Date: 1915-12-21
Source: ru:LS/v40; DeepSeek-v4-pro MT

NOTES ON L. MARTOV'S ARTICLE
"WAR AND THE RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT" *
[Between November 30 and December 21, 1915]
NB
[SW] ...Russia,
as was to be expected,
proved to be the locus
minoris
resistentiae — the point
of least
resistance — for the spirit of revolution, called to life by the imperialist
whirlwind.
For the
stage
of socio-political
development
at which
it stands did not allow
|| the ossification |
of inter-class relations within it to the extent that,
with the entry of Western Europe into the period of imperialist
struggle, this happened in the advanced capitalist countries.
Not the first) nations*** | The first
revolutionary action of the world-imperialist
war manifested itself first of all in the fact that the Russian
bourgeoisie, increasingly imbued with imperialist tendencies, moved to struggle for power.
In itself, of course, the revolutionary significance of
this fact would be insignificant, and the very struggle of the Russian
bourgeoisie may yet end in a rather pitiful fiasco.
But, arising in the atmosphere of a world crisis and directly
stimulated by the grandiose calamities that have befallen
the entire country, this struggle must become the starting
point of a vast social movement, which has
many chances of assuming the character of a revolution.
[104] "Great-power" status thus played for the June-Third
Russia the same role that national-state
unification played after 1848 in Germany:
it served as a banner for the process of modernizing the monarchy
and the nobility, on the one hand, for the political consolidation
of the bourgeoisie into a co-governing class — on the other ...
[107–108] The June-Third
experiment
could
historically
justify itself only insofar as, on its basis, it
would be possible to create political and economic might
sufficient to exploit all the favorable
chances created for Russia by its geographical position
and its vastness during the period of antagonism between the imperialist
giants of the "West," which had reached its ultimate
degree of exacerbation.
Pointing to this sole case, which could
remove from the agenda the problem of a new bourgeois revolution
in Russia, we laid this analysis at the foundation of our understanding
of the tasks of the Russian workers' movement in the counter-revolutionary
period. We rejected staking the entire policy of the proletariat
on the single card of a bourgeois
revolution,
continuing
from the point at which it stopped in 1906–07.
Having taken a stand on the ground created by the defeat of the 1905 revolution
and the begun
process
of mutual adaptation of old and
new Russia, we advanced the "struggle for an open party"
as a slogan summarizing the organizational-tactical
side of the new tasks of the class struggle of the Russian proletariat.
But at the same time, we fought against such an interpretation of this
slogan and these tasks that would signify recognition of this path of mutual
adaptation as irrevocable and assured in its success. That in the Russian workers' movement (and not
at all among its Mitläufer’s*, as Lenin
and Plekhanov tried to portray) there was a tendency to accept as finally given
and historically assured a similar "painless" development
of June-Third Russia towards the "Prussian type" is beyond
any doubt: this tendency was nourished by the natural
striving of the militant elements
of the working class
to find
solid ground for their long-term political and organizational
construction. However, this tendency did not develop further,
and at the August Conference of
1912 2
the line
of "Menshevism"
(or "Liquidationism")
was outlined in relation to both possible outcomes
of the historical process. — In the vacillations and hesitations
that manifested themselves at the beginning of the current war among a part
of the "Liquidators" in Russia, there undoubtedly manifested itself also a vestige
of the tendencies of 1909–11 to build the future of the Russian
proletariat in advance on the historical victory of the Russian bourgeoisie
in its attempt, through imperialism — bypassing a national
revolution — to move towards the Europeanization of Russia and the solution of its
internal problems of emancipating the national productive
forces. The irony of history demanded that, at a time
when among this part of the "Liquidators" the revival of this tendency
in most cases did not go further than the slogan of "non-resistance
to the war," the mission of carrying it to its logically merciless
conclusion and in fact wholly subordinating the destinies and tasks
of the proletarian movement to the success of the imperialist-liberal
experiment
of the bourgeoisie
was taken
upon
themselves by
Plekhanov,
Alexinsky 3,
Iordansky (long live victory!), Finn-Enotaevsky 4,
that is, people who had garnered no few laurels in the "struggle
against Liquidationism"...
[108] By the end of the first year of the world war, Russia proved to be
the only one of the warring great powers whose fighting
strength was undermined at the root, whose economic disorganization
assumed a catastrophic character, and which from significant
territorial amputations as a result of the war could
still be saved (if salvation is still possible at all) only by
its allies, — of course, at the price of its complete enslavement by the
latter. In the very first decisive imperialist clash
* — fellow travelers.
Not in
itself
The Russia of Sazonov — Guchkov — Milyukov 5 was left behind the
flag, once again ceased to exist as a serious contender
for participation in the redivision of the world.
This result |in itself|| signifies the collapse of the June-Third
system,
the destruction
of the social
equilibrium
created by
it. Almost automatically, all the problems posed on a revolutionary scale by 1905
and eliminated by the counter-revolution — political, estate, national,
agrarian, financial, labor — arise in full magnitude before
broad public circles, and arise in the context
of military defeats, in the perspective of a fundamental disruption
of the national economy. The Burgfrieden * is broken, and amidst hysterical
cries
about the salvific nature of "unity,"
in
the midst
of war, to the roar of cannons, in the camp of the propertied, open
party and class struggle rages fiercely.
[109] The destruction of the Russian Burgfrieden in two
respects signifies the collapse of the June-Third system and, consequently,
of the attempt to bypass the problem of a national-bourgeois
revolution by a leap into imperialist space.
\
Firstly, in the respect that the bourgeoisie proved to be
at the monarchy, bureaucracy, and nobil-
"to tear" a [compelled {(to contest ■
to undermine
/ ity that very function of organizer and leader
of "state defense,"
the preservation of which for these
social groups constitutes the very essence
of the counter-revolutionary cohabitation.
Secondly, by the fact that, placed before the necessity
of presenting its claims to participation in power, the bourgeoisie
was compelled to appeal to the broad popular masses,
to raise a noisy public — extra-Duma — agitation,
through its party, non-party, and yellow press to introduce
alarm, excitement, and embitterment into the popular lower strata, to bring
a match closer to the colossal combustible material, which,
by the growth
of poverty
and
insecurity, the high cost of living,
the panic of defeats, and the disorganization of the state, is being piled
up anyway in the proletariat, peasantry, and petty
bourgeoisie.
[110] That the moment of a new social upsurge — inevitable
as a result of the self-exhaustion of the June-Third regime —
will
be characterized
first of
all
by the initiative
and
leading — among other non-proletarian classes — role
of the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie — this we, on the basis of
an analysis of the internal contradictions of post-revolutionary development,
pointed out already several years ago. Then our assertions
* — civil peace.
were far from meeting with sympathy among a significant part
of Russian Marxists. Least of all did it seem at that time
probable that the Russian commercial-industrial bourgeoisie,
directly patronized by the June-Third bloc
and possessed by a counter-revolutionary
fear
of the proletariat, could ever stand
at the head of |
a national
movement,
uniting various propertied and less propertied
strata, and impart to this movement the character of a conscious
struggle
for power,
consequently,
find itself among
the "motive forces of the revolution," as the writer of these
lines expressed it.
[111] ...a new struggle for power against tsarism and the nobility
has been initiated at the given moment under the hegemony of the commercial-industrial
bourgeoisie...
incorrect
[111–112] Being drawn by the course of events into the struggle for power,
the bourgeois
classes
fall
into
a fundamental
contradiction
with the starting point of their "war" policy. They concluded
with
the
monarchy
and
bureaucracy
a "Burgfrieden"
in the name
of the interests of state defense. But what constitutes
the real essence of the "Burgfrieden" in all countries?
That, in the name of defense, the proletariat unconditionally leaves
state power and the leadership of military organization
to the bourgeoisie — where it is the ruling
class; that the bourgeoisie renounces its claims
to state power and the management of military organization — where they are in the hands of privileged
estates. When, however,
|the Russian
bourgeoisie| in the name of better
organization of the management of the army and the state begins
a struggle for
power,
renouncing
the
Burgfrieden,
it
undoubtedly and inevitably undermines the cause of "state
defense"...
2 o
NB
[112–113] | With us|
the matter concerns a genuine replacement in the role
of the ruling one estate by another.
How ridiculous, therefore, are these attempts to squeeze the movement
in favor of a "public ministry" into the framework of "non-violation
of the interests of state defense"!, these attempts, according to the
French proverb, to make an omelette without breaking eggs! That is,
more accurately, they are not ridiculous when they emanate from the real politicians
of the bourgeoisie; for the latter, shouting: "quiet, quiet, do not step
on defense!", are mainly concerned about ensuring that
the popular unrest awakened by their struggle does not encroach
on their own narrow class interests or, as
A. I. Guchkov expressed it, in the struggle against the given state
order does not touch upon order in general; that in the process
of struggle against the given government the popular masses do not form
an independent political force,
dangerous for
Plekha-
NB
the pretenders to power themselves. But all the more ridiculous are
the Plekhanovs, Bunakovs, Sommers 6, with a serious and pathetic
air repeating the admonitions of industrialists, city
mayors, and zemstvo politicians, addressed to the workers:
fight, but in such a way as not to spill a single drop from the patriotic
cup! put pressure on the authorities, but in such a way as, if possible,
not to set in motion the main means of pressure available to you — strikes! prefer demonstrations to strikes
in time free from the manufacture of shells! or, if you
really cannot wait to strike,
then make up for this absenteeism by working
on Sundays!
[113] ...We — Mensheviks — in 1904 with the same energy
called on the workers not to see in street demonstrations
the sole saving means, with which in 1913 we rose up against
the "strike fever."
[114] The occupation by enemy armies of ever new
regions, colossal contributions, the direct or disguised
severance of significant territories will directly
and painfully affect the interests of the popular masses, and in particular
the proletariat.
[115] Calling for a struggle against the given regime, Social
Democracy knows that an Octobrist, liberal, or any other
bourgeois-imperialist government, which, according to the correlation
of social forces, is the nearest contender
for power, will continue the war in the name of the same imperialist
and capitalist interests in the name of which
it has been waged until now... "National defense" in the hands
of such a government and the social groups standing behind it
will be directed against the proletariat... this national
defense,
exploiting the natural striving of the popular
masses to save themselves from violent annexations and contributions,
will be carried out by the only method accessible to the propertied
classes...
[116] All this Social Democracy knew even before the start of the war,
which is why it "swore allegiance" to the Stuttgart and Basel resolutions;
whoever did not know this or hastened to forget it with the start
of the current war had at their disposal no less than 15 months
to see from graphic examples what the
participation of the proletariat and socialists in the cause of
"national defense" led by the propertied classes really means...
However
tempting
it is
for a revolutionary
party
to have
behind it at once the sympathies of the broad popular masses and the army, as

it must necessarily avoid creating, through inept tactics
or, even more so, through verbal mischief (like playing at "defeatism"),
a gulf between itself and the popular masses and the army,
it must not forget, for the sake of momentary successes, the future
NB
A lie!
Not
true
lackey
of petty-bourgeois
chauvinism *
(1)
(2)
* This
of the class which it serves... If the masses cannot
come to us except through new illusions, through their
exposure
by the tragic
experience
of history,
we
are obliged
to shield from the influence of these illusions those strata of the people who
already stand with us, obliged to tell and repeat to the proletariat
the whole truth that we know — the truth that,
as long as the war bears an imperialist character, the task of "defense of the fatherland" cannot arise before the proletariat.
[116–117] It goes
without
saying
that
if
the present
crisis led to the victory of a democratic revolution, to a republic,
the character of the war would fundamentally change...
But a Russian democratic republic, directly
emerging from
acute
revolutionary
battles,
led by
the proletariat, expressing (of course, transiently) the
triumph of the general democratic interests of the petty bourgeoisie
and peasantry over the narrow class appetites of the capitalist
bourgeoisie — such a republic would represent
in the war the side in whose victory the world
proletariat is interested. If, therefore, we keep within the framework of this
hypothesis, it can be said that such a republic, in case
of need, the Russian proletariat would have to defend
with arms in hand against external enemies, just as it would defend
it against internal enemies.
If we are already picturing these — for now rather distant — perspectives, it will be permissible to try
to imagine concretely what character this "defensive" war of a republic emerging from revolution
would have to assume. It would be, in the full sense of the word,
a revolutionary war, or, more precisely, the proletariat would have
to give it the character of a revolutionary war. This means,
firstly, that it could not do without the most revolutionary
encroachments on the "sacred" rights of private property — at least, the private property of the noble estate
defeated by the revolution. This means, secondly,
that, setting itself the goal of defending Russia from enslavement
in the event of the victory of the central monarchies, it would have
at the same time to take measures to ensure that victory over these
monarchies did not lead to the same kind of enslavement of Russia
by its present allies. It is difficult, for example, to imagine
that a victorious democracy in Russia could leave
untouched those multi-billion obligations to French
capital, by which tsarism has sold the labor of the Russian people
to the latter for many decades; it is difficult to imagine a victorious democratic revolution in Russia
that would not declare state bankruptcy.
This means, thirdly, that the revolutionary war of the Russian
republic would have to be waged in the name of the principle,
unrestricted
by any
capitalist
considerations,
of
this phrase was written by V. I. Lenin at the bottom of page 117.
(3)
democratic self-determination
of peoples — both those
whom German imperialism would encroach upon, and those
whose liberation runs counter to the interests of English,
French, or Italian imperialism.
[117–118] It is enough
to imagine
the picture
of such
a war — and only such
a war would express the historical
progressiveness of a Russian republic defending itself
against German imperialism — to pose the question:
is such a transformation of the imperialist war into a democratic-revolutionary one compatible with the current
interrelationship of states in the world conflict? Does not the whole character
of the latter guarantee us that a revolutionary
victory of even bourgeois democracy in one of the countries
would immediately blow up this interrelationship,
uniting
the entire capitalist bourgeoisie of the whole world in a striving
to extinguish
the fire of revolution,
and thereby, consequently,
would abolish for the Russian proletariat the very question
of
whether to continue a defensive war against
the central monarchies in the event of the victory of democracy in Russia
and the unwillingness of Germany and Austria to conclude an honorable peace?
It is perfectly obvious that in such a situation the question would become
not about the continuation of the old war, but about a completely new war, and this
new war would have little in common with a defensive war
in the
usual
sense
of the word:
like the revolutionary
war
of the first French Republic, it would bear an offensive
character or
would
have
to
assume
such,
since it would become undeniable that the situation of international imperialist reaction would not permit democracy
to establish itself in Russia (1).
What a clever
rogue!
NBx
X
= revolutionary-
democratic
dictatorship
of the proletariat
and peasantry!
?
i1* Can the Russian bourgeois democracy, having come to power,
prove capable of waging such a revolutionary war, i.e., of developing
the revolution against domestic serfdom into a struggle against
international imperialism? This can be very, very much doubted:
the proletariat, in its attempts to push its revolutionary ally
onto this path, may suffer defeat, which would mean its
break with bourgeois democracy and the latter's entry onto that path
of adaptation to the interests of the capitalist bourgeoisie, which
transforms the "republic of 1793" into the "republic of Gambetta and Clemenceau." — Connected with this is the general question of whether the complete
victory of the revolution in Russia is historically conceivable as a bourgeois
revolution, transferring real power to the petty-bourgeois and peasant
democracy (with the support of the proletariat or with its participation in
power — it makes no difference)? Comrade N. Trotsky in No. 217 of "Nashe Slovo" answers
this question categorically in the negative,
without bothering
to support his thesis with any proofs other than axiomatic
assertions, the purpose of which is to prepare the reader for the slogan: "a revolutionary
workers' government, the conquest of power by the revolutionary
proletariat." As in 1905 and 1906, Comrade Trotsky proceeds from a peculiar
teleological
conception:
the democratic revolution
must triumph in Russia. Then he proceeds to an analysis of social
forces and arrives at the conclusion: neither a liberal transformation, nor a
bourgeois-revolutionary overturn is conceivable: the capitalist
bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, and "there is no bourgeois democracy" (that is,
none capable of conquering power). Consequently, the overturn will be carried out by
the proletariat,
and if it does, "for what reason" would it cede
power to other classes? Consequently, a "workers'
government"...
[119] But if we have already gone so far in our hypotheses,
we cannot but introduce into our constructions yet another complicating
factor. Is the development of the Russian political
crisis to the point at which we stopped
conceivable under the condition of the continuing dominance of militarist
and imperialist reaction throughout the world? Such an assumption
seems utterly improbable. A series
of revolutionary upheavals of an ever deeper and ever broader
character, which alone could lead Russia to a democratic republic, could not fail to make an immediate deep
impression on the popular masses of the countries allied and at war
with Russia and would probably serve as an impetus for the emergence
||| of popular movements in them. And on the other hand, if
the situation of the war proved unfavorable for the development
of the latter, then the development of the revolutionary crisis
in Russia itself would thereby be paralyzed, if only because
the forces of imperialism, both of the allied and hostile countries, would come
in one form or another to the aid of the "order" shaken in Russia. Under these conditions, the perspective
of the complete triumph of democracy in Russia still during
the
war
would hardly become real,
the
only
perspective
under
which
the task of "defense" could become an integral part of the revolutionary
tasks of the proletariat.
[120] From this it follows that the slogan "revolution for defense,"
if it is posed in the perspective of a revolution developing,
as we used to say, "to its logical end" —
and social democracy cannot pose the problem of bourgeois
revolution in any other perspective — loses its concrete
historical content and is contrived...
In waging the struggle in Russia for the decisive triumph
of democracy, the proletariat, consequently, must view
it as part of the international struggle of the proletariat against
international imperialist reaction; must therefore
closely link it with the struggle against the war, with the struggle for "peace,
concluded by the peoples," as the recently
issued leaflet of the OC 7 puts it, for peace imposed on the warring countries
by the awakened | peoples^...
[120–121] Not revolution in the name of national
defense,
but revolution in the name of peace! The central fighting slogan
of the moment for the Russian proletariat must be a nationwide
constituent assembly for the liquidation of both tsarism
and
the
war.
— Very well, they object to us. The proletariat, together with democracy, has achieved a constituent assembly and is moving towards the establishment
of a republic. The new government proposes to Germany
peace without annexations. Imperialist Germany wants to know
nothing of it, and the German proletariat proves to be still not
awakened or not strong enough to stop
the further invasion of the German armies into Russia. Then
A vulgarian,
"led up" to
"Nashe
Delo"8
NB
NB
NB
will we defend the fatherland together with the just-conquered
republic?
[122] ...Marxists do not have to resort to faith at all.
Those of them who have remained Marxists after this turmoil,
and, despite it, remained so only because this
turmoil and the facts that caused it (the capitulation of the proletariat
and its parties before imperialism) did not dissuade them of
the correctness of the basic Marxist conception of the tendencies
of the class development of the proletariat. These tendencies, despite
any delays, despite any temporary retreats,
draw the proletariat towards internationalism and towards revolutionary
struggle. Therefore, in the chaos of the most terrible confusion,
the Marxist foresees the beginning of a new awakening and upsurge and,
if he wishes, will be able to apply his active energy
there and in such a way as, in the struggle between the contradictory tendencies
now tearing apart the international proletariat,
to contribute to the strengthening of those tendencies to which
the future belongs. And these, of course, are the revolutionary-internationalist
tendencies,
now stifled by the possibilist-national ones.
He
whom skepticism prevents, at the given
critical moment, from standing with both feet on the path of the most
resolute support for the currently stifled internationalist
element of the workers' movement, thereby condemns himself
to a passively contemplative role in the historical process;
and in attempting to retain the role of a political activist,
will inevitably slide into the swamp of nationalist
opportunism.
[122–124] The starting
point
of the revolutionary
crisis
in Russia is the clash, caused by
defeats, of
the united propertied classes, relying on the discontent
of the popular masses, with the ruling clique. The movement, grown
out of this clash and already assuming significant
dimensions, is united by the idea of national defense.
The proletariat must, of course, support this movement,
insofar as it shakes the old power and knocks
the ground from under its feet. But to support a movement led by the
bourgeoisie does not mean to follow in its wake. While supporting
the militant actions directed against the "government of
treason," the proletariat and social democracy do not support
its slogans. They criticize some of them as half-hearted
and insufficient ("a public ministry"); they come out
directly against others, as hostile to the interests of democracy ("war to victory," "struggle against German dominance!",
"no strikes!" etc.).
As long as the liberal-patriotic movement under the flag
of "defense" has not exhausted itself internally, has not dealt the existing
order all those blows which it is capable of dealing
it,
social democracy,
while taking what part it can
in the conflicts provoked by this movement, making agitational
use of them, calling on the working masses to actively protest
against manifestations of reaction in response to this movement, must
concentrate the center of gravity of its work on organizing
the forces of the proletariat,

in view of the unfolding events,
which will demand all of its revolutionary energy...
It is unthinkable to work successfully on the task of organizing
the proletariat as an independent political force if
the slogan of organization is divorced from the tasks of that revolutionary
struggle which lies ahead for the proletariat — the struggle for peace
and the struggle for democracy. As far as we can judge from
our
distance abroad,
such a
tendency
to divorce
organizational
work
from
agitation
for
the general
slogans
of the movement is present among the Russian comrades. Let us recall
the article by Comrade Gorsky in No. 1 of the now-closed "Utro"<sup>9</sup>.
He proposed, as far as we understood him, to decide the question of
participation or non-participation in the war-industry committees
independently of the attitude towards the cause of "national defense,"
proceeding from the idea that one could be a principled supporter of "defense" and boycott the Goremykin "committees"
and
that,
conversely,
one could,
while being a principled
opponent of defense, stand for the participation of workers in these
committees. In reality, however, attempts to resolve this question from the
angle
of the organizational "utilization"
of new
positions, while leaving in the shadows or aside the question of
the principled and practical attitude of the working class
to "defense," instead of facilitating the task of organizing
the workers,
must
rather lead
to
their disorganization.
On the threshold of a revolutionary period in the history of Russia, the working
class must give itself the clearest possible account of
what goals and by what methods it will uphold in the course of
the revolutionary process, must know for what and in the name of what
it is organizing its forces.
Any
reticence
and lack of forethought,
displayed now, will cruelly avenge
themselves tomorrow (* J.
The entire movement of the working class must be inspired
and united by the idea of the struggle for peace and the struggle for the democratic
liquidation of the June Third regime. The proletariat must therefore organize
its forces and strengthen its positions,
not by tagging along, not by adapting to the "national-defense" movement led by
the bourgeoisie, but by
counterposing to this movement its internationalist
tasks and methods of action calculated on international class
solidarity.
This was excellently done by the
workers' delegation — with Comrades Khaustov and Skobelev<sup>10</sup> at its head —
at the Moscow congress on the struggle against the high cost of living...
Not
clear
/ Well, \\
<*' The article was
already
typeset when
the results
( CRAFTY I I of the campaign regarding the war-industry committees fully
NB
LITTLE SWINDLER / /  confirmed our fears.
Will the masses of the proletariat in fact now immediately take the path
of consistently revolutionary politics, under the flag of
internationalism, or, under the immediate impression of the
disasters caused by the defeat, and under the pressure of the surrounding
atmosphere of general national "patriotic alarm," will they
move into battle under the banner of "defense" and play their role in the
political crisis (perhaps only at first),
remaining under the sway of patriotic-democratic
illusions?
The fighters of the Commune
of 1871
also, after all, moved under the
banner of defense and "war to the end." If the same were to happen
with the Russian proletariat, this would, of course, not destroy
either the revolutionary character of its role in the crisis that has begun
(a character determined by the interrelation of classes
in Russia), or the international significance of its revolutionary
struggle, but would merely weaken them. In this case, the advanced
stratum of worker-socialists would have, without detaching themselves from
the struggle of the broad masses, without counterposing themselves to their
movement, to pursue their own line within it (as Varlin,
Malon<sup>11</sup> and the Parisian internationalists pursued it in the insurrectionary
movement of 1870–71, which was generally imbued
with Blanquist-patriotic illusions). As
R. Hilferding quite correctly notes, Marxists may,
perhaps, in the events of the immediate historical moment,
marked by the accursed stamp of the world war, again, like
the "communists" of 1848, have to reduce their role to that of
formulating and defending,
in each concrete movement,
the general and permanent
interests
of the proletariat,
obscured at the given moment by its particular and transient
interests.
[125] The more decisively Russian Social-Democracy, at the
very beginning of the political crisis, takes a clear revolutionary-
internationalist
position,
the more distinctly
it
calls upon the proletariat to build its entire policy on
the revival of the international class struggle, the greater
will be its influence in the course of the development of this crisis,
the more surely and the more quickly will the proletariat outlive
illusions of all kinds and prove capable of raising high above
the raging sea of Russian life the red banner of international
socialism. The more surely and the more quickly will it defend its class interests in the nationwide
crisis.
L. Martov
A first-class cook, who has most deliciously prepared... a rotten cat.
<sup>1</sup> L. Martov's article "War and the Russian Proletariat" was published
in the collection "The International and War" No. 1, which appeared on November 30,
1915. V. I. Lenin subjected it to critical analysis in his article
"A Cover for Social-Chauvinist Policy with Internationalist Phrases,"
published on December 21, 1915, in the newspaper "Sotsial-Demokrat"
No. 49 (see V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, pp. 90–92).
L. Martov (Yu. O. Tsederbaum) — one of the leaders of Menshevism.
In 1900, he took part in the preparation of the publication of "Iskra," a member of its
editorial board. Delegate to the Second Congress of the RSDLP, Menshevik. During the years of reaction and the
new revolutionary upsurge — a liquidator, participated in the anti-party
August Conference (1912). During the period of the world imperialist
war, he held a centrist position. After the October Socialist
Revolution, he opposed Soviet power.
<sup>2</sup> This refers to the conference of liquidators held in Vienna
in August 1912; at which the anti-party August
Bloc took shape, the organizer of which was Trotsky. The conference was attended by
representatives of the Bund, the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, the Social-
Democracy of the Latvian Territory, and émigré groups — liquidator,
Trotskyist, otzovist, and representatives of some groups of liquidators
from Russia.
The conference
adopted
anti-party,
liquidator
decisions
on all questions of Social-Democratic tactics and spoke out against
the existence of an illegal party. It excluded from the electoral
platform the slogan of a democratic republic, replacing it with the slogan
of universal suffrage and a fully empowered Duma; rejecting the slogan
of confiscation of landed estates in favor of the peasants, the conference put
forward the demand for a revision of the agrarian legislation of the Third
State Duma; instead of the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination, it
put forward the demand for cultural-national autonomy, condemned by the
decisions of party congresses as a manifestation of nationalism. On the question
of electoral tactics, the conference recognized as permissible the support
of candidates from liberal bourgeois parties who pledged to defend
universal suffrage and freedom of coalition. The
platform adopted at the
conference
was
clearly
opportunistic
in character.
Lenin gave an assessment of it in his article "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform
of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats" (see Collected Works, Vol. 22,
pp. 167–175).
The liquidators' attempt to create their own centrist party in Russia
was not supported by the workers. The liquidators were unable to elect a Central Committee
and limited themselves to forming an Organizing Committee. Created
from
motley
elements, the anti-Bolshevik
bloc,
under the blows
of the Bolsheviks, actually disintegrated within a year and a half. On the disintegration of the August
Bloc, see
Lenin's articles "The Disintegration of the 'August' Bloc,"
"Exposure of the 'August' Fiction," "On the Violation of Unity, Covered
by Shouts for Unity" (ibid., Vol. 25, pp. 1–4, 27–30, 183–206).
<sup>3</sup> G. A. Aleksinsky — at the beginning of his political activity —
a Social-Democrat. During the years of reaction — an otzovist, one of the organizers
of the anti-party group "Vperyod." During the world imperialist
war — a social-chauvinist.
<sup>4</sup> A. Yu. Finn-Enotaevsky — Social-Democrat, economist, and writer.
In 1903–1914, he sided with the Bolsheviks. During the world
imperialist war — a defensist and chauvinist. Author of a number of works
on economic questions, in which he distorted the essence of Marxism.
<sup>5</sup> S. D. Sazonov — a prominent diplomat of Tsarist Russia, an exponent of
the interests of large landowners and capitalists. In 1910–1916 —
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
A. I. Guchkov — a major capitalist, organizer and leader of the Octobrist
party. During the world imperialist war — Chairman
of the Central War-Industry Committee and member of the Special
Council for Defense.
P. N. Milyukov — leader of the Cadet party, ideologist of the Russian imperialist
bourgeoisie, historian and publicist.
<sup>6</sup> M. Zommer (A. I. Lyubimov) — Social-Democrat, took part in the revolutionary
movement from 1898. During the years of reaction and the new
revolutionary upsurge, he gravitated towards the liquidators. During the First World
War — an extreme defensist, belonged to Plekhanov's "Yedinstvo"
group.
I. Bunakov (I. I. Fundaminsky) — one of the leaders of the SR party.
During the world imperialist war — a social-chauvinist.
In 1918, he was a member of the counter-revolutionary "Union for the Regeneration of Russia."
Emigrated to France.
<sup>7</sup> OC (Organizing Committee) — the leading center of the Mensheviks,
created in 1912 at the August Conference of liquidators.
During the world imperialist war, it stood on the positions of social-
chauvinism, justified the war on the part of Tsarism, preached the ideas
of nationalism and chauvinism. The OC functioned until the elections of the Central Committee of the Menshevik
party in August 1917. Besides the OC operating in Russia,
there existed a Foreign Secretariat of the OC consisting of five secretaries
(P. B. Axelrod, Astrov (I. S. Poves), L. Martov, A. S. Martynov,
S. Yu. Semkovsky), which held a position close to centrism, and,
while covering itself
with internationalist
phrases,
in fact
supported
the Russian social-chauvinists.
<sup>8</sup> "Nashe Delo" — a monthly
organ of the Menshevik-liquidators;
began publication in January 1915 instead of the journal "Nasha Zarya," closed in October 1914.
"Nashe Delo" was the main organ of the social-chauvinists
in Russia. Contributors included E. Maevsky, P. P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov,
N. Cherevanin, and others. A total of 6 issues appeared.
<sup>9</sup> This refers to the article by A. V. Gorsky "On Participation in the Central War-Industry
Committee," published in No. 1 of the newspaper "Utro" on August 14, 1915,
signed "A. Gr."
A.
V. Gorsky (A. E. Dubois) — a Menshevik-liquidator; contributed
to various liquidator organs, was the publisher of the liquidator
journal "Nasha Zarya." During the world imperialist
war — a social-chauvinist.
"Utro" — a Menshevik legal newspaper. Published in Petrograd
in August 1915. 2 issues appeared.
<sup>10</sup> V. I. Khaustov — Social-Democrat, Menshevik, a turner by trade,
deputy to the Fourth State Duma from the workers of Ufa
Gubernia, belonged to the Social-Democratic faction. During the world imperialist
war — an internationalist.
M. I. Skobelev — from 1903 took part in the Social-Democratic
movement in the ranks of the Mensheviks. In 1906, he emigrated
abroad, contributed to Menshevik publications, was a member of the editorial board
of Trotsky's "Pravda." Deputy to the Fourth State Duma from the Russian curia
of Transcaucasia. During the world imperialist war — a centrist.
<sup>11</sup> Louis Eugène Varlin — French revolutionary, an outstanding
figure of the Paris Commune of 1871; a bookbinder by trade.
In 1865, he joined the First International, was one of the organizers
and leaders of its Paris sections. During the days of the Paris Commune —
a member of its Council (government). After the invasion of Paris by the Versaillais,
he was arrested and shot without trial.
Benoît Malon — French socialist, member of the First International,
member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and the Paris Commune; after the suppression
of the Commune, he emigrated to Italy, then to Switzerland, where he sided
with the anarchists; one of the leaders and ideologists of the opportunist
current
in the socialist movement of France — possibilism.