing and maturing. Every war is a
continuation of politics by other means. The national liberation
politics of the colonies will inevitably be continued by national wars of the colonies against
imperialism. Such wars may lead to an imperialist war between the present “Great” imperialist Powers or they may not;
that depends on many circumstances.

For example: England and France were engaged in a seven years
war for colonies, i.e., they waged an imperialist war (which is
as possible on the basis of slavery, or of primitive capitalism,
as on the basis of highly developed modern capitalism). France
was defeated and lost part of her colonies. Several years later
the North American States started a war for national liberation
against England alone. Out of enmity towards England, i.e., in
conformity with their own imperialist interests, France and
Spain, which still held parts of what are now the United States,
concluded friendly treaties with the states that had risen
against England. The French forces together with the American
defeated the English. Here we have a war for national liberation
in which imperialist rivalry is a contributory element of no
great importance, which is the opposite of what we have in the war of 1914–16 (in which the national element in the
Austro-Serbian war is of no great importance compared with the
all determining imperialist rivalry). This shows how absurd it
would be to employ the term imperialism in a stereotyped fashion
by deducing from it that national wars are “impossible.” A war
for national liberation waged, for example, by an alliance of
Persia, India and China against certain imperialist Powers is
quite possible and probable, for it follows logically from the
national liberation movements now going on in those countries. Whether such a war will be transformed into an
imperialist war among the present imperialist Powers will depend
on a great many concrete circumstances, and it would be
ridiculous to guarantee that these circumstances will arise.

Thirdly, national wars must not be regarded as impossible in the
epoch of imperialism even in Europe. The “epoch of imperialism”
made the present war an imperialist war; it inevitably engenders
(until the advent of socialism) new imperialist war; it
transformed the policies of the present Great Powers into
thoroughly imperialist policies. But this “epoch” by no means
precludes the possibility of national wars, waged, for example,
by small (let us assume, annexed or nationally oppressed) states
against the imperialist Powers, any more than it precludes the possibility of big national movements in Eastern
Europe. With regard to Austria, for example, Junius shows sound
judgment in taking into account not only the “economic,” but
also the peculiar political situation, in noting Austria’s
“inherent lack of vitality” and admitting that “the Hapsburg
monarchy is not a political organisation of a bourgeois state,
but only a loosely knit syndicate of several cliques of social
parasites,” that “historically, the liquidation of
Austria-Hungary is merely the continuation of the disintegration
of Turkey and at the same time a demand of the historical
process of development.” The situation is no better in certain
Balkan states and in Russia. And in the event of the “Great
Powers” becoming extremely exhausted in the present war, or in
the event of a victorious revolution in Russia, national wars,
even victorious ones, are quite possible. On the one hand,
intervention by the imperialist powers is not possible under all circumstances. On the other hand, when people argue
haphazardly that a war waged by a small state against a giant
state is hopeless, we must say that a hopeless war is war
nevertheless, and, moreover, certain events within the “giant”
states—for example, the beginning of a revolution—may transform a “hopeless” war into a very “hopeful” one.

The fact that the postulate that “there can be no more national
wars” is obviously fallacious in theory is not the only reason
why we have dealt with this fallacy at length. It would be a
very deplorable thing, of course, if the “Lefts” began to be
careless in their treatment of Marxian theory, considering that
the Third International can be established only on the basis of
Marxism, unvulgarised Marxism. But this fallacy is also very
harmful in a practical political sense; it gives rise to the
stupid propaganda for “disarmament,” as if no other war but
reactionary wars are possible; it is the cause of the still more
stupid and downright reactionary indifference towards national
movements. Such indifference becomes chauvinism when members of
“Great” European nations, i.e., nations which oppress a mass of
small and colonial peoples, declare with a learned air that
“there can be no more national wars!” National wars again s t the imperialist Powers are not only
possible and probable, they are inevitable, they are progressive and revolutionary, although, of
course, what is needed for their success is either the combined
efforts of an enormous number of the inhabitants of the
oppressed countries (hundreds of millions in the example we have
taken of India and China), or a particularly favourable
combination of circumstances in the international situation (for
example, when the intervention of the imperialist Powers is
paralysed by exhaustion, by war, by their mutual antagonisms,
etc.), or a simultaneous uprising of the proletariat of
one of the Great Powers against the bourgeoisie (this latter
case stands first in order from the standpoint of what is
desirable and advantageous for the victory of the proletariat).

We must state, however, that it would be unfair to accuse Junius
of being indifferent to national movements. When enumerating the
sins of the Social-Democratic Parliamentary group, he does at
least mention their silence in the matter of the execution of a
native leader in the Cameroons for “treason” (evidently for an
attempt at insurrection in connection with the war); and in
another place he emphasises (for the special benefit of
Messrs. Legien, Lensch and similar scoundrels who call themselves “Social-Democrats”) that colonial nations are also
nations. He declares very definitely:

“Socialism recognises for every people the right to independence
and freedom, the right to be masters of their own destiny.... International socialism recognises the right of
free, independent, equal nations, but only socialism can create
such nations, only socialism can establish the right of nations
to self-determination. This slogan of socialism,” justly
observes the author, “like all its other slogans, serves, not to
justify the existing order of things, but as a guide post, as a
stimulus to the revolutionary, reconstructive, active policy of
the proletariat.” (p. 77-78)

Consequently, it would be a profound mistake to suppose that all
the Left German Social-Democrats have stooped to the narrow-mindedness and distortion of Marxism advocated by certain
Dutch and Polish Social-Democrats, who repudiate self-determination of nations even under socialism. However, we
shall deal with the special Dutch and Polish sources of
this mistake elsewhere.

Another fallacious argument advanced by Junius is in connection with the question of defence of the
fatherland. This is a cardinal political question during an
imperialist war. Junius has strengthened us in our conviction
that our Party has indicated the only correct approach to this
question: the proletariat is opposed to defence of the fatherland in this imperialist war because of its
predatory, slave-owning, reactionary character, because
it is possible and necessary to oppose to it (and to strive to
convert it into) civil war for socialism. Junius, however, while
brilliantly exposing the imperialist character of the present
war as distinct from a national war, falls into the very strange
error of trying to drag a national programme into the present non-national war. It sounds almost incredible,
but it is true.

The official Social-Democrats, both of the Legien and of the
Kautsky shade, in their servility to the bourgeoisie, who have
been making the most noise about foreign “invasion” in order to
deceive the masses of the people as to the imperialist character
of the war, have been particularly assiduous in repeating this
“invasion” argument. Kautsky, who now assures naive and
credulous people (incidentally, through the mouth of “Spectator,” a member of the Russian Organization Committee)
that he joined the opposition at the end of 1914, continues to
use this “argument”! To refute it, Junius quotes extremely
instructive examples from history, which prove that “invasion
and class struggle are not contradictory in bourgeois history,
as the official legend has it, but that one is the means and the
expression of the other.” For example, the Bourbons in France
invoked foreign invaders against the Jacobins; the bourgeoisie
in 1871 invoked foreign invaders against the Commune.

In his
Civil War in France , Marx wrote:

“ The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable
is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of the
classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle
bursts out in civil war.” [7] “ The classical example for all times,” says Junius, referring to
1793, “is the Great French Revolution.” From all this, he draws
the following conclusion:

“Century-old experience thus proves that it is not a state of
siege, but heroic class struggle, which rouses the self-respect,
the heroism and the moral strength of the masses of the people,
and serves as the country’s best protection and defence against
the foreign enemy.”

Junius’ practical conclusion is this:

“ Yes, it is the duty of the Social-Democrats to defend their
country during a great historical crisis. But the grave guilt
that rests upon the Social-Democratic Reichstag group lies
precisely in that, in solemnly declaring, on August 4, 1914,
that ‘In the hour of danger we will not leave our fatherland
unprotected,’ they at the same time belied those words. They
did leave the fatherland unprotected in the hour of greatest peril. For their first duty to the fatherland in that
hour was to show the fatherland what was really behind the
present imperialist war; to tear down the web of patriotic and
diplomatic lies with which this encroachment on the fatherland
was enmeshed; to proclaim loudly and dearly that both victory
and defeat in the present war are equally fatal for the German
people; to resist to the last the throttling of the fatherland
by declaring a state of siege; to proclaim the necessity of
immediately arming the people and of allowing the people to
decide the question of war and peace; resolutely to demand a
permanent session of the people’s representatives for the whole
duration of the war in order to guarantee vigilant central over
the government by the people’s representatives, and the control
over the people’s representatives by the people; to demand the
immediate abolition of all restrictions on political rights, for
only a free people can successfully defend its country; and,
finally, to oppose the imperialist war programme, which is to
preserve Austria and Turkey, i.e., perpetuate reaction in Europe
and in Germany, with the old, truly national programme of the
patriots and democrats of 1848, the programme of Marx, Engels
and Lassalle: the slogan of a united, Great German republic. This is the banner that should have been unfurled
before the country, which would have been a truly national
banner of liberation, which would have been in accord with the
best traditions of Germany and with the international class
policy of the proletariat....

Hence, the grave dilemma—the interests of the fatherland
or the international solidarity of the proletariat—the tragic conflict which prompted our parliamentarians ‘with a
heavy heart’ to side with the imperialist war, is purely
imaginary, it is bourgeois nationalist fiction. On the contrary,
there is complete harmony between the interests of the country
and the class interests of the proletarian International, both
in time of war and in time of peace; both war and peace demand
the most energetic development of the class struggle, the most
determined fight for the Social-Democratic programme.”

This is how Junius argues. The fallacy of his argument is
strikingly evident, and since the masked and avowed lackeys of
tsarism, Messrs. Plekhanov and Chkhenkeli, and perhaps even
Messrs. Martov and Chkheidze may gloatingly seize upon Junius’
words, not for the purpose of establishing theoretical truth,
but for the purpose of wriggling, of covering up their tracks
and of throwing dust in the eyes of the workers, we must in
greater detail elucidate the theoretical source of
Junius’ error.

He proposes to “oppose” the imperialist war with a national
programme. He urges the advanced class to turn its face to the
past and not to the future! In France, in Germany, and in the
whole of Europe it was a bourgeois-democratic revolution that, objectively, was on the order of the
day in 1793 and 1848. Corresponding to this objective historical situation was the “truly national,” i.e. ,
the national bourgeois programme of the then existing democracy; in 1793 this programme was carried out by the most
revolutionary elements of the bourgeoisie and the plebeians, and
in 1848 it was proclaimed by Marx in the name of the whole of
progressive democracy. Objectively, the feudal and dynastic wars were then opposed with revolutionary democratic
wars, with wars for national liberation. This was the content of
the historical tasks of that epoch.

At the present time the objective situation in the biggest advanced states of Europe is different. Progress, if
we leave out the possibility of temporary steps backward, is
possible only towards socialist society, only towards the socialist revolution. Objectively, the imperialist
bourgeois war, the war of highly developed capitalism, can, from
the standpoint of progress, from the standpoint of the progressive class, be opposed only with a war against
the bourgeoisie, i.e ., primarily civil war between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie for power; for unless such a war is waged serious progress is impossible; and
after that—only under certain special conditions—a war to defend the socialist state against bourgeois stares is
possible. That is why those Bolsheviks (fortunately, very few,
and we quickly handed them over to the
Prizyv-ists ) who were ready to adapt the point of view of conditional defence, i.e., of defending the
fatherland on the condition that there was a victorious
revolution and the victory of a republic in Russia, were true to
the letter of Bolshevism, but betrayed its spirit: 48 for being drawn into the imperialist war of
the advanced European Powers, Russia, even under a republican
form of government, would also be waging an imperialist
war!

In saying that class struggle is the best means of defence
against invasion, Junius applied Marxian dialectics only
halfway, taking one step on the right road and immediately
deviating from it. Marxian dialectics call for a concrete
analysis of each specific historical situation. That class
struggle is the best means of defence against invasion is true
both with regard to the bourgeoisie, which is overthrowing feudalism, and with regard to the proletariat,
which is overthrowing the bourgeoisie. Precisely because it is
true with regard to every form of class oppression, it is too general, and therefore, inadequate in
the present specific case. Civil war against the bourgeoisie is also a form of class struggle, and only
this form of class struggle would have saved Europe (the whole
of Europe, not only one country) from the peril of invasion. The
“Great German Republic” had it existed in 1914-16, would
also have waged an imperialist war.

Junius came very close to the correct solution of the problem
and to the correct slogan: civil war against the bourgeoisie for
socialism; but, as if afraid to speak the whole truth, he turned
back to the fantasy of a “national war” in 1914, 1915 and 1916. Even if we examine the question from the purely
practical and not theoretical angle, Junius’ error remains no
less clear. The whole of bourgeois society, all classes in
Germany, including the peasantry, were in favour of war
(in all probability the same was the case in Russia—at least a majority of the well-to-do and middle peasantry and a
very considerable portion of the poor peasants were evidently
under the spell of bourgeois imperialism). The bourgeoisie was
armed to the teeth. Under such circumstances to “proclaim” the
programme of a republic, a permanent parliament, election of
officers by the people (the “armed nation”), etc., would have
meant, in practice , “ proclaiming ” a revolution (with a
wrong revolutionary programme!).

In the same breath Junius quite rightly says that a revolution
cannot be “made.” Revolution was on the order of the day in
1914–16, it was hidden in the depths of the war, was emerging out of the war. This should have been
“ proclaimed ” in the name of the revolutionary class, and its programme should have been fearlessly and fully
announced: socialism is impossible in time of war without civil
war against the arch-reactionary, criminal bourgeoisie, which
condemned the people to untold disaster. Systematic, consistent,
practical measures should have been thought out, which could be carried out no matter what the
rate of development of the revolutionary crisis might have been, and which would be in line with the maturing
revolution. These measures are indicated in the resolution of
our Party:
1) voting against war credits;

2) violation of “civil
peace”;
3) creation of an illegal organisation;
4)
fraternisation among the soldiers;
5) support to all the
revolutionary actions of the masses. [1]

The success of all these steps inevitably leads to civil war.

The promulgation of a great historical programme was undoubtedly
of tremendous significance; not the old national German
programme, which became obsolete in 1914-16, but the proletarian
international and socialist programme. “You, the bourgeoisie,
are fighting for plunder; we, the workers of all the belligerent
countries, declare war upon you for socialism”—this is the
sort of speech that should have been delivered in the
Parliaments on August 4, 1914, by Socialists who had not
betrayed the proletariat, as the Legiens, Davids, Kautskys,
Plekhanovs, Guesdes, Sembats, etc. betrayed it.

Evidently
Junius’ error is due to two mistakes in reasoning. There is no
doubt that Junius is decidedly opposed to the imperialist war
and is decidedly in favor of revolutionary tactics; and
all Messrs. Plehhanovs’ gloating over Junius’ “defencism” cannot
wipe out this fact . Possible and probable calumnies of
this kind must be answered promptly and bluntly.

But, firstly, Junius has not completely rid himself of the
“environment” of the German Social-Democrats, even the Lefts,
who are afraid of a split, who are afraid to follow revolutionary slogans to their logical
conclusions. [2]

This is a mistaken fear, and the Left Social-Democrats of Germany must and
will rid themselves of it. They will do so in the course of the struggle against the social-chauvinists. The
fact is that they are fighting against their own social-chauvinists resolutely, firmly and sincerely,
and this is the tremendous, the fundamental difference in
principle between them and Messrs. Martovs and Chkheidzes, who,
with one hand ( à la Skobelev) unfurl a banner bearing the greeting, “To the Liebknechts of All Countries,” and
with the other hand tenderly embrace Chkhenkeli and Potresov!

Secondly, Junius apparently wanted to achieve something in the
nature of the Menshevik “theory of stages,” of sad memory; he
wanted to begin to carry out the revolutionary programme from
the end that is “more suitable,” “more popular” and more
acceptable to the petty-bourgeoisie. It is something like the plan “to outwit history,” to outwit the philistines. He
seems to say: surely, nobody would oppose a better way of defending the real fatherland; that real fatherland is the
Great German Republic, and the best defence is a militia, a
permanent parliament, etc. Once it was accepted, that programme
would automatically lead to the next stage-to the socialist
revolution.

Probably, it was reasoning of this kind that consciously or
semi-consciously determined Junius’ tactics. Needless to say,
such reasoning is fallacious, Junius’ pamphlet conjures up in
our mind the picture of a lone man who has no comrades in an illegal organisation accustomed to thinking out
revolutionary slogans to their conclusion and systematically
educating the masses in their spirit. But this shortcoming—it would be a grave error to forget this-is not
Junius’ personal failing, but the result of the weakness of all
the German Lefts, who have become entangled in the vile net of
Kautskyist hypocrisy, pedantry and “friendliness” towards the
opportunists. Junius’ adherents have managed in spite of their isolation to begin the publication of illegal
leaflets and to start the war against Kautskyism. They will
succeed in going further along the right road.

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Notes:
[1]
See present edition, Vol. 21, “The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad.”— Ed .

[2]

We find the same error in Junius’ arguments about which is
better, victory or defeat His conclusion is that both are equally bad (ruin, growth of armaments, etc.). This is the
point of view not of the revolutionary proletariat, but of the
pacifist petty bourgeois. If we speak about the “revolutionary
intervention” of the proletariat—of this both Junius and
the thews of the International group speak, although unfortunately in too general terms—then we must
raise the question from another point of view, namely:
1) Is

“revolutionary intervention” possible without the risk of
defeat!
2) Is it possible to scourge the bourgeoisie and the
government of one’s own country without taking that risk;
3) Have we not always asserted, and does not the
historical experience of reactionary wars prove, that defeats
help the cause of the revolutionary class?
— Lenin

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