V. I.

Lenin

Under a False Flag [3]

Issue No. 1 of Nashe Dyelo  (Petrograd, January
1915) [4]
published a highly characteristic programmatic article by Mr. A. Potresov,
entitled “At the Juncture of Two Epochs”. Like an earlier
magazine article by the same author, the present article sets forth the
ideas underlying an entire bourgeois trend of public thought in
Russia—the liquidationist—regarding the important and burning
problems of the times. Strictly speaking, we have before us not articles but
the manifesto of a definite trend, and anyone who reads them carefully and
gives thought to their content will see that only fortuitous considerations,
i.e., such that have nothing in common with purely literary interests, have
prevented the author’s ideas (and those of his friends, since the
author does not stand alone) from being expressed in the more appropriate
form of a declaration or credo.

Potresov’s main idea is that present-day democracy stands at the
juncture of two epochs, the fundamental difference between the old epoch
and the new consisting in a transition from national isolation to
internationalism. By present-day democracy, Potresov understands the kind
that marked the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth, as distinct from the old bourgeois democracy that marked the
end of the eighteenth century and the first two-thirds of the
nineteenth.

At first glance it may seem that the author’s idea is absolutely
correct, that we have before us an opponent to the national-liberal tendency
predominant in present-day democracy, and that the author is an
“internationalist”, not a national-liberal.

Indeed, this defence of internationalism, this reference to national
narrow-mindedness and national exclusiveness as features of an outworn and
bygone epoch—is it not a breakaway from the wave of national-liberalism, that bane of present-day democracy or, rather, of its
official representatives.

That, at first glance, is not only the possible but the almost inevitable
impression. Yet it would be a gross error to think so. The author is
transporting his cargo under a false flag. Consciously or
otherwise—that does not matter in this instance—he has resorted
to a stratagem by hoisting the flag of “internationalism” so as
the more securely to transport under this flag his contraband cargo of
national-liberalism. After all, Potresov is a most undeniable
national-liberal. The gist of his article (and of his programme, platform,
and credo) is in the employment of this little—and if you wish even
innocent—stratagem, in carrying opportunism under the flag of
internationalism. One must go into all the details of this manoeuvre, for
the matter is of prime and tremendous importance. Potresov’s use of a
false flag is the more dangerous since he not only cloaks himself with the
principle of “internationalism” but also assumes the title of an
adherent of “Marxist methodology”. In other words, Potresov
pretends to be a true follower and exponent of Marxism, whereas in actual
fact he substitutes national-liberalism for Marxism. Potresov tries to
“amend” Kautsky, accusing him of “playing the advocate”, i.e., of defending liberalism now of one shade, now of
another, that is to say, the liberalism of shades peculiar to various
nations. Potresov is out to contrast national-liberalism (for it is
absolutely indubitable and indisputable that Kautsky has become a
national-liberal) with internationalism and Marxism. In reality, Potresov is
contrasting particoloured national-liberalism with national-liberalism of a single colour, whereas Marxism is
hostile—and in the present historical situation, absolutely
hostile—to any kind of national-liberalism.

We shall now go on to show that such is the case, and why.

I

The highlight of Potresov’s misadventures, which led to his setting
out under a national-liberal flag, can be best understood if the reader
examines the following passage in his article:

“ With their characteristic temperament, they [Marx and his comrades] attacked the
problem, no matter how difficult it was; they diagnosed the conflict, and
attempted to determine the success of which side opened up broader
vistas for possibilities desirable from their point of view; thus they laid
down a certain basis on which to build their tactics” (p. 73, our
italics in excerpts).

“ The success of which side is more desirable”—this is what has to be determined, and that from an international, not a national
point of view. This is the essence of the Marxist methodology. This is what
Kautsky does not do, thus turning from a “judge” (a Marxist)
into an “advocate” (a national-liberal). Such is
Potresov’s line of argument. Potresov himself is most deeply convinced
that he is not “playing the advocate” when he defends the
desirability of success for one side (namely, his own) and that, conversely,
he is guided by truly international considerations with regard to the
egregious sins of the other side.

Potresov, Maslov, Plekhanov, etc., who are all guided by truly
international considerations, have reached the same conclusions as Potresov
has. This is a simple-mindedness that borders on—well, we shall not
make undue haste, but shall first complete an analysis of the purely
theoretical question.

“ The success of which side is more desirable” was established
by Marx in the Italian war of 1859, for instance. Potresov dwells on this
particular instance, which, he says, “has a special interest for us
because of certain of its features”. We too, for our part, are willing
to take the instance chosen by Potresov.

In 1859 Napoleon III declared war on Austria, allegedly for the
liberation of Italy, but in reality for his own dynastic aims.

“ Behind the back of Napoleon III,” says Potresov, “could be discerned the figure of Gorchakov, who had just signed a
secret agreement with the Emperor of the French.” What we have here is
a tangle of contradictions: on the one side, the most reactionary European
monarchy, which has been oppressing Italy; on the other, the representatives
of revolutionary Italy, including Garibaldi, fighting for her liberation,
side by side with the ultra-reactionary Napoleon III, etc.

“Would it not have been simpler,” Potresov writes, “to step aside and to
say that the two are equally bad? However, neither Engels, Marx, nor
Lassalle were attracted by the “simplicity” of such a solution,
but started to search the problem [Potresov means to say, to study and
explore the problem], of the particular outcome of the conflict which might
provide the greatest opportunities for a cause dear to all three.”

Lassalle notwithstanding, Marx and Engels came to the conclusion that
Prussia must intervene. Among their considerations, as Potresov himself
admits, was that “of the possibility, as a result of a conflict with
the enemy coalition, of a national movement in Germany, which might develop
over the heads of its numerous rulers; there was also the consideration as
to which Power in the Concert of Europe was the main evil: the reactionary
Danubian monarchy, or other outstanding representatives of this
Concert”.

“ To us, it is not important who was right, Marx or Lassalle,”
Potresov concludes; “what is important is that all were agreed on the
necessity of determining, from an international point of view, the success
of which side was more desirable.”

This is the instance cited by Potresov, and the way our author pursues
the argument. If Marx was then able “to appraise international
conflicts” (Potresov’s expression), notwithstanding the highly
reactionary character of the governments of both belligerent sides,
then Marxists too are at present obliged to make a similar
appraisal, Potresov concludes.

This conclusion is either naïve childishness or crass sophistry,
since it boils down to the following: since, in 1859, Marx was working on
the problem of the desirability of success for which particular bourgeoisie,
we, over half a century later, must solve the problem in exactly the same
way.

Potresov has failed to notice that, to Marx in 1859 (as well as
in a number of later cases), the question of “the success of which
side is more desirable” meant asking “the success of which
bourgeoisie is more desirable”. Potresov has failed to notice that Marx was working on the problem at a time when there
existed indubitably progressive bourgeois movements, which moreover
did not merely exist, but were in the forefront of the historical process in
the leading states of Europe. Today, it would be ridiculous even to imagine
a progressive bourgeoisie, a progressive bourgeois movement, in, for
instance, such key members of the “Concert” of Europe, as
Britain and Germany. The old bourgeois “democracy” of these two
key states has turned reactionary. Potresov has “forgotten”
this, and has substituted the standpoint of the old (bourgeois)
so-called democracy for that of present-day (non-bourgeois)
democracy. This shift to the standpoint of another class, and moreover of an
old and outmoded class, is sheer opportunism. There cannot be the least
doubt that a shift like this cannot be justified by an analysis of the
objective content of the historical process in the old and the new
epochs.

It is the bourgeoisie—for instance in Germany, and in Britain too,
for that matter—that endeavours to effect the kind of substitution
accomplished by Potresov, viz., replacing of the imperialist epoch by that
of bourgeois-progressive, national and democratic movements for
liberation. Potresov is uncritically following in the wake of the
bourgeoisie. This is the more unpardonable, since, in the instance he has
selected, Potresov has himself been obliged to recognise and specify the
considerations guiding Marx, Engels, and Lassalle in those bygone
days. [1]

First of all, these were considerations on the national
movement (in Germany and Italy)—on the latter’s development over
the heads of the “representatives of medievalism”; secondly,
these were considerations on the “main evil” of the reactionary
monarchies (the Austrian, the Napoleonic, etc.) in the Concert of
Europe.

These considerations are perfectly clear and indisputable. Marxists have
never denied the progressiveness of bourgeois national-liberation movements
against feudal and absolutist forces. Potresov cannot but know that
nothing like this does or can exist in the major, i.e., the leading
rival states of today. In those days there existed, both in Italy and in
Germany, popular national-liberation movements with decades of
struggle behind them. In those days the Western bourgeoisie did not give
financial support to certain other states; on the contrary, those states
were really “the main evil”. Potresov cannot but know—as he admits in the same article—that today none
of the other states is or can be the “main evil”.

The bourgeoisie (in Germany, for instance, though not in that country
alone) is, for selfish reasons, encouraging the ideology of national
movements, attempting to translate that ideology into the epoch of
imperialism, i.e., an entirely different epoch. As usual, the opportunists
are plodding along in the rear of the bourgeoisie, abandoning the
standpoint of present-day democracy and shifting over to that of
the old (bourgeois) democracy. That is the chief shortcoming in all
the articles, as well as in the entire position and the entire line of
Potresov and his liquidationist fellow-thinkers. At the time of the
old (bourgeois) democracy Marx and Engels were working on the
problem of the desirability of success for which particular bourgeoisie;
they were concerned with a modestly liberal movement developing into a
tempestuously democratic one. In the period of present-day
(non-bourgeois) democracy, Potresov is preaching bourgeois
national-liberalism at a time when one cannot even imagine bourgeois
progressive movements, whether modestly liberal or tempestuously democratic,
in Britain, Germany, or France. Marx and Engels were ahead of
their epoch, that of bourgeois-national progressive movements; they
wanted to give an impetus to such movements so that they might
develop “over the heads” of the representatives of medievalism.

Like all social-chauvinists, Potresov is moving backwards, away from his
own period, that of present-day democracy, and skipping over to the outworn,
dead, and therefore intrinsically false viewpoint of the old (bourgeois)
democracy.

That is why Potresov’s following appeal to democracy reveals his
muddled thinking and is highly reactionary:

“ Do not retreat, but advance, not towards individualism, but
towards internationalist consciousness in all its integrity and all its
vigour. To advance means, in a certain sense, to go also back—back to
Engels, Marx, and Lassalle, to their method of appraising international
conflicts, and to their finding it possible to utilise inter-state relations
for democratic purposes.”

Potresov drags present-day democracy backwards , not “in a
certain sense” but in all senses; he drags it back to the slogans and
the ideology of the old bourgeois democracy, to the dependence of the masses
upon the bourgeoisie. . . . Marx’s method consists, first of all, in
taking due account of the objective content of a historical process
at a given moment, in definite and concrete conditions; this in order to
realise, in the first place, the movement of which class is the
mainspring of the progress possible in those concrete conditions. In 1859,
it was not imperialism that comprised the objective content of the
historical process in continental Europe, but national-bourgeois movements
for liberation. The mainspring was the movement of the bourgeoisie against
the feudal and absolutist forces. Fifty-five years later, when the place of
the old and reactionary feudal lords has been taken by the not unsimilar
finance capital tycoons of the decrepit bourgeoisie, the knowledgeable
Potresov is out to appraise international conflicts from the standpoint of
the bourgeoisie , not of the new class . [2]

Potresov has not given proper thought to the significance of the truth he
uttered in the above words. Let us suppose that two countries are at war in
the epoch of bourgeois, national-liberation movements. Which country should
we wish success to from the standpoint of present-day democracy? Obviously,
to that country whose success will give a greater impetus to the
bourgeoisie’s liberation movement, make its development more speedy,
and undermine feudalism the more decisively. Let us further suppose that the
determining feature of the objective historical situation has
changed, and that the place of capital striving for national liberation has
been taken by international, reactionary and imperialist finance
capital. The former country, let us say, possesses three-fourths of Africa,
whereas the latter possesses one-fourth. A repartition of Africa is the
objective content of their war. To which side should we wish success? It
would be absurd to state the problem in its previous form, since we do not
possess the old criteria of appraisal: there is neither a bourgeois
liberation movement running into decades, nor a long process of the decay of
feudalism. It is not the business of present-day democracy either to help
the former country to assert its “right” to three-fourths of
Africa, or to help the latter country (even if it is developing economically
more rapidly than the former) to take over those three-fourths.

Present-day democracy will remain true to itself only if it joins neither
one nor the other imperialist bourgeoisie, only if it says that the two
sides are equally bad, and if it wishes the defeat of the imperialist
bourgeoisie in every country. Any other decision will, in reality, be
national-liberal and have nothing in common with genuine
internationalism.

The reader should not let himself be deceived by the pretentious
terminology Potresov employs to conceal his switch over to the standpoint of
the bourgeoisie. When Potresov exclaims: “. . . not towards
individualism, but towards internationalist consciousness in all its
integrity and all its vigour”, his aim is to contrast his own point of
view with that of Kautsky. He calls the latter’s view (and that of
others like him) “individualism”, because of Kautsky’s refusal to decide “the success of which side is more desirable”,
and his justification of the workers’ national-liberalism in each
“individual” country. We, on the contrary, he, as it were, says,
we—Potresov, Cherevanin, Muslov, Plekhanov, and others—appeal to
“internationalist consciousness in all its integrity and all its
vigour”, for we stand for national-liberalism of a definite shade, in
no way from the standpoint of an individual state (or an individual nation)
but from a standpoint that is genuinely internationalist. This line of
reasoning would be ridiculous if it were not so—disgraceful.

Both Potresov and Co. and Kautsky, who have betrayed the standpoint of
the class which they are trying hard to represent, are following in the wake
of the bourgeoisie.

II

Potresov has entitled his article “At the Juncture of Two
Epochs”. We are undoubtedly living at the juncture of two epochs,
and the historic events that are unfolding before our eyes can be
understood only if we analyse, in the first place, the objective
conditions of the transition from one epoch to the other. Here we have
important historical epochs; in each of them there are and will always be
individual and partial movements, now forward now backward; there are and
will always be various deviations from the average type and mean tempo of
the movement. We cannot know how rapidly and how successfully the various
historical movements in a given epoch will develop, but we can and do know
which class stands at the hub of one epoch or another, determining its main content, the main direction of its development, the
main characteristics of the historical situation in that epoch, etc. Only
on that basis, i.e., by taking into account, in the first place, the
fundamental distinctive features of the various “epochs” (and
not single episodes in the history of individual countries), can we
correctly evolve our tactics; only a knowledge of the basic features of a
given epoch can serve as the foundation for an understanding of the
specific features of one country or another.

It is to this region that both Potresov’s and Kautsky’s main
sophism, or their fundamental historical error, pertains (Kautsky’s
article was published in the same issue of Nashe Dyelo ), an error
which has led both of them to national-liberal, not Marxist,
conclusions.

The trouble is that the instance chosen by Potresov, which has
presented a “special interest” to him, namely, the instance of
the Italian campaign of 1859, as well as a number of similar
historical instances quoted by Kautsky, “ in no way pertain to those historical epochs”, “at the juncture” of which
we are living. Let us call the epoch we are entering (or have entered, and
which is in its initial stage) the present-day (or third) epoch. Let us call
that which we have just emerged from the epoch of yesterday (or the
second). In that case we shall have to call the epoch from which Potresov
and Kautsky cite their instances, the day-before-yesterday (or first)
epoch. Both Potresov’s and Kautsky’s revolting sophistry, the
intolerable falseness of their arguments, consist in their substituting for
the conditions of the present-day (or third) epoch the conditions of the
day-before-yesterday (or first) epoch.

I shall try to explain what I mean.

The usual division into historical epochs, so often cited in Marxist
literature and so many times repeated by Kautsky and adopted in
Potresov’s article, is the following: (1) 1789-1871; (2) 1871-1914;
(3) 1914 - ? Here, of course, as everywhere in Nature and society, the lines
of division are conventional and variable, relative, not absolute. We take
the most outstanding and striking historical events only approximately, as
milestones in important historical movements. The first epoch from the Great
French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war is one of the rise of the
bourgeoisie, of its triumph, of the bourgeoisie on the upgrade, an epoch of
bourgeois-democratic movements in general and of bourgeois-national
movements in particular, an epoch of the rapid breakdown of the obsolete
feudal-absolutist institutions. The second epoch is that of the full
domination and decline of the bourgeoisie, one of transition from its
progressive character towards reactionary and even ultra-reactionary finance
capital. This is an epoch in which a new class—present-day
democracy—is preparing and slowly mustering its forces. The third
epoch, which has just set in, places the bourgeoisie in the same
“position” as that in which the feudal lords found themselves
during the first epoch. This is the epoch of imperialism and imperialist
upheavals, as well as of upheavals stemming from the nature of
imperialism.

It was none other than Kautsky who, in a series of articles and in his
pamphlet Der Weg zur Macht (which appeared in 1909), outlined with
full clarity the basic features of the third epoch that has set in, and who
noted the fundamental differences between this epoch and the second (that of
yesterday), and recognised the change in the immediate tasks as well as in
the conditions and forms of struggle of present-day democracy, a change
stemming from the changed objective historical conditions. Kautsky is now
burning that which he worshipped yesterday; his change of front is most
incredible, most unbecoming and most shameless. In the above-mentioned
pamphlet, he spoke forthrightly of symptoms of an approaching war, and
specifically of the kind of war that became a fact in 1914. It would suffice
simply to place side by side for comparison a number of passages from that
pamphlet and from his present writings to show convincingly how Kautsky has
betrayed his own convictions and solemn declarations. In this respect
Kautsky is not an individual instance (or even a German instance); he is a
typical representative of the entire upper crust of present-day democracy,
which, at a moment of crisis, has deserted to the side of the
bourgeoisie.

All the historical instances quoted by Potresov and Kautsky belong to the
first epoch. The main objective content of the historical wartime phenomena,
not only of 1855, 1859, 1864, 1866, or 1870, but also of 1877 (the
Russo-Turkish war) and 1896-1897 (the wars between Turkey and Greece and the
Armenian disturbances) were bourgeois-national movements or
“convulsions” in a, bourgeois society ridding itself of every
kind of feudalism. At that time there could have been no possibility of
really independent action by present-day democracy, action of the kind
befitting the epoch of the over-maturity, and decay of the bourgeoisie, in a
number of leading countries. The bourgeoisie was then the chief class, which
was on the upgrade as a result of its participation in those wars; it alone
could come out with overwhelming force against the feudal-absolutist
institutions. Represented by various strata of propertied producers of
commodities, this bourgeoisie was progressive in various degrees in the
different countries, sometimes (like part of the Italian bourgeoisie in
1859) being even revolutionary. The general feature of the epoch, however,
was the progressiveness of the bourgeoisie, i.e., its unresolved and
uncompleted struggle against feudalism. It was perfectly natural for the
elements of present-day democracy, and for Marx as their representative, to
have been guided at the time by the unquestionable principle of support for
the progressive bourgeoisie (i.e., capable of waging a struggle) against
feudalism, and for them to be dealing with the problem as to “the
success of which side”, i.e., of which bourgeoisie, was more
desirable. The popular movement in the principal countries affected by the
war was generally democratic at that time, i.e., bourgeois-democratic in its
economic and class content. It is quite natural that no other
question could have been posed at the time except the following: the success
of which bourgeoisie, the success of which combination of forces,
the failure of which reactionary forces (the feudal-absolutist forces which
were hampering the rise of the bourgeoisie) promised contemporary democracy
more “elbow room”.

As even Potresov has had to admit, Marx was guided, in his
“appraisal” of international conflicts springing from bourgeois
national and liberation movements, by considerations as to whose success was
more capable of contributing to the “development” (p. 74 of
Potresov’s article) of national and, in general, popular democratic
movements. That means that, during military conflicts stemming from the
bourgeoisie’s rise to power within the various nationalities, Marx
was, as in 1848, most of all concerned with extending the scope of the
bourgeois-democratic movement and bringing it to a head through the
participation of broader and more “plebeian” masses, the petty
bourgeoisie in general, the peasantry in particular, and finally of the poor
classes as a whole. This concern of Marx for the extension of the
movement’s social base and its development is the fundamental
distinction between Marx’s consistently democratic tactics and
Lassalle’s inconsistent tactics, which veered towards an alliance with
the national-liberals.

The international conflicts in the third epoch have, in form ,
remained the same kind of international conflicts as those of the first
epoch, but their social and class content has changed radically. The objective historical situation has grown quite different.

The place of the struggle of a rising capital, striving towards national
liberation from feudalism, has been taken by the struggle waged against the
new forces by the most reactionary finance capital, the struggle of a force
that has exhausted and outlived itself and is heading downward towards
decay. The bourgeois-national state framework, which in the first epoch was
the mainstay of the development of the productive forces of a
humanity that was liberating itself from feudalism, has now, in the third
epoch, become a hindrance to the further development of the
productive forces. From a rising and progressive class the bourgeoisie has
turned into a declining, decadent, and reactionary class. It is quite
another class that is now on the upgrade on a broad historical scale.

Potresov and Kautsky have abandoned the standpoint of that class; they
have turned back, repeating the false bourgeois assertion that today too the objective content of the historical process consists in the
bourgeoisie’s progressive movement against feudalism. In reality,
there can now be no talk of present-day democracy following in the
wake of the reactionary imperialist bourgeoisie, no matter of what
“shade” the latter may be.

In the first epoch, the objective and historical task was to ascertain
how, in its struggle against the chief representatives of a dying
feudalism, the progressive bourgeoisie should “utilise”
international conflicts so as to bring the greatest possible advantage to
the entire democratic bourgeoisie of the world. In the first epoch, over
half a century ago, it was natural and inevitable that the bourgeoisie,
enslaved by feudalism, should wish the defeat of its “own”
feudal oppressor, all the more so that the principal and central feudal
strongholds of all-European importance were not so numerous at the
time. This is how Marx “appraised” the conflicts: he ascertained
in which country, in a given and concrete situation, the success of the
bourgeois-liberation movement was more important in undermining the
all-European feudal stronghold.

At present, in the third epoch, no feudal fortresses of all-European
significance remain. Of course, it is the task of present-day democracy to
“utilise” conflicts, but—despite Potresov and
Kautsky—this international utilisation must be directed, not
against individual national finance capital, but against international
finance capital. The utilisation should not be effected by a class which was
on the ascendant fifty or a hundred years ago. At that time it was a
question of “international action” (Potresov’s expression)
by the most advanced bourgeois democracy; today it is another class that is
confronted by a similar task created by history and advanced by the
objective state of affairs.

III

The second epoch or, as Potresov puts it, “a span of forty-five
years” (1870-1914), is characterised very inconclusively by him. The
same incompleteness is the shortcoming in Trotsky’s characterisation
of the same period, given in his German work, although he does not agree
with Potresov’s practical conclusions (this, of course, standing to
the former’s credit). Both writers hardly realise the reason for their
standing so close to each other, in a certain sense.

Here is what Potresov writes of this epoch, which we have called the
second, that of yesterday:

“ A detailed restriction of work and the struggle and an
all-pervading gradualism—these signs of the times, which by some have
been elevated to a principle, have become to others an ordinary fact in
their lives, and, as such, have become part of their mentality, a shade of
their ideology” (p. 71). “Its [this epoch’s] talent for a
smooth and cautious advance had, as its reverse, firstly, a pronounced
non-adaptability to any break in gradualness and to catastrophic phenomena
of any kind and secondly, an exceptional isolation within the sphere of
national action—the national milieu. . .”
(p. 72). “Neither revolution, nor war. . .”
(p. 70). “Democracy became the more effectively nationalist, the
longer the period of its ‘position warfare’ was protracted and
the longer there lingered on the stage that spell of European history which
. . . knew of no international conflicts in the heart of Europe, and
consequently experienced no unrest extending beyond the boundaries of
national state territories, and felt no keen interest on a general European
or world scale” (75-76).

The chief shortcoming in this characterisation, as in Trotsky’s
characterisation of the same epoch, is a reluctance to discern and recognise
the deep contradictions in modern democracy, which has developed on the
foundation described above. The impression is produced that the democracy
contemporary with the epoch under review remained a single whole, which,
generally speaking, was pervaded with gradualism, turned nationalist, was by
degrees weaned away from breaks in gradualness and from catastrophes, and
grew petty and mildewed.

In reality this could not have happened, since, side by side with the
aforesaid tendencies, other and reverse tendencies were undoubtedly
operating: the day-by-day life of the working masses was undergoing an
internationalisation—the cities were attracting ever more inhabitants,
and living conditions in the large cities of the whole world were being
levelled out; capital was becoming internationalised, and at the big
factories townsmen and country-folk, both native and alien, were
intermingling. The class contradictions were growing ever more acute; the
employers’ associations were exercising ever greater pressure on the
workers’ unions; sharper and more bitter forms of struggle were
arising, as, for instance, mass strikes; the cost of living was rising; the
pressure of finance capital was becoming intolerable, etc., etc.

In actual fact, events did not follow the pattern described by
Potresov. This we know definitely. In the period under discussion, none,
literally not one, of the leading capitalist countries of Europe was spared
by the struggle between the two mutually opposed currents within
contemporary democracy. In each of the big countries, this struggle at times
assumed most violent forms, including splits, this despite the general
“peaceful”, “sluggish”, and somnolent character of the epoch. These contradictory currents have affected all the various fields
of life and all problems of modern democracy without exception, such as the
attitude towards the bourgeoisie, alliances with the liberals, the voting
for war credits, the attitude towards such matters as colonial policies,
reforms, the character of economic struggle, the neutrality of the trade
unions, etc.

“ All-pervading gradualism” was in no way the predominant
sentiment in all contemporary democracy, as the writings of Potresov and
Trotsky imply. No, this gradualism was taking shape as a definite political
trend, which at the time often produced individual groups, and sometimes
even individual parties, of modern democracy in Europe. That trend had its
own leaders, its press organs, its policy, and its own particular—and
specially organised—method of influencing the masses of the
population. Moreover, this trend was more and more basing itself—and
ultimately based itself solidly—on the interests of a definite social
stratum within the democracy of the time.

“ All-pervading gradualism” naturally attracted into the
ranks of that democracy a number of petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers;
furthermore, the specifically petty-bourgeois conditions, and consequently,
a petty-bourgeois political orientation, became the rule with a definite
stratum of parliamentarians, journalists, and trade union officials; a kind
of bureaucracy and aristocracy of the working class was arising in a manner
more or less pronounced and clear-cut.

Take, for instance, the possession of colonies and the expansion of
colonial possessions. These were undoubted features of the period dealt with
above, and with the majority of big states. What did that mean in the
economic sense? It meant a sum of super-profits and special privileges for
the bourgeoisie. It meant, moreover, the possibility of enjoying crumbs from
this big cake for a small minority of the petty bourgeois, as well as for
the better placed employees, officials of the labour movement, etc. The
enjoyment of crumbs of advantage from the colonies, from privileges, by an
insignificant minority of the working class in Britain, for instance, is an
established fact, recognised and pointed out by Marx and Engels. Formerly
confined to Britain alone, this phenomenon became common to all the great
capitalist countries of Europe, as their colonial possessions expanded, and
in general as the imperialist period of capitalism grew and developed.

In a word, the “all-pervading gradualism” of the second
epoch (the one of yesterday) has created, not only a certain “non-adaptability to any break in gradualness”, as Potresov
thinks, not only certain “possibilist” tendencies, as Trotsky
supposes, but an entire opportunist trend based on a definite
social stratum within present-day democracy, and linked with the bourgeoisie
of its own national “shade” by numerous ties of common economic,
social, and political interests—a trend directly, openly, consciously,
and systematically hostile to any idea of a “break in gradualness”.

A number of Trotsky’s tactical and organisational errors (to say
nothing of Potresov’s) spring from his fear, or his reluctance, or
inability to recognise the fact of the “maturity” achieved by
the opportunist trend, and also its intimate and unbreakable link with the
national-liberals (or social-nationalists) of our times. In practice, this
failure to recognise this “maturity” and this unbreakable link
leads, at least, to absolute confusion and helplessness in the face of the
predominant social-nationalist (or national-liberal) evil.

The link between opportunism and social-nationalism is, generally
speaking, denied by Potresov, by Martov, Axelrod, V. Kosovsky (who has
talked himself into defending the German democrats’ national-liberal
vote for war credits) and by Trotsky.

Their main “argument” is that no full coincidence exists
between yesterday’s division of democracy “along the line of
opportunism” and today’s division “along the line of social-nationalism”. This argument is, firstly, incorrect in point of
fact, as we shall presently show; secondly, it is absolutely one-sided,
incomplete and untenable from the standpoint of Marxist principles. Persons
and groups may shift from one side to the other; that is not only possible,
but even inevitable in any great social upheaval; however, it does not at
all affect the nature of a definite trend , or the ideological links
between definite trends, or their class significance. All these
considerations might seem so generally known and indisputable that one feels
almost embarrassed at having to lay such emphasis on them. Yet the
above-mentioned writers have lost sight of these very considerations. The
fundamental class significance of opportunism—or, in other words, its
social-economic content—lies in certain elements of present-day
democracy having gone over (in fact, though perhaps unconsciously) to the
bourgeoisie, on a number of individual issues. Opportunism is tantamount to
a liberal-labour policy. Anyone who is fearful of the “factional” look of these words would do well to go to the
trouble of studying the opinions of Marx, Engels, and Kautsky (is the latter
not an “authority” highly suitable to the opponents of “factionalism”?) on, let us say, British opportunism. There
cannot be the slightest doubt that such a study would lead to a recognition
of the coincidence of fundamentals between opportunism and a liberal-labour
policy. The basic class significance of today’s social-nationalism is
exactly the same. The fundamental idea of opportunism is an
alliance or a drawing together (sometimes an agreement, bloc, or the like)
between the bourgeoisie and its antipode. The fundamental idea of
social-nationalism is exactly the same. The ideological and political
affinity, connection, and even identity between opportunism and
social-nationalism are beyond doubt. Naturally, we must take as our basis,
not individuals or groups, but a class analysis of the content of
social trends , and an ideological and political examination of
their essential and main principles.

Approaching the same subject from a somewhat different angle, we shall
ask: whence did social-nationalism appear? How did it grow and
mature? What gave it significance and strength? He who has been
unable to find answers to these questions has completely failed to
understand what social nationalism is, and is consequently quite incapable
of drawing an “ideological line” between himself and social-nationalism, no matter how vehemently he may assert that he is ready
to do so.

There can be only one answer to this question: social nationalism has
developed from opportunism, and it was the latter that gave it strength. How
could social-nationalism have appeared “all of a sudden”? In the
same fashion as a babe appears “all of a sudden” if nine months
have elapsed since its conception. Each of the numerous manifestations of
opportunism during the entire second (or yesterday) epoch in all the
European countries was a rivulet, which now flowed “all of a
sudden” into a big though very shallow (and, we might add
parenthetically, muddy and dirty)

river of social-nationalism. Nine months after conception the babe must separate from its mother; many decades after
opportunism was conceived, social-nationalism, its ripe fruit, will have to
separate from present-day democracy within a period that is more or less
brief (as compared with decades). No matter how good people may scold, rage
or vociferate over such ideas and words, this is inevitable, since it
follows from the entire social development of present-day democracy and from
the objective conditions in the third epoch.

But if division “along the line of opportunism” and division
“along the line of social-nationalism” do not fully coincide,
does that not prove that no substantial link exists between these two facts?
It does not, in the first place, just as the fact that individual bourgeois
at the end of the eighteenth century went over either to the side of the
feudal lords or that of the people does not prove that there was “no
link” between the growth of the bourgeoisie and the Great French
Revolution of 1789. Secondly, taken by and large, there is such a
coincidence (and we are speaking only in a general sense and of movements as
a whole). Take, not one individual country but a number of them, let us say
ten European countries: Germany, Britain , France , Belgium , Russia, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and
Bulgaria. Only the three countries given in italics may seem the
exceptions. In the others, the trends of uncompromising antagonists
to opportunism have given birth to trends hostile to social-nationalism. Compare the well-known Monatshefte and its
opponents in Germany, Nashe Dyelo and its opponents in Russia, the
party of Bissolati and its opponents in Italy, the adherents of Greulich and
Grimm in Switzerland, Branting and Höglund in

Sweden,

and Troelstra, Pannekoek and Gorter in Holland, and finally the Obshcho Dyelo adherents and the Tesnyaki
in
Bulgaria. [5] The general coincidence between the old and the
new division is a fact; as for complete coincidences, they do not occur even
in the simplest of natural phenomena, any more than there is complete
coincidence between the Volga before the Kama joins it, and the Volga below
that point; neither is there full similarity between a child and its
parents. Britain only seems the exception; in reality, there were two main
currents in Britain prior to the war, these being identified with two
dailies —which is the truest objective indication of the mass
character of these currents—namely, the Daily Citizen , [6] the
opportunists’ newspaper, and the Daily Herald , [7] the organ of the
opponents of opportunism. Both papers have been swamped by the wave of
nationalism; yet, opposition has been expressed by under one-tenth of the
former’s adherents and by some three-sevenths of the adherents of the
latter. The usual method of comparison, whereby only the British Socialist
Party is compared with the Independent Labour Party, is erroneous because it
overlooks the existence of an actual bloc of the latter with
the
Fabians [8] and the Labour Party. It follows, then, that
only two out of the ten countries are exceptions, but even here the
exceptions are not complete, since the trends have not changed places; only
(for reasons so obvious that they need not be dwelt on) the wave has swamped
almost all the opponents of opportunism. This undoubtedly proves the
strength of the wave, but it does not in any way disprove coincidence
between the old division and the new for all Europe.

We are told that division “along the line of opportunism” is
outmoded, and that only one division is of significance, namely, that
between the adherents of internationalism and the adherents of national
self-sufficiency. This opinion is fundamentally wrong. The concept of
“adherents of internationalism” is devoid of all content and
meaning, if we do not concretely amplify it; any step towards such
concrete amplification, however, will be an enumeration of features of
hostility to opportunism. In practice, this will prove truer still. An
adherent of internationalism who is not at the same time a most consistent
and determined adversary of opportunism is a phantom, nothing more. Perhaps
certain individuals of this type will honestly consider themselves
“internationalists”. However, people are judged, not by what
they think of themselves but by their political behaviour. The political
behaviour of “internationalists” who are not consistent and
determined adversaries of opportunism will always aid and abet the
nationalist trend. On the other hand, nationalists, too, call themselves
“internationalists” (Kautsky, Lensch, Haenisch, Vandervelde, Hyndman, and others); not only do they call themselves so, but they fully
acknowledge an international rapprochement , an agreement, a union
of persons sharing their views. The opportunists are not against
“internationalism”; they are only in favour of international
approval for and international agreement among the opportunists.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

---
Notes:
[1]
Incidentally Potresov refuses to make up his mind as to whether Marx or
Lassalle was right in appraising the conditions of the war of 1859. We
think that (Mehring notwithstanding) Marx was right, whereas Lassalle was
then an opportunist, just as he was during his flirtation with
Bismarck. Lassalle was adapting himself to the victory of Prussia and
Bismarck, to the lack of sufficient strength in the democratic national
movements of Italy and Germany. Thus Lassalle deviated towards a
national-liberal labour policy, whereas Marx encouraged and developed an
independent, consistently democratic policy hostile to national-liberal
cowardice (Prussia’s intervention in 1859 against Napoleon would
have stimulated the popular movement in Germany). Lassalle was casting
glances, not downwards but upwards, as he was fascinated by
Bismarck. Bismarck’s “success” was no justification of
Lassalle’s opportunism.
— Lenin

[2]

“ Indeed,” Potresov writes, “it was during that period of seeming stagnation that tremendous molecular processes
were taking place in every country, the international situation too was
gradually changing, the policy of colonial acquisitions, of militant
imperialism becoming its determining feature.”
— Lenin