What I have said above about the intensive, large-scale
capitalist enterprises on small tracts raises this question: is
there any reason to believe that the intensification of
agriculture leads to a reduction of farm acreage? In other
words, are there any conditions relating to modern farming
techniques as such that require smaller farm acreage for greater
intensity of farming?

No answer is provided either by general theoretical reasoning or
by examples. In each case it is a matter of the concrete
technical level of agriculture under a given set of conditions,
and the actual amount of capital required by a given system of
farming. In theory, any amount of capital can be invested in any
acreage in any possible way, but it is obvious that “this
depends” on the existing economic, technical, and cultural
conditions, etc., and the whole point is the kind of conditions
prevalent in a given country at a given time. Examples serve no
purpose at all, because in the sphere of such complex, varied,
interwoven and contradictory trends in the economics of modern
agriculture, any number of examples will be found to support
opposite views. What this calls for above all—and more so
than in any other sphere—is a picture of the process as a whole , with all the trends taken into account and summed
up in the form of a resultant.

The third method of grouping used by American statisticians in
1900 helps to find an answer to this question. It is classification according to the principal source of income . Accordingly, farms fall into one of the following
groups: (1) hay and grain as the principal source of income; (2)
miscellaneous; (3) livestock; (4) cotton; (5) vegetable; (6)
fruit; (7) dairy produce; (8) tobacco; (9) rice; (10) sugar;
(11) flowers and plants; (12) nursery products; (13) taro; and
(14) coffee. The last seven groups (8-14) together make up only
2.2% of the total number of farms, i.e., such an insignificant
share, that I shall not consider them separately. These groups
(8-14) are similar to the preceding three groups (5-7) in
economic characteristics and significance and constitute a
single type.

Here are the data characterizing the various types of farms;

| | Average per acre of all land ($) |
| --- | --- |
| Groups of farms by principal source of income | Percentage of total number of farms | Average acreage per farm | Total improved | Outlays on labour | Outlays on fertilizers | Value of implements and machinery | Value of livestock |
| Hay and grain Miscellaneous | 23.0 18.5 | 159.3 106.9 | 111.1 46.5 | 0.47 0.35 | 0.04 0.08 | 1.04 0.94 | 3.17 2.73 |
| |
| Livestock Cotton | 27.3 18.7 | 226.9 83.6 | 86.1 42.5 | 0.29 0.30 | 0.02 0.14 | 0.66 0.53 | 4.45 2.11 |
| |
| Vegetables Fruits Dairy produce | 2.7 1.4 6.2 | 65.1 74.8 121.9 | 33.8 41.6 63.2 | 1.62 2.46 0.86 | 0.59 0.30 0.09 | 2.12 2.34 1.66 | 3.74 3.35 5.58 |
| |
| Average for all farms | 100.0 | 146.6 | 72.3 | 0.43 | 0.07 | 0.90 | 3.66 |

It is clear that the first two groups of enterprises (hay and
grain, and miscellaneous) may be classified as average both as
regards the degree of their capitalist development (their
expenditures for hired labour are nearest the average—0.35
to 0.47, as against an average of 0.43 for the U.S.A.) and the
intensiveness of agriculture. All the characteristics of
intensive operations—expenditures for fertilizers, the per-acre value of machinery and livestock—are nearest to
the general average for the U S.A.

There is no doubt that these two groups are especially typical
of the majority of agricultural enterprises in general. Hay and
grain, followed by a combination of various farm products
(“miscellaneous” sources of income), are the chief types of
agricultural enterprises in all countries. It would be extremely
interesting to have more detailed data about these groups, such,
for instance, as a breakdown into more and less commercialized
enterprises, etc. But, as we have seen, the American Census,
having made one step in that direction, did not go forward, but
went back.

The next two groups, livestock and cotton, are an example of
farms with the least capitalistic development (the expenditures
for hired labour: 0.29 to 0.30 as against the average of 0.43),
and the least intensive methods of agriculture. Their values of
implements and machinery are the lowest and considerably lower
than the average (0.66 and 0.53 as against 0.90). Farms whose
principal source of income is livestock naturally have more
livestock per acre than the average for the U.S.A. (4.45 as
against 3.66), but appear to be engaged in extensive livestock
raising: their expenditures for fertilizers are the minimum,
they have the largest average acreage (226.9 acres) and the
smallest proportion of improved acreage (86.1 out of 226.9). The
cotton farms have a higher than-average figure for fertilizers,
but other indexes indicative of intensive agriculture (the
per-acre value of livestock and machinery) are very low.

Finally, the last three groups—vegetables, fruit, and dairy
produce—include farms which are, first, the smallest in
acreage (33 to 63 acres of improved land, as against 42 to 86
and 46 to 111 in the other groups); secondly, the most capitalist: they have the heaviest expenditure of hired labour, from 2 to 6 times the average; and thirdly, the most
intensive. Almost all the indexes of intensive agriculture are
above the average: the expenditure on fertilizers, the value of
machinery, the value of livestock (a minor exception are the
fruit-growing farms which lag behind the average, but are well
ahead of the farms which derive their income chiefly from hay
and grain).

Let us now see what is the share of these highly capitalist
farms in the country’s economy. But we must first examine their
intensive character in somewhat greater detail.

Take the farms whose main income is derived from vegetables. It
is well known that in all capitalist countries the development
of towns, factories, industrial settlements, railway stations,
ports, etc., stimulates a demand for this type of product, it
pushes up their prices, and increases the number of agricultural
enterprises raising them for the market. The average “vegetable”
farm has less than one-third of the improved acreage of
an “ordinary” farm deriving income chiefly from hay and grain:
the former is 33.8 acres, and the latter, 111.1. This means that
this particular technical level with this particular accumulation of capital in agriculture requires “vegetable”
farms of smaller acreage; in other words, if capital invested in
agriculture is to yield a not less-than average profit, a
vegetable-raising farm should have, technology being what it is,
a smaller acreage than a hay-and grain farm.

But that is not all. The growth of capitalism in agriculture
consists above all in a transition from natural agriculture to
commercial agriculture. This is being constantly forgotten, and
must be brought up again and again. Commercial agriculture, it
should be noted, does not develop along the “simple” lines
imagined or projected by bourgeois economists, namely, through
an ever greater output of the same products. Not at all. Commercial agriculture very frequently develops by shifting
from one type of product to another, and the shift from hay and
grain to vegetables is very common. But what bearing does it
have on the question before us, that of farm acreage and the
growth of capitalism in agriculture?

Such a shift signifies the split-up of a “large”
111.1-acre farm into more than three “small” 33.8-acre farms. The old farm produced a value of $760—the average
value of its products, less the feed raised on the farm, whose
chief source of income is hay and grain. Each of the new farms
produces a value of $665, or a total of $665 x 3 = $1,995, i.e.,
more than double the original figure.

As large-scale production displaces small-scale production, farm
acreage is reduced .

The average expenditure on hired labour on the old farm was $76;
on the new farm it is $106, or almost half as much again, while
acreage is one-third or even less. Expenditure on fertilizers
has gone up from $0.04 per acre to $0.59, an increase of almost
15 times; the value of implements and machinery has doubled from
$1.04 to $2.12, etc.

There will, of course, be the usual objection that the number of
such highly capitalist farms with specialized “commercial” crops
is negligible, as compared with the total. The answer is that,
first, the number and the role , the economic role of such farms, are much greater than is generally realized; and
secondly—and this is the most important point— it is such crops that are developed more rapidly than
others in the capitalist countries. That is just why a reduction
in farm acreage with the intensification of agriculture so often
implies an increase and not a reduction in the scale of
operations, an increase and not a decrease in the exploitation
of hired labour.

Here are the exact American statistics for the country as a
whole. Let us take all the special, or “commercial”, crops
listed above under heads 5-14, namely, vegetables, fruit, dairy
produce, tobacco, rice, sugar, flowers, nursery products, taro,
and coffee. In 1900, these products were the principal source of income for 12.5% of all farms in the U.S.A. This is
one-eighth, a very small minority. Their acreage was 8.6%, or
one-twelfth, of the total. But to continue. Let us take the
total value of the products of American agriculture (less
feed). Of this value the farms in question accounted for as much
as 16%, i.e., their share of the value was almost double their
share of the acreage.

This means that the productivity of labour and land on these
farms was almost double the average.

Let us take the sum total of expenditure on hired labour in
American agriculture. Of this total, 26.6%, i.e., over one-quarter, fell to the farms in question. This is more than
three times their share of the acreage, and more than three
times the average. This means that these farms are very much
more capitalist than the average.

Their share of the total value of implements and machinery is
20.1%, and of the expenditures for fertilizers, 31.7%, i.e.,
slightly less than one-third of the total, and nearly four times the average.

Consequently, an incontrovertible fact is established for the
country as a whole. It is that the especially intensive farms
have an especially small acreage, especially great employment of
hired labour, and especially high productivity of labour; that
the economic role of these farms in the nation’s agriculture is
two, three and more times greater than their proportion of the
total number of farms, to say nothing of their share of the
total acreage.

As time goes on, does the role of these highly capitalist and
highly intensive crops and farms increase or decrease in
comparison with other crops and farms?

The answer is provided by a comparison of the last two census
reports: their role is unquestionably increasing . Let us take the acreage planted to the various crops. From 1900 to
1910, the acreage under grain increased by only 3.5% for the
U.S.A.; under beans, peas, and the like, 26.6%; hay and forage,
17.2%; cotton, 32%; vegetables, 25.5%; sugar-beets, sugar-cane,
etc., 62.6%.

Let us examine the crop returns. From 1900 to 1910, the grain
crop went up only 1.7%; beans, 122.2%; hay and forage, 23%;
sugar-beets, 395.7%; sugar-cane, 48.5%; potatoes, 42.4%; grapes,
97.6%; there was a poor crop of berries, apples, etc., in 1910,
but the orange and lemon crops, etc., were treble those of
1900.

Thus, the apparently paradoxical but nevertheless proven fact
bas been shown to apply to U.S. agriculture as a whole that,
generally speaking, small-scale production is not only being
displaced by large scale production, but also that this
displacement is taking place in the following form:

Small-scale production is being crowded out by large-scale production
through the displacement of farms which are “larger” in acreage,
but are less productive, less intensive and less capitalist, by
farms which are “smaller” in acreage, but are more productive,
more intensive, and more capitalist.

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Notes: