V. I.

Lenin

The newspapers have already had a good deal to say about
the conference held on March 1 between government spokes men and certain
members of the Duma; however, the importance of this conference as far as
the position and aims of the “opposition” in the Duma is concerned, has
not by any means been sufficiently highlighted.

We would remind our readers that just before March 1 a number of
liberal newspapers in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the provinces, raised and
animatedly discussed the general question of a Duma in the doldrums, the
Duma’s impotence and lifelessness, of members fleeing from the Duma, the
aims of the opposition, and so forth.

Just before March 1, Milyukov and Shingaryov, the most outstanding
leaders of the “Constitutional-Democratic” Party, came out in the
St. Petersburg and Moscow press against Mr. Struve for his appeals for
“reform of the government”, as well as against the Right-wing Cadet
V. Maklakov for his “pessimistic-optimistic” appeals for an agreement
with the Octobrists. Just before March 1, Mr. Milyukov did his utmost to
pose as an opponent of Vekhism, i.e., of consistent and avowed
counter-revolutionary liberalism. [1]

The composition and the character of the March 1 Conference proved once
again that all the flimsy reservations made by the
Constitutional-Democratic Party leaders against P. Struve and V. Maklakov,
all their efforts to pose as being “more Left” than the aforesaid
politicians, are sheer hypocrisy and an attempt to hoodwink democrats. In actual fact it was the
policy of the Vekhists among the liberals that triumphed at this
conference, the policy of Struve and V. Maklakov, not of Messrs. Milyukov,
Shingaryov and Co., the Constitutional-Democratic Party’s official leaders
and diplomats.

The conference was attended only by representatives of the government
parties and of the liberal-bourgeois opposition; neither the
Social-Democrats nor the Trudoviks ( bourgeios democrats) were invited (on the pretext that they are “anti-militarists on
principle, and always vote against all war credits”. The real reason,
however, is that the sponsors did not want to receive a reasoned and public
refusal, which would certainly have been forthcoming, at least from the
Social-Democrats).

When the opposition members—according to a most official report in
Rech —“ attempted to raise the question of our domestic policies ” they were told that the only question that could be
discussed was that of war credits, and that “government spokesmen do not
deem it possible at this conference to make any statements on questions
concerning domestic policies”.

“ Nevertheless ,” wrote fleck , “several deputies, among them I. N. Yefremov, A. I. Shingaryov and others, did , in
their speeches, touch upon questions concerning the internal
situation.”

So much the more irrelevant, ridiculous, absurd and undignified, it must be said concerning this statement, was the role played
by the Cadet, Constitutional-Democratic, deputies. Were their party called
the Moderate Liberal-Monarchist Party, i.e., a name truly expressing its
class nature and its real political character, the conduct of the
Constitutional-Democratic deputies would have been quite normal from the
party point of view. But for people who wish to be considered democrats,
for people among whom even such Right-wingers as V. Maklakov publicly
declare that they have lost faith “in the possibility of a way
being found out of the impasse without revolutionary upheavals and
cataclysms” (this is exactly how Mr. Shingaryov himself expounded
V. Maklakov’s views in Rech No. 55, for February 26; and
Mr. Milyukov himself wrote in the same vein in the issue of that paper for February 25)—for such people, participation in a
conference with the Rights and Octobrists was a public slap in the face.

The Constitutional-Democrats slapped their own faces. By participating
in the conference they publicly repudiated their own statements about their
“loss of faith”. They publicly demonstrated their readiness to prove that
their faith was alive , and this is tantamount to readiness to
serve and be subservient.

Trust the Cadets to understand perfectly both the inseverable
connection that exists between home and foreign policies and the
significance of “allocating credits”....

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Notes:
[1]
See pp. 129–31 of this volume.— Ed .