PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
“To present the realm of thought in its
philosophical aspect—that is, in its own
(NB) immanent activity, or (which comes
excellent!
to the same thing) in its necessary (NB)
development....”
(10)
“The familiar forms of thought”—an im-
portant beginning, “die leblosen Knochen
eines Skeletts.”
[6]
(11)
What is necessary is not
leblose Knochen, but living life.
The connection between thought
and language (the Chinese language, inciden-
tally, and its lack of development:
(11)
,
the formation of nouns and verbs. (11)
In the German language words sometimes
have “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”
[7]
(12)
(not simply “different” but
opposed
mean-
ings)—“a joy to thought....”
the history
of thought =
the history of
language??
The concept of
force
in Physics—and
of
polarity
(“the things distinguished
insep-
arably
(Hegel’s italics) bound up to-
gether”). (12) The transition from force
to polarity—a transition to “higher Denk-
verhältnisse.”
[8]
(12)
[
NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature in
general is opposed, as physical, to what is
mental, then it must be said that Logic
is rather something supernatural....”
]
nature and
“das Geistige”
[9]
Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,
[10]
but
... “was
bekannt
ist, darum noch nicht
erkannt
.
[11]
(13)
“Infinite progress”
—“liberation” 
	  of “forms
of thought” from the matter (von dem
Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of
the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning
of Knowledge....
“It was only after nearly everything that
was necessary ... was available, that people
began to trouble themselves about philo-
sophic knowledge,” says
Aristotle
(13-14)
;
and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp-
tian priests, the beginning of the mathe-
matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with
“pure thought” presupposes “a long stretch
of road already traversed by the mind
of man.” In this kind of thought
“those interests are hushed which move
the lives of peoples and individuals.”
(14)
interests
“move the lives
of peoples”
The categories of Logic are
Abbrevi-
aturen
[12]
(“epitomiert”
[13]
in another pas-
age) for the “endless multitude” of “par-
ticulars of external existence and of ac-
tion....” (15) In turn, these categories
die
-
nen
[14]
people in 
	  practice (“in the
intellectual exercise of living content, in
production and interchange”).
(15)
“We do not say of our feelings, impulses
and interests that they serve us—rather,
they are regarded as independent faculties
and powers...all this is just what we are.”
(15)
the relation
of thought to
interests and
impulses...
And concerning forms of thought (Denk-
formen) it cannot be said that they serve
us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16),
they are “the Universal as such.”
Objectivism: the categories of
thought are not an auxiliary tool
of man, but an expression of laws
both of nature and of man—com-
pare further the antithesis—
of “subjective thinking” and “the objec-
tive concept of the very essence of things”.
We cannot
“get beyond the nature of things”
.
“Also the remark against the "Critical
Philosophy.”
(17)
It conceives the relation
between “three terms” (We, Thought,
Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid-
dle” between things and us, and so that
this middle term “separates” (abschließt)
“rather than... connects” (zusammenschli-
eBen) us. This view may be met, says
Hegel, by the “simple observation” that
“these very things which are supposed
to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ...
are themselves thought entities (Gedanken-
dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it-
self is only ein Gedankendingder leeren
Abstraktion.
[15]
”
against
Kantianism
In my opinion, the essence of the argu-
ment is: (1) In
Kant
,
      cognition demar-
cates (divides) nature and man; actually
it unites them; (2) In Kant, the “
empty
abstraction
” of the
Thing-in-it-
self
instead of living Gang, Bewegung,
[16]
deeper and deeper, of our knowledge
about things.
In Kant, Ding an sich
[17]
is an
empty
abstraction, but Hegel demands abstrac-
tions which correspond to
der Sache
[18]
:
“der objective Begriff der Dinge die
Sache selbst ausmacht,”
[19]
which cor-
respond—speaking materialistically—to
the real deepening of our knowledge of
the world.
It is incorrect to say that Denkformen
are only a “Mittel”, “zum Gebrauch.”
[20]
(17)
It is also incorrect to say that they are
“äußere Formen,”
[21]
“Formen die nur
an dem
Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst
seien,” (forms which are merely forms at-
tached to the content, and not the content
itself). (17)...
NB
What Hegel demands is a Logic,
the forms of which would be ge-
haltvolle Formen,
[22]
forms of
living, real content, inseparably
connected with the content.
And Hegel draws attention to “thoughts
of all natural and spiritual things”, to the
“substantial content....” (18)
—“To bring into clear consciousness this
logical character, which gives soul to mind
and drives and operates in it, this is our
problem.”
(18)
Logic is the science not of ex-
ternal forms of thought, but of
the laws of development “of all
material, natural and spiritual
things”,
i.e., of the development
of the entire concrete content of
the world and of its cognition, i.e.,
the sum-total, the conclusion of the
History
of knowledge of the world.
“Instinctive 
	  action”
(instinktartiges
Tun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely di-
verse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligent
and conscious action” brings out “the con-
tent of that which motivates” (den Inhalt
des Treibenden) “out of its immediate unity
with the subject” and makes it “an object
for it” (for the subject).
“
In this web
strong knots are formed
now and then, which are foci of the arrest
and direction of its”
[
the spirit’s, or the
subject’s
]
“life and consciousness ....” (18)
How is this to be understood?
Man is confronted by a
web
of natural phenomena. Instinctive
man, the savage, does not distin-
guish himself from nature. Con-
scious man does distinguish, cate-
gories are stages of distinguishing,
i.e. of cognising the world, focal
points in the web, which assist
in cognising and mastering it.
“Truth is infinite” (19) —its finiteness
is its denial, “its end”. The forms (Denk-
formen
[23]
),
	  if one regards them as forms,
“distinct from the substance and merely at-
tached to it” are incapable of embrac-
ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of
[
formal logic
]
makes them deserving of
“contempt” (19) and “derision.”  (20)
The
Law of identity,
A = A,
—vacuousness,
“unerträglich.”
[24]
. (19)
It is unfair to forget that these categories
“have their place and validity in cognition.”
(20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be
“instruments of error and sophistry” (20),
not of truth.
“Contemplative thought” should include
“der Inhalt”
[25]
as well as the “external form.”
(20)
“With this introduction of Content into
logical consideration,” the subject becomes
not Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff der
Dinge.
[26]
NB
NB
not things, but the laws
[27]
of their
movement, materialistically
...”
the logos, the reason of that which
is.
" (21)
And on page (22) at the beginning,
the
subject of logic
is expressed in the
words:
...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner
Notwendigkeit.”
“develop-
ment” of
thinking in
accordance
with its
necessity
The categories have to be
derived
(and
not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not
by “exposition”, not by “assurances,” but
with
proofs
) proceeding from the
simplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth-
ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without
taking others)—here, in them, “in this
germ, the whole development.”  (23)
INTRODUCTION:
GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC
Logic is usually understood as being the
“science of thinking,” the “bare form of
cognition.”
(27) Hegel refutes this view.
He is against Ding an sich
[28]
as “something
beyond thought.” (29)
Forms of thinking apparently “have no
applicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31)
Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,
[29]
which does
not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not
Verstand
[30]
also a Thing-in-itself? (31)
“Transcendental idealism, carried
more consistently to its logical conclusion, has
perceived the nullity of the spectre of the
Thing-in-itself
left over from the critical
philosophy—that abstract shadow detached
from all content—and has had the aim
of demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi-
losophy (Ficthe?) made a beginning of mak-
inf reason develop its own determinations
out of itself.  But the subjective attitude
of this attempt did not admit of its being
carried to completion.”
(32)
Logical forms are tote Formen
[31]
—
for they are not regarded as an “organic
unity,” (33) as
“their living concrete unity”
(ibidem).
In the
Phenomenology of Mind
I have examined “the movement of con-
sciousness, from the first direct contradiction
(Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up
to absolute knowledge.
(34)
This path goes
through all the forms of the relation of con-
sciousness to the object....”
“Truth, as science, is pure self-conscious-
ness unfolding itself...” (35) “objective think-
ing“ ... ”the concept, as such, is that which
exists in and for itself.” (35) (36: clerical-
ism, God, the realm of truth, etc., etc.)
37:
Kant imparted “an essentially subjec-
tive signification” to “logical determi-
nations”. But “thought determinations”
have “an objective value and exist-
ence”. (37)
	
      The old logic has fallen into
Verachtung.
[32]
(38)
It requires trans-
formation...
39—
The old, formal logic is exactly like
a
child’s game
, making pictures out
of jig-saw pieces (in Verachtung ge-
kommen
[33]
:
	  (38))
40
Philosophy must have its own method
(
not
that of mathematics,
contra
Spi-
noza, Wolff und Andere
[34]
).
40-41:
“For method is the conscious-
ness of the form taken by the inner
spontaneous movement of its content,”
NB
and the rest of
page 41
gives
a good explanation of dialectics
“es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dia-
lektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche
ihn fortbewegt.” (42)
“The given sphere of phenomena is
moved forward by the content itself
of this sphere, the dialectic, which
it (this content) has
in
(an) itself” (i.e.,
the dialectic of its own movement).
“The negative is to an equal extent pos-
itive”
(41)—negation is something defi-
nite, has a definite content, the inner con-
tradictions lead to the replacement of the
old content by a new, higher one.
In the old logic there is no transition
, de-
velopment (of concept and thought), there
is not “
eines inneren, notwen-
digen Zusammenhangs
”
[35]
(43)
of all the parts and “Übergang”
[36]
of some
parts into others.
NB
And Hegel puts forward two basic require-
ments:
1)
“The necessity of connection”
and
2)  “the immanent emergence of distinctions”.
Very important!! This is what it means,
in my opinion:
1.
Necessary
connection, the ob-
jective connection of all the aspects,
forces, tendencies, etc., of the given
sphere of phenomena;
2. The “immanent
emergence
of dis-
tinctions” - the inner objective logic of
evolution and of the struggle of the
differences, polarity.
Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics
in Parmenides
.
[37]
“Dialectic is generally regarded as an
external and negative procedure, that does
not belong to the subject-matter itself,
that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec-
tive craving to shake and break down what
is fixed and true,—or that at best leads
to nothing but the inaneness of the dialec-
tically treated matter.”
(43)
44
The great merit of
Kant
was that he
removed “den Schein von Willkür”
[38]
from dialectics.
Two
important things:
(1)  Die Objektivität
#
des Scheins
[39]
NB
: unclear,
return to it!!
(2)  die Notwendigkeit des Wilderspruchs
[40]
selbstbewegende Seele
[41]
... (“inher-
ent negativity”) ...
“the principle of all phys-
ical and spiritual life”
(44)
#
Is not the thought here that semblance
also is objective, for it contains
one
of the aspects
of the
objective
world? Not only Wesen,
[42]
but
Schein, too, is objective. There is a
difference between the subjective
and the objective,
BUT IT, TOO,
HAS ITS LIMITS.
The dialectical =
=
“comprehending the antithesis in its unity....”
45
Logic resembles grammar, being one
thing for the beginner and another thing
for one who knows the language (and lan-
guages) and the spirit of language. “It is
one thing for him who approaches Logic
and the Sciences in general for the first
time and another thing for him who comes
back from the sciences to Logic.”
subtle and
profound!
Then logic gives “the essential character
of this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt-
vorstellung
[43]
),
	  “the inner nature of spir-
it and of the world....” (46)
“Not merely an abstract universal, but
a universal which comprises in itself the
wealth of the particular
” (47)
c.f.
Capital
A beautiful formula: “Not mere-
ly an abstract universal, but a uni-
versal which comprises in itself
the wealth of the particular, the
individual, the single” (all the
(all the wealth of the particular
and single!)!! Très bien!
“—Just
	  as one and the same moral
maxim in the mouth of a youth who
understands it quite accurately does
not have the significance and scope
which it has in the mind of a man
of years and experience, for whom it
expresses the full force of its con-
tent.
a good
comparison
(materialist)
Thus, the value of logic only receives due
appreciation when it is the result of ex-
perience of the sciences; then it presents
itself to the mind as universal truth, not
as a
particular
department of knowledge
alongside
other departments and realities,
but as the essence of all this other con-
tent....”
(47)
“sum-total of
experience of
the sciences”
NB
(“Essence”)
the “essential
content of all
other
knowledge”
“The system of logic is the realm of
shades"
(47), free from "all sensuous con-
creteness....”
(50)—
...“not abstract, dead and immo-
bile, but concrete....”
[This is characteristic! The spirit and
essence of dialectics!]
(52)
Note ... the results of
Kant’s philos-
ophy
...: “that reason can cognise no
valid content, and with regard to
absolute truth must be referred to
faith....”
Kant
: to res-
trict “reason”
and strength-
en
faith
[44]
(53) Once again, that Ding an
sich = an abstraction, the product
of thinking that abstracts.
Notes
[1]
The first edition of Hegel’s works in German
	consists of 18 volumes (1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887).
[2]
Wissenschaft der Logik (The Science of Logic)
consists of two parts (three books).
[3]
Hegel,
Werke,
Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—
Ed.
[4]
In the manuscript the words “from ignorance to knowledge” 
	are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of being underlined.—
Ed.
[5]
In the nature of pure essentialities—
Ed.
[6]
“the lifeless bones of a skeleton”—
Ed.
[7]
“opposed meanings”—
Ed.
[8]
“relations of thought”—
Ed.
[9]
“the mental”—
Ed.
[10]
“are familiar to all”—
Ed.
[11]
“what is
familiar
is not on that 
	account necessarily
known
”—
Ed.
[12]
abbreviations
—
Ed.
[13]
optimised—
Ed.
[14]
serve
—
Ed.
[15]
a thought entity of empty abstraction—
Ed.
[16]
progress, the movement—
Ed.
[17]
the
Thing-in-itself
—
Ed.
[18]
the
essence
—
Ed.
[19]
“the objective concept of things constitutes
	their very essence”—
Ed.
[20]
a “means,” “for 
	use”—
Ed.
[21]
“external forms”—
Ed.
[22]
forms with content—
Ed.
[23]
forms of thought—
Ed.
[24]
“insufferable"—
Ed.
[25]
“content”—
Ed.
[26]
things, but the essence, the concept of things—
Ed.
[27]
The word “laws” is linked by an arrow with the word
	“logos” in the next paragraph—
Ed.
[28]
Thing-in-itself—
Ed.
[29]
True cognition is absurd—
Ed.
[30]
understanding—
Ed.
[31]
dead forms—
Ed.
[32]
disrepute—
Ed.
[33]
It has fallen into disrepute.—
Ed.
[34]
and others—
Ed.
[35]
“
an inner
,
necessary connection
”—
Ed.
[36]
“transition”—
Ed.
[37]
Parmenides
—the name of one of
Plato’s
dialogues, in which the philosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient Greek
Eleatic
	philosopher
, are discussed.
[38]
“the semblance of arbitrariness”—
Ed.
[39]
the objectivity of semblance—
Ed.
[40]
the necessity of contradiction—
Ed.
[41]
self-moving soul—
Ed.
[42]
essence—
Ed.
[43]
the wealth of the world view—
Ed.
[44]
Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known 
	statement by
Kant
in the preface 
	to the second edition of
Critique of Pure Reason
:
	“I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to make place for faith.”
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	  Conspectus of Hegel’s
Science of Logic
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