PAUL VOLKMANN.
"THEORETICAL-CONGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCES"
("SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS," IX) 2ND EDITION. LEIPZIG, 1910
(Nat. IV. 171 in the Bern Library)
The author is an eclectic and a philistine in philosophy, especially when he speaks against Haeckel,
about Buckle, etc., etc. But the tendency is still materialistic, for example, p. 35* [40]** - "The question of whether we prescribe concepts to nature or nature to us" - is a combination of both
viewpoints. Mach is right (p. 38 [43]), but I oppose it (Mach's viewpoint) with the "objective":
"Thus, I consider that logic in us has its origin in the regular course of things outside us, that the external necessity of natural processes is the first and truest teacher" (p. 39 [43]).
He rebels against phenomenology and modern monism, - but completely fails to understand the essence of materialist and idealist philosophy. In fact, he reduces
the matter to "methods" of natural science in the general positivist spirit. He is not even able to pose the question of the objective reality of nature outside of human consciousness (and sensations).