Written in September - December
1914
First published in 1929 in Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. IX

Printed from the manuscript

Bern: Log. I. 175
Hegels Werke *
Vol. I. Philosophical Essays **
II. Phenomenology of Spirit
III-V. Science of Logic
VI-VII. (1 and 2) Encyclopedia
VIII. Philosophy of Right
IX. Philosophy of History
X. (3 parts) Aesthetics
XI-XII. History of Religion
XIII-XV. History of Philosophy
XVI-XVII. Miscellaneous Writings
XVIII. Philosophical Propaedeutics
XIX. (1 and 2) Letters to and from Hegel.

* - Hegel's Works. Ed.
** - Vol. I. Philosophical Essays. Ed.

Cover of the first notebook with the Summary of Hegel's book "Science of Logic". - September - December 1914.

Reduced

Works

of G. W. F. Hegel, Vol. III (BERLIN, 1833) (468 pages.)
"SCIENCE OF LOGIC" 66.
Full title of the Works of G. W. F. Hegel 65.
"Complete Edition by the circle of friends of the late:

Marheineke, Schulze, Hans, Henning, Göthe, Michelis, Förster".
Part I. Objective Logic.

Section I. Doctrine of Being.
(Bern: Log. I. 175)
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Vol. III*, p. 5 [V, 2]** - wittily on logic: it is a "prejudice" that it "teaches thinking" (as physiology "teaches digesting"??)
... "logical science, which constitutes the proper metaphysics or pure, speculative philosophy"... (6) [3].
... "Philosophy cannot take its method from the subordinate science - mathematics"... (6-7) [4].
"But such a method can only be the nature of the content, moving in scientific cognition, whereby at the same time this self-reflection of the content first posits and produces its determination."
(The movement of scientific cognition - this is the essence).
"Understanding (Verstand) gives determinations" (bestimmt), reason (Vernunft) negates, it is dialectical, for it reduces the determinations of understanding to nothing ("in Nichts auflost"). The combination of both, - "understanding reason or reasonable understanding" = positive.

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833. Ed.
** Hegel. Works, Vol. V, M., 1937. Ed.

Negation of the "simple" ... "spiritual movement"... (7) [4]. "Only on this self-constructing path can philosophy... be an objective, demonstrative science" (7-8) [4].
("Self-constructing path" = the path (here is the crux, in my opinion) of actual cognition, of moving from ignorance to knowledge *.)
Characteristic!
The movement of consciousness "is like the development of all life of nature and spirit" based on the "nature of pure essences, which constitute the content of logic" (Natur der reinen Wesenheiten **).
Invert: logic and theory of knowledge should be derived from the "development of all life of nature and spirit."
Up to this point: Preface to the First Edition.

* In the manuscript, the words "from ignorance to knowledge" are crossed out horizontally, apparently instead of underlining. Ed.
** - nature of pure essences. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC"
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
"To present the kingdom of thought philosophically, i.e., in its own (NB) immanent activity, or, what is the same, in its necessary (NB) development"... (10) [6].

remarkable!
"Known forms of thought" - an important beginning, "die leblosen Knochen eines Skeletts" * (11) [6].
What is needed is not lifeless bones, but living life.
The connection of thinking with language (incidentally, the Chinese language and its underdevelopment: 11), the formation of nouns and verbs (11) [7].
In the German language, sometimes words have "opposite meanings" (12) [7] (not only "different," but also opposite) - "joy for thought"...
history

of thought = history of language??
The concept of force in physics - and polarity ("opposites inseparably (Hegel's emphasis) connected"). The transition from force to polarity - the transition to "higher Denkverhaltnisse" ** (12) [7-8].

* - "lifeless bones of a skeleton." Ed.
** - "thought relations." Ed.

nature and "das Geistige" *
|¯ NB still on p. 11 [7]... "But if one generally opposes nature, as the physical, to the spiritual, one should rather say that the logical is more super-natural"...¯|
Logical forms are Allbekanntes sind, but... "what is known, is not yet recognized" ** (13) [8].
"Infinite progress" - "liberation" of "forms of thought" from material (von dem Stoffe), representations, desires, etc., the elaboration of the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning of cognition...
"Only after all that was necessary was at hand, ... people began to philosophize," says Aristotle (13-14) [9]; and he also: the leisure of Egyptian priests, the beginning of mathematical sciences (14) 67. Engagement with "pure thoughts" presupposes "a long path that the human spirit had to travel earlier."
In such thinking interests "move the life of peoples" "the interests that move the life of peoples and individuals fall silent" (14) [9].
The categories of logic are Abbreviaturen *** ("epitomized" **** elsewhere) of "an infinite mass" of "particulars of external existence and activity."
In turn, these categories dienen ***** people in practice ("in the spiritual elaboration of living content, in the creation of thoughts and their exchange").
the relationship of thinking to interests and inclinations...
"About our sensations, inclinations, and interests, we do not say that they serve us, but they are considered independent forces and authorities, so that we ourselves are this" (15) [10].

* - "the spiritual." Ed.
** - well-known, but... "what is known, is not yet recognized." Ed.
*** - abbreviations. Ed.
**** - "extracted." Ed.
***** - serve. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC"
And about the forms of thought (Denkformen), it cannot be said that they serve us, for they pass "through all our representations" (16) [10], they are the "universal as such."
—————— Objectivism: the categories of thought are not a human aid, but an expression of the regularity and nature of both nature and man—see further the opposition.
——————
- "subjective thinking" and "objective concept of things themselves." We cannot "go beyond the nature of things" (16) [11].
——— And a remark against "critical philosophy" (17) [11]. It conceives the relation between "the three terms" (we, thinking, things) in such a way that we place "thinking in the middle" between things and ourselves, so that this middle
"separates" (abschlieβt) us "instead of uniting" (zusammenschlieβen).
To this, Hegel says, one must reply with a "simple observation," that "these very things, which are supposed to stand on the other side (jenseits) of our thoughts, are themselves (Gedankendinge) thought-things"... and "the so-called thing-in-itself is merely a Gedankending der leeren Abstraktion"*.
against Kantianism
——— The essence of the argument, in my view: (1) For Kant, cognition separates (divides) nature and man; in reality, it unites them; (2) For Kant, the "empty abstraction" of the thing-in-itself replaces the living Gang, Bewegung** of our knowledge of things, which goes deeper and deeper.

* - a thought-thing of empty abstraction. Ed.
** - course, movement. Ed.

Ding an sich* in Kant is an empty abstraction, while Hegel demands abstractions corresponding to der Sache**: "the objective concept of things constitutes their very essence," corresponding—materialistically speaking—to the actual deepening of our knowledge of the world.
It is incorrect that Denkformen are only "Mittel," "zum Gebrauch"*** (17) [11].
NB
It is also incorrect that they are "äuβere Formen"****, "forms that are only on the content, not the content itself" (17) [12]...
Hegel, on the other hand, demands a logic in which the forms were gehaltvolle Formen*****,
forms of living, real content, inseparably linked with the content.
And Hegel draws attention to the "ideas of all natural and spiritual things," to the "substantial content"...
- "The task is to become aware of this logical nature, which animates the spirit, impels it, and acts within it" (18) [12].
Logic is not a doctrine of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development of "all material, natural, and spiritual things," i.e., the development of all concrete content of the world and its cognition, i.e., the result, sum, and conclusion of the history of the world's cognition.

* - Thing-in-itself. Ed.
** - essence. Ed.
*** - "means," "for use." Ed.
**** - "external forms." Ed.
***** - substantial forms. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC"
"Instinctive action" (instinktartiges Tun) "dissipates in infinitely diverse material." On the contrary, "intelligent and conscious action" extracts "the content of the driving" motive (den Inhalt des Treibenden) "from the immediate unity with the subject into objectivity before it" (before the subject).
"In this web, more solid knots are tied here and there, serving as supporting and guiding points for his" |¯spirit or subject¯| "life and consciousness"... (18) [12-13]
How is this to be understood?

Before man is a web of natural phenomena. The instinctive man, the savage, does not separate himself from nature. The conscious man does separate, and categories are the steps of this separation, i.e., the cognition of the world, the nodal points in the web, helping to understand and master it.
"Truth is infinite"—its finitude is its negation, "its end."
Forms (Denkformen), if considered as forms "distinct from content and merely external to it," are incapable of grasping truth. The emptiness of these forms |¯of formal logic¯| makes them worthy of "contempt" (19) [13] and "ridicule" (20) [14]. The law of identity, A = A, is emptiness, "unertraglich"* (19) [14].
It is unjust to forget that these categories "in cognition have their domain where they must retain their significance." But as "indifferent forms," they can be "tools of error and sophistry," not of truth.
"To the mental consideration" should be brought not only "external form," but also "der Inhalt"** (20) [14].

* - "unbearable." Ed.
** - "content." Ed.

NB
"With the introduction of content into logical consideration," the subject becomes not Dinge, but die Sache, der Begriff der Dinge* not things,
NB

but the laws of their movement, materialistically

↑

↓
... "logos, the reason of what is" (21) [15].
And at the beginning of page (22) [15], the subject of logic is expressed in the words:
—————

——— "development" of thought in its necessity
... "Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner Notwendigkeit."
————— ——— Categories must be derived (and not arbitrarily or mechanically taken) (not by "narrating," not by "asserting," but by proving) (24) [17], starting from the simplest basic (being, nothing, becoming (das Werden)) (taking no others)—here, in them, "all development is in this germ" (23) [17].

* - things, but the essence, the concept of things. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC"
INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC
Logic is usually understood as "the science of thinking" as "bare form of cognition" (27) [20].
Hegel rejects this view. Against Ding an sich*—"something entirely beyond thought" (29) [21].
The forms of thought are supposedly "inapplicable to things-in-themselves." Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis**, not cognizing things-in-themselves. And Verstand*** is also a thing-in-itself? (31) [24].
"A more consistently developed transcendental idealism recognized the nullity of the phantom of the thing-in-itself, still preserved by critical philosophy, this abstract, contentless shadow, and set itself the goal of finally
destroying it. Moreover, this philosophy" (Fichte?) "initiated the attempt to let
reason unfold its determinations from itself. But the subjective position of this attempt did not allow it to be completed" (32) [25].
Logical forms are tote Formen****—for they are not considered as "organic unity" (33) [25], "their living, concrete unity" (ibid.*****).
In "Phenomenology of Spirit," I examined "consciousness in its movement from the first immediate contradiction (Gegensatz) between it and the object to the absolute

* - things-in-themselves. Ed.
** - absurd true knowledge. Ed.
*** - understanding. Ed.
**** - dead forms. Ed.
***** - ibidem - the same. Ed.

knowledge (34) [26]. This path goes through all forms of the relationship of consciousness to the object...
"As a science, truth is pure self-developing self-consciousness"... "objective thinking"... "the concept as such is being-in-itself and for-itself" (35) [27]. (36 [28]: clericalism. God, the kingdom of truth, etc., etc.)
37 [29]: Kant gave "essentially subjective significance" to "logical determinations." But "thought determinations" have "objective value and existence."
The old logic has fallen into contempt * (38) [30].
It requires revision...
39 [30] - The old, formal logic is like a child's pastime, putting together pictures from pieces (in Verachtung gekommen **: (38) [30]).
40 [32] The method of philosophy must be its own (not that of mathematics, contra Spinoza, Wolf und Andere ***).
NB
40-41 [33]: "For the method is the consciousness of the form of the internal self-movement of its content," and further, the entire page 41 [33] provides a good explanation of dialectics.

"It is the content in itself, the dialectic it has in itself, which moves it forward" (42) [34].
"The given field of phenomena is moved forward by the content of this field, the dialectic it (this content) has on (an) itself" (i.e., the dialectic of its own movement).
¯¯
"The negative is equally positive" (41) [33] - negation is a definite something, has a definite content, internal contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content with a new, higher one.
¯¯
NB
In the old logic, there is no transition, no development (of concepts and thinking),
no "internal, necessary connection" (43) [35] of all parts and
"Übergang" **** of some into others.

* - contempt. Ed.
** - fell into contempt. Ed.
*** - against Spinoza, Wolff, and others. Ed.
**** - "transition." Ed.

CONCEPT OF THE "SCIENCE OF LOGIC"
Hegel sets two fundamental requirements:

1) "Necessity of connection"

and

2) "immanent origin of differences."
Very important!! This is what I think it means:
1) Necessary connection, objective connection of all sides, forces, tendencies, etc., of the given field of phenomena;
2) "immanent origin of differences" - the internal, objective logic of the evolution and struggle of differences, polarities.
The shortcomings of Platonic dialectics in "Parmenides" 68.
"Usually, in dialectics, one sees only external and negative action, not
belonging to the thing itself, caused only by vanity, as a certain subjective passion to shake and decompose the solid and true, or see in it an action,
leading to nothing, as the futility of the dialectically considered subject" (43) [35].
(44) [35] - A great merit of Kant is that he took away from dialectics "den Schein von Willkür" *.
Two important things:
#
(1) Die Objektivität des Scheins ** (2) die Notwendigkeit des Widerspruchs ***
(NB: unclear, return!!
)
selbstbewegende Seele ****, ...(“internal negativity”)... “the principle of all natural and spiritual vitality” (44) [36].

#
Is not the thought that both appearance and essence are objective, for in appearance there is one side of the objective world? Not only Wesen ***** but also Schein are objective.

* - "appearance of arbitrariness" Ed.
** - objectivity of appearance Ed.
*** - necessity of contradiction Ed.
**** - self-moving soul Ed.
***** - essence Ed.

The distinction between the subjective and the objective exists, BUT IT ALSO HAS ITS LIMITS.

Dialectical =

= "to grasp the opposites in their unity"...
subtle and profound!
45 [37] Logic is like grammar in that for the beginner it is
- one thing, for the one who knows the language (and languages) and the spirit of the language, - another. "It
is one thing for the one who is just beginning it and generally with the sciences, and
something else for the one who returns to it from them."
Then logic gives "the essence of this wealth" (des Reichtums der Weltvorstellung *),
"the inner nature of spirit and the world" ... (46) [38].
cf. "Capital" "Not only abstractly universal, but universal, encompassing the wealth of the particular" (47) [38].
A beautiful formula: "Not only abstractly universal, but universal in such a way that it embodies the wealth of the particular, individual, and singular" (all the wealth of the particular and singular!)!! Tres bien! **
——— a good comparison (materialistic)
"- Just as the same moral maxim in the mouth of a young man, even if he understands it perfectly, lacks the meaning and scope it has for the mind of a mature man, seasoned by life, expressing in it the full force of its inherent content.
——— "the result of the experience of the sciences"

NB
So too, the logical only then receives its true evaluation when it is the result of the experience of the sciences; it is then presented to the spirit as a general truth, standing not alongside other objects and realities as separate knowledge, but as the essential content of all other knowledge" ... (47) [38-39].

("Essence")

"essential content of all other knowledge"
===== "The system of logic is a kingdom of shadows" (47) [39], free from "all sensory concreteness"...
(50) [41] - ... "not abstract, dead, motionless, but concrete" ... |¯Characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectics!¯|
(52) [43] Note... the results of Kant's philosophy...: "that reason cannot know the true content and that in relation to absolute truth, one should refer to faith"...

Kant:

limit

"reason" and strengthen faith 69 (53) [44] Once again, that Ding an sich = abstraction, a product of abstracting thought.

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING
WHERE SHOULD THE SCIENCE BEGIN?
(59) * [49] **... (en passant *** ) "the nature of cognition" (id. p. 61 [51])
(
The theme of logic.

Compare with "epistemology" today.
)
NB
(60) [50]... "No" (Hegel's emphasis) "there is nothing in heaven, in nature, in spirit, or anywhere, that does not contain both immediacy and mediation"...
1) Heaven - nature - spirit. Away with heaven: materialism.

2) All vermittelt = mediated, connected into a whole, connected by transitions. Away with heaven - the regular connection of everything (process) in the world.
(62) [52] "Logic is a pure science, i.e., pure knowledge in the FULL extent of its DEVELOPMENT"...
The first line is nonsense.

2-ая гениальна.
Where to begin? "Pure being" (Sein) (63) [53] - "to assume nothing," the beginning. "To contain no content"... "to be mediated by nothing"...
====== (66) [55]... "Development" (des Erkennens*)... "must be determined by the nature of things and the content itself"...
NB
====== (68) [58] The beginning contains both "Nichts" and "Sein"**, it is their unity: ... "the beginning has not yet begun; it is merely directed towards being"... (from non-being to being: "non-being, which is at the same time being").
Nonsense about the absolute (68-69) [58-59]. I generally try to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism turned on its head (according to Engels 70) - that is, I mostly discard the deity, the absolute, pure idea, etc.
(70-71) [60-61] One cannot start philosophy with "I." There is no "objective movement."

* - of knowledge. Ed.
** - "nothing" and "being." Ed.

FIRST SECTION
:
DETERMINACY (QUALITY)
(77) [66] Pure being - "without any further determination."

(Bestimmung is already Qualitat*.)
Transition from Sein to Dasein (actual being?)
finite" and this to Fursichsein (being-for-itself?)
Sein - Nichts - Werden** "Pure being and pure nothing are... one and the same" (78) [67].
(81 [70]: This seems like a "paradox"). Their combination is Werden.
"The movement of immediate disappearance of one into the other"...
Nichts is opposed to dem Etwas***. But Etwas is already a determined being, distinct from another Etwas, whereas here we are talking about simple Nichts (79) [68].
(The Eleatics and Parmenides, especially the former, arrived at this abstraction of being 71.) In Heraclitus, "everything flows" (80) [69]... that is, "everything is becoming."
Ex nihilo nihil fit?**** From Nichts comes Sein (Werden)...
(81) [70]: "It would not be difficult to discover this unity of being and nothing... in every
(Hegel's italics) real

* - Determinacy is already quality. Ed.
** - being - nothing - becoming. Ed.
*** - something. Ed.
**** - from nothing, nothing comes? Ed.

CONCEPTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF BEING
thing or thought"... "there is nothing, neither in heaven nor on earth, that does not
contain both, being and non-being." Objections introduce bestimmtes Sein* (do I have 100 thalers or not) 82 i. f. [71], - but that is not the point...
"Determinate, finite being is such that it relates to something else; it is content that is in
a necessary relation to another content, to the whole world. Considering the mutually determining connection of the whole,
metaphysics is justified in making the assertion - essentially tautological - that if one speck of dust were destroyed, the entire universe would be destroyed" (83) [72].

"Necessary connection of the whole world"... "mutually determining connection of everything"
(86) [75]: "What is first in science must also have been historically first." ⊂Sounds very materialistic!⊃.

NB
91 [80]: "Becoming is the givenness of being as well as of non-being." ... "Transition
is the same as becoming"... (92 i. f.) [81].
94 [83] "For Parmenides, as for Spinoza, there can be no transition from being or absolute substance to the negative, the finite."
In Hegel, however, the unity or inseparability (p. 90 [79] this expression is sometimes
better than unity) of "being" and "nothing" gives rise to transition, Werden.
The absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite = parts, stages of the same
world. So etwa?** (92 [81]: For "mediated being, we will retain the term: existence.")

* - determinate being. Ed.
** - Is that so? Ed.

102 [90-91]: In Plato's "Parmenides," the transition from being and the one = "außere Reflexion"*.
104 [93]: It is said that darkness is the absence of light. But "in pure light, just as in pure darkness, nothing is visible"...
107 [96] - Reference to infinitesimals, which are taken in the process of their vanishing...
NB||

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"There is nothing at all that is not an intermediate state between being and nothing." "The incomprehensibility of the beginning" - if nothing and being exclude each other, but this is not dialectics, a Sophisterei**.
Sophistry and Dialectics
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"For sophistry is reasoning from an unfounded premise, accepted uncritically and unthinkingly; dialectics, on the other hand, we call the highest rational movement, in which such seemingly completely separate determinations pass into one another through themselves, through what they are, and the premise is sublated" (108) [96].
Werden. Its moments: Entstehen und Vergehen*** (109) [97].
Das Aufheben des Werdens**** - das Dasein |¯concrete, determinate¯|
|¯being (?)¯|
110 [98-99]: aufheben = ein Ende machen

= erhalten (aufbe- wahren zugleich)*****
NB||

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112 [100]: Dasein ist bestimmtes Sein****** (NB 114 [102] "ein Konkretes"*******), -
quality, distinct from Anderes, - veranderlich und endlich ********.

* - "external reflection." Ed.
** - sophistry. Ed.
*** - coming-to-be and passing-away. Ed.
**** - Sublation of becoming. Ed.
***** - to sublate = to end = to preserve (at the same time to keep). Ed.
****** - actual being is determinate being. Ed.
******* - "something concrete." Ed.
******** - other, - changeable and finite. Ed.

CONCEPTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF BEING
114 [103] "Determinacy, isolated as such, as existing determinacy, is
quality"... "Quality, as distinct being, is reality" (115) [103].
117 [106] ... "Determinacy is negation"...

(Spinoza) Omnis determinatio est negatio*, "this proposition has infinite importance"...
120 [108]: "Something is the first negation of negation"...
(
Here the exposition is somewhat disjointed and extremely
obscure.)

abstract and abstruse Hegelianism

— Engels 72.
125 [113-114] - ... Two pairs of definitions: 1) "Something and Other"; 2) "Being for Other and Being-in-Itself."
127 [115] - Ding an sich** - "a very simple abstraction." It seems wise to say that we do not know what things in themselves are. A thing in itself is an abstraction from all definition |¯Sein-fur-Anderes***¯| |¯from all relation to the other¯|, i.e., nothing. Therefore, a thing in itself "is nothing but a truthless, empty abstraction."

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This is very profound: the thing in itself and its transformation into a thing for others (cf. Engels 73). The thing in itself is generally an empty, lifeless abstraction. In the movement of life, everything and anything is both "in itself" and "for others" in relation to the other, transforming from one state to another.
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Sehr gut!! **** If we ask what things in themselves are, so ist in die Frage gedankenloser Weise die Unmoglichkeit der Beantwortung gelegt... ***** (127) [116].

* - (Spinoza) Every determination is a negation. Ed.
** - Thing in itself. Ed.
*** - being for other. Ed.
**** - Very good!! Ed.
***** - then the question is posed in such a thoughtless way that it is impossible to answer... Ed.

Kantianism = metaphysics

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129 [117] - en passant: dialectical philosophizing, which is unknown to "metaphysical philosophizing, to which also critical philosophy belongs."
Dialectics is the doctrine of how opposites can be and how they are (how they become) identical, under what conditions they are identical, transforming into one another, and why the human mind should not take these opposites as dead, frozen, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming into one another. En lisant Hegel...*
134 [122-123]: "The boundary (is) simple negation or first negation" (of something. Every something has its boundary) "and the other is at the same time the negation of the negation"...
137 [125]: "Something set with its immanent boundary as the contradiction of itself, through which it is pointed beyond itself and driven, is the finite."
(Something, taken from the point of view of its immanent boundary, - from the point of view of its self-contradiction, which drives it
|¯this something¯| and pushes it beyond its limits, is finite).
When things are said to be finite, this means that their non-being is their nature ("non-being is their being").
"They" (things) "are, but the truth of this being is their end."

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Witty and intelligent! Concepts that usually seem dead, Hegel analyzes and shows that there is movement in them. Finite? means,
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* - Reading Hegel... Ed.

CONCISE SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF BEING
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moving toward the end! Something? - means, not that which is other. Being in general? - means, such indeterminacy that being = non-being. Comprehensive, universal flexibility of concepts, flexibility reaching the identity of opposites, - this is the essence. This flexibility, applied subjectively, = eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e., reflecting the comprehensiveness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.
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NB

thoughts on dialectics en lisant Hegel

139 [127] - Infinite and finite, they say, are opposites? (see p. 148 [136-137])
(c.f. p. 151 [139]).
141 [129] - Sollen und Schranke - moments of the finite*.
143 [132] - "In the ought begins the going beyond finitude, infinity."
143 [132] - They say that reason has its limits. "In this assertion, there is no awareness that defining something as a limit already means going beyond this limit."
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||sehr gut!
144 [132-133]: A stone does not think, and therefore its limitation (Beschranktheit) is not a boundary (Schranke) for it. But even a stone has its boundaries, for example, oxidizability, if it "is a base capable of oxidation."
|¯Evolution** of the stone¯|
144-145 [133]: - Everything (human) goes beyond boundaries (Trieb, Schmerz etc.***), and reason, you see, "cannot go beyond the limit!"

* - Ought and limit - moments of the finite. Ed.
** In the manuscript, the letter "i" is written above the last letter of the word "evolution." Ed.
*** - drive, pain, etc. Ed.

"But, of course, not every going beyond the limit is true liberation from it!"
A magnet, if it had consciousness, would consider its inclination to the north (Leibniz) as free. - No, then it would know all directions of space, and only one direction would be considered the boundary of its freedom, a limitation of it.
Dialectic of things themselves, of nature itself, of the course of events
148 [137] ... "The nature of the finite consists in going beyond its limits, negating its negation, and becoming infinite"... Not an external (fremde) force (Gewalt) (149) [137] transforms the finite into the infinite, but its (the finite's) nature (its own nature).
151 [139]: "Schlechte Unendlichkeit"* - infinity, qualitatively opposite to finitude, not connected with it, separated from it, as if the finite were diesseits, and the infinite jenseits**, as if the infinite stood above the finite, outside of it...
153 [142]: In reality, however, sind sie (the finite and the infinite) untrennbar***. They are one (155) [143-144].
===||

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Apply to atoms versus electrons.

Generally, the infinity of matter in depth... 74
158-159 [147]: ... "The unity of the finite and the infinite is not their external juxtaposition, or an inappropriate, opposite connection, in which separate and opposing, independent of each other, and therefore incompatible beings would be linked, but each is in itself this unity, and each is only the sublation of itself, and neither has any advantage over the other in being-in-itself and affirmative

* - "Bad infinity." Ed.
** - on this side, and the infinite on the other side. Ed.
*** - they are... inseparable. Ed.

Page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript
Concise summary of Hegel's "Science of Logic." - September - December 1914

Reduced

OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF BEING
of actual being. As was shown earlier, finitude is but a going beyond itself; therefore, it contains
infinity, the other of itself"...
||

||

====
... "But infinite progress expresses something more" (than a simple comparison of the finite with the infinite), "in it
connection (Hegel's italics) is also posited and the distinguished"...
(160) [148].
||

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Connection (of all parts) of infinite progress
167 [155] "The nature of speculative thinking... consists solely in grasping
opposite moments in their unity."
Sometimes, the question of how the infinite comes to the finite is considered the essence
of philosophy. But this question boils down to clarifying their connection...
168 [156] ... "And regarding other subjects as well, a certain development is required to be able to ask questions, especially regarding
philosophical subjects, for otherwise, the answer might be that the question is no good."
||

||

||
Well said!
173-174 [161-162]: Fursichsein - being-for-itself = infinite being, complete
qualitative being. |¯The relation to the other has disappeared; only the relation to itself remains.¯|

Quality reaches its extreme (auf die Spitze) and becomes quantity.
The idealism of Kant and Fichte... (181) [169] "get stuck in dualism" ((unclear)) "of
actual being and being-for-itself"...
i.e., that there is no transition from the thing-in-itself (which is mentioned in the following sentence) to appearance?
from object to subject?
Why Fursichsein is Eins*, I do not understand. Here Hegel is extremely obscure, in my opinion.

* - the One. Ed.

NB:

Self-movement****
||

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The One - an ancient principle ...ch..* (and emptiness). Emptiness
is considered the source of movement** (185) [173] not only in the sense
that the place is unoccupied, but also contains*** "a deeper thought, that in
the negative generally lies the basis of becoming, unrest, self-movement" (186) [173].
183 [170]: "The ideality of being-for-itself as totality thus
first, turns into reality and moreover into the most abstract, the most enduring, as the One."
The water is dark...
The idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is profound: very important for history.
But in personal human life, it is also evident that there is much truth here. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The distinction between the ideal and the material is also not unconditional, not uberschwenglich 75.
189 [177] - Note. Leibniz's monads. The principle of the One and its incompleteness in Leibniz 76.
Apparently, Hegel takes his self-development of concepts, categories in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives yet another new aspect to the whole Logic.
193 [181] ... "There is an ancient saying that the One is many and, in particular: that
the many is one"...
195 [183] ... "The difference between the One and the many is determined in the difference of their relation to each other, which is divided into two relations, repulsion and
attraction"...

* - atom (indivisible). Ed.
** - the source of movement. Ed.
*** - contains. Ed.
**** - self-movement. Ed.

OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF BEING
Generally, all this being-for-itself, must have been partly needed by Hegel to derive how "quality turns into quantity" (199) [187] - quality is
determinacy, determinacy-for-itself, Gesetzte*, is the unit - this produces
an impression of great artificiality and emptiness.
Note, p. 203 [190], a remark not without irony against the "reflective empirical mode of action of cognition, which first perceives in the phenomenon these or those determinations, then lays them as a foundation and accepts for so-called explanation the corresponding basic matters or forces, which are supposed to produce these determinations of the phenomenon"...
||

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* - posited. Ed.

SECOND SECTION
:
QUANTITY (MAGNITUDE)
Kant has 4 "antinomies" 77. In fact, every concept, every category is just as antinomic (217) [205].
The role of skepticism in the history of philosophy
|||

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|||
"Ancient skepticism did not shirk the labor of pointing out this contradiction or antinomy in all the concepts it found in the sciences."
Examining Kant very critically (and wittily), Hegel concludes that Kant
simply repeats in the conclusions what was said in the premises, namely, he repeats what is the category of Continuity* and the category of Discreteness**.
True Dialectic***
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|||
From this, it only follows "that none of these determinations,
taken separately, is true, but only their unity is true. Such
is the truly dialectical consideration of them, as well as their true result"
(226) [214]. 229 [217]: "Die Diskretion |¯translation?
separateness****, discreteness*****|, like die Kontinuitat,
|¯closeness (?), continuity (?)*****, continuity¯| is
a moment of quantity"...

* - continuity. Ed.
** - discreteness. Ed.
*** - True Dialectic. Ed.
**** The word "separateness" is crossed out in the manuscript. Ed.
***** The words "closeness, continuity" are crossed out in the manuscript. Ed.

OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF BEING
232 [219]: "Quantity, first of all, quantitativeness with some determinacy
or boundary in general - in its perfect determinacy is number"...
234 [221]: "Anzahl
|

|

numerosity.

enumeration?|

|
and the unit constitute the moments of number."
248 [235-236] - On the question of the role and significance of number (much about Pythagoras etc. etc.), incidentally, a pertinent remark:
"As thoughts become richer in determinacy, and thereby in relations, on the one hand, their representation in such forms as numbers becomes more complicated, and on the other, more arbitrary and devoid of meaning" (248-249) [236].
((Evaluation of thoughts: richness in determinacy and, consequently, in relations.))

Regarding Kant's antinomies (the world without beginning, etc.), Hegel again proves at length* that in the premises, what needs to be proved is taken as given (267-278)
[255-267].
|

|——
——|

|
Furthermore, the transition of quantity into quality in the abstract-theoretical exposition
is so obscure that nothing can be understood. Return!!
——
——
283 [271]: The infinite in mathematics. So far, the justification consists only
in the correctness of the results ("proven from other grounds"), ... and not
in the clarity of the subject |¯confer Engels¯|78.
||

||

||NB
285 [273]: In the calculus of infinites, a certain inaccuracy (known and deliberate) is ignored, yet the result obtained is not approximate, but entirely precise!
Still, to seek Rechtfertigung** here - "is not so superfluous" as it might seem to demand proof for the right to use one's own nose 79.

* - verbose. Ed.
** - justification. Ed.

Hegel's answer is complex, abstrus* etc. etc. This concerns higher mathematics; cf.
Engels on differential and integral calculus 80.
|

|——
——|

|
Incidentally, Hegel makes an interesting remark - "transcendental, i.e., essentially subjective and psychological"... "in a transcendental manner, namely in the subject" (288) [276].
———— Pages 282-327 [270-314] u. ff. - 379 [363]

A detailed examination of differential and integral calculus, with quotations from Newton, Lagrange, Carnot, Euler, Leibniz, etc. - showing how interested Hegel was in this "vanishing" of the infinitesimals, this "mean between being and non-being." Without studying higher mathematics, all this is incomprehensible. Characteristic is the title of Carnot: "Reflexions sur la Metaphysique du calcul infinitesimal"!!!**
The development of the concept of Verhaltnis*** (379-394) [363-379] is extremely obscure. Note only, on page 394 [378-379], the remarks about symbols, that there is nothing generally to be said against them.
But "against all symbolism," it must be said that it sometimes serves as a "convenient means to do without comprehending, indicating, or justifying conceptual definitions" (Begriffsbestimmungen). And this is precisely the task of philosophy.
NB?||

||

||
"The usual definitions of force, or substantiality, cause and effect, etc., are also merely symbols for expressing, for example, vital or spiritual relations, i.e., untruthful definitions for the latter" (394) [379].

* - obscure. Ed.
** - Carnot: "Reflections on the Metaphysics of Infinitesimal Calculus"!!! Ed.
*** - relation. Ed.

OUTLINE OF THE "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF BEING
THIRD SECTION:
MEASURE
"In measure, quality and quantity are abstractly united. Being as such is the immediate equality of determinacy with itself. This immediacy of determinacy has sublated itself. Quantity is being that has returned into itself in such a way that it is a simple equality with itself, as indifference to determinacy" (395) [380]. The third member is measure.
Kant introduced the category of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity), and Hegel notes that for Kant:
"This category has the significance that it is the relation of the object to thinking. From the standpoint of this idealism, thinking in general is something essentially external to the thing-in-itself... the objectivity inherent in the other categories is not inherent in the categories of modality" (396) [380].
En passant (397) [381-382]:
Indian philosophy, in which Brahma transitions into Shiva (change = disappearance, emergence)...
Peoples deify measure (399) [383].
? Measure transitions into essence (Wesen).
(On the question of measure, it is worth noting in passing Hegel's remark that "in developed civil society, the quantities of individuals engaged in various occupations stand in a certain relation to one another") (402) [386].
On the category of gradualness (Allmahligkeit), Hegel notes:
"This category is often resorted to in order to present or explain the disappearance of some quality or something, for thus the disappearance seems to take place almost before one's eyes, since a definite quantity is taken as an external, inherently variable boundary, and at the same time, the change as a change in quantity alone is self-evident. But in reality, this explains nothing; change is at the same time essentially a transition from one quality to another, or, more abstractly, from existing being to non-being; this involves a different determination than gradualness, which is merely diminution or increase and a one-sided focus on magnitude.
NB

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But that change, appearing as purely quantitative, also transitions into qualitative - this connection was already noted by the ancients and presented in popular examples of the collisions that arise from ignorance of this" (405-406) [389-390] ("the bald man": pulling out one hair; "the heap" - taking away one grain...) "what" (in this context) "is contradicted is das einseitige Festhalten an der abstrakten Quantumsbestimmtheit" ("one-sided adherence to abstract quantitative determinations," i.e., without considering comprehensive changes and specific qualities, etc.).
... "These turns are therefore not empty or pedantic jokes, but they are correct in themselves and are products of a consciousness that shows interest in phenomena arising in thought.
Quantity, insofar as it is taken as an indifferent boundary, is the side from which something existing is subjected to unexpected attack and destruction.
The cunning of the concept lies in its

OUTLINE OF THE "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF BEING
grasping something existing from the side where, it seems, its quality is not touched, and moreover, to such an extent that the increase of the state, property, etc., which leads to the misfortune of the state, the owner, initially even appears as their happiness" (407) [391].
"Great merit lies in recognizing empirical numbers of nature, for example, the mutual distances of the planets; but an immeasurably greater merit lies in making empirical definite quantities disappear and elevating them to the universal form of quantitative determinations, so that they become moments of law or measure"; the merit of Galileo and Kepler... "They proved the laws they found by showing that they correspond to the entire range of perceptual particulars" (416) [400-401]. However, a hoheres Beweisen** of these laws is still required, so that their quantitative determinations are recognized from Qualitaten oder bestimmten Begriffen, die bezogen sind (wie Raum und Zeit)***.
|||

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||
Law or Measure*

?

* - Law or Measure. Ed.
** - higher proof. Ed.
*** - qualities or specific concepts related (such as space and time). Ed.

The development of the concept of *Maß* as *spezifische Quantität* and as *reales Maß* (including *Wahlverwandtschaften* - for example, chemical elements, musical tones) is very obscure.
A long note on chemistry, with a polemic against Berzelius and his theory of electrochemistry (433-445) [417-429].
"The nodal line of relations of measure" (*Knotenlinie von Maßverhältnissen*) - transitions from quantity to quality... Gradualness and leaps.

* - law or measure. Ed.
** - of the highest proof. Ed.
*** - of qualities or certain related concepts (such as space and time). Ed.
**** - of measure as specific quantity and as real measure. Ed.
***** - elective affinities. Ed.

NB|||

|||——|||

|||NB
And again, p. 448 [432], that gradualness explains nothing without leaps.
——
In Hegel's notes, as always, the factual, examples, the concrete (Feuerbach
Therefore, he once laughed that Hegel relegated nature to the notes, Feuerbach, Works, II, p. ?) 81.
Leaps!|||

|||
Pp. 448-452 [432-436], a note titled in the table of contents (not in the text!! pedantry!!): "Examples of such nodal lines; on the claim that there are no leaps in nature."
Examples: chemistry; musical tones; water (steam, ice) - p. 449 [433-434] - birth and death.
Interruptions of gradualness
*Abbrechen der Allmählichkeit*, p. (450) [434].

Leaps!

Leaps!
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"They say that there are no leaps in nature; and the ordinary conception, if it wishes to understand origin or destruction, assumes, as was mentioned, that it understands them by representing them as gradual emergence or disappearance. But it has already been shown that changes in being are not only transitions from one quantity to another, but also transitions from the qualitative to the quantitative and vice versa, becoming something else, which represents an interruption of gradualness and is qualitatively different from the preceding existence. Water does not become gradually solid through cooling, so that it first becomes gelatinous and then gradually hardens to the consistency of ice, but it becomes solid at once; having reached the freezing point, it, if left undisturbed, can still remain in a liquid state, but the slightest disturbance brings it into a solid state.

SUMMARY OF THE 'SCIENCE OF LOGIC'. DOCTRINE OF BEING
The assumption of gradual emergence is based on the idea that what is emerging already exists sensibly or generally in reality and cannot yet be perceived merely because of its small magnitude; similarly, the assumption of gradual disappearance is based on the idea that non-being or the other that takes the place of the disappearing also exists but is still unnoticed; and both exist not in the sense that this other is contained within the given other, but in the sense that it exists, but only imperceptibly. Thus, emergence and destruction are generally negated, or otherwise, the in-itself, the internal, in which something is before its existence, is transformed into a small magnitude of external existence, and the essential difference or conceptual difference into an external difference, a simple difference in magnitude. To make emergence or destruction understandable by assuming gradual change is to fall into the tedium of tautology; here it is assumed that what is emerging or disappearing is already present in a ready-made form, and change is reduced to a mere alteration of external difference, thus resulting in tautology. The difficulty for such a reason striving for understanding lies in the qualitative transition of something into its other in general and into its opposite; to avoid this difficulty, reason conceives of identity and change as indifferent external changes in quantity. In the moral sphere, insofar as the moral is considered in the realm of being, the same transition from quantity to quality occurs; different qualities are based on differences in magnitude. A certain 'more' and 'less' is enough, and the measure of frivolity is exceeded, and something entirely different, a crime, results, where right turns into injustice, virtue into vice. - Similarly, states, under otherwise equal conditions, acquire a different qualitative character due to the difference in their magnitude" ... (450-452) [434-436].
Further.
The transition from being to essence (*Wesen*) is presented extremely obscurely.
End of Volume I.

SUMMARY OF THE 'SCIENCE OF LOGIC'. DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
VOLUME IV. (BERLIN, 1834)

PART I. OBJECTIVE LOGIC.

SECTION II. DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
FIRST DIVISION:
ESSENCE AS REFLECTION INTO ITSELF
"The truth of being is essence" (3)* [455]**. This is the first sentence, sounding thoroughly idealistic, mystical. But immediately after this, so to speak, a fresh breeze begins: "Being is immediate. Since knowledge wants to know the truth*** of what being is in itself and for itself, it does not stop" (does not stop NB) "at the immediate and its determinations, but penetrates (NB) through (NB) it, assuming (italicized by Hegel) that behind this being there is something other than the being itself, that this background constitutes the truth of being. This knowledge is mediated, since it is not immediately in and with the essence, but starts with something else, with being, and must go through a preliminary path, a path of going beyond being or, more correctly, into it"...

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theory

of knowledge

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||"path"

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
** Hegel. Works, Vol. V, M., 1937. Ed.
*** Incidentally. Hegel often mocked |see the above-cited passages on gradualness| the word (and concept) *erklären*, explanation, presumably opposing the metaphysical solution once and for all ("explained"!!) to the eternal process of deeper and deeper knowledge. Cf. Vol. III, p. 463 [447]: "can be known or, as they say, explained."

This *Bewegung*, the path of knowledge, seems to be the "activity of knowing" (*Tätigkeit des Erkennens*)
"external to being."
Objective significance
|||

|||

|||"But this movement is the movement of being itself."
"Essence... is what it is... through its own infinite movement of being" (4) [456].
"The absolute essence... does not have actual existence. But it must pass into actual existence" (5) [457].
Essence stands between being and concept, as a transition to the concept (= the absolute).
Subdivisions of essence: appearance (Schein), phenomenon (Erscheinung), reality (Wirklichkeit).
The Essential and the Inessential** (8) [460]. Appearance (Schein) (9) [461].
In the inessential, in appearance, there is a moment of non-being (10) [462].
That is, the inessential, the apparent, the superficial more often disappears, does not hold as "tightly," does not "sit as firmly" as "essence." For example***: the movement of a river - foam on top and deep currents below. But the foam is also an expression of essence!
Appearance and skepticism, respectively****, Kantianism:
"Thus, appearance is a phenomenon of skepticism or also of idealism, such immediacy which is not something or some thing, generally not an indifferent being that would exist outside of its determinacy or relation to the subject. Skepticism

* - movement. Ed.
** - The Essential and the Inessential. Ed.
*** - Approximately. Ed.
**** - respectively. Ed.

CONCEPTS FROM THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
did not allow itself to say - this is; the newest idealism did not allow itself
to view knowledge as knowledge of the thing-in-itself; this appearance, in general, should not have any basis of any being, the thing-in-itself should not enter into these knowledges. But at the same time, skepticism allowed for various determinations of its appearance, or rather, its appearance had as content all
the diverse richness of the world. Similarly, the phenomenon of idealism encompasses
all the volume of these diverse determinacies."
||

||

NB

You include in appearance* all the richness of the world and you deny the objectivity of appearance!!
"This appearance and this phenomenon are immediately determined so diversely. Let, therefore, no being, no thing or thing-in-itself, underlie this
content; it remains as it is by itself; it is merely moved from being into appearance, so that appearance has within itself these diverse determinacies, which are immediate, existing, mutually different. Therefore, appearance itself is something immediately determined. It can have one or another content, but what the latter is, is not posited by it itself, but is inherent in it immediately. Leibnizian or Kantian or Fichtean idealism, as well as other forms of it, just as little as skepticism, go beyond being as determinacy, as this immediacy. For skepticism, the content
|¯"immediately given"!!¯| of its appearance

|||

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|||immediacy

of appearance
|||

|||

|||does not go deeper!

* - appearance, semblance. Ed.

is given to it; whatever it may be, it is immediate for it.
Leibniz's monad develops its representations from itself; but
it is not their generating and connecting force, they bubble up in
it like bubbles; they are indifferent, immediate to one another, and thus also to the monad itself.
Similarly, Kant's phenomenon is a given content of perception, presupposing influences, determinations of the subject, which are immediate to one another and to the latter.
Fichte's infinite impulse, indeed, has no thing-in-itself as its basis, so that it becomes exclusively a certain determinacy in the I. But this
determinacy in relation to the I, which makes it its own and removes its external character, is at the same time an immediate determinacy, is its limit, beyond which it, indeed, can go,
but which contains within itself a side of indifference, according to which, although it belongs to the I, it contains in itself the immediate non-being of the latter" (10-11) [462-463].
cf. Machism!!|||

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|||

... "The determinations that distinguish it" (appearance) "from essence, are determinations of essence itself"...
appearance = negative nature of essence|||

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... "The immediacy of non-being is what constitutes appearance... Being is non-being in essence. Its nothingness in itself is the negative nature of essence itself"...
... "These two moments, nothingness, but as stability, and being, but as a moment,
otherwise, the self-existing negativity and reflected immediacy, constituting the moments of appearance, are thereby the moments of essence itself"...

CONCEPTS FROM THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
"Appearance is essence in the determinacy of being"... (12-13) [464].
Appearance is (1) nothing, non-existent (Nichtigkeit), which exists

- (2) being as a moment
"Thus, appearance is essence itself, but essence in a certain determinacy, and in such a way that the latter is only a moment of essence, and essence is
the manifestation of itself within itself" (14) [466].
||

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||
[Appearance]* What appears is essence in one of its determinations, in one of its
sides, in one of its moments. Essence appears as such. Appearance is the manifestation
(Scheinen) of essence in itself.
... "Essence... contains appearance within itself as an infinite movement within itself"...
... "Essence in this self-movement is reflection. Appearance is the same as reflection" (14) [466].
Appearance (what appears) is the reflection of essence in itself.
... "Becoming in essence, its reflecting movement, is therefore a movement from nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself"... (15) [467].
¯¯¯¯
This is clever and profound. There are movements in nature and life "to nothing."
But "from nothing," perhaps, never happens. Always from something.
____ "Reflection is usually understood in a subjective sense, as the movement of the power of judgment, going out

* In the manuscript, the word "appearance" is crossed out. Ed.

For the given immediate representation and seeking for it or comparing with it universal definitions» (21) [473]. (Citing Kant - "Critique of Judgment" 82)... "But here we are not speaking of the reflection of consciousness, nor of a more definite reflection of the understanding, which has as its determinations the particular and the universal, but of reflection in general"...
Thus, Hegel again accuses Kant of subjectivism. This is noteworthy. Hegel advocates for the "objective significance" (sit venia verbo*) of appearance, "the immediately given" |¯the term "given" is common in Hegel's work, and see p. 21 i. f. [473]; p. 22 [474]. Lesser philosophers debate whether to take essence or the immediately given as the basis (Kant, Hume, all Machists). Hegel replaces or with and, explaining the concrete content of this "and."
"Die Reflexion is the appearance of essence within itself" (27) [478] ⊂translation? reflectivity? reflective determination? reflection does not fit.⊃
... "It" (das Wesen) "is movement through differentiated moments, absolute mediation by itself" ... (27) [479].
Identity (- difference -

+ [Gegensatz]**

in particular opposition
) contradiction (ground)...
Therefore, Hegel clarifies the one-sidedness and incorrectness of the "law of identity" (A = A), categories (all determinations of being are categories - p. 27-28 [479-480]).
"If everything is identical with itself, then it is not different, not opposed, and has no ground" (29) [481].

* - let this be said. Ed.
** The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the manuscript. Ed.

CONCEPTS FROM "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
"Essence is... simple identity with itself" (30) [482].
Ordinary thinking places similarity and difference side by side ("daneben"), without understanding "this movement of transition from one of these determinations to the other": (31) [483].
And once again against the law of identity (A = A): its adherents
"since they cling to this static identity, which has its opposite in difference, they do not see
that thereby they turn identity into a one-sided determination, which as such lacks truth" (33) [485].
|||

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|||NB

terms underlined by me ("Empty tautology": 32 [484])
("Contains only formal, abstract, incomplete truth" (33) [485]).
|¯Types of reflectiveness: external etc. are developed very obscurely.¯|
Principles of difference: "All things are different"... "A is also not A" ... (44) [496].
"There are no two things that are the same"...
Difference can occur in one or another aspect (Seite), Rucksicht etc. "insofern" etc.*
"The usual coddling of things (bien dit!!**), concerned only with their not contradicting themselves, forgets here, as in other cases, that in this way the contradiction is not resolved, but merely transferred to another place, to subjective or external reflection in general, and that the latter indeed contains both moments, sublated and related to each other, in one unity, which, due to such removal and displacement, are simply proclaimed as posited" (47) [498].

* - relation etc. "insofar as" etc. Ed.
** - well said!! Ed.

(This irony is charming! "Coddling" nature and history (among philistines) - the desire to cleanse them of contradictions and struggles)...
The result of adding + and − will be zero. "The result of contradiction is not just zero" (59) [511].
Resolving the contradiction, reducing the positive and negative to "only determinations" (61) [513], transforms essence (das Wesen) into ground (Grund) (ibidem*).
NB||

||
... "Resolved contradiction is, therefore, ground, essence,
as the unity of the positive and the negative" ... (62) [514].
||

||

||
"A little experience in reflective thinking is enough to confirm that if something is defined as positive, then, when proceeding from this basis, it immediately turns into the negative, and vice versa, something defined as negative turns into the positive, to confirm that
reflective thinking gets entangled and contradicts itself in these determinations. Unfamiliarity with the nature of the latter leads to the opinion
that this confusion is something false, which should not be, and that it should
be attributed to some subjective error. Indeed, this transition from one to the other remains mere confusion, as long as there is no consciousness of the necessity of this transformation" (63) [515].
|||

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|||
... "The opposition of the positive and the negative is primarily understood in the sense that the former (although by its name it expresses positedness, positiveness) should be something objective, while the latter is subjective, belonging only to external reflection, not touching the objective, self-subsistent, and completely non-existent for it" (64) [516]. "Indeed, if the negative expresses only an abstraction

* - ibid. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
"subjective arbitrariness"... (then this negative does not exist "for the objective positive")...
"Truth, as knowledge that accords with the object, is also a positive, but it is this self-equality only insofar as knowledge has related negatively to the other, penetrated the object, and sublated the negation of which it consists. Error
is something positive, as an opinion that knows itself and persists in what is not inherently existent. Ignorance, on the other hand, is
either indifferent to truth and error and thus undetermined as either positive or negative, so that its definition as a certain absence belongs to external reflection; or, as objective, as the proper determination of
a certain property, it is a drive directed against itself, a negative containing within itself a positive direction.
- One of the most important insights is recognizing and maintaining the view of the nature of the definitions of reflection considered, that their truth consists only in their relation to one another, and thus in the fact that each in its very concept contains the other; without this insight, no real step can be made in philosophy" (65-66) [517-518]. This is from Note 1. — — — —
|

|

|

|truth

and

object
||

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||self

in

itself

Note 2. "The Law of Excluded Middle."
Hegel presents the law of excluded middle: "Something is either A or not-A; there is no third" (66) [518] and "analyzes." If this indicates that
"everything is opposite," everything has its positive and its negative
determination, then it is good. But if it is understood, as it is usually understood, that
of all predicates either the given one or its non-being, then it is "trivial!!" Spirit... sweet,
not sweet? green, not green? The determination should lead to definiteness, but in this
triviality it leads to nothing.
And then, - Hegel jests, - they say: there is no third. There is a third in this very thesis,
A itself is the third, for A can be both +A and -A. "Thus, the very something is that third
which was supposed to be excluded" (67) [519].
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|————|

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This is witty and correct. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in various and often contradictory relations to everything else, ergo*, it is itself and other.
———— Note 3. "The Law of Contradiction" (at the end of Chapter 2, Section 1, Book II of Logic).
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"Thus, if the first determinations of reflection, identity, difference, and opposition, found their expression in one proposition, then the determination into which they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, must be comprehended and expressed in one proposition: all things are inherently contradictory; and the meaning of this proposition is such that, compared to others, it more truly expresses the truth and essence of things. The contradiction that appears in opposition is merely the developed nothing contained in identity and encountered by us in the expression that the beginning of identity says nothing. This negation further determines itself as difference and opposition, which is the posited contradiction.
But one of the fundamental prejudices of existing logic and ordinary conception is that contradiction is not as essential and immanent a determination as identity; however, if we are already speaking of

* - therefore. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
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hierarchy and both determinations must be preserved as separate, then contradiction should be regarded as something deeper and more essential. For in contrast to it, identity is a determination of merely simple, immediate, dead being; whereas contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; only insofar as something has contradiction within itself does it
move, have impulse and activity.
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Contradiction is usually eliminated, first, from things, from being and truth in general; it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Second, on the contrary, it is displaced into subjective reflection, which supposedly creates it through its own relation and comparison. But even in this reflection, it is not actually present, for the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought. Generally, it is considered, both in reality and in thinking reflection, as something accidental, like an anomaly and a transient, pathological paroxysm.
As for the assertion that there is no contradiction, that it is not something existing, we need not worry about such assurances; the absolute determination of essence must be inherent in every experience, in all reality, as well as in every concept. Above, in connection with the infinite, which is a contradiction, as it ultimately appears in the sphere of being, something similar was already indicated. Ordinary experience itself testifies that there are at least many contradictory things, contradictory institutions, etc., whose contradiction lies not only in external reflection but in themselves. But, further, contradiction should not be considered simply as some anomaly occurring here and there: it is the negative in its essential determination, the principle of all self-movement, consisting in nothing other than a certain representation of contradiction. External sensory movement is its immediate actual existence. Something moves not simply in the sense that it is
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here now, and there at another now, but insofar as it is here and not here in the same now, since it is simultaneously here and not here in this "here." We should, along with the ancient dialecticians, recognize the contradictions they pointed out in movement, but from this, it does not follow that there is no movement; rather, it follows that movement is the very existing contradiction.
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Equally, the internal, inherent self-movement, the impulse in general (the appetite or *nisus* of the monad, the entelechy of an absolutely simple entity) consists in nothing other than that in the same relation there exist something in itself and its absence, the negation of itself. Abstract identity with itself is not yet vitality, but since the positive in itself is negativity, it thereby goes beyond itself and brings about its own change. Thus, something is vital only insofar as it contains a contradiction within itself and is precisely the power capable of containing and enduring this contradiction. If an existing thing is unable, in its positive determination, to also pass into its negative and to hold one in the other, if it is incapable of having a contradiction within itself, then this thing is not a living unity, not a foundation, but perishes in the contradiction. Speculative thinking consists solely in holding onto the contradiction and in it, holding onto itself, and not, as is characteristic of representation, being at the mercy of the contradiction and allowing it to dissolve its determinations into others or into nothing (67-70) [519-521].

Movement and "self-movement" (this is NB! spontaneous, autonomous, spontaneous, internally necessary movement), "change," "movement and vitality," "the principle of all self-movement," "impulse" (Trieb) to "movement" and to "activity" -

* - effort. Ed.

CONCEPTS FROM THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
The opposition to "dead being" - who would believe that this is the essence of "Hegelianism," abstract and abstruse (heavy, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This essence had to be discovered, understood, rescued, extracted, and purified, which Marx and Engels did.
The idea of universal movement and change (1813, Logic) was intuited before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed for society earlier (1847) than it was demonstrated in its application to humans (1859) 84.
"If in movement, impulse, etc., the contradiction is hidden from representation by the simplicity of these determinations, then, conversely, in the determinations of relations, the contradiction appears immediately.
The most trivial examples: top and bottom, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, all contain the opposition in one determination. The top is what is not the bottom; the determination of the top consists only in not being the bottom, and the first is only insofar as the second is, and vice versa; in each determination, its opposite is contained. The father is the other of the son, and the son is the other of the father, and each is only this other of the other; and at the same time, each determination exists only in relation to the others; their being is a single existence".........(70) [521-522].

Therefore, representation indeed has contradiction as its content everywhere, but does not reach the consciousness of it; it remains external reflection, passing from sameness to difference or from negative relation to reflected differentiation within itself. This reflection externally opposes both these determinations to each other and has in mind only them, not their transition, which is the essential and contains the contradiction. - Clever reflection, let us mention it here, consists, on the contrary, in grasping and expressing the contradiction. Although it, indeed, does not express the concept of things and their relations, and has as its material and content only the determinations of representation, it nevertheless brings them into such a relation that their contradiction is contained, and thereby makes their concept shine through the contradiction. - Thinking reason, so to speak, sharpens the blunted difference of the different, the simple diversity of representations, to essential difference, to opposition. Only in this way do the various, sharpened contradictions become mobile and alive in relation to one another and acquire in it that negativity which is the inner pulsation of self-movement and vitality"..... (70-71) [522-523].
NB
(1) Ordinary representation grasps difference and contradiction but not the transition from one to the other, which is the most important.
(2) Wit and reason.
Wit grasps the contradiction, expresses it, brings things into relation to one another, and makes "the concept shine through the contradiction," but does not express the concept of things and their relations.
(3) Thinking reason (reason) sharpens the blunted difference of the different, the simple diversity of representations, to essential difference, to opposition. Only when raised to the peak of contradiction, do diversities become mobile (active) and alive in relation to one another, acquiring that negativity which is the inner pulsation of self-movement and vitality.

Subdivisions:
The Ground - (foundation)

(1) absolute ground - the basis. "Form and matter." "Content."

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE** (2) definite ground (as the ground |¯for¯| a definite content).
Its transition into the conditioning mediation *die bedingende Vermittelung*
(3) thing-in-itself (transition into existence). Note. "The Law of Ground."
Common: "Everything has its sufficient ground."
"The meaning of this proposition is nothing other than that everything that exists should be considered not as an immediate being, but as posited; it should not rest on immediate actuality or on determinacy in general, but return from them to their ground"... It is superfluous to add:
sufficient ground. An insufficient one is not a ground.
Leibniz, who made the law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy,
understood this more profoundly. "Leibniz opposed the sufficiency of the ground primarily to causality in the strict sense of the word, as a mechanical mode of action" (76) [528]. He sought the *Beziehung* der Ursachen* (77) [528-529], - - "the whole as essential unity."
He sought ends, but teleology 85 belongs rather to the doctrine of the concept.
... "One cannot ask how form comes to essence, for the former is merely the self-radiance of the latter, its inherent (sic!) self-reflection"... (81) [532-533].
Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another, depending on the essence...
Essence as formless identity (with itself) becomes matter.

* - "relation" of causes. Ed.

"... It" (matter) "is the proper ground or substrate of form"... (82) [533].
"If one abstracts from all determinations, from all form of some thing, what remains is indeterminate matter. Matter is something purely abstract.
(- One cannot see, touch, etc., matter, - what one sees, touches, is already determined matter, i.e., the unity of matter and form)" (82) [534].
Matter is not the ground of form, but the unity of the ground and the grounded. Matter is passive, form is active (*tatiges*) (83). "Matter must be formed, and form must materialize"... (84) [535].
NB|||

|||"What is the activity of form is also, to the same extent, the movement of matter itself"... (85-86) [537].
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... "Both, the activity of form and the movement of matter, are one and the same... Matter as such is determined or necessarily has some form, and form is simply a stable, material form" (86) [538].
Note: "The formal method of explanation from tautological grounds."
Very often, especially in the physical sciences, "grounds" are explained tautologically: the movement of the earth is explained by the "attractive force" of the sun. But what is attractive force? Movement!! (92) [544]. Empty tautology: why is this person going to the city? Due to the attractive force of the city! (93) [544]. Sometimes in science, initially, things like molecules, ether, "electric matter" (95-96) [547] etc., are put forward as "grounds," and then it turns out that "they" (these concepts) "are actually definitions derived from what they are supposed to ground, are hypotheses and fictions derived from uncritical reflection"... Or they say that we "do not know the internal essence of these forces and matters"... (96) [547] then there is nothing to "explain," and one should simply confine oneself to facts...
*Der reale Grund* ... not a tautology, but already "another determination of content" (97) [548-549].

* - real ground. Ed.

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE**
On the question of "ground" (*Grund*), Hegel remarks, among other things:
"If nature is said to be the ground of the world, then what is called nature, on the one hand, is the same as the world, and the world is nothing other than nature itself" (100) [552]. On the other hand, "for nature to become the world, a multiplicity of determinations is added to it from outside"...
Since every thing has *mehrere* * "determinations of content, relations, and aspects," arguments can be brought forth in any number for and against (103) [554-555]. This is what Socrates and Plato called sophistry. Such arguments do not contain "the entire scope of the thing," do not "exhaust" it (in the sense of "embracing the connection of the thing" and "containing all" its sides).
Transition of the ground (*Grund*) into condition (*Bedingung*).
If I'm not mistaken, there is much mysticism and *leeres* ** pedantry in Hegel's conclusions, but the basic idea is genius: the universal, all-sided, living connection of everything with everything
and the reflection of this connection - *materialistisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel* *** - in human concepts, which must also be chiseled, broken, flexible, mobile, relative, interconnected, united in opposites, in order to embrace the world. The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx should consist in the dialectical processing of the history of human thought, science, and technology.

And "purely logical" processing?

*Das fallt zusammen* ****.

This should coincide, as induction and deduction in "Capital."
The river and the drops in this river. The position of each drop, its relation

* - "numerous." Ed.
** - If I am not mistaken, there is much mysticism and empty. Ed.
*** - materialistically inverted Hegel. Ed.
**** - This coincides. Ed.

Often in Hegel, the word "moment" in the sense of a moment of connection, a moment in the chain
to others; its connection with others; the direction of its movement; speed; line of movement - straight, curved, circular, etc. -
up, down. Sum of movement. Concepts as accounts of individual
aspects of movement, individual drops (= "things"), individual
"streams," etc. Here is *a peu pres* * the picture of the world according to Hegel's Logic,
- of course, minus God and the absolute.
"If all the conditions of a certain thing are present, it comes into existence"... (116) [568].
Very good! What does the absolute idea and idealism have to do with it?
It is amusing this "derivation" ... of existence...

* - approximately. Ed.

**CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE**
**SECOND SECTION:**
**PHENOMENON**
The first sentence: "Essence must appear,"... (119) [571] The appearance of essence is
(1) Existenz (thing); (2) phenomenon (Erscheinung). ("Phenomenon is that which is a thing-in-itself
or the truth of the latter," p. 120.) "The world of phenomena stands in opposition to the
reflected-into-itself, self-existing world"... (120) [572]. (3) Verhaltnis (relation) and actuality.
Incidentally: "Proof is generally mediated knowledge"...
... "Different kinds of being require their own specific kinds of mediation or contain them within themselves; therefore, the nature of proof varies with respect to each
of them"... (121) [573].
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And again... about the existence of God!! Poor God, as soon as the word 'existence' is mentioned, he gets offended.
———— Existence differs from being by its mediation (Vermittelung: 124 [576]).
|¯Concreteness and connection¯|
... "The thing-in-itself and its mediated being are both contained in existence and
both are themselves existences; the thing-in-itself exists as the essential existence of the
thing, while mediated being is its inessential existence"... (125) [577-578].

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|————|

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? Does the thing-in-itself relate to being as the essential to the inessential?
———— ... "The latter" (Ding-an-sich) "should not in itself have any definite multiplicity and thus acquires this multiplicity only when it is transferred into
external reflection, but remains indifferent to it. (- The thing-in-itself has color only when brought to the eye, smell - to the nose, etc.)"... (126) [578].
... "The thing has the property of producing something in another and revealing itself in a specific way in its relation to this other"... (129) [581]. "The thing-in-itself, therefore, exists essentially"...
In the note, there is a discussion of the "thing-in-itself of transcendental idealism"...
... "The thing-in-itself as such is nothing but an empty abstraction from all determinacy, about which, of course, nothing can be known, precisely because it must
be an abstraction from all determination"...
"Transcendental idealism... transfers every determinacy of things, both in form and content, into consciousness"... "From this point of view, what happens in me, in the subject, is that I see the leaves of the tree not black but green, the sun round, not square, that sugar is sweet, not bitter, for my taste, that the first and second strokes of the clock I determine as successive, not simultaneous, and also, the first not as cause and not as effect of the second, etc." (131) [583]... Hegel adds further that here he was considering only the question of the thing-in-itself and "äußere Reflexion"*.
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* - "external reflection." Ed.

**CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE**
The essential deficiency of the standpoint at which the indicated philosophy stops
consists in that it stubbornly clings to the abstract thing-in-itself as some ultimate determination and opposes the thing-in-itself to reflection or determinacy and multiplicity of properties; whereas in reality, the thing-in-itself essentially contains this external reflection within itself and
defines itself as something endowed with its own determinations, properties, so that the abstraction of the thing, by virtue of which it is a pure thing-in-itself, turns out to be an untrue determination (132) [584].
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= against subjectivism and the separation of the thing-in-itself and phenomenon
... "Many different things are in essential interaction through their
properties; the property is this very relationship, and the thing outside of it is nothing"... (133) [585].
Die Dingheit transitions into Eigenschaft* (134) [585]. Eigenschaft transitions into "matter"
or "Stoff"** ("things consist of substances") etc.
"Phenomenon is... immediately, essence in its existence"... (144) [596].
"Phenomenon is... the unity of visibility and existence"... (145) [597].
Unity in phenomena: "This unity is the law of phenomenon. Law
is, thus, the positive in the mediation of the appearing" (148) [600].
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|||law (of phenomena)
|¯Here, generally, there is a great deal of obscurity. But there seems to be a living thought: the concept of law is one of the stages in the human understanding of the unity and interconnection, interdependence, and wholeness of the world process. The "breaking off" and "twisting" of words and concepts, to which Hegel gives himself here, is a struggle against the absolutization of the concept of law, against its simplification, against its fetishization. NB for modern physics!!!¯|

* - Thingness transitions into property. Ed.
** - "substance." Ed.

NB

Law is the enduring (remaining) in the phenomenon
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"This enduring stability, which the phenomenon possesses in the law"... (149) [600].
"Law is the reflection of the phenomenon in identity with itself" (149)
(Law - the identical in the phenomenon)
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[601]. (Law is the identical in phenomena: "the reflection of the phenomenon in
its identity with itself").
NB

Law = calm reflection of phenomena
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... "This identity, the basis of the phenomenon, forming the law, is
the proper moment of the phenomenon... Therefore, the law is not beyond the phenomenon but is immediately inherent in it; the realm
of laws is the calm (Hegel's italics) reflection of the existing or appearing world"...
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This is a remarkably materialistic and remarkably apt (with the word
"ruhige"*) definition. Law takes the calm - and therefore, any law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.
NB

Law is the essential phenomenon
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\\

//

//

//
"Existence returns to the law as its foundation; the phenomenon contains both, the simple foundation and
the decomposing movement of the appearing universe, the essence of which constitutes the foundation." "Therefore, the law is the essential phenomenon" (150) [602].
Ergo, law and the essence of the concept are homogeneous (of the same order) or rather, of the same degree, expressing the deepening of human understanding of phenomena, the world, etc.

* - "calm." Ed.

**CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE** (
Movement of the universe in phenomena (Bewegung des erscheinenden Universums), in the essence of this movement, is law.
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NB

(The law is a reflection of the essential in the movement of the universe.)
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"The realm of laws is the calm content of the phenomenon; the phenomenon, however, is the same content, but appearing in restless change and as a reflection into another... therefore, the phenomenon is, relative to the law, a totality, for it contains the law and even more—namely, the moment of self-moving form" (151) [602-603].
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(Phenomenon is totality, totality) ((law = part))
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(The phenomenon is richer than the law)
But further, although unclear, it seems to be acknowledged, on p. 154 [605], that the law can compensate for this *Mangel*, encompassing both the negative side and the **Totalität der Erscheinung** (especially 154 i. f. [606]). Return!
The world-in-itself is identical with the world of phenomena, but at the same time is opposed to it (158) [610-611]. What is positive in one is negative in the other. What is evil in the world of phenomena is good in the world-in-itself. Cf. - Hegel says here - "Phenomenology of Spirit," p. 121 ff 86.
"The appearing and the essential worlds... both are independent total existences, one should be merely reflected existence, and the other immediate existence, but each continuously continues in its other and is therefore in itself the identity of both these moments... Both worlds are, first of all, independent, but they are such only as totalities, and such insofar as each essentially contains the moment of the other" (159-160) [611].
The point here is that both the world of phenomena and the world-in-itself are moments of human cognition of nature, stages, changes, or deepening (of cognition). The shifting of the world-in-itself further and further away from the world of phenomena—this is what Hegel does not yet see. NB. In Hegel, "moments" of the concept do not have the meaning of "moments" of transition?
... "Thus, the law is an essential relation" (Hegel's emphasis).
(
The law is a relation. This is NB for Machists and other agnostics, and for Kantians, etc. Relation of essences or between essences.
)
"The word 'world' designates generally the formless totality of the manifold" (160) [612].
And the third chapter ("Essential Relation") begins with the proposition: "The truth of the phenomenon is the essential relation" (161) [612].
Subdivisions:
Relation of whole to part; this relation transitions into the next (sic!! (p. 168) [619-620]): - force to its manifestation; - internal and external. - Transition to substance, actuality.
... "The truth of the relation thus lies in mediation" (167) [619].
"Transition" to force: "Force is the negative unity in which the contradiction of whole and parts, the truth of this first relation, is resolved" (170) [621].
((This is one of 1000 similar places in Hegel that drive naive philosophers like Pearson, the author of "The Grammar of Science" 87, mad. - He cites a similar passage and rages: what kind of nonsense do they teach in our schools!! And he is right in a certain, partial sense. It is absurd to teach this. First, one must extract the materialist dialectic from it. But this is 9/10 chaff, trash.))

**CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE**
Force appears as a "property" (als angehörig) of "existing things or matter" ... "If, therefore, one asks how a thing or matter comes to possess some force, the latter appears externally connected to them and implanted in the thing through some foreign violence" (171) [623].
... "In all natural, scientific, and spiritual development, it turns out, and it is very important to realize this, that while something is still only internal or also within its concept, it is precisely because it is only immediate, passive, existing being" (181) [633].
#
The beginning of everything can be considered as internal - passive - and at the same time external.
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But what is interesting here is not this, but something else: the accidentally slipped criterion of dialectics in Hegel: "in all natural, scientific, and spiritual development"—here is the kernel of deep truth in the mystical shell of Hegelianism!
# Example: the human embryo is only an internal human, *dem Anderssein Preisgegebenes*, passive. *Gott* is not yet spirit. "Immediately, God is therefore only nature" (182) [633-634].
(This is also characteristic!!)
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Feuerbach *daran "knüpft an"* 88.
Away with *Gott*, only *Natur* remains.

* - given up to other-being. Ed.
** - God. Ed.
*** - "takes up" this. Ed.
**** - nature. Ed.

**THIRD SECTION: ACTUALITY**
... "Actuality is the unity of essence and existence" (184) [636].
Subdivisions: 1) "absolute" - 2) actuality proper. "Actuality, possibility, and necessity are the formal moments of the absolute." 3) "Absolute relation": substance.
"In it itself" (*dem Absoluten*) "there is no becoming" (187) [639] - and other nonsense about the absolute...
the absolute is the absolute absolute ...
(!!) the attribute is the relative ...
In the "note," Hegel speaks (too generally and vaguely) about the shortcomings of Spinoza's and Leibniz's philosophy.
usually: from one extreme to another
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Incidentally, note:
"The one-sidedness of any philosophical principle ordinarily opposes itself to the opposite one-sidedness, and, as always happens, their totality arises, at least as a scattered fullness" (197) [649].
totality = (in the form of) scattered fullness
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Actuality is higher than being and existence.
(1) Being is immediate.
"Being is not yet actual."
It transitions into the other.

**CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE** (2) Existence (it transitions into phenomenon)
- emerges from the foundation, from conditions,
but it does not yet have the unity of "reflection and immediacy."
(3) Actuality is the unity of existence and being-in-itself (Ansichsein)
... "Actuality stands higher than mere existence"... (200) [652].
... "Real necessity is a substantive relation"... "But this necessity is also relative"... (211) [663].
"Absolute necessity, therefore, is the truth to which actuality and possibility in general, as well as formal and real necessity, return" (215) [667].
(Continuation)*...
(End of Volume II of Logic, Doctrine of Essence)...
Note that in the smaller Logic (Encyclopedia), the same points are often more clearly and concretely explained. Cf. idem Engels and Kuno Fischer 89.
On the question of "possibility," Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and in the Encyclopedia states:
"Whether something is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the totality of moments of actuality, which in its development turns out
to be necessity." (Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 287** [242]***, § 143, Addition.)
"The totality*, the totality of moments of actuality*, which in its development turns out to be necessity."
The development of the totality of moments of actuality NB = the essence of dialectical knowledge.

* Here V. I. Lenin's note transitions to the notebook "Hegel. Logic II (p. 49-88)." Ed.
** Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
*** Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. I, M.-L., 1929. Ed.

Cf. in the same Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 289, eloquent words about the futility of merely admiring the richness and change of natural phenomena and the necessity
... "to move forward to a more precise understanding of the internal harmony and
regularity of nature"... (289) [243]. (Proximity to materialism.)
Ibid. Encyclopedia, p. 292 [246-247]: "Developed actuality, as the alternation
of the internal and external, coinciding in unity, the alternation of opposing movements of actuality, uniting in a single movement - this is necessity."
Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 294 [248]: ... "Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood"...
Ib. p. 295 [248]: "with him*" (dem Menschen*)... "it happens... that from his action
something entirely different comes out than what he thought and wanted"...
Ib. p. 301 [253]: "Substance is an important stage in the development of the idea"...
Read: an important stage in the process of developing human knowledge of nature and matter.
Logic, Vol. IV
... "It" (die Substanz) "is being in all being"... (220)** [671]***.
The relation of substantiality transitions into the relation of causality (223) [674].
... "Substance has... actuality only as cause"... (225) [676].
On one hand, it is necessary to deepen the knowledge of matter to the point of understanding (the concept of) substance, in order to find the causes of phenomena. On the other hand, the actual knowledge of cause is a deepening of knowledge
from the externality of phenomena to substance. Examples of two kinds should clarify this: 1) from the history of natural science and 2) from the history of philosophy. More precisely: not "examples" here, but rather - comparison is not proof*, - but the quintessence of both histories + the history of technology.
"The effect does not contain... anything that is not contained in the cause"... (226) [677]
and vice versa...
Cause and effect, ergo, are merely moments of universal interdependence, connection
(universal), interconnection of events, merely links in the chain of the development of matter.
NB:
NB
"The same thing appears in one case as cause, in another as effect, there - as a specific stability,
here - as a positedness or determination in some other" (227) [678].

NB
The all-sided and all-encompassing character of the world's connections, expressed only one-sidedly, fragmentarily, and incompletely by causality.
"Here it can also be noted that, where a relation of cause and
effect is admitted, even if not in the proper sense, the effect cannot be greater than
the cause; for the effect is nothing but the manifestation of the cause."
And further on history. It is customary in it to cite anecdotes as
small "causes" of great events - in fact, these are merely occasions, merely external excitation***, "in which the inner spirit of the event
might not need" (230) [681]. "This historical arabesque style,
in history 'small causes of great events'"

* - by man. Ed.
** Hegel. Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
*** - external excitation. Ed.

According to which some great image grows on a weak stem, is therefore, of course, a witty but extremely superficial interpretation of history» (ib.).
This "inner spirit" - cf. Plekhanov 90 - is an idealistic, mystical, but very profound indication of the historical causes of events. Hegel subsumes all of history under causality and understands causality a thousand times more deeply and richly than the multitude of "scholars" today.
"For example, a moving stone is a cause; its movement is a certain determination it possesses, outside of which it contains many other determinations of color, form, etc., which do not enter into its causality" (232) [683].
Causality, as we usually understand it, is but a small part of the universal connection, but (a materialist addition) a part of an objectively real, not subjective, connection.
"But through the movement of a certain relation of causality, it has now come about that the cause does not only fade in the effect, and thereby the effect also fades, as in formal causality, but that the cause, in its fading, in the effect, re-emerges, and that the effect, disappearing in the cause, likewise re-emerges in it. Each of these determinations abolishes itself in its positing and posits itself in its abolition; this is not an external transition of causality from one substrate to another, but their becoming other is at the same time their own positing. Causality, therefore, presupposes or conditions itself" (235) [686].
"The movement of the relation of causality" = in reality: the movement of matter, respectively, the movement of history, SUMMARY OF THE "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
grasped and assimilated in its internal connection to a greater or lesser degree of breadth or depth...
"Interaction, in the first instance, appears as the reciprocal causality of assumed, mutually conditioning substances; each is, in relation to the other, both active and passive substance" (240) [691].
"In interaction, the original causality appears as a kind of emergence from its negation, passivity, and as a disappearance in it, as a kind of becoming...
... In this coincidence, necessity and causality, therefore, disappear; they contain both, immediate identity, as connection and relation, and absolute substantiality of the differentiated, thus their absolute contingency; they contain the original unity of substantial differences, thus, absolute contradiction.
Necessity is being, because it is; the unity with itself of being, having itself as its ground; but conversely, because it has some ground, it is not being, but only appearance, relation, or mediation. Causality is this posited transition of the original being, the cause, into appearance or mere positedness, and conversely, of the posited into the original; but the very identity of being and appearance is still inner necessity. This inwardness or this being-in-itself is abolished by the movement of causality; thereby, the substantiality of the related sides is lost, and

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| "connection and relation"
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|| "unity of substance in the different"
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|| relation, mediation

necessity does not disappear, becoming freedom
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necessity is revealed. Necessity becomes freedom not because it disappears, but because it manifests only its inner identity" (241-242) [692-693].
When reading Hegel on causality, it seems strange at first glance why he dwells so comparatively little on this favorite topic of the Kantians.
Why? Because for him, causality is merely one of the determinations of the universal connection, which he had already encompassed much more deeply and comprehensively earlier in his exposition, always and from the very beginning emphasizing this connection, mutual transitions, etc. It would be very instructive to compare the "strivings" of the new empiricism (respectively, "physical idealism") with the solutions, rather, the dialectical method of Hegel.
It should also be noted that in the Encyclopedia, Hegel emphasizes the insufficiency and emptiness of the bare concept of "interaction."
Volume VI, p. 308* [259]**:
"But although interaction is, undoubtedly, the nearest truth of the relation of cause and effect and it stands, so to speak, on the threshold of the concept, yet precisely for this reason, one cannot be satisfied with the application of this relation when it comes to knowledge that grasps in concepts.
only "interaction" = emptiness
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If one stops at considering the given content only from the standpoint of interaction, then this is, in fact, a way of considering in which the concept is entirely absent. In this case, one deals only

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
with the dry fact, and again, the requirement of mediation remains unsatisfied, which is precisely the point when applying the relation of causality. Upon closer examination, the inadequacy in applying the relation of interaction lies in the fact that this relation, instead of being an equivalent of the concept, must itself be understood. To understand the relation of interaction, we should not leave both sides of the relation as immediately given; but, as was shown in the two preceding paragraphs, they must be recognized as moments of a third, higher determination, namely, the concept. Thus, for example, if we consider the customs of the Spartan people as an effect of their social system and, conversely, the social system as an effect of the customs, we may perhaps have a correct view of the history of this people, but this understanding will still not provide any final satisfaction, because with such an explanation we will not understand either the social system or the customs of this people. This can only be understood when we grasp that both sides of the relation, as well as all other particular aspects that entered into the life and history of the Spartan people, flowed from the concept that underlay them all (308-309) [259-260].
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the requirement of mediation, (connection) this is what is at issue in the application of the relation of causality

NB||

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all "individual aspects" and the whole ("Begriff"*)

* - "concept." Ed.

At the end of the second volume of Logic, Vol. IV, p. 243 [694]*, in the transition to "the concept," the following definition is given: "the concept, the realm of subjectivity or freedom"...
NB Freedom = subjectivity, ("or")
purpose, consciousness, striving
NB

* Hegel. Works, Vol. V, Moscow, 1937. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
VOLUME V. SCIENCE OF LOGIC
PART II.
SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

or
doctrine of the concept
ON THE CONCEPT IN GENERAL
In the first two parts, I had no Vorarbeiten*, but here, on the contrary, there is "verknochertes Material," which must be "in Flussigkeit bringen"**... (3)*** [3]****.
"Being and essence are moments of its" (= des Begriffs***** ) "becoming" (5) [5].
To turn around: concepts are the highest product of the brain, the highest product of matter.
"Objective logic, which considers being and essence, therefore constitutes the proper genetic exposition of the concept" (6) [6].
9-10 [9-10]: The significant importance of Spinoza's philosophy as a philosophy of substance (this viewpoint is very high, but incomplete, not the highest: generally, to refute a philosophical system does not mean to discard it, but to develop it further, not to replace it with another, one-sided, opposite, but to include it in something higher).
In Spinoza's system, there is no

* - preliminary works. Ed.
** - "ossified material," which must be "made fluid"… Ed.
*** Hegel. Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
**** Hegel. Works, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1939. Ed.
***** - concept. Ed.

free, independent, conscious subject (it lacks "freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject"), but even in Spinoza, thinking is an attribute of substance (10 i. f.) [10].
13 i. f. [12]: In passing - what was once fashionable in philosophy, "das Schlimme nachzusagen" der Einbildungskraft und dem Gedachtnisse*, - now to diminish the value of "the concept" (= "das hochste des Denkens"**) and to exalt "das Unbegreifliche"*** |¯a hint at Kant?¯|
Moving on to the critique of Kantianism, Hegel considers it a great merit (15) [13-14] - to put forward the idea of "transcendental unity of apperception" (the unity of consciousness in which the concept is created), but he criticizes Kant for one-sidedness and subjectivism:
from contemplation to the knowledge of objective reality...
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... "As it is" (der Gegenstand****)... "in thought, so it is first in itself and for itself; as it is in contemplation or representation, it is - appearance"... (16) [15]. (Hegel elevates Kant's idealism from the subjective to the objective and absolute)...
Kant acknowledges the objectivity of concepts (Wahrheit***** their subject), but still leaves them subjective. He presupposes Gefuhl und Anschauung****** before the understanding (Verstand). Hegel speaks about this:
"But regarding, first, the indicated relation of the understanding or the concept to the stages presupposed to it, everything depends on which science deals with determining the form of these stages. In our science, as pure logic, these stages are being and essence. In psychology, feeling and contemplation, and then representation in general, are presupposed to the understanding. The phenomenology of spirit, as a doctrine of consciousness, ascends to the understanding through the stages of sensory consciousness and then perception" (17) [16].
Here, Kant's exposition is very "incomplete."
Then - THE MAIN POINT -
... "Here... the concept must be considered not as an act of self-conscious understanding, not as a subjective understanding, but as a concept in itself and for itself, forming a STAGE BOTH OF NATURE AND SPIRIT. LIFE, OR ORGANIC NATURE, IS THAT STAGE OF NATURE WHERE THE CONCEPT APPEARS" (18) [16].
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* - "to repeat the bad" about imagination and memory. Ed.
** - "the highest in thought." Ed.
*** - "the incomprehensible." Ed.
**** - object. Ed.
***** - truth. Ed.
****** - feeling and contemplation. Ed.

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"The Eve" of the Transformation of Objective Idealism into Materialism

The following is a very interesting passage (pp. 19-27 [17-24]), where Hegel critiques Kant precisely from an epistemological standpoint (Engels, in "Ludwig Feuerbach," likely had this passage in mind when he wrote that the main critique of Kant was already made by Hegel, as far as possible from an idealist perspective 91), - exposing the duality, inconsistency of Kant, his, so to speak, oscillation between empiricism (= materialism) and idealism, while Hegel conducts this argument entirely and exclusively from the standpoint of a more consistent idealism.
|¯Begriff is not yet the highest concept: even higher is the idea - the unity of Begriff with reality.¯|
"‘This is only a concept,’ - this is what is usually said, opposing the concept, as something superior, not only to the idea but also to sensible, spatial, and temporal tangible existence. In such a case, the abstract is considered less significant than the concrete because it supposedly omits so much of this kind of matter. According to this view, abstraction means that from the concrete, for our subjective use, one or another feature is extracted in such a way that, despite the omission of so many other qualities and properties of the object, it does not lose any of its value and

Kant diminishes the power of reason
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dignity; they remain as real, merely on the other side, as something that retains its full significance, and it is only the weakness of the understanding, according to this view, that leads to the inability to encompass all this wealth and to be content with the meager abstraction. If, however, the material of contemplation and the diversity of representation are taken as real in opposition to the thinkable and the concept, then this is a view, the abandonment of which is a condition not only of philosophizing but is already presupposed by religion; how could there be a need for it and its meaning if fleeting and superficial sensory and individual phenomena were still considered as truth? ... Therefore, one should not regard abstract thinking simply as setting aside the sensory matter, which thereby suffers no loss in its reality, but rather as the sublation of the latter and its reduction as a mere phenomenon to the essential, which manifests itself only in the concept" (19-21) [17-18].
the more consistent idealist clings to God!
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Hegel is entirely correct in substance against Kant. Thinking, ascending from the concrete to the abstract, does not move away - if it is correct (N.B.) (and Kant, like all philosophers, speaks of correct thinking) - from the truth, but approaches it. The abstraction of matter, of the laws of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not nonsensical) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, more accurately, more fully. From living contemplation to abstract thinking and from it

CONCEPT OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
to practice - this is the dialectical path of knowing the truth, of knowing objective reality. Kant devalues knowledge to make room for faith: Hegel elevates knowledge, asserting that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materialist elevates knowledge of matter, of nature, consigning God and the philosophical riffraff that defends him to the garbage heap.
"The main misunderstanding that arises here is the opinion that the natural principle or beginning, from which one proceeds in natural development or in the history of the developing individual, is also true and first in the concept" (21) [18-19]. (- It is true that people start with this, but the truth lies not at the beginning, but at the end, more precisely, in the continuation. The truth is not the initial impression)... "but philosophy should not be a narrative of what happens, but a knowledge of what is true in it" (21) [19].
In Kant, "psychological idealism": for Kant, the categories "are only determinations arising from self-consciousness" (22) [20]. Ascending from the understanding (Verstand) to reason (Vernunft), Kant devalues the significance of thinking, denying it the ability to "attain complete truth."
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"It is considered" (by Kant) "an abuse of logic if it, which should only be a canon of judgment, is recognized as an organon for the formation of objective views. The concepts of reason, in which one would expect a higher power (idealist phrase!) and deeper (correct!!) content, no longer have anything *Konstitutives* |¯should be: objektives¯|**, as was still the case with the categories; they are only ideas; it is indeed quite permissible to use them, but with these intelligible entities, in which the whole truth should be revealed, nothing can be thought except hypotheses, to which

* - constitutive. Ed.
** - objective. Ed.

To deny the truth in itself and for itself would be sheer arbitrariness and mad audacity, as they cannot be encountered in any experience. Could one ever have thought that philosophy would deny the truth of intelligible entities because they lack the material substance of sensibility?» (23) [20-21].
Here Hegel is right in essence: value is a category that *lacks the material substance of sensibility*, but it is truer than the law of supply and demand. Only Hegel is an idealist: hence the nonsense: "Konstitutives," etc.
On the one hand, Kant clearly recognizes the "objectivity" of thinking ("des Denkens") (the "identity of concept and thing"), - on the other hand,
"On the other hand, it is also asserted that we still cannot know things as they are in themselves and for themselves, and that truth is inaccessible to the knowing reason; that the truth which consists in the unity of object and concept is, after all, only a phenomenon, and precisely on the ground that the content is merely the manifold of intuition. It has already been mentioned, however, that, on the contrary, it is precisely in the concept that this manifold is sublated, since it belongs to intuition in opposition to the concept, and that through the concept the object returns to its non-accidental essence; the latter appears in the phenomenon, and therefore the phenomenon is not simply something devoid of essence, but the manifestation of essence" (24-25) [21-22].
Hegel stands for the knowability of things in themselves
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the phenomenon is the manifestation of essence
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* - lacks the material substance of sensibility. Ed.

CONCEPT OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
"It remains remarkable that Kantian philosophy recognized the relation of thinking to sensible existence, where it stopped, as only a relative relation of mere appearance, and although it acknowledged and affirmed the higher unity of both in the idea in general and, for example, in the idea of some contemplating reason, it stopped at that relative relation and at the assertion that the concept is completely separated and remains separated from reality; thereby it recognized as true what it had declared to be finite knowledge, and what it recognized as true and brought under a definite concept, it declared to be something immoderate, impermissible, and merely mental things."

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In logic, the idea "becomes the creator of nature" (26) [22-23].
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||!!Ha-ha!
Logic is a "formal science" in contrast to the concrete sciences (of nature and spirit), but its subject matter is "pure truth"... (27) [23].
Kant himself, when asking what truth is ("Critique of Pure Reason," p. 83) and giving a trivial answer ("agreement of cognition with its object"), beats himself, for the "fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism," - that "cognition cannot grasp things in themselves" (27) [24] - clearly, these are all "untrue representations" (28) [24].
Opposing the purely formal understanding of logic (which, according to him, Kant also has) - saying that from the ordinary point of view (truth is agreement |¯"Übereinstimmung"¯| of cognition with the object) for agreement "two sides are essential" (29) [25], Hegel says that the formal in logic is "pure truth" and that
... "this form must, therefore, be much richer in determinations and content within itself, and must possess infinitely greater power over the concrete than is usually acknowledged" ... (29) [26].

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... "Even if one sees nothing in logical forms other than formal functions of thinking, even then they would deserve investigation into the extent to which they themselves correspond to truth. Logic that does not do this can at most claim to be a natural-historical description of the phenomena of thinking, as they exist" (30-31) [27]. (This, indeed, is Aristotle's immortal merit), but "it is necessary to move further" ...(31) [27].
In this understanding logic coincides with epistemology.

This is generally a very important question.
V

V

V

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V
Thus, not only a description of the forms of thinking and not only
a natural-historical description of the phenomena of thinking (how does this differ from the description of forms??),
but also correspondence with truth, i.e., ?? the quintessence or, more simply, the results and outcomes of the history of thought?? In
Hegel, there is an idealistic obscurity and incompleteness here.

Mysticism.
Not psychology, not phenomenology of spirit, but logic = the question of truth.


General laws of the movement of the world and thinking


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Cf. Encyclopedia, vol. VI, p. 319* [I, 267]**: "But in fact they" (die logischen Formen***) "on the contrary, as forms of the concept, constitute the living spirit of the real"...

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, vol. I, M. - L., 1929. Ed.
*** - logical forms. Ed.

CONCEPT OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
NB|||

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Begriff, developing into "adaquater Begriff"* becomes the Idea (33)**
[29]***. "The concept in its objectivity is the self-subsistent and self-related thing" (33) [29]
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= objectivism + mysticism and betrayal of development.

* - "adequate concept." Ed.
** Hegel. Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
*** Hegel. Collected Works, vol. VI, M., 1939. Ed.

FIRST SECTION:
SUBJECTIVITY
The dialectical movement of the "concept" - from the purely "formal" concept at the beginning -
to judgment (Urteil), then - to conclusion (Schlu.) and - finally, to the transformation from the subjectivity of the concept into its objectivity (34-35)* [30]**.
The first distinctive feature of the concept is universality (Allgemeinheit). NB: The concept
arose from essence, which arose from being.
En lisant...

These parts of the work should be called:

a best means for getting a headache!****
The further development of the universal, particular (Besonderes), and individual (Einzelnes) is extremely abstract and
"abstruse"***.
Kuno Fischer presents these "abstruse" arguments very poorly, taking the easier - examples from the Encyclopedia,
adding vulgarities (against the French Revolution. Kuno Fischer, vol. 8, 1901, p. 530) etc., but not indicating to the reader
how to find the key to the difficult transitions, nuances, and shifts in Hegel's abstract concepts.

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. VI, M., 1939. Ed.
*** - obscure. Ed.
**** - While reading... These parts of the work should be called: the best means for getting a headache! Ed.

CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
It seems that here, too, what is most important for Hegel is to outline the transitions. From a certain point of view, under certain conditions, the universal is the particular, and the particular is the universal. Not only (1) the connection, and an inseparable one, of all concepts and judgments, but (2) the transitions from one to the other, and not only transitions, but also (3) the identity of opposites—this is what is most important for Hegel. But this merely "shines through" the fog of extremely "abstruse" exposition. The history of thought from the perspective of the development and application of general concepts and categories of logic—voila ce qu'il faut!***

Or is this still a tribute to the old, formal logic?

Yes! And another tribute—a tribute to mysticism = idealism

Voila* the abundance of "definitions" and

Begriffsbestimmungen** in this part of the "Logic"!
Having cited on p. 125 [112] the "famous" conclusion— "All men are mortal, Caius is a man, therefore he is mortal"—Hegel wittily adds: "One immediately falls into boredom when one hears such a conclusion"—this, he says, arises from the "useless form"—and makes a profound remark:
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"All things are conclusions, some general, connected through the particular with the individual; but, of course, they are not a whole consisting of three propositions" (126) [112].
"All things are conclusions"...
Very good! The most ordinary logical "figures"—(all this in the section on the "first figure of the syllogism")—are schoolishly smeared out, sit venia verbo****,
the most ordinary relations of things.

* - Behold. Ed.
** - definitions of concepts. Ed.
*** - this is what is needed! Ed.
**** - let it be permitted to say so. Ed.

Hegel's analysis of syllogisms (E. - B. - A., Eins; Besonderes; Allgemeines*, B. - E. - A. etc.) reminds one of Marx's imitation in Chapter I, 92.
On Kant
Incidentally:
"The antinomies of reason consist in nothing other than that in one case one definition of the concept is taken as the basis, and in the other, with equal necessity, another" (128-129) [115].
One should return to Hegel to analyze step by step some common
logic and theory of knowledge of a Kantian and the like.
NB:
Umkehren**:
Marx applied
Hegel's dialectic in its rational form to political economy.
The formation (of abstract) concepts and operations with them already include the notion, the conviction, the consciousness of the regularity
of the objective connection of the world. It is absurd to single out causality from this connection. It is impossible to deny the objectivity of concepts, the objectivity of the general in the particular and in the specific. Hegel is much
deeper, therefore, than Kant and others, in tracing the reflection in the movement of concepts of the movement of the objective world. As a simple form
of value, a single act of exchange of one, given, commodity for another, already includes in itself in
undeveloped form all the main contradictions of
NB
On the true meaning of Hegel's
Logic

* - individual; particular; universal. Ed.
** - to invert. Ed.

Page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript
Outline of Hegel's book "Science of Logic." - September - December 1914

CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
capitalism—so the very simplest generalization, the first and simplest formation of concepts
(judgments, syllogisms, etc.) means the recognition by man of ever deeper and more objective connections of the world. Here one must seek the true
meaning, significance, and role of Hegelian Logic.
This is NB.
Two aphorisms:

1. Plekhanov criticizes Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from a vulgar-materialist than from a dialectical-materialist standpoint, since he merely a limine* rejects their arguments, rather than correcting (as Hegel corrected
Kant) these arguments, deepening, generalizing, and expanding them, showing the connections and transitions of all and every kind of concept.

2. Marxists criticized (at the beginning of the 20th century) Kantians and Humeans more in a Feuerbachian (and Buchnerian) way than in a Hegelian way.
On the question of criticizing contemporary
Kantianism, Machism and the like:
... "Experience based on induction is recognized as significant, although perception, by general admission, is incomplete; but it can only be assumed that no objection can be found against this experience, since it is true in itself and for itself" (154) [139].
NB

* - at the threshold. Ed.

This passage is in the section: "Inductive Syllogism." The simplest truth, obtained by the simplest, inductive method, is always incomplete, for experience is always unfinished. Ergo:
the connection of induction with analogy—with conjecture (scientific foresight), the relativity
of all knowledge and the absolute content in each step forward in cognition.
Aphorism: One cannot fully understand Marx's "Capital," especially its Chapter I, without
studying and understanding the entire Logic of Hegel. Therefore, no Marxist understood Marx half a century later!!
aphorism.
The transition from analogical inference (about analogy) to
necessary inference, from inductive inference to analogical inference, from
general to particular, inference* from particular to general, the exposition of connections and transitions, connection
and transitions *, this is Hegel's task. Hegel indeed proved that logical forms and laws are not
empty shells, but a reflection of the objective world.
More precisely, he did not prove, but brilliantly intuited.
In the Encyclopedia, Hegel notes that the division of understanding and reason, and the concepts of both kinds, should be
understood in such a way that our activity either stops at
the merely negative and abstract form of the concept, or understands it according to its true
abstract and concrete concepts

* Apparently, the preposition "to" is missing before the word "inference." Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT

Nature, as both positive and concrete. For example, if we consider the concept of freedom as an abstract opposite to necessity, this is only a rational concept of freedom; the true and rational concept of freedom contains within itself necessity as sublated* (p. 347-348, vol. VI)* [I, 290]**.
Ibid., p. 349 [291]: Aristotle described the logical forms so comprehensively that "essentially" nothing could be added.
Usually, the "figures of syllogisms" are considered as empty formalism. "But in reality, they" (these figures) "have a very important significance, based on the necessity for each moment, as a determination of the concept, to become whole and mediating ground" (352, vol. VI [I, 294]).
Encyclopedia (vol. VI, p. 353-354 [I, 294-295]):
"The objective meaning of the syllogistic figures generally consists in the fact that all rationality appears as a triadic syllogism, and precisely in such a way that each of its members occupies the place of both extremes and the mediating middle.
This is exactly the case with the three members of philosophical science, i.e., the logical idea, nature, and spirit. Here, at first, nature is the mediating, connecting member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds into both extreme members - into the logical idea and into spirit." +
"Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds into the logical idea and into spirit." Logic is the doctrine of knowledge. It is a theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, immediate, or whole reflection, but a process of a series of abstractions, formations, and the creation of concepts, laws, etc., which (thinking, science = "logical idea") encompass conditionally, approximately, the universal regularity of eternally moving and developing nature. Here, indeed, objectively, there are three members:
1) nature; 2) human knowledge, = the human brain (as the highest product of the same nature); and 3) the form of reflecting nature in human knowledge, which is concepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannot encompass = reflect = represent the entirety of nature, completely, in its "immediate totality"; he can only eternally approach this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc.
+ "But spirit is spirit only when mediated by nature"... "It is precisely the spirit that recognizes the logical idea in nature and thus elevates nature to its essence"... "The logical idea is the 'absolute substance of both spirit and nature, the universal, all-pervading'" (353-354) [295].
Regarding analogy, a pertinent remark:
"The instinct of reason makes one feel that some empirically found definition has its basis in the inner nature or kind of the given object, and it further relies on this definition" (357) [298]. (Vol. VI, p. 359 [299-300].)
NB:
Hegel "only" deifies this "logical idea," regularity, universality
NB

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
And p. 358 [298-299]: legitimate contempt for natural philosophy was caused by the trivial play of empty analogies.
In ordinary logic*, thinking is formally separated from objectivity:
"Thinking is recognized here as merely a purely subjective and formal activity, while the objective, in opposition to thinking, is considered something stable and self-given. But this dualism is not true, and it is meaningless to take the definitions of subjectivity and objectivity so simply, without asking about their origin"...
(359-360) [300]. In reality, subjectivity is only a stage of development from being and essence, - and then this subjectivity "dialectically 'breaks through its limit'" and "through the syllogism unfolds into objectivity" (360) [300].
Very profound and wise! The laws of logic are reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.
Vol. VI, p. 360 [I, 300-301]:
"The realized concept" is the object.
This transition from the subject, from the concept to the object seems "strange," but under the object, one must understand not just being, but the completed "concrete in itself, full, independent"...
(361) [301].
"The world is the other-being of the idea."
Subjectivity (or the concept) and the object - these are the same and not the same... (362) [302].
Against itself!

* In the manuscript, the word "logic" is connected by a line to the word "here" in the text of the following quote from Hegel. Ed.

The ontological proof of God is nonsense!
... "It is wrong to view subjectivity and objectivity as some firm and abstract opposition. Both are fully dialectical"...
(367) [306].

NB

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
SECOND SECTION
:
OBJECTIVITY
(Logic) V, 178* [VI, 161-162]**:
Dual meaning of objectivity: ... "it turns out that objectivity also has a dual meaning - the meaning of something standing opposed to the independent concept, but also the meaning of something existing in and for itself"...
(178) [161].
... "The cognition of truth is posited in the recognition of the object as it is, as an object, free from the admixture of subjective reflection"...
(178) [162].
Reflections on "mechanism" - further - extremely abstruse and almost entirely nonsense.
Further, idem on chemistry, the stage of "judgment," etc.
The paragraph titled "Law" (198-199) [179-180] does not provide what one might expect from Hegel on such an interesting topic. It is strange why "law" is referred to "mechanism"?
The concept of law is brought closer here to the concepts of: "order" (Ordnung), homogeneity (Gleichformigkeit); necessity; "soul" of the objective totality***; "principle of self-movement."
objectivity cognition of the object this proximity is very
important

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, vol. VI, M., 1939. Ed.
*** - of the objective totality. Ed.

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, vol. I, M.-L., 1930. Ed.

All of this from the standpoint that mechanism is the other-being of spirit, concepts, etc., soul, individuality... A game of empty analogies, apparently!
Note that on p. 210 [190] the concept "Naturnotwendigkeit"* - "both mechanism and chemism are thus subsumed under the concept of natural necessity"... for here we see "its" (des Begriffs) "submersion into externality" (ib.).
"It has already been mentioned that the opposition between teleology and mechanism is, in the first place, a more general opposition between freedom and necessity. Kant brought this opposition into this form in the exposition of the antinomies of reason and precisely as the third conflict of transcendental ideas" (213) [193].
Briefly repeating Kant's arguments for the thesis and antithesis, Hegel notes the emptiness of these arguments and draws attention to what
Kant's reasoning boils down to:
"Kant's resolution of this antinomy is the same as the general
resolution of the other antinomies; namely, it consists in the fact that
reason cannot prove either of the two positions, since by purely empirical laws of nature we cannot have any determining principle a priori about the possibility of things;
that therefore both positions must be considered not as objective propositions, but as subjective maxims;
that on the one hand, I must constantly think about all events in nature according to the principle of mechanism alone
"nature = submersion of the concept into externality" (ha-ha!)
freedom and necessity
Hegel against Kant (on freedom and necessity)

* - "natural necessity." Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
of nature, but that this does not prevent me, when the occasion arises, from investigating certain natural forms according to another maxim, namely, according to the principle of final causes; as if these two maxims, which are supposed to serve only for the human reason, were not in the same opposition as the aforementioned positions. From such a point of view, as indicated above, what alone demands philosophical interest, namely, to which of the two principles truth is inherently ascribed, is not at all investigated; and from this perspective, there is no difference whether these principles are to be considered as objective, which here means externally existing determinations of nature, or simply as maxims of subjective knowledge; - all this knowledge is rather subjective, i.e., contingent, since it resorts to one or the other maxim by chance, depending on which is deemed suitable for the given object, without generally asking about the truth of these determinations themselves, whether they are determinations of objects or of knowledge" (215-216) [195].
Hegel:
"The purpose turned out to be the third member in relation to mechanism and chemism; it is their truth. Since it
itself is still within the sphere of objectivity or immediacy of the whole concept, it still experiences the influence of externality
Materialist Dialectic:
The laws of the external world, nature, divided into mechanical and chemical (this is very important),
are the foundations of purposive human activity.
In his practical activity, man
Bien!

as such and opposes a certain objective world, with which it is related. From this side
in the purposive relationship we are considering, which is an external relationship, mechanical causality still appears, to which, in general, chemism should also be counted, but it appears as subordinated to it, as inherently sublated" (216-217) [196].
... "From this, the nature of the subordination of both previous forms
of the objective process becomes clear; that other, which appeared in them as an infinite progression, is the concept initially posited as external to them, which is the purpose; not only is the concept their substance, but externality is also an essential, constitutive moment for them.
Thus, mechanical or chemical technique, by its character, which consists in being determined from the outside, itself gives itself to the service of the purposive relationship, which now must be examined more closely" (217) [197].
faces an objective world, depends on it, and determines its activity by it.
From this side, from the side of practical (purposive) human activity, the mechanical (and chemical) causality of the world (nature) appears as something external, secondary, as if overshadowed.
Two forms of the objective process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and purposive human activity. The relationship
of these forms. Human purposes initially seem foreign ("other") in relation to nature. Human consciousness, science (der Begriff), reflects the essence, the substance of nature, but at the same time, this consciousness is external to nature (not immediately, not simply coinciding with it).
MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE serves human purposes because its character (essence)
consists in being determined by external conditions (laws of nature).
((TECHNIQUE and OBJECTIVE WORLD. TECHNIQUE and PURPOSES))

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT**

... "It" (the purpose*) "faces an objective mechanical and chemical world to which its activity relates as something given"...
(219-220) [199]. "To this extent, it has a truly extramundane existence, precisely because the above-mentioned objectivity stands in opposition to it"...
(220) [199].

In reality, human purposes are generated by the objective world and presuppose it, finding it as given, present. But to a person, it seems that their purposes are taken from outside the world, independent of it ("freedom").
((NB: This is all in the § on "subjective purpose" NB)) (217-221) [197-200].
"The purpose connects with objectivity through the means and in the latter with itself"
(221 [200] §: "Means").
"Since the purpose is finite, it further has some finite content; thereby, it is not something absolute or unconditionally rational in itself. The means, however, is the external middle term of the syllogism, which represents the realization of the purpose; in the means, therefore, rationality as such manifests itself, preserving itself in this externality and precisely through this externality. In this respect, the means is something higher than the finite ends of external purposiveness; the plow is more honorable than the immediate pleasures it prepares and serves as goals. The tool endures, while the immediate pleasures pass and
the germs of historical materialism in
Hegel

* - purpose. Ed.

are forgotten.
IN THEIR TOOLS, HUMANS POSSESS POWER OVER THE EXTERNAL NATURE, WHILE IN THEIR PURPOSES THEY ARE RATHER SUBJECTED TO IT" (226) [205].
Vorbericht, i.e., the preface to the book, is dated:
Nuremberg. 21. VII. 1816.
This is in the §: "The Realized Purpose"
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS ONE OF THE APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF GENIUS IDEAS - SEEDS, PRESENT IN HEGEL IN GERMINAL FORM.
"The teleological process is the translation of the concept (sic!), clearly existing as a concept, into objectivity"...
(227) [206].
When Hegel tries - sometimes even: strives and exerts himself - to subsume human purposive activity under the categories of logic, saying that this activity
is "syllogism" (Schlu.), that the subject (human) plays
the role of such-and-such a "term" in the logical "figure" of "syllogism," etc.,
THIS IS NOT ONLY A STRETCH, NOT ONLY
A GAME. THERE IS A VERY DEEP CONTENT HERE, PURELY MATERIALISTIC. IT MUST BE TURNED AROUND: HUMAN PRACTICAL ACTIVITY MUST HAVE LED HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS TO REPEAT VARIOUS LOGICAL FIGURES BILLIONS OF TIMES, SO THAT THESE FIGURES COULD ATTAIN THE STATUS OF AXIOMS. THIS IS NOTABLE.
Hegel and historical materialism
NB
CATEGORIES OF LOGIC AND HUMAN PRACTICE
NB
NB

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT**
"The movement of the purpose has now reached the point where the moment of externality is not only posited in the concept and the concept is not only a should-be and striving, but
as a concrete totality, it is identical with immediate objectivity"
(235) [213]. At the end of the § on "the realized purpose," at the end of the section (Chapter III: "Teleology") - Section II "Objectivity" - there is a transition to Section III: "The Idea."
Remarkably: to "the idea" as the coincidence of the concept with the object, to the idea as truth, Hegel approaches through practical, purposive human activity. He comes very close to the idea that through practice, humans prove the objective correctness of their ideas, concepts, knowledge, and science.

NB
NB
FROM THE SUBJECTIVE CONCEPT AND SUBJECTIVE
PURPOSE TO OBJECTIVE TRUTH

THIRD SECTION:
THE IDEA
Beginning of Section III: "The Idea."
"The idea is the adequate concept, objectively true or true as such" (236) [214].
Generally, the introduction to the third section ("The Idea") of the second part of "Logic" ("Subjective Logic") (Vol. V, pp. 236-243 [VI, 214-221]) and the corresponding §§ of the Encyclopedia
(§§ 213-215) - IS PERHAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF DIALECTICS. Here, the coincidence, so to speak, of logic and epistemology is also remarkably and brilliantly shown.
The term "idea" is also used in the sense of a simple representation. Kant.
"Kant again demanded that the expression 'idea' be restored to its meaning as a concept of reason. - According to Kant, the concept of reason must be a concept of the unconditional, and in relation to phenomena - be transcendent, since it has no adequate empirical use. For Kant, the concepts of reason serve for comprehension, while the concepts of understanding serve for the comprehension of perceptions. - In reality, if the latter are indeed concepts, they are concepts, - through them, comprehension is achieved"...
(236) [214].
See below for more on Kant
NB NB
Hegel against Kant against the transcendent in the sense of
separating truth (objective)
from empiricism very good!

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT**
It is equally incorrect to consider the idea as something "non-actual"; - as it is said: "these are just ideas."
"If thoughts are merely subjective and contingent, then, of course, they have no further value, but in this respect, they do not stand lower than temporary and contingent actualities, which likewise have no further value beyond the value of contingencies and phenomena. If, on the other hand, one holds that the idea has no value of truth because it is transcendent in relation to phenomena, that in the sensory world there can be no object coinciding with it, this is a strange misunderstanding, for here the idea is denied objective significance precisely because it lacks what constitutes the phenomenon, the non-true being of the objective world" (237-238) [215].
Regarding practical ideas, Kant himself admits a popular
reference to experience against ideas; he presents ideas as a Maximum, to which reality should strive to approximate. And Hegel continues:
"But since the result has been that the idea is the unity of the concept and objectivity, - the truth, - it cannot be viewed merely as a goal to which one should approach, but which remains a kind of beyond, rather, everything actual exists only insofar as it has the idea within itself and expresses it. The object, both objective and subjective
Hegel against "Jenseits"** of
Kant very good!

* - purpose. Ed.
** - "Beyond." Ed.

* - vulgar. Ed.
** - "transcendence." Ed.

the world, not only must generally coincide with the idea, but they themselves are the coincidence of concept and reality; that reality which does not correspond to the concept is only a phenomenon, subjective, accidental, arbitrary, which is not truth (238) [216].
"She" (die Idee) "is, first, the simple truth, the identity of the concept and objectivity as the general... (242) [219].
The Idea (read: human cognition) is the coincidence (agreement) of the concept and objectivity ("the general"). This is, first.
... "Secondly, it is the relation of self-subsistent subjectivity of the simple concept and its distinct objectivity; the former is essentially
the striving to annihilate this separation...
Second, the idea is the relation of self-subsistent (= seemingly independent) subjectivity (= human) to the distinct
(from this idea) objectivity...
Subjectivity is the striving to annihilate this separation (of the idea from the object).
... "As this relation, the idea is a process directed towards dividing itself
into individuality and its inorganic nature, to subjugating the latter again to the power of the subject and to returning
to the first simple universality. The identity of the idea with itself is one with the process; thought, liberating reality from the appearance of purposeless
variability and illuminating it into the idea, Cognition is the process of immersing
(the mind) into inorganic nature for subjugating it to the power of the subject and generalizing (cognition of the general in its phenomena)...
The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: thought (= human) should not
imagine truth as a dead repose, as a simple picture (image), pale
The agreement of concepts with things is not subjective

CONCEPTS FROM "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
should not imagine this truth of reality as a dead repose, as a simple image, dull, without
striving and movement, like some genius, or number, or abstract thought; the idea, by virtue of the freedom
which the concept attains in it, also has within itself the sharpest
contradiction; its repose consists in the firmness and certainty with which it eternally creates this contradiction and eternally overcomes it and coincides with itself in it"...
(dull), without striving, without movement, just like a genius, just like a number, just like
abstract thought.
The idea has within itself the strongest contradiction, repose (for human thought) consists in the firmness and certainty with which he eternally creates
(this contradiction of thought with the object)
and eternally overcomes it...
Cognition is an eternal, infinite approach of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in human thought should be understood not "dead," not "abstract,"
not without movement, not without contradictions, but in an eternal process of movement, the emergence of contradictions
and their resolution.
"The idea is... the idea of truth and good as cognition and will... The process of this
finite cognition and (NB) action (NB) transforms the initially
abstract universality into wholeness, thereby making it complete objectivity" (243) [220].
The idea is cognition and striving (will) of man... The process (transient, finite, limited)
of cognition and action transforms abstract concepts into complete
objectivity.
NB
NB

THE SAME IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIA (VOLUME VI).
Encyclopedia § 213 (p. 385* [I, 321**]):
... "The idea is truth; for truth consists in the correspondence of objectivity to the concept... But all
reality, insofar as it is something true, is the idea... Individual being represents
only one side of the idea; the latter therefore needs other realities, which equally appear as
separate and seemingly independent existences; only in their totality and in their relation to each other is the concept realized. The individual, taken by itself, does not correspond
to its concept; this limitation of its actual being constitutes its finitude and leads to its
destruction"...
Individual being (object, phenomenon, etc.) is (only) one
side of the idea (truth). For truth, other sides of reality are needed,
which also only seem independent and separate (besonders für sich bestehende***). Only in their totality (zusammen)
and in their relation (Beziehung) is truth realized.
The totality of all sides of the phenomenon, reality, and their (mutual) relations - this is what
constitutes truth. Relations (= transitions = contradictions) of concepts = the main content of logic, where these concepts (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world.
The dialectic of things creates the dialectic of ideas, not vice versa.
Hegel ingeniously intuited the dialectic of things (phenomena, world,
nature) in the dialectic of concepts

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, vol. I, M.-L., 1929. Ed.
*** - existing separately for themselves. Ed.

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT**

This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word 'dialectic': roughly as follows: Hegel brilliantly intuited in the change, interdependence of all concepts, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions from one concept to another, in the eternal change, movement of concepts,
*EXACTLY SUCH A RELATIONSHIP OF THINGS, NATURE.* precisely
intuited, no more
= - - - - - - - - - - interdependence of concepts "all"
without exception transitions of concepts from one to another
"all" without exception.
The relativity of opposition between concepts...
the identity of opposites between concepts.
"Initially, truth is understood as that which I know to exist. This,
however, is truth only in relation to consciousness, or formal truth, - merely
correctness (§ 213, p. 386 [322]). Truth in a deeper sense consists in
the fact that objectivity is identical with the concept"...
"A bad person is an untrue person, i.e., a person who behaves inconsistently with his concept, or his purpose. However, nothing can exist entirely devoid of the identity of concept and reality. Even the bad and untrue exists only insofar as its reality somehow and to some extent corresponds to its concept"...
... "All that deserves the name of philosophy has always based its doctrine
on the consciousness of the absolute unity of what the understanding recognizes only in its separateness"...
what consists in dialectic?
- - - - = NB
Each concept exists in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all others

The distinction between being and essence, concept and objectivity are relative
"The stages of being and essence, as well as the stages of concept and objectivity, considered up to this point,
are not, in their difference, something fixed and self-founded, but prove to be dialectical, and their truth consists
only in the fact that they are moments of the idea" (387-388) [322-
323].
Vol. VI, p. 388 [I, 323]
Moments of knowledge (= "ideas") of nature by man - these are the categories of logic.
Vol. VI, p. 388 [323-324] (§ 214):
"The idea can be expressed in various ways. It can be called reason (this is the genuinely philosophical meaning of the concept
of reason), further - subject-object, the unity of the ideal and real, finite and infinite, soul and body, possibility,
which in itself has its actuality, that whose nature can be grasped only as existing, etc. All
these expressions are legitimate, as in the idea all relations
of the understanding are contained, but they are contained in it in their infinite return
and identity within themselves.
It is not difficult for the understanding to show that everything said about the idea is internally contradictory. However, on all points, it can be paid back in the same coin, or,
rather, it has already been paid back in the idea in the same coin; - the latter is the work of reason, which, of course, is not as easy as the work of the understanding. - If the understanding shows that
the idea contradicts itself because, for example, the subjective is only subjective,
the objective is opposed to it; that being is something completely different from
the concept, and therefore (idea) truth is comprehensive

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
cannot be derived from it; that the finite is only finite and is directly opposed to the infinite, hence cannot be identical with the latter, and so on with respect to all definitions, - then logic
shows, on the contrary, the opposite, namely, that the subjective, which is only subjective, the finite, which is only finite, the infinite, which must be only infinite, etc., do not possess truth, contradict themselves, and pass into their opposite; thus this transition and unity, in which
the extremes are contained as sublated, as a kind of appearance or moments, reveal themselves as the truth of these extremes (388) [323-324].
"When the understanding criticizes the idea, it falls into
a double misunderstanding. First, the extreme terms of the idea - in whatever form they are expressed, -
since they are given in the unity of the idea, are taken by it in the sense and definition in which they are not contained in its concrete unity, but as abstractions,
still outside the idea. Its" (der Verstand*) "misunderstanding of their relation is no less great
even when it is already explicitly posited; for example, it
overlooks even the nature of the copula in the judgment,
which indicates that the individual, the subject, is also
not individual, but universal. Second, the understanding
considers its reflection, according to which the self-identical idea contains within itself the negation of itself, contradiction, - as an external reflection, not entering into the idea itself. In reality, this - is not a special wisdom of the understanding, but the
individual = universal
NB
NB:
Abstractions and "concrete unity" of opposites.
A beautiful example:
the simplest and clearest, the dialectic of concepts and its
materialist roots
Dialectic is not in the human understanding, but in the "idea," i.e., in
objective reality

* - of the understanding. Ed.

The idea represents a dialectic that eternally separates and distinguishes the identical from the different,
the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul from the body—and only insofar as the idea is
eternal creativity, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit"... (389) [324].
VI, § 215, p. 390 [I, 325]:
"The idea is essentially a process, for its identity is absolute and free identity of the concept only insofar as it is absolute negativity and therefore dialectical."
Therefore, the expression "unity" of thought and being, finite and infinite, etc., is *false*, because it expresses "identity
that remains calm." It is incorrect to say that the finite simply neutralizes ("neutralisiert") the infinite and *vice versa*. In reality, we
have a process.
If one were to count... every second on earth more than 10 people die and even
more are born. "Movement" and "moment": catch it. At every moment...
Catch this moment. Idem in simple mechanical movement (contra Chernov 93).
"The idea as a process passes through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea
is life... The second form... is the idea as cognition, which appears in a dual
form of theoretical and practical idea. The process of cognition results in the restoration of the unity enriched by difference, and this gives the third form,
the form of the absolute idea"... (391) [326].
"eternal life" = dialectic the idea is...
process this is NB

* - false. Ed.
** - vice versa. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
The idea is "truth" (p. 385 [320-321], § 213).
The idea, i.e., truth, as a process—since truth is a process—passes through three stages in its development
(Entwicklung): 1) life; 2) the process of cognition, including human practice and technique (see above 94), - 3) the stage of the absolute idea
(i.e., complete truth).
Life generates the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By verifying and applying these reflections in practice
and in technique, man arrives at objective truth.
Truth is a process. From the subjective idea, man moves to objective truth
through "practice" (and technique).
LOGIC. VOLUME V.
III Division. The Idea. Chapter I. Life.
"According to the common conception of logic" (Vol. V, p. 244* [VI, 221]**) there is no place for the question of life in it. But if the subject of logic is truth, and "truth as such
wesentlich im Erkennen ist"***, then one must treat of cognition—in connection
with cognition already (p. 245 [222]) one must speak of life.
Sometimes, after so-called "pure logic," an "applied" (angewandte)
logic is placed, but then...
... "it would be necessary to include in logic every science, for each
science is, to the extent that it consists in expressing its subject in the forms of thought and concept"
(244) [221].
every science is applied logic

* Hegel. Werke, Vol. V, Berlin, 1834. Ed.
** Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1939. Ed.
*** - essentially consists in cognition. Ed.

The idea of including life in logic is clear—and genius—from the perspective of the process of reflection in consciousness (first individual) of the objective world
and the verification of this consciousness (reflection) by practice—see:
life = the individual subject separates itself from the objective
... "The initial judgment of life, therefore, is that it separates itself, as an individual subject, from objectivity"... (248) [224].
Encyclopedia*
§ 216: the individual members of the body are what they are only in their connection
with the body. A hand, separated from the body, is a hand only in name (Aristotle).
If one considers the relation of the subject to the object in logic, one must take into account the general premises of the existence of the concrete subject (= human life) in
the objective setting.
Subdivisions**:
1) life as a "living individual" (§ A)
2) "the process of life"
3) "the process of the species" (Gattung), reproduction of humans and transition to cognition.
(1) "subjective totality" and "indifferent" "objectivity"
(2) the unity of subject and object

* Hegel. Werke, Vol. VI, Berlin, 1840; Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929. Ed.
** Hegel. Werke, Vol. V, Berlin, 1834, pp. 248-262; Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1939, pp. 224-237. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
... "This objectivity of the living is an organism; it is
the means and instrument of the end"...
(251) [227].
Encyclopedia § 219: ... "The inorganic nature subjugated by the living being
undergoes this because it is, in itself, the same as what life is for itself."
To reverse = pure materialism. Excellent, profound, correct!! And also NB: proves the extreme correctness and accuracy of the terms "an sich" and "für sich"*!!!
Further, the subsumption under logical categories of "sensibility" (Sensibilität), "irritability" (Irritabilität) -
this is something special, distinct from the general!! - and "reproduction" is an empty game. The central line is forgotten, the transition to the plane of natural phenomena.
And so on. "Pain is the 'actual existence' of contradiction" in the living individual.
Ridiculous in Hegel
Or again: the reproduction of humans...
"is their" (of 2 individuals of different sexes)
"realized identity, is the negative unity of the species reflecting itself
out of its duality"... (261)
[236].
Hegel and play with "organism"!!!
Hegel and play with "organic concepts"
NB

* - in itself and for itself. Ed.

LOGIC. VOLUME V.
III Section. The Idea.
II Chapter. The Idea of Cognition (p. 262-327 [237-295]).
subjective consciousness and its immersion in objectivity
... "Its* (des Begriffs*) reality in general is the form of its actual being; everything depends on the determination of this form; it is on this that the difference rests between what the concept is in itself or as subjective, and what it is when immersed in objectivity, and then in the idea of life" (263) [238].
mysticism
... "Spirit is not only infinitely richer than nature, but also... the absolute unity of the opposite in the concept constitutes the essence of spirit"... (264) [238-239].
?
mysticism!
For Kant, the "I" is "a certain transcendental subject of thoughts" (264) [239]; "and this I, in Kant's own words, has the inconvenience that for any judgment about it, we must constantly use it"...
(p. 265 [240])
"In his" (= Kant's) "critique of these definitions" (namely:
abstrakte einseitige
Hegel against
Kant:
i.e., that the "I" in Kant is an empty form ("self-suction") without
concrete analysis of the process of cognition

* - of the concept. Ed.

SUMMARY OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
tige Bestimmungen "der vormaligen - pre-Kantian -
Metaphysics"* about "soul") "he" (Kant) "simply followed Hume's
skeptical manner, namely, firmly standing on what the I is in self-consciousness, discarding from it, - since it was to be known as essence, as a thing-in-itself, - all
empirical; thus, nothing remained but this phenomenon: I think, - which accompanies all representations and about which we have no slightest conception" (266) [240].
Apparently, Hegel sees skepticism here in that
Hume and Kant do not see the appearing thing-in-itself in "appearances," they separate appearances from objective truth, doubt the objectivity of knowledge, alles Empirische separate,
weglassen, from Ding an sich...** And Hegel continues:
... "There can be no doubt that neither about the I nor about anything else, even about the concept itself, we have no slightest conception, as long as we do not grasp it in the concept, but stop at the simple, static representation and designation" (266) [240].
One cannot understand outside the process of understanding
(cognition, concrete study, etc.)
To understand, one must empirically begin to understand, to study, to rise from empiricism
to the general. To learn to swim, one must get into the water.
NB
NB:
Kant and
Hume - skeptics
In what does Hegel see the skepticism of Hume and
Kant?

* - abstract one-sided determinations of "the former - pre-Kantian - metaphysics." Ed.
** - all empirical is separated from the thing-in-itself. Ed.

The old metaphysics, striving to know the truth, divided objects,
by the criterion of truth, into substances and phenomena. Kant's critique abandoned the investigation of truth... "But to stop at appearances and
at what in ordinary consciousness turns out to be merely representation,
means to renounce the concept and philosophy" (269) [243-244].
§ A:
"The idea of truth. The subjective idea is, in the first instance, a drive... The drive
therefore has a determinacy consisting in that it negates its own subjectivity, transforms its still abstract reality into a concrete one and fills it with the content of the world, which is presupposed by its subjectivity... Since cognition is the idea as purpose or as a subjective idea, the negation of the presupposed
world as a thing-in-itself is the first negation"... (274-275) [248-249].
i.e., the first stage, moment, beginning, approach of cognition is its finitude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, the negation of the world-in-itself - the goal of cognition
is initially subjective...
"In a strange way in modern times" (clearly Kant)
"this side of the finite was fixed and recognized as the absolute relation of cognition, as if
the finite as such should be absolute! From this point of view, the object is ascribed some unknown property of being a thing-in-itself beyond cognition, and the latter, along with truth,
is considered as something absolutely transcendent in Kant
thing-in-itself absolute "Jenseits"*
Kant limits himself to "appearances"
Hegel against
Kant:
Kant elevated one side to the absolute

* - "transcendent." Ed.

SUMMARY OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
for cognition. The determinations of thought in general, categories, determinations of reflection, as well as the formal concept and its moments,
receive in this understanding a position not as determinations
that are finite in themselves, but finite in the sense that they
are something subjective compared to the mentioned empty
property of being a thing-in-itself; accepting this untrue relation of cognition as true is a delusion that has become the common opinion of modern times" (276) [250].
The finite, transient, relative, conditional character of human cognition (of its categories, causality, etc.) Kant took for subjectivism, and not
for the dialectic of the idea (= of nature itself), separating cognition from the object.
... "But cognition must, through its own movement, resolve its finitude and thereby its contradiction" (277) [250].
... "It is equally one-sided to conceive of analysis as if there were nothing in the object that was not put into it,
as it is one-sided to assume that the resulting determinations
are only extracted from it. The first conception is, as is well known, expressed by subjective idealism, which recognizes the activity of cognition in analysis as exclusively one-sided positing, behind which remains hidden the thing-in-itself; the second
Kant's subjectivism
But the course of cognition leads it to objective truth
Hegel against subjective idealism and "realism"

The concept belongs to what is called realism, which understands the subjective concept as an empty identity, receiving definitions of thought from outside.
... "But these two moments cannot be separated from each other; the logical in its abstract form, in which it appears in analysis, is certainly given only in cognition, just as, conversely, it is not only something posited but also something that exists in itself" ... (280) [253-254].
Logical concepts are subjective as long as they remain "abstract," in their abstract form, but at the same time, they express things in themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstraction and detachment, but objective in their totality, in the process, in the result, in the tendency, in the source.
Very good is § 225 of the Encyclopedia, where "cognition" ("theoretical") and "will," "practical activity," are depicted as two sides, two methods, two means of overcoming "one-sidedness" and subjectivity and objectivity.
Further, 281-282 [254-255] is very important on the transition of categories into one another (and against Kant, p. 282 [255]).
Logic, vol. V, p. 282 [VI, 255] (end)*
... "Kant... borrows a certain connection, i.e., the very concepts of relations and synthetic principles
Objectivity of logic
NB

* Here, V. I. Lenin's note transitions into the notebook "Hegel. Logic III (pp. 89-115)." Ed.

SYNOPSIS OF THE "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
from formal logic, taking them as given; their deduction should have been a representation of the transition of this simple unity of self-consciousness into such determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of indicating this truly synthetic progressive movement of the self-producing concept (282)
[255].
Kant did not show the transition of categories into one another.
286-287 [259-260] - Returning once again to higher mathematics (incidentally showing familiarity with how Gauss solved the equation \(X^m - 1 = 0\)), Hegel again touches on differential and integral calculus, stating that
"mathematics... has hitherto been unable to justify, by its own means, i.e., mathematically, those operations based on this transition" (transition from some quantities to others), "since this transition is not of a mathematical nature."
Leibniz, to whom the credit for the discovery of differential calculus is attributed, made this transition "in the most impermissible, completely foreign to the concept, and non-mathematical manner" ... (287) [259-260].
"Analytical cognition is the first premise of all inference - the immediate relation of the concept to the object; identity is therefore the determination that cognition recognizes as its own, and this cognition is merely the grasping of what is. Synthetic cognition aims at understanding what is, i.e., at comprehending the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. It is, therefore, the second premise of inference, in which the different as such is found to be related. Its aim, therefore, is necessity in general" (288) [260-261].
Regarding the method of some sciences (e.g., physics) to take various "forces," etc., and to stretch (adjust) facts, etc., for "explanation," Hegel makes the following insightful remark:

"The so-called explanation and proof of the specific material introduced into the theorems turns out to be partly tautology, partly a distortion of the true state of affairs; partly, this distortion served to cover up the deception of cognition, which one-sidedly selected experiments, thereby obtaining only its simple definitions and principles; and it eliminates objections drawn from experience by understanding and interpreting experience not in its concrete wholeness, but as an example, and moreover, from the side favorable to hypotheses and theories. In this subordination of concrete experience to preconceived definitions, the basis of the theory is obscured and shown only from the side that confirms the theory" (315-316) [285-286].
Old metaphysics, for example, Wolff's, with its ridiculous pretentiousness about trivialities, etc., was supposedly overthrown by Kant and Jacobi.
Kant showed that "strict proofs" lead to antinomies.
"But he (Kant) did not reflect on the nature of this proof, which is connected with some finite content; yet, one must fall along with the other" (317) [287].
Synthetic cognition is still not complete, for "the concept does not become the unity of itself with itself in its object or in its reality... Therefore, the idea does not yet attain truth in this cognition due to the non-correspondence of the object to the subjective concept. - But the sphere of necessity is the highest peak of being and reflection; it itself passes into
remarkably true and profound cf. bourgeois political economy
against subjectivism and one-sidedness i.e., Kant did not understand
the universal law of dialectics of the "finite"?

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT** "In the concept, internal identity transitions into its manifestation, which is the concept as a concept"...
... "The idea, insofar as the concept for itself now becomes a self-sufficient and determined concept, is a practical idea, an action" (319) [288-289]. The following section is titled "B: The Idea of Good."
Theoretical knowledge should present the object in its necessity, in its comprehensive relations, in its contradictory
movement *an und für sich*. But human concepts only fully grasp, capture, and master this objective truth of knowledge when the concept becomes "for itself being" in the sense of practice. That is, the practice of humans and humanity
is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of knowledge. Is this Hegel's thought? This needs to be revisited.
Why does the transition from practice, from action, lead only to "good," *das Gute*? This is narrow, one-sided! What about utility?
Undoubtedly, utility also enters into it. Or, according to Hegel, is this also *das Gute*?
All of this is in the chapter "The Idea of Knowledge" (Chapter II) - in the transition to "absolute idea"
(Chapter III) - that is, undoubtedly, practice stands with Hegel as a link in the analysis of the process of knowledge and precisely as a transition to objective ("absolute," according to Hegel)
truth. Marx, therefore, directly connects with Hegel by introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge: see the Theses on Feuerbach 97.
Hegel on practice and the objectivity of knowledge

* - *an und für sich*. Ed.

Practice in the theory of knowledge:
(320) [289] "As subjective, it" (the concept) "again presupposes some self-existing other; it is the striving to realize itself, a goal that
wants to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself and to fulfill itself. In the theoretical idea,
the subjective concept, as universal and devoid of determinations, stands opposed
to the objective world, from which it takes specific content and fulfillment. In the practical idea,
this concept, as actual, stands opposed to the actual; but the self-assurance inherent in the subject in its
self-existence and self-for-itself determined being, is assurance in
its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world...".

......

Alias*:
Human consciousness not only reflects the objective world but also creates it.
The concept (= human) as subjective again presupposes a self-existing other (= nature
independent of humans). This concept (= human) is the striving to realize itself,
to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself and to realize (fulfill) itself.
In the theoretical idea (in the realm of theory), the subjective concept (knowledge?) as general and devoid of determinacy, stands opposed
to the objective world, from which it draws specific content and fulfillment.
In the practical idea (in the realm of practice), this concept, as actual (acting?), stands opposed to the actual. The self-assurance that the subject here suddenly has, instead of "concept,"
in its self-existence and self-for-itself being, as a determined subject, is assurance in
its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world.

* - Otherwise, in other words. Ed.

**SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC." DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT**

That is, the world does not satisfy the human, and the human, through their action, decides
to change it.
... "This determination contained in the concept, equal to it and containing within itself
the demand for individual external actuality, is good. It appears with the dignity
of something absolute, since it is the totality of the concept within itself, the objective, which at the same time
possesses the form of free unity and subjectivity. This idea is higher than the idea of the previously examined
knowledge, for the former has the dignity not only of the universal but also of the simply actual"... (320-321)
[290].
Essence:
"The good" is "the demand for external actuality," that is, by "good" is meant human practice = the demand (1) and external actuality (2).
Practice is higher (than theoretical)
knowledge, for it has not only the merit of universality but also immediate actuality.
... "The activity of the goal is therefore not directed
towards itself for the purpose of taking in and assimilating
some given determination, but rather directed towards putting its own determination and giving itself reality in the form
of external actuality by negating the determinations of the external
world"... (321) [290]...
...
"The activity of the goal is not directed towards itself...
but towards giving itself reality in the form of external actuality by means of destroying certain (aspects, features, phenomena) of the external world"...

... "The good that is accomplished is good because it already exists in the subjective goal, in its
idea; accomplishment gives it some external existence"... (322) [291].
"From the side of the assumed objective world, in the assumption of which
consists the subjectivity and finitude of the good and which, as something else, goes its
own way, the very accomplishment of the good is subject to obstacles and even encounters impossibility"... + (322-323) [292].
The "objective world" "goes its own way," and human practice, facing this objective world, encounters "difficulties in realization" of the goal, even running into "impossibility"...
+ ... "Good thus remains a kind of ought; it is in itself
and for itself, but being as the ultimate, abstract immediacy remains in opposition to the good as also a kind of non-being"... + +
Good, benefit, good intentions remain SUBJECTIVE OUGHT...
+ + ... "The idea of the completed good is, indeed, a certain absolute postulate, but no more than a postulate, i.e., the absolute,
burdened with the determinacy of subjectivity. Here are still two
opposed worlds, the kingdom of subjectivity in pure spaces of transparent thought and the kingdom of objectivity in the element of some external, diverse actuality, which is the unopened kingdom of darkness. The full
development of the unresolved contradiction, formed by the indicated
absolute goal, which is irreconcilably opposed to
Two worlds:
subjective and objective

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
the barrier of this reality, examined more closely in "Phenomenology of Spirit," p. 453 and following... (323) [292].
Mockery of the pure "spaces of transparent thought" in the realm of subjectivity, which is opposed to the "darkness" of "objective," "variegated" reality.
... "In the latter" (= der theoretischen Idee as opposed to der praktischen Idee*)...
"cognition knows itself only as perception, as an inherently indeterminate identity of the concept with itself; the content, i.e., the self-determined and for-itself determined objectivity, is for the theoretical idea something given, and what is truly real is the existing, independent of subjective positing, reality. Conversely, for the practical idea, this reality, which at the same time confronts it as an insurmountable limit, has the significance of something inherently insignificant, which must receive its true determination and sole value through the ends of the good. Therefore, the will itself opposes the attainment of its goal by separating itself from cognition and by the external reality not retaining for it the form of the truly real; therefore, the idea of the good can find its complement only in the idea of truth" (323-324) [292-293].
Cognition... finds before it the truly real as an existing reality independent of subjective opinions (Setzen**). (This is pure materialism!) Human will, his practice, itself obstructs the attainment of its goal... by separating itself from cognition and
NB
Nota bene

* - the theoretical idea as opposed to the practical idea. Ed.
** - positing. Ed.

not recognizing external reality as the truly real (as objective truth). The union of cognition and practice is necessary.
And immediately after this:
... "But this transition it accomplishes through itself" (the transition of the idea of truth into the idea of the good, of theory into practice and vice versa*). "In the conclusion of action, the first premise is the immediate relation of the good end to the reality that this end masters and directs against external reality as an external means in the second premise" (324) [293].
"The conclusion of action"... For Hegel, action, practice, is a logical "conclusion," a figure of logic. And this is true! Of course, not in the sense that the figure of logic, in its other-being, has human practice (= absolute idealism), but vice versa: human practice, repeated billions of times, is consolidated in human consciousness as figures of logic. These figures have the tenacity of prejudice, an axiomatic character precisely (and only) because of this billion-fold repetition.
1st premise: the good end (subjective end) versus reality ("external reality")
2nd premise: the external means (instrument), (objective)
3rd premise, or conclusion: the coincidence of the subjective and the objective, the verification of subjective ideas, the criterion of objective truth.
... "The accomplishment of the good in spite of the opposing, other reality, is the mediation that is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the actual realization of the good"...
... "But if the end of the good were not thereby" (by activity) "fulfilled, then this would be a return of the concept to the point of view it had before its activity, to the point of view from which reality is defined as insignificant and yet presupposed as real; this return becomes a progress into the bad infinity and has its sole basis in the fact that, in the negation of the indicated abstract reality, this negation is also immediately forgotten, or it is forgotten that this reality, on the contrary, was already presupposed as inherently insignificant, non-objective reality" (325) [294].
The non-fulfillment of goals (of human activity) has as its cause (Grund) the fact that reality is taken as non-existent (nichtig), that its (reality's) objective actuality is not recognized.
"Since, through the activity of the objective concept, external reality is changed and its determination is thereby negated, it is precisely thereby deprived of the character of exclusively apparent reality, external determinability, and insignificance, and is thereby posited as being-in-itself and for-itself"...
Human activity, having formed an objective picture of the world, changes external reality, abolishes its determinacy (= changes one or another of its aspects, qualities), and thereby deprives it of the characteristics of appearance, externality, and insignificance, making it self-subsistent and self-related (= objectively true).
NB
NB
NB

+ ... "This generally removes the indicated assumption, namely, the definition of good as a merely subjective and in its content limited goal, the necessity to realize the latter through subjective activity, and this very activity.
As a result, the mediation cancels itself out; the result is immediacy, which is not a restoration of the assumption, but, on the contrary, its negation. Thus, the idea, in itself and for itself, is already posited not only in the acting subject, but also as a certain immediate reality, and, conversely, the latter, as it is in cognition, is posited such that it is true and essential objectivity" (326) [295].
The result of action is the verification of subjective cognition and the criterion of TRUE AND ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVITY.
... "In this result, cognition is thereby restored and united with the practical idea, the pre-found reality is determined at the same time as the accomplished absolute goal; but not as in seeking cognition, only as an objective world devoid of the subjectivity of the concept, but as such an objective world, the inner foundation and actual existence of which is the concept. This is the absolute idea" (327) [295]. ((End of Chapter II. Transition to Chapter III: "Absolute Idea".))
Chapter III: "Absolute Idea".
... "The absolute idea, as it turns out, is the identity of the theoretical and practical ideas, each of which, for itself, is still one-sided" (327) [296].
The unity of the theoretical idea (cognition) and practice - this is important - and this unity precisely in the theory of cognition, for in sum it results in the "absolute idea" (and idea = "das objektive Wahre"*), vol. V, 236 [VI, 214].

* - "objectively true". Ed.

CONCEPTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
It remains, then, to consider not the *content*, but... "the universality of its form, i.e., the method" (329) [298].
"In seeking cognition, the method is also an instrument, a certain means standing on the subjective side, through which it relates to the object... On the contrary, in true cognition, the method is not only a multitude of known determinations, but in itself and for itself the determination of the concept, which is the middle term (in the logical figure of the syllogism) because it also has the significance of the objective" (331) [299-300].
... "On the contrary, the absolute method" (i.e., the method of knowing objective truth) "does not manifest itself as external reflection, but takes the determinate from its own subject, since this method itself is its immanent principle and soul. - This is what Plato demanded of cognition, to consider things in themselves, partly in their universality, partly without deviating from them and without grasping at incidental circumstances, examples, and comparisons, but to have these things alone before oneself and to bring to consciousness what is immanent in them" (335-336) [303].
This method of "absolute cognition" is analytical, ... "but it is also synthetic" (336) [303-304].
"This so much synthetic as analytical moment of judgment, whereby the initial generality determines itself as the other of itself, is to be called dialectical" (336) [304] (+ see next page)**.
"This equally synthetic as well as analytical moment of judgment, by virtue of which the initial generality, the general concept, determines itself as the other in relation to itself, must be called dialectical."
Not a clear definition!!
One of the definitions of dialectics

* - content. Ed.
** In the manuscript, a bracket begins with a pointer indicating the paragraph "Dialectic is...," located on the following page of the manuscript (see the present volume, p. 204). Ed.

1) The definition of the concept itself, the thing in its relations and in its development, should be considered;
2) the contradictory nature within the thing (its *other*), contradictory forces and tendencies in every phenomenon;
3) the combination of analysis and synthesis.
These seem to be the elements of dialectics.
Perhaps, these elements can be presented in more detail as follows:
1) the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not digressions, but the thing in itself).
2) the entire complex of diverse relations of this thing to others.
3) the development of this thing (respectively, the phenomenon), its own movement, its own life.
4) internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing.
5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of opposites.
6) the struggle or unfolding of these opposites, contradictory tendencies, etc.
7) the combination of analysis and synthesis, the dissection of individual parts and the totality, the summation of these parts together.
Elements of dialectics

* - Other of itself. Ed.
** - respectively. Ed.

CONCEPTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
8) the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only diverse but universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with every other.
9) not only the unity of opposites, but transitions of each determination, quality, feature, aspect, property into each other, into their opposite?
10) the infinite process of revealing new aspects, relations, etc.
11) the infinite process of deepening human knowledge of things, phenomena, processes, etc., from phenomena to essence, and from less profound to more profound essence.
12) from coexistence to causality and from one form of connection and interdependence to another, more profound, more general.
13) the repetition in a higher stage of known features, properties, etc., of the lower.
14) the return, seemingly, to the old.
15) the struggle of content with form and vice versa. Shedding of form, reworking of content.
16) the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. ((15 and 16 are examples of 9.))
Briefly, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This captures the core of dialectics, but it requires explanation and elaboration.
negation of negation

+ (continuation. See the previous page.*)
... "Dialectics is one of those ancient sciences which has been most ignored in metaphysics—here clearly = the theory of knowledge and logic of the new philosophers, and then generally in popular philosophy, both ancient and modern"... Diogenes Laertius said of Plato that he was the initiator of dialectics, the third philosophical science (as Thales was of natural philosophy, Socrates of moral philosophy) 98, but little thought is given to this merit of Plato by those who especially shout about it...
... "Dialectics has often been considered as a kind of art, as if it were based on some subjective talent, rather than belonging to the objectivity of the concept"...
(336-337) [304]. Kant's important merit is to reintroduce dialectics, to recognize it as a "necessary" (property) of "reason" (337) [304], but the result (of applying dialectics) should be "opposite" (to Kantianism) see below.
What follows is a very interesting, clear, and important outline of dialectics:
... "Apart from the fact that dialectics is usually seen as something accidental, it commonly takes the more detailed form of indicating, with regard to some subject, for example, the world, motion, point, etc., that it has some determination, for example, in the order mentioned: finitude in space or time, being in this place, absolute negation of space; but also, further, that the opposite determination is equally necessary, for example, infinity in space and time, not being in this place, relation to space and thereby spatiality. The older Eleatic school applied its dialectics primarily against motion, while Plato often used it against the conceptions and concepts of his time, especially against the sophists, but also against pure categories and reflective determinations; later, developed skepticism extended it not only to immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of everyday life, but also to all scientific concepts. The consequence drawn from such dialectics is generally the contradictoriness and nullity of accepted assertions. But such a result can have a twofold meaning: either the objective meaning, that the subject itself, thus contradicting itself, sublates and annihilates itself (for example, the conclusion of the Eleatics, which denied the truth of the world, motion, point); or the subjective meaning, according to which cognition is unsatisfactory. Or the latter conclusion is understood to mean that this very dialectic produces a trick, creating such a false appearance. This is the usual view of so-called common sense, which clings to sensory evidence and habitual
from the history of dialectics the role of skepticism in the history of dialectics
dialectics is understood as a trick conceptions and statements"… (337-338) [304-305].
For example, Diogenes the Cynic 99 proves motion by walking, which Hegel calls a "vulgar refutation."
... "Or the conclusion about the subjective nullity of dialectics concerns not dialectics itself, but rather the cognition against which it is directed, namely in the spirit of skepticism, and likewise in the sense of Kantian philosophy, against cognition in general."
... "The main prejudice here is that dialectics has only a negative result" (338) [306].
Incidentally, Kant's merit is to draw attention to dialectics and to the consideration of "determinations of thought in themselves and for themselves" (339) [306].
"The subject, as it is without thinking and without concept, is some representation or even just a name; only in the determinations of thinking and concept is it what it is"...
... "Therefore, it cannot be considered the fault of any subject or cognition if, by their nature or due to some external connection, they show themselves to be dialectical"...
... "Thus, all opposites, recognized as something stable, for example, finite and infinite, individual and universal, are contradictions not through any external combination, but, on the contrary, as an examination of their nature shows, they themselves are a certain transition"… (339) [307].
"This is the same point of view mentioned above, according to which a certain universal first, considered in itself, turns out to be other in relation to itself"...
... "but this other is essentially not a mere negative, not a nothing, which is the usual result of dialectics, but the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is, therefore, determined as mediated, generally containing within itself the determination of the first. Thus, the first, essentially, is also preserved and retained in the other. - To retain the positive in its negative, the content of the premise in its result, this is the most important in rational cognition; at the same time, it requires only the simplest reflection to be convinced of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, and as for examples to prove this, the whole of logic consists of them" (340) [307-308].
Not bare negation, not empty negation, not skeptical negation, hesitation, doubt, is characteristic and essential in dialectics, - which, undoubtedly, contains an element of negation and, moreover, as its most important element, - no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, with the retention of the positive, i.e., without any hesitation, without any eclecticism.
nature = transition
The first general concept (and = the first to come, any general concept)
This is very important for understanding dialectics

* - nothing else. Ed.

CONCEPT OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF CONCEPT
* See this volume, p. 201. Ed.

Page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript
Outline of Hegel's book "Science of Logic." - September - December 1914

Dialectics in general consists in the negation of the first position, in its replacement by the second (in the transition of the first into the second, in indicating the connection between the first and the second, etc.). The second can be made the predicate of the first—
"for example, the finite is the infinite, the one is the many, the individual is the universal"... (341) [308].
... "Since the first, or immediate, is a concept in itself, and therefore proves to be negative only in itself, the dialectical moment of the latter consists in the fact that the difference contained within it is posited within it. On the contrary, the second is itself something definite, a difference or relation; its dialectical moment, therefore, consists in positing the unity contained within it"... - (341-342) [309].
(In relation to simple and primary, "first" positive affirmations, propositions, etc., the "dialectical moment," i.e., scientific consideration, requires indicating the difference, connection, and transition. Without this, a simple positive affirmation is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In relation to the "second," the negative position, the "dialectical moment" requires indicating "unity," i.e., the connection of the negative with the positive, finding this positive in the negative. From affirmation to negation—from negation to "unity" with the affirmed—without this, dialectics becomes bare negation, play, or skepticism.)
... - "If, therefore, the negative, the definite, the relation, the judgment, and all that is implied by this second moment of determination are not already in themselves contradictory and dialectical, this simply depends on the deficiency of thought, which does not bring its thoughts together. For the material—opposing determinations in one relation—is already posited and present for thinking. But formal thinking makes identity, 'in itself' = in potential, still undeveloped, still unexpanded, a law for itself.

CONCEPT OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
reduces the contradictory content before it to the sphere of representation, to space and time, in which the contradictory is held apart from each other in coexistence and succession, and thus appears before consciousness without mutual contact" (342) [309].
"Appears before consciousness without mutual contact" (the object)—this is the essence of anti-dialectics. Here, Hegel seems to have shown the donkey's ears of idealism—by referring time and space (in connection with representation) to something lower than thought. However, in a certain sense, representation is, of course, lower. The point is that thought must encompass all "representation" in its movement, and for this, thought must be dialectical. Is representation closer to reality than thought? Yes and no. Representation cannot grasp movement as a whole, for example, it does not grasp movement at the speed of 300,000 km per second, but thought grasps and must grasp it. Thought, taken from representation, also reflects reality; time is a form of being of objective reality. Here, in the concept of time (and not in the relation of representation to thought), is Hegel's idealism.
... "It* sets for itself a definite proposition that contradiction is unthinkable; in fact, however, the thought of contradiction is an essential moment of the concept. Formal thinking actually thinks contradiction, but immediately turns a blind eye to it and in the mentioned statement" (in the saying that contradiction is unthinkable) "moves only to abstract negation."
"The negativity just considered forms the turning point in the movement of the concept. It is the simple point of negative relation to itself, the inner
NB

* Formal thinking. Ed.

source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul, which all truth has in itself and through which it alone is truth; for it is solely on this subjectivity that the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality and the unity, which is truth, is based. - The second negation, the negation of the negation, to which we have come, is the indicated sublation of the contradiction, but this sublation, like the contradiction, is not the action of some external reflection; it is the most profound, the most objective moment of life and spirit, through which the subject, the person, the free, has being" (342-343) [309-310].
Here, what is important: 1) the characterization of dialectics: self-movement, the source of activity, the movement of life and spirit; the coincidence of the concepts of the subject (human) with reality; 2) the highest degree of objectivity ("das objektivste Moment"*).
This negation of the negation is the third member, says Hegel (343) [310]—"if one wishes to count it so"—but it can also be recognized as the fourth (Quadruplicitat**) (344) [311], counting two negations: "simple" (or "formal") and "absolute" (343 i. f.) [310-311].
The distinction is unclear to me, is the absolute not more concrete?
NB:
"triad" of dialectics is its external, superficial side
"Although this unity, as well as the entire form of the method—the triad—is merely a completely superficial
external aspect of the way of knowing" (344) [311] the essence of dialectics, the criterion of truth, the unity of concept and reality

* - "the most objective moment." Ed.
** - quadruplicity. Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
- but, he says, it is already an "infinite merit of Kant's philosophy" that even if it (let it be ohne Begriff*) is indicated.
"Formalism, indeed, also adopted the triad and clung to its empty schema; but the superficiality, scandalousness, and emptiness of contemporary, so-called philosophical construction, which consists solely in thrusting this formal schema everywhere, without concept and immanent determination, and using it to establish an external order, has made this form tedious and earned it a bad reputation. However, due to the banality of this usage, it cannot yet lose its intrinsic value, and it should still be highly valued that, thereby, at least a form of the rational, though not yet grasped in concepts, has been found" (344-345) [311].
The result of the negation of the negation, this third, is not... "a resting third, but rather this unity" (of opposites), "which is a self-mediating movement and activity"... (345) [312].
The result of this dialectical transformation into the "third," into the synthesis, is a new premise, an affirmation, etc., which again becomes the source of further analysis.
But into this "third" stage, the "content" of knowledge ("the content of knowledge as such enters into the circle of consideration") - and the method expands into a system (346) [313].
The beginning of all reasoning, all analysis, this first premise, now seems indefinite, "imperfect," and there arises the need to prove, "to derive" (ableiten) it, which "may seem to require an infinite, regressive progress in proof and derivation" (347) [313-314] - but on the other hand, the new premise pushes forward...
Hegel harshly criticizes formalism, tedium, and the emptiness of playing with dialectics

* - without concept. Ed.

... "Cognition moves from content to content. First of all, this progressive movement is characterized by the fact that it begins with simple determinations and that the subsequent ones become richer and more concrete. For the result contains within itself its beginning, and the movement of the latter has enriched it with some new determination. The universal forms the basis; therefore, the progressive movement should not be taken as a flow from one thing to another.
In the absolute method, the concept is preserved in its other-being, the universal in its isolation, in judgment and reality; at each stage of further determination, the universal elevates the entire mass of its preceding content and not only loses nothing due to its dialectical progressive movement and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that has been acquired, and is enriched and condensed within itself"... (349) [315].
This passage very well summarizes what dialectics is.
But expansion also requires deepening (In-sich-gehen*) "and greater expansion is equally higher intensity."
"The richest is, therefore, the most concrete and the most subjective, and that which returns to the simplest depth - the most powerful and predominant" (349) [316].
"Thus, every step forward in the progressive movement, every further determination, moving away from the indefinite beginning, is also a return to the latter, and thereby what initially seemed different - the backward justification of the beginning and the forward further determination of it - coincide and are one and the same" (350) [316].
This N.B.:
The richest is the most concrete and the most subjective

* - "going into itself." Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
This indefinite beginning cannot be deprezieren*:
... "there is no need to apologize for the fact that it" (the beginning)
"can be accepted only provisionally and hypothetically.
What could be objected to it, for example, that human cognition is limited and that, before embarking on the task, the instrument of cognition must be critically examined, these are also premises, which, as specific determinations, lead to the requirement of their mediation and justification. Since they thus formally have no advantage over starting with the subject, against which they protest, and, due to their more specific content, rather need to be derived, it should, on the contrary, be considered empty pretensions to claim that they should be given more attention than anything else. Their content is untrue, for they turn something finite and untrue, namely, some limited cognition, determined as form and instrument in relation to its content, into something unalterable and absolute; this untrue cognition is also a form, a justification that goes back. The method of truth also recognizes the beginning as imperfect, since it is a beginning, but at the same time, it knows this imperfection generally as necessary, for truth is nothing other than coming to itself through the negativity of immediacy"... (350-351) [316-317].
N.B.:
Hegel against
Kant against
Kant (correct)

* - devalue. Ed.

... "Due to the aforementioned nature of the method, science appears as a certain self-enclosed circle, into the beginning of which, the simple foundation, the end is woven through mediation; moreover, this circle is a circle of circles... The links in this chain are individual sciences" ... (351) [318].
"The method is a pure concept, referring only to itself; it is therefore that simple relation to itself which is being. But it is now also a filled being, a concept that comprehends itself, being as a concrete and equally intense totality"...
... "Secondly, this idea" ((die Idee des absoluten Erkennens**))
"is still a logical idea, enclosed in pure thought, it is still only the science of the divine concept. Its systematic development, indeed, is a certain realization, but contained within this same sphere. Since the pure idea of cognition is thereby enclosed in subjectivity, it is an urge to overcome the latter, and pure truth, as the final result, becomes also the beginning of some other sphere and science. This transition is required here only to be indicated.
Namely, while the idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure concept and its reality, and thus includes itself in the immediacy of being, as a totality in this form it is nature" (352-353) [318-319].
NB:
the connection of the dialectical method with "erfulltes
Sein"*, with being full of content and concrete
Science is a circle of circles
Transition from idea to nature...

* - "filled being". Ed.
** - the idea of absolute cognition. Ed.

CONCISE OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT
This phrase on the last, 353rd [319] page of Logic is extraordinarily remarkable. The transition of the logical idea to nature. It is a step away from materialism. Engels was right that Hegel's system is inverted materialism 101. This is not the last phrase of the Logic, but what follows until the end of the page is unimportant.

End of "Logic." December 17, 1914.
Remarkably, the entire chapter on the "absolute idea" hardly mentions God (perhaps once, incidentally, the word "divine" "concept"*) appeared, and besides - this is NB - it contains almost no specific idealism, but its main subject is the dialectical method. The conclusion and summary, the last word and essence of Hegel's logic is the dialectical method - this is extremely remarkable. And one more thing: in this most idealistic work of Hegel, there is the least idealism and the most materialism. "Contradictory," but a fact!

Volume VI, p. 399 [I, 332-333]:
Encyclopedia § 227 - excellent on the analytical method ("to decompose" "the given concrete" phenomenon - "into
NB:
In the smaller Logic (Encyclopedia § 244, Zusatz*
p. 414**
[344]***), the last sentence
of the book is:
"diese seiende
Idee aber ist die
Natur"****
NB

* - addition. Ed.
** Hegel. Works, Vol. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
*** Hegel. Collected Works, Vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929. Ed.
**** - "but this existing idea is nature." Ed.

abstract forms" of its individual aspects and "herausheben"* "the genus or force and law"), p. 398 - and on its application:
It is by no means "a matter of our discretion" (398) [332], whether to apply the analytical or synthetic method (as man pflegt zu sprechen**) - this depends "on the form of the objects themselves to be known."
Locke and empiricists stand on the point of view of analysis. And they often say that "knowledge can do no more" (399) [332].
"But it immediately becomes clear that this is a perversion of things and that knowledge, wishing to take things as they are, falls into contradiction with itself." For example, a chemist "martert"*** a piece of meat and discovers nitrogen, carbon, etc. "But these abstract substances are no longer meat."
There can be many definitions, for there are many aspects in objects:
"The richer the object to be defined, i.e., the more different sides it presents for consideration, the more varied can be the definitions based on them" (400 [334] § 229) - for example, the definition of life, state, etc.
Spinoza and Schelling give a multitude of "speculative" (obviously, Hegel uses this word here in a good sense) in their definitions, but "in the form of a simple assertion."
Philosophy, however, must prove and deduce everything, and not limit itself to definitions.
NB:
"genus or force and law" (genus = law!)
Very true!
Cf. Marx's remark in "Capital"
I,5.2 102

* - "to extract." Ed.
** - as is commonly said. Ed.
*** - "tortures." Ed.

SUMMARY OF "SCIENCE OF LOGIC". DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT

Division (Einteilung) should be "natural, not purely artificial, i.e., arbitrary" (401) [334].

Pages 403-404 [336] - against "construction" and "play" in construction, whereas the matter is about "concept," "idea," "unity of concept and objectivity"... (403) [336].

In the smaller Encyclopedia § 233, section b is titled *Das Wollen* (that which in the larger Logic is "Die Idee des Guten"**).

Activity is a "contradiction" - the goal is both valid and invalid, possible and not... and so on.

"Formally, the disappearance of this contradiction consists in the fact that activity removes the subjectivity of the goal, and thereby also the objectivity, removing the opposition by virtue of which both were finite, not only the one-sidedness of the given subjectivity, but subjectivity in general" (406) [338].

The viewpoint of Kant and Fichte (especially in moral philosophy) is the viewpoint of the goal, subjective ought (407) [338-339] (disconnected from the objective)...

Speaking of the absolute idea, Hegel ridicules (§ 237, vol. VI, p. 409 [340]) the "declamations" about it, as if everything is revealed in it, and notes that the "absolute idea"... is... "universal," "but this universal is not simply an abstract form, to which (sic!) all specific content stands opposed as something other, but as an absolute form into which all determinations, the fullness of the content it has posited, have returned. In this respect, the absolute idea can be compared to an old man who utters the same religious truths as a child, but for whom they have the significance of his entire life. The child also understands the religious content, but for him, it has significance only as something outside of which lies an entire life and the whole world."

tres bien!
A splendid comparison!
Instead of vulgar religion, one should take various abstract
truths

* - Willing, desire. Ed.
** - "Idea of the Good." Ed.

... "The interest lies in the entire movement"... (§ 237, p. 409 [341]).
"The content is the living development of the idea"... "Any of the previously considered stages is an image of the absolute, but first of all in a limited sense"... (410) [341].
§ 238, addition:
"The method of philosophy is at the same time synthetic and
analytic; but not in the sense that these two methods of finite knowledge are placed side by side or simply alternate, but
in such a way that both are contained in the philosophical method in a sublated form, and it acts simultaneously analytically and synthetically in each of its movements. Philosophical thinking acts analytically insofar as it merely apprehends
its subject - the idea, allowing it to act freely and as if merely observing its movement and development. To this extent, philosophizing is entirely passive. But at the same time, philosophical thinking is synthetic and manifests itself as the activity of the concept itself.
The philosophical method also requires abstaining from accidental personal assumptions and from particular opinions, which constantly seek to assert themselves"... (411) [342].
(§ 243, p. 413 [344])... "Thus, the method is not an external form, but the soul and the concept of the content"...
(End of the Encyclopedia; see the excerpt from the end of the Logic* above on the side.)
charming!
tres bien very good!
(and vivid)

* See the present volume, p. 215. The following pages in the notebook are blank; at the end of the notebook, there are notes "On Recent Literature about Hegel" and a note on the review of Perren's book (see the present volume, pp. 347-351). Ed.