THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCEPTICS
[53]
Speaking of
Scepticism
, Hegel points
to its apparent “invincibility” (Unbezwing-
lichkeit) (538):
NB
“If anyone actually desires to be a Scep-
tic, he cannot be convinced, or be brought
to a positive philosophy, any more than he
who is paralysed can be made to stand.” (539)
Bien dit!!
“Positive philosophy in relation to it”
(den denkenden Skeptizismus
[54]
) “may
have this consciousness: it contains in itself
the negative of Scepticism; Scepticism is
not opposed to it, nor outside it, but is
a moment of it; but it contains the negative
in its truth, as it is not present in Scepti-
cism.” (539)
(The relation of philosophy to Scepti-
cism:)
“Philosophy is dialectical, this dialectic
is change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, is
the inert and existent, but it is only true
insofar as it grasps itself as living; this
is that it is dialectical in itself, in order
to transcend that quiescence and inertness.
Hence the philosophic idea is dialectical
in itself and not contingent; Scepticism,
on the contrary, exercises its dialectic
contingently—for just as the material, the
content comes before it, it shows that it
is negative in itself....” (540)
NB
dialectics of
Scepticism is
“contingent”
The old (
ancient
) Sciepticism has to be
distinguished from the
new
(only Schulze
of Göttingen is named). (540)
Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the ideal
of the Sceptics:
“Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow-
passengers on board a ship, who were fright-
ened during a storm, a pig, which remained
quite indifferent and peaceably ate on,
saying to them: in such imperturbahility
the wise man must also abide” (Diogenes
Laertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.
not a bad
anecdote
about the
Sceptics
“Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is just
the opposite of the tranquillity that is
the result of scepticism.” (552)
NB
Scepticism is
not doubt
...“Scepticism, on the contrary, is indif-
ferent to the one as well as to the other....”
(553)
Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scep-
ticism the statement that everything sen-
suous is truth (557), but the Sceptics did
not say so: one must sich danach richten,
orientate oneself by the sensuous, but that
is not the truth. The new Scepticism does
not
doubt the reality of things. The old
Scepticism does doubt the reality of things.
NB
Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.)
of the Sceptics:
everything in
Sextus
Empiricus
(second cen-
tury A. D.)
a
.
The diversity of animal organisation.
(558)
Differences in sensations: the jaun-
diced (dem Gelbsiichtigen) sees as
yellow what to others appears white,
etc.
b
.
The diversity of mankind. “Idiosyn-
crasies.” (559)
Whom to believe? The majority? Fool-
ish, for all men cannot be interro-
gated. (560)
Diversity of philosophies: Stupid re-
ference, Hegel waxes indignant: ...
“such men see everything in a phi-
losophy excepting Philosophy itself,
NB
and this is overlooked....” “However
different the philosophic systems may
be, they are not as different as white
and sweet, green and rough, for they
agree in the fact that they are philos-
ophies and this is what is overlooked.”
(561)
NB
...“All tropes proceed against the
‘is,’ but the truth is all the same
not this dry ‘is,’ but essentially proc-
ess....” (562)
NB
c
.
The diversity in the constitution of
the organs of sense: the various sense
organs perceive differently (on a paint-
ed panel something appears erha-
ben
[55]
to the eye but not to the
touch).
d
.
The diversity of circumstances in the
subject (rest, passion, etc.).
e
.
The diversity of distances, etc.
the earth going round
the sun or vice versa, etc.
f.
Intermixture (scents in strong sun-
shine and without it, etc.).
g.
The composition of things (pounded
glass is not transparent, etc.).
h.
The “
relativity
of things.”
i.
The frequency, rarity of happenings,
etc.; habit.
k.
Customs, laws, etc., their diversity....
|These (10) are all
old
tropes|
and He-
gel: this is all “empirical”—“do not have
to do with the Notion....” (566) This is
“trivial”..., but ....
“In fact, as against the dogmatism of
the common human understanding they
are quite valid....” (567)
The
five new
tropes (are said by Hegel
to he much more advanced, they contain
dialectics
, concern
concepts
)—also accord-
ing to Sextus:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
The diversity of the
opinions
...
of
philosophers
...
The falling into an infinite pro-
gression (one thing depends on an-
other
and so on
without end).
Relativity (of premises).
Presupposition. The dogmatists put
forward unprovable presupposi-
tions.
Reciprocity. Circle (vicious)...
“These sceptical tropes, in fact,
concern
that which is called a dogmatic philosophy
(and in accordance with its nature such
a philosophy must display itself in all
these forms) not in the sense of its having
a positive content, but as asserting some-
thing determinate as the absolute.” (575)
NB
Hegel
against the absolute!
Here we have the germ of dialectical mat-
erialism.
NB
“To the criticism which knows nothing
in itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!)
[56]
ab-
solute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself,
as such, is held to be dogmatism, while
it is the worst dogmatism of all, because
it maintains that the ‘I,’ the unity of self-
consciousness, opposed to Being, is in and
for itself, and that what is ‘in itself’ in
the outside world is likewise so, and there-
fore that the two absolutely cannot come
together.” (576)
“Criticism” is
the “worst
dogmatism”
“These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy,
which has this manner of representing one
principle in a determinate proposition as
determinateness. Such a principle is always
conditioned; and consequently contains dia-
lectics, the destruction within it of itself.”
(577) “These tropes are a powerful weapon
against the philosophy of reason.” (ib.)
Bien
dit!!!
Dialectics
=
“destruction
of itself”
Sextus, for example, reveals the dialec-
tics of the concept of a
point
(der Punkt).
A point has no dimensions? That means
that it is
outside
space! It is the limit
of space in space, a negation of space, and
at the same time “it touches space”—“but
at the same time it is also in itself some-
thing dialectical.” (579)
NB
“These tropes ... are powerless against
speculative
ideas, because the latter contain
within themselves a
dialectical
moment
and the
abrogation
of the finite.” (580)
NB
End of Volume XIV (p. 586).
Notes
[1]
Sophists
(from the Greek
sophos
—a
	  wise man)—the designation (since the second half of the 5th century B.C.)
	  for professional philosophers, teachers of philosophy and rhetoric. The Sophists
	  did not constitute a single school. The most characteristic feature common
	  to Sophists was their belief in the relativity of all human ideas, ethical
	  standards and values, expressed by Protagoras in the following famous statement:
	  “Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what
	  is not, that it is not.” In the first half of the 4th century B.C.,
	  sophism disintegrated and degenerated into a barren play with logical conceptions.
[2]
counterproofs—
Ed.
[3]
Hegel
,
Werke
, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—
Ed.
[4]
the
universal
—
Ed.
[5]
this “relativity”—
Ed.
[6]
Phenomenologism
—a branch of subjective
	  idealism that considers phenomena to be only the totality of man’s sensations.
	  The Machists were phenomenalists. An important role in the Marxist criticism
	  of phenomenologism was played by Lenin’s book
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism
(
Collected Works
, Vol. 14).
[7]
common sense—
Ed.
[8]
This excerpt was made by Lenin somewhat later in
	  outlining the philosophy of
Socrates
(pp. 43-44 of Hegel;
see
	  p. 273
of this volume).—
Ed.
[9]
This excerpt was made by Lenin in outlining the
	  philosophy of Socrates (p. 69 of Hegel; see
p. 274
of this volume).—
Ed.
[10]
See § 27 of
Feuerbach
’s
Principles
	  of the Philosophy of the Future
for his views on being and essence.
[11]
The reference is to the following statement of
	  Feuerbach: “At the beginning of phenomenology we immediately come across
	  a contradiction between the word which represents the universal, and the thing,
	  which is always a particular.” (See § 28 of Feuerbach’s
Principles
	  of the Philosophy of the Future
.)
[12]
“in it itself”—
Ed.
[13]
Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt
	  on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added 
	  on Gorgias....” (See
p. 271
of this volume.)—
Ed.
[14]
the art of midwifery
—
Ed.
[15]
Becoming = not-Being and Being.—
Ed.
[16]
Meno
—
Plato
’s dialogue directed
	  against the Sophists. It is considered to be one of Plato’s early works.
[17]
“drugged”—
Ed.
[18]
Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt
	  on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added
	  further on Gorgias....” (See
p. 272
of this 
	  volume.)—
Ed.
[19]
very well put—
Ed.
[20]
Lenin is referring to the following philosophical
	  works by
Plekhanov
:
	  N. Beltov,
The Development
	  of the Monist View of History
,
	  published as a separate volume in 1895 in St. Petersburg (see
Selected
	  Philosophical Works
, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, pp. 542-782); articles against
	  Bogdanov appearing in Social-Democratic periodicals and published in the collection
	  entitled “From Defence to Attack” (1910); articles against the Kantians E.
	  Bernstein, C. Schmidt and others appearing in the journal
Die Neue Zeit
and published in the collection: N. Beltov, “Criticism of Our Critics,” St.
	  Petersburg, 1906; and “Fundamental Questions of Marxism,” published as 
	  a separate volume in 1908 in St. Petersburg.
[21]
the sensuous—
Ed.
[22]
the very essence of the
	  thing
—
Ed.
[23]
Cyrenaics
-adherents, of an ancient Greek
	  school of philosophy, founded in the 5th century B.C. by Aristippus of Cyrene
	  (North Africa). In the theory of knowledge, the Cyrenaics adhered to sensualism.
	  They asserted that objective truth does not exist and that, with certainty,
	  one can only speak of subjective sensations. In Cyrenaicism, the sensualist
	  theory of knowledge is supplemented by sensualist ethics—the doctrine
	  of sensual satisfaction as the basis of morality. The Cyrenaic school produced
	  a number of representatives of ancient atheism.
[24]
Cf. Überweg-Heinze, § 88, p. 122 (10th edition)—
	  and also about them in Plato’s
Theaetetus.
[24a]
Their (the Cyrenaics’) scepticism
	  and subjectivism.—
Ed.
[24a]
The reference is to § 38 “The Aristippian
	  and Cyrenaic or Hedonistic School” in Überweg’s book:
Grundriss
	  der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums
. 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1909.
	  (F. Überweg,
Outline of the History of Ancient Philosophy
, 10th
	  edition, Berlin, 1909). In the dialogue
Theaetetus
, Plato expounds
	  his mystical theory of knowledge, calling cognition the rise of reason into
	  the realm of ideas; this rise is like recollection since, according to Plato,
	  reason, the soul, by their origin, belong to this supersensual world of ideas.
[25]
to fall back, the better to leap (to know?)—
Ed.
[26]
nodal point—
Ed.
[27]
substance—
Ed.
[28]
See L. Feuerbach,
Against Dualism of Body
	  and Soul, Flesh and Spirit.
[29]
See
F. Engels
,
Anti-Dühring
, 
	  Moscow, 1959, p. 54.
[30]
logos—
Ed.
[31]
sense-perception (sensation) and cognition—
Ed.
[32]
“is external”—
Ed.
[33]
to talk out of existence—
Ed.
[34]
A matter of indifference—
Ed.
[35]
the soul—
Ed.
[36]
perceives—
Ed.
[37]
reason—
Ed.
[38]
what is apprehended by reason—
Ed.
[39]
Stoics
—adherents 
	  of an ancient Greek school of philosophy arising about the 3rd century B.C. and existing
	  until the 6th century A.D. The Stoics recognised two elements in the universe:
	  an enduring element—matter without quality; and an active one—reason,
	  logos, god. In logic, the Stoics proceeded from the assumption that the source
	  of all cognition is sensuous perception and that a conception can be true only
	  if it is a faithful and full impression of the object. The Stoics taught,
	  however, that perceptual judgment arises only as a result of agreement between
	  the mind and a true conception. This the Stoics called “catalepsy”
	  (or “seizure”) and viewed it as a criterion for truth.
[40]
In the manuscript the word “Canonic”
	  is linked by an arrow with the word “It” at the beginning of the
	  following paragraph.—
Ed.
[41]
in opinion—
Ed.
[42]
The words in brackets are missing in Lenin’s
	  manuscript.—
Ed.
[43]
meager
—
Ed.
[44]
also
—
Ed.
[45]
difference—
Ed.
[46]
“curvilinear”
	  motion—
Ed.
[47]
“natural science” today—
Ed.
[48]
feeble—
Ed.
[49]
superstitions
—
Ed.
[50]
“finite” things—
Ed.
[51]
“the universal”—
Ed.
[52]
See L. Feuerbach,
Lectures 
	  on the Essence of Religion
: “the God of man is nothing but the deified being of
	  man.” (L. Feuerbach,
Werke
, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840, S. 21.)
[53]
Sceptics
—in this case,
	  adherents of the ancient Greek philosophical school founded by Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B.C.).
	  The best known of the ancient Sceptics were Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus
	  (2nd century A.D.). [See also:
“Scepticism and Dogmatism”
]
Tropes
—the designation for the reasons
	  for doubt advanced by the ancient Sceptics (ten tropes) and later supplemented
	  (five tropes) by Agrippa. By means of these reasons the Sceptics tried to
	  prove the impossibility of cognising things and the absolute relativity of
	  all perceptions.
[54]
thinking scepticism—
Ed.
[55]
raised—
Ed.
[56]
Lenin’s remark in parentheses was evoked
	  by a misprint in the German text, which had nicht (not) instead of nichts
	  (nothing) before the word “absolute.”—
Ed.
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