V. I.

Lenin

The Conference of the Central Committee has adopted a resolution on the national
question, [1] which has been printed in the “Notification”, and has placed the question
of a national programme on the agenda of the Congress.

Why and how the national question has, at the present time, been
brought to the fore—in the entire policy of the counter-revolution, in
the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie and in the proletarian
Social-Democratic Party of Russia—is shown in detail in the resolution
itself. There is hardly any need to dwell on this in view of the clarity of
the situation. This situation and the fundamentals of a national programme
for Social-Democracy have recently been dealt with in Marxist theoretical
literature (the most prominent place being taken by Stalin’s
article  [2] ). We there fore consider that it will be to the point if,
in this article, we confine ourselves to the presentation of the problem
from a purely Party standpoint and to explanations that cannot be made in
the legal press, crushed as it is by the Stolypin-Maklakov oppression.

Social-Democracy in Russia is taking shape by drawing exclusively on
the experience of older countries, i.e., of Europe, and on the theoretical
expression of that experience, Marxism. The specific feature of our country
and the specific features of the historical period of the establishment of
Social-Democracy in our country are: first, in our country, as distinct
from Europe, Social-Democracy began to take shape before the
bourgeois revolution and continued taking shape during that
revolution. Secondly, in our country the inevitable struggle to separate proletarian from general bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois democracy—a struggle that is fundamentally the same as
that experienced by every country—is being conducted under the conditions
of a complete theoretical victory of Marxism in the West and in our
country. The form taken by this struggle, therefore, is not so much that of
a struggle for Marxism as a struggle for or against petty-bourgeois
theories that are hidden behind “almost Marxist” phrases.

That is how the matter stands, beginning with Economism (1895–1901)
and “legal Marxism” (1895–1901, 1902). Only those who shrink from
historical truth can forget the close, intimate connection and relationship
between these trends and Menshevism (1903–07) and liquidationism
(1908–13).

In the national question the old Iskra , which in 1901–03
worked on and completed a programme for the R.S.D.L.P. as well as laying
the first and fundamental basis of Marxism in the theory and practice of
the Russian working-class movement, had to struggle, in the same way as on
other questions, against petty-bourgeois opportunism. This opportunism was
expressed, first and foremost, in the nationalist tendencies and waverings
of the Bund. The old Iskra conducted a stubborn struggle against
Bund nationalism, and to forget this is tantamount to becoming a Forgetful
John again, and cutting oneself off from the historical and ideological
roots of the whole Social-Democratic workers’ movement in Russia.

On the other hand, when the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. was finally
adopted at the Second Congress in August 1903, there was a struggle,
unrecorded in the Minutes of the Congress because it took place in the
Programme Commission , which was visited by almost the entire
Congress—a struggle against the clumsy attempts of several Polish
Social-Democrats to cast doubts on “the right, of nations to
self-determination”, i.e., attempts to deviate towards opportunism and
nationalism from a quite different angle.

And today, ten years later, the struggle goes on along those same two
basic lines , which shows equally that there is a profound
connection between this struggle and all the objective conditions affecting
the national question in Russia.

At the Br\"unn Congress in Austria (1899) the programme of
“cultural-national autonomy” (defended by Kristan, Ellenbogen and others
and expressed in the draft of the Southern Slavs) was rejected . Territorial national autonomy was adopted, and
Social-Democratic propaganda for the obligatory union of all national
regions was only a compromise with the idea of “cultural-national
autonomy”. The chief theoreticians of this unfortunate idea themselves lay
particular emphasis on its inapplicability to Jewry.

In Russia—as usual—people have been found who have made it their
business to enlarge on a little opportunist error and develop it into a
system of opportunist policy. In the same way as Bernstein in Germany
brought into being the Right Constitutional-Democrats in Russia—Struve,
Bulgakov, Tugan & Co.—so Otto Bauer’s “forgetfulness of
internationalism” (as the supercautious Kautsky calls it!) gave rise in Russia to the complete acceptance of “cultural
national autonomy” by all the Jewish bourgeois parties and a
large number of petty-bourgeois trends (the Bund and a conference
of Socialist-Revolutionary national parties in 1907). Backward Russia
serves, one might say, as an example of how the microbes of West-European
opportunism pro duce whole epidemics on our savage soil.

In Russia people are fond of saying that Bernstein is “tolerated” in
Europe, but they forget to add that nowhere in the world, with the
exception of “holy” Mother Russia, has Bernsteinism engendered
Struvism, [3] or has “Bauerism” led to the justification, by
Social-Democrats, of the re fined nationalism of the Jewish bourgeoisie.

“ Cultural-national autonomy” implies precisely the most refined and,
therefore, the most harmful nationalism, it implies the corruption of the
workers by means of the slogan of national culture and the propaganda of
the profoundly harmful and even anti-democratic segregating of schools
according to nationality. In short, this programme undoubtedly contradicts
the internationalism of the proletariat and is in accordance only with the
ideals of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

But there is one case in which the Marxists are duty bound, if
they do not want to betray democracy and the proletariat, to defend one
special demand in the national question; that is, the right of nations to self-determination (§ 9 of
the R.S.D.L.P. Programme), i.e., the right to political secession. The
Conference resolution explains and motivates this demand in such detail
that there is no place left for misunderstanding.

We shall, therefore, give only a brief description of those amazingly
ignorant and opportunist objections that have been raised against this
section of the Programme. In connection with this let us mention that
in the course of the ten years ’ existence of the Programme not one single unit of the R.S.D.L.P., not one single national
organisation, not one single regional conference, not one local committee
and not one delegate to a congress or conference, has attempted to raise
the question of changing or annulling § 9!

It is necessary to bear this in mind. It shows us at once whether there
is a grain of seriousness or Party spirit in the objections raised to this
point.

Take Mr. Semkovsky of the liquidators’ newspaper. With the casual air
of a man who has liquidated a party, he announces: “For certain reasons we
do not share Rosa Luxemburg’s proposal to remove § 9 from the
Programme altogether” ( Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta No. 71).

So the reasons are a secret! But then, how can secrecy be avoided in
face of such ignorance of the history of our Programme? Or when that same
Mr. Semkovsky, incomparably casual (what do the Party and the Programme
matter!) makes an exception for Finland?

“ What are we to do ... if the Polish proletariat wants
to carry on a joint struggle together with the whole proletariat of Russia
within the framework of one state, and the reactionary classes of Polish
society, on the contrary, want to separate Poland from Russia and, through
a referendum, obtain a majority of votes in favour of separation; are we,
Russian Social-Democrats, to vote in a central parliament together with our
Polish comrades against secession, or, in order not to infringe on
the ‘right to self-determination’, vote in favour of secession?”

What, indeed, are we to do when such na\"ive and so hopelessly confused
questions are raised?

The right to self-determination, my dear Mr. Liquidator,
certainly does not imply the solution of the problem by a central
parliament, but by a parliament, a diet, or a referendum of the
seceding minority . When Norway seceded from Sweden (1905) it was decided by Norway alone (a country half
the size of Sweden).

Even a child could see that Mr. Semkovsky is hopelessly mixed up.

“ The right to self-determination” implies a democratic system of a type in which there is not only democracy in general, but
specifically one in which there could not be an undemocratic
solution of the question of secession. Democracy, speaking generally, is
compatible with militant and tyrannical nationalism. The proletariat
demands a democracy that rules out the forcible retention of any
one of the nations within the bounds of the state. “In order not to
infringe on the right to self-determination”, therefore, we are duty bound
not “to vote for secession”, as the wily Mr. Semkovsky assumes,
but to vote for the right of the seceding region to decide the question
itself .

It would seem that even with Mr. Semkovsky’s mental abilities it is not
difficult to deduce that “the right to divorce” does not require
that one should vote for divorce! But such is the fate of those
who criticise § 9—they forget the ABC of logic.

At the time of Norway’s secession from Sweden, the Swedish proletariat,
if they did not want to follow the nationalist petty bourgeoisie, were
duty bound to vote and agitate against the annexation of Norway by
force, as the Swedish priesthood and landed proprietors desired. This is
obvious and not too difficult to understand. Swedish nationalist democrats
could refrain from a type of agitation that the principle of the
right to self-determination demands of the proletariat of
ruling, oppressor nations .

“ What are we to do if the reactionaries are in the majority?” asks
Mr. Semkovsky. This is a question worthy of a third-form schoolboy. What is
to be done about the Russian constitution if democratic voting
gives the reactionaries a majority? Mr. Semkovsky asks idle, empty
questions that have nothing to do with the matter in hand—they are the
kind of questions that, as it is said, seven fools can ask more of than
seventy wise men can answer.

When a democratic vote gives the reactionaries a majority, one of two
things may, and usually does occur: either the decision of the
reactionaries is implemented and its harmful consequences send the masses more or less speedily over to the side
of democracy and against the reactionaries; or the conflict between
democracy and reaction is decided by a civil or other war, which is also
quite possible (and no doubt even the Semkovskys have heard of this) under
a democracy.

The recognition of the right to self-determination is, Mr. Semkovsky
assures us, “playing into the hands of the most thorough-paced bourgeois
nationalism”. This is childish nonsense since the recognition of the
right does not exclude either propaganda and agitation against separation or the exposure of bourgeois nationalism. But
it is absolutely indisputable that the denial of the right to
secede is “playing into the hands” of the most thorough-paced reactionary Great-Russian nationalism!

This is the essence of Rosa Luxemburg’s amusing error for which she was
ridiculed a long time ago by German and Russian (August 1903)
Social-Democrats; in their fear of playing into the hands of the bourgeois
nationalism of oppressed nations, people play into the hands not merely of
the bourgeois but of the reactionary nationalism of the oppressor
nation.

If Mr. Semkovsky had not been so virginally innocent in matters
concerning Party history and the Party Programme he would have understood
that it was his duty to refute Plekhanov, who, eleven years ago ,
in defending the draft programme (which became the Programme in 1903) of
the R.S.D.L.P. in
Zarya , [4] made a special point (page 38) of the recognition of the right to self-determination and wrote the following
about it:

“ This demand, which is not obligatory for bourgeois democrats, even in theory, is obligatory for us as Social-Democrats. If we
were to forget about it or were afraid to put it forward for fear of
impinging on the national prejudices of our compatriots of Great-Russian
origin, the battle-cry of world Social-Democracy, ‘Workers of all
countries, unite!’ would be a shameful lie upon our lips.”

As long ago as the Zarya days, Plekhanov put forward the basic
argument which was developed in detail in the conference resolution, an
argument to which the Semkovskys have not attempted to draw attention for
eleven years. In Russia there are 43 per cent Great Russians, but
Great-Russian nationalism rules over the other 57 per cent of the population and
oppresses all nations. The National-Liberals (Struve & Co., the
Progressists, etc.) have already joined forces with our
national-reactionaries and the “first swallows” of national
democracy have appeared (remember Mr. Peshekhonov’s appeal in August 1906
to be cautious in our attitude to the nationalist prejudices of the
muzhik).

In Russia only the liquidators consider the bourgeois-democratic
revolution to be over, and the concomitant of such a revolution
all over the world always has been and still is national movements. In
Russia in particular there are oppressed nations in many of the border
regions, which in neighbouring states enjoy greater liberty. Tsarism is
more reactionary than the neighbouring states, constitutes the
greatest barrier to free economic development, and does its utmost
to foster Great-Russian nationalism. For a Marxist, of course, all other conditions being equal , big states are always preferable to
small ones. But it would be ridiculous and reactionary even to suppose that
conditions under the tsarist monarchy might be equal to those in any
European country or any but a minority of Asian countries.

The denial of the right of nations to self-determination in present-day
Russia is, therefore, undoubted opportunism and a refusal to fight against
the reactionary Great-Russian nationalism that is still all-powerful.

---
Notes:
[1]
See pp. 427–29 of this volume.— Ed .

[2]
The work referred to is Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question .

[3]
Struvism —a variety of the bourgeois distortion of Marxism.

Struve, P. B. —Russian bourgeois liberal, exponent of legal
Marxism in the nineties. He later became one of the leaders of the Cadet
Party and after the October Revolution, as a white émigré,
was an inveterate enemy of the Soviet Union.

[4]
Lenin here refers to Plekhanov’s article “Draft Programme of the
Russian Social-Democratic Party” published in Zarya No. 4, in
August 1902.

Zarya ( Dawn )—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901–02 by the editors of Iskra . Four numbers appeared in three issues. The Lenin writings published in Zarya
were: “Casual Notes” (Vol. 4), “The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the
Hannibals of Liberalism” (Vol. 5), the first four chapters of “The
Agrarian Question and the ‘Critics of Marx’\thinspace” (published under
the title “The ‘Critics’ on the Agrarian Question” [ibid.]), “Review of
Home Affairs” (ibid.) and “The Agrarian Programme of Russian
Social-Democracy” (Vol. 6).