“ι”

(“IOTA”)
Contents
Lifman. “Participating and Financing Societies.” [1–13]
“Die Neue Zeit,” 1911 (on the war, NB) and
1912 (among other things, on the United States of Europe). [15–20]
“Finanz-Archiv”: 1915. [21]
Statistics on Emissions. [23]
Eggenšweiler.
Kron (on Argentina, NB).
Paysh. [25–26]
Mühlhaup. “The Dairy Cartel.” [27–30]
Capitalist Unions on the War. [31–34]
Crammond. England and Germany. [35–36]
Sail. Japan versus England. [37–38]
LIFMAN. “PARTICIPATING AND FINANCING SOCIETIES”
Professor Dr. Robert Lifman. “Participating and Financing Societies.” Jena, 1909. (A Study of Contemporary Capitalism and the Nature of Securities) (X + 495 pp.).
[Compare especially p. 11 for excerpts] ((The author is a veritable fool, forever preoccupied with definitions—absurdly pedantic definitions—whirling around the little word “substitution.” The factual data are valuable, though for the most part quite raw. Opposed to the labor theory of value… pp. 104–449: “Descriptive Section.” The theoretical section is sheer nonsense.
Number of shareholders shares
p. 9: — opposed to Sombart for his adherence “entirely along the path” of the labor theory of value as articulated by Ricardo and Marx. p. 33: “In Prussia, the number of shareholders accounts for only 2% of the population.” The figure is higher in England and America. “According to an estimate contained in the 1909 Bill on Taxation of Joint-Stock Companies, the average value of shareholdings in Prussia did not even reach 10,000 marks. This wealth was distributed among roughly 700,000 individuals. However, all such estimates are highly imprecise” (34). “There are currently no comprehensive statistical data available regarding the scale of development of stock capital… According to Filippovich (“Fundamentals,” 7th edition, p. 164), 40% of England’s national wealth consists of ‘capital in securities’ (i.e., funds and mortgages). Schmoller (statistical appendices to the stenographic reports of the Stock Exchange Inquiry Commission, 1892/3) calculated in 1892 that in Prussia, approximately 16–20 billion marks—roughly one-quarter of all Prussian capital—was invested in funds. Sombart (‘The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century,’ p. 224) estimated German stock capital at 31–32 billion marks in 1900” (37). “This figure is undoubtedly far too low for the present day; the stock capital embodied in German funds should be reckoned at 45–50 billion marks, which still represents only about one-fifth of Germany’s national wealth, estimated at 250 billion marks” (37).
In America (X), in 1904, national wealth totaled 107 billion dollars. Roughly one-third of this was stock capital. “For England, X indicates stock capital amounting to 26 billion dollars; for France, 19.5 billion dollars. Total European stock capital stands at around 75 billion dollars” (38).
(X) Charles A. Conant. “The Concentration of Capital in New York and Those Who Control It.” Bankers’ Magazine. November 1907 (cited, p. 38).

NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
Thus:
American stock capital: 35 billion dollars
England’s capital: 26 billion dollars
France: 19.5 billion dollars – 58.0–75
Germany: 12.5 billion dollars – 58–93.0; a difference of 17
X 5 = 465 billion francs
[While Neumark reckons 600]
44: … “an extraordinary interweaving of all economic interests”…

51: “Union” (a mining and industrial joint-stock company in Dortmund) ((discussed alongside Stilllich on pp. 38 and 41*)). Founded in 1872. “A share capital totaling nearly 40 million marks was issued in 1872; the share price soared to 170% when, within a single operating year, the company paid out a 12% dividend. However, after that, dividend payments ceased until 1880, and already in 1875—after a period of (12%-0%)—one of those restructuring measures was undertaken for the first time, a practice that would be repeated almost every time economic conditions turned unfavorable… Each time, the primary victims were the long-term shareholders” **.
“But even in cases where joint-stock companies do not set themselves these goals (‘speculation with funds’) upon their founding, it nonetheless happens that enterprises pursuing other objectives end up, to a greater or lesser extent, shifting exclusively toward fund speculation. This may occur partly because shareholders take insufficient interest in the activities of their directors, and partly because the directors themselves deliberately mislead them in this regard” (67).

* See this volume, pp. 26–27. Ed.
** See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 223. Ed.

71: Different types of societies predominate in different countries:
In America, control over other societies prevails; In Germany, takeover-oriented societies (Übernahme-).
In France, capital-investment societies.
In the Netherlands (“as a rentier state,” p. 71)—the same holds true there as well.
Belgium is akin to Germany.
England favors capital-investment trusts…
Eidel’s. “The Relationship Between Germany’s Major Banks and Industry.” Leipzig, 1905.
Dr. Rißer. “On the History of the Development of Germany’s Major Banks, with Special Attention to the Tendency Toward Concentration.” 1906.
p. 117—a case among many of shareholding in Belgium’s “Société Générale” (December 31, 1906: shares and bonds totaling 198 million francs, countless companies). pp. 136–7. A small example:
an instance of speculation
The London and Colonial Finance Corporation, “which, with a basic capital of only £21,745, earned £80,567 in net profit in 1890—equivalent to 370% of its capital—and paid out a 100% dividend.”
The capital-investment company (Kapitalanlagegesellschaft)—
—“Aktiengesellschaft für Rheinisch-Westfälische Industrie.” Founded in October 1871 (p. 156).
a good example
Dividend: 1872—35%—35!!
NB 1873–1883—0—0
1884–1895—3—9% 1896–1899—10–21%
1900—60%—60
1901–2—0—0
1905–6—40%—40
1907–8—6—4%
Dr. Emil Wolf. “The Practice of Financing, etc.” Berlin, 1905.
Francis Cooper. “Financing Business Enterprises.” 2 vols. New York, 1906.

THE NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
Eduard Karol. “Principles and Practice of Finance.” 1902 (New York).
V. Lotz. “The Art of Emission Banking.” In Schmoljer’s Yearbook, 1890, pp. 393 et seq.
“Thus, the attempt to harness public institutions for the purpose of channeling capital in such a way as to ‘ensure the profitability of small holdings through large-scale operations’ (X) came to naught” (163).
p. 6, 4: “The Cologne banker Louis Hagen served on the supervisory boards of 35 enterprises; the Deutsche Bank in Eideltsu (XX) had its own directors sitting as members of the supervisory boards of 101 stock corporations—and in an additional 120 corporations, it appointed its own representatives to those same supervisory boards” (p. 64).
(X) Jorgens, pp. 45–6.
(XX) Eideltsu, “The Relationship Between German Major Banks and Industry,” 1905.
Effects are issued repeatedly by different corporations, each time for the same nominal value.
Example (American)... “Their (these railway companies’) fixed capital is reinvested five times over in the share capital of corporations that stand under their direct or indirect control” (182).
Ch. A. Conant. “Trends in Modern Banking” (“Bankers’ Magazine,” 1905).

1000% and the Crisis
The Northern Pacific Railway Company. Capital: 80 million dollars in authorized shares. The struggle between Harriman and X. X. X. acquired 15 million dollars’ worth of authorized shares. “Thanks to this ‘raid’—this aggressive maneuver—the stock price of the Northern Pacific Railway Company was driven up to nearly 1000%... On May 9, 1901, a stock market crisis erupted, leaving a great many small investors ruined, while (new techniques) 500% dividend...
*(Italics mine) NB
Italics by Lifman
According to Harriman’s testimony, the principal actors involved in this scheme (CORNER) suffered no losses whatsoever” (184).
“As fund capital continued to develop along modern lines, the methods by which substantial sums of money could be siphoned off from the public and funneled into private pockets became increasingly sophisticated. The means employed for this purpose now consisted in the continuous establishment and layering of ever new corporations—each of which would in turn resell or lease out the very same fixed assets, while these assets circulated endlessly among the various entities” (186).
In 1900, Standard Oil Company was founded, Its authorized capital amounted to 150 million dollars. Common stock totaling 100 million dollars was issued, alongside 106 million dollars in preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907, dividends were paid on the latter at rates of 48%, 48%, 45%, 44%, 36%, 40%, 40%, and 40%, for a total of 367 million dollars. From 1882 to 1907, net profits reached 889 million dollars; of this sum, 606 million dollars were distributed as dividends, while the remainder was allocated to reserve capital” * (212).
“At all enterprises within the Steel Trust,” in 1907 there were no fewer than 210,180 workers and employees… (1908–165,211)… The largest enterprise in German mining, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Gesellschaft, employed 46,048 workers and employees in 1908, compared with 43,293 in 1907” ** (p. 21)–
“The Internationale Bergwerks-Gesellschaft” (in Erkelenz)… “It was founded with the aim of applying the drilling method invented by engineer Anton Raki… (235) …the company paid dividends of 500% in both 1905–6 and 1906–7” (236).

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 191. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.

THE NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
“In general, experience shows that owning roughly 40% of a company’s voting shares is sufficient to maintain control over that enterprise during normal periods” * (258). And then there are, especially in America, “shares that do not carry voting rights” (259), as well as bonds and the like—and if these are shares in a corporation that controls a number of other corporations, then “that capitalist can, with just 5 million dollars of his own capital, manage capital 40 to 50 times greater” (259).
…even “up to 80 to 100 times greater” (than what he actually owns) “in terms of total capital” (260)…
“The trade in non-ferrous metals—especially copper and zinc, as well as precious metals—is concentrated almost exclusively in Germany and in other major industrial nations” (301)… “a small number of firms” (mostly privately owned)…
…“many of the earlier German gas works were built by British enterprises and financed by British capital”… (321)…
…“only relatively few have since achieved true mastery in this field” (335)—in financial affairs and the like.
…“The Swiss Credit Institute itself manages its affairs” (“the bank for electrical enterprises” in Zurich), “for the ‘bank’ is not an institution in the conventional sense; rather, like all corporations of this type, it is, so to speak, a vast portfolio holding the funds entrusted to it, together with several accounting ledgers” (376)…
Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (AEG)
– shares: 100 million marks
– bonds: 37 million marks
– fund management: 23 million marks, etc.
Gold deposits in South Africa. “The monstrous profits earned, particularly in the late 1880s and the early
1890s, provided the impetus for the acquisition of mining shares—not only by English

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 216. Ed.

dialectics, but alongside it—and above all for French capital, as well as for German, Belgian, and Dutch capital… The extraordinary surge in stock prices reached its peak during the “boom” that came to an end in 1895. The subsequent collapse in the value of mining shares was further exacerbated by the Transvaal War… (414).
“The more developed a national economy becomes, the more it tends to turn toward riskier ventures—or toward foreign enterprises, those that require lengthy periods of development, or, finally, those whose significance is confined to a local or regional scope. * These are precisely the areas for which specialized financing institutions were established: enterprises that demand extended timeframes for growth, such as railway and mining projects…” (etc.) (434).
[The more developed an economy is, the riskier it becomes… NB]
Schulze-Gaevernitz virtually repeats this point in his article “Banking,” p. 21. (Book III, “Foundations of Social Economics,” Section V, Part II.)
“When the center of gravity of actual economic activity lies in subsidiary companies, while the parent company merely holds their capital—and when shareholders remain entirely in the dark regarding the operations of these subsidiaries, as is often the case in American holding companies—then it becomes clear that any legal provisions designed to ensure the greatest possible public oversight over the management of these corporate affairs may be rendered ineffective. Such risks can arise for any corporation formed through the substitution—or replacement—of capital from other entities, and even in instances where a single enterprise exercises significant control over others” (439). “By the end of 1904, 3.8% of all limited liability companies held capital exceeding 1 million—

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 197. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
marks, while 9.1% possessed capital exceeding 500,000 marks each. At the same time, the capital held by the aforementioned 3.8% of corporations accounted for 45.2% of the total capital of all limited liability companies, and the 9.1% of companies controlled 60.5% of that very capital” (459).
(In Germany? Clearly.)
460: Author’s proposal: require corporations to “disclose” in their annual reports any fund amounts exceeding one-twentieth of the “paid-up share capital.”
((Idiotic state control!))
“Humanity is likely to witness, in the near future, another series of major technological upheavals that will exert their influence on the organization of the national economy.” …Electricity, aviation… “As a general rule, during periods of profound economic transformation, speculative activity tends to intensify—and based on past experience, there is no doubt that the principle of substituting funds and the practice of equity participation and financial support will play a crucial role in facilitating the large-scale capital investments that are becoming increasingly necessary” (465–466)…
But now… the “youthful era” of stock-market capitalism is already behind us. The public has grown wiser… And with major technological innovations, “Gründungsschwindel” (“the founding of shell corporations”) is “unlikely,” etc. … (466–67)… ((The “harmonizer”))
…“the essence of trade, in general, lies in the substitution of demand”… (475)
((Ha-ha! A “theorist”!))
…“trade is an industrial activity aimed at gathering goods, preserving them, and making them available for use” (476). ((Italics and boldface. What an idiot!)) **
Nil in theory
End

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 197. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 215, Ed.

“NEUE ZEIT,” 1911 (ON WAR, NB) AND 1912 (AMONG OTHER THINGS, ON THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE) “Die Neue Zeit,” 30th year of publication (1912)
[NB. Here also appears an article on the history of private wealth in America.] 30th year of publication, 1 (X. 1911–1912)
articles by Varga (p. 660), Hilferding (p. 773), and Kautsky (p. 837 and onward) on gold, commodities, and money.
Otto Bauer addresses the same topic in the 30th year of publication, Volume 2.
NB also, p. 1, “Bandit Politics” (6 Oct. 1911) __
Kautsky’s article on the Tripolitan War, concluding with the words: “Our electoral struggle may, overnight, turn into a struggle for power”
(p. 5).

30th year of publication, 2 (1912)
articles by Pannekoek (“Mass Action and Revolution,” p. 541 and onward) and Kautsky. “New Tactics” (2 Aug. 1912 and onward), replete with disparaging remarks about ministries and the like (a thoroughly opportunistic piece). [NB prior to Basel.] Radek’s “On Our Struggle Against Imperialism” (p. 233).
[Here too, we find the polemic between Lenč and Kautsky on disarmament. NB
[Here also appear articles by Eichstein, likewise directed against Pannekoek—Pannekoek’s article, “The Essence of Our Contemporary Demands,” p. 810.
Specifically addressing the question of the “feasibility” of these demands.
“Why, in fact, does the program include demands for political democracy, a people’s militia, the democratization of the judiciary, and the like—demands that, taken together, are unattainable under capitalism—while it omits the right to work or the prohibition of introducing machinery that reduces the number of workers required, which is equally impossible under capitalism?” There are two kinds of impossibility: “economically impossible” and “politically excluded” (811). The demands of this particular moment are not “absolutely” unattainable under capitalism (812). _____
“Die Neue Zeit,” 1911, 2 (29th year of publication).
pp. 248 and 276. A brief “polemic” between Karl Kautsky and the “Leipziger Volkszeitung” (Rosa Luxemburg) over

NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
The United States of Europe – notes that do not touch upon the core issue, yet point to the ongoing polemic in the Leipziger Volkszeitung.
The Leipziger Volkszeitung had also attacked Ledebour for his remark:
“We demand… of capitalist society… that it (the state officials), in the interest of capitalist development itself and of Europe as a whole, should work toward the unification of Europe into the United States of Europe—so as to avert, in the long run, the ultimate demise of Europe in the face of global competition” (p. 276).
This, they claimed, was no different from what Kalver had said when he defended the customs union against America.
Kautsky replied: No, it is not the same. Ledebour, they argued, did not utter a single word about tariff struggles; instead, he spoke only of the United States of Europe—a notion whose “point”—they insisted—“need not necessarily be directed against the United States” (p. 277). ((So the idea of peaceful competition, then!))
Karl Kautsky, p. 248, noted that both Parvus and Johann Philipp Becker had either advocated or at one time advocated for the United States of Europe.
Ibidem, pp. 943–4 (September 29, 1911), reporting on an article by G. Quelch (published in The Social-Democrat, August 1911), who argued that even capitalists favored peace—after all, capital had already become international: capital could already establish “the United States of the World (NB: sic! ‘der Erde’), but such a global trust would oppress workers even more. ‘A capitalist world peace… an all‑powerful international police force, the complete abolition of political asylum… in this state of slaves, peace and tranquility would reign’…” (p. 944).
Quelch, unlike Karl Kautsky, did not expect revolution from war—but rather economic prosperity, a liberation from the “pressure of overproduction.”
Die Neue Zeit, 1911, vol. 2, no. 30, April 28, 1911 (pp. 97–107).
Karl Kautsky. “War and Peace.”
In this article, Karl Kautsky advocated for the propaganda of peace and for the United States of Europe (§ 3 of the article was explicitly titled: “The United States of Europe”).

Karl Kautsky opposed the proposal to preemptively resolve the question of war through a general strike (here he cited, in 1915, the passage where he had argued that if the people (“die Bevolkerung”), the “masses,” believed their borders were in danger and feared invasion, they themselves would rise up to kill the opponents of war—pp. 104 et seq.).
However, while quoting these passages from his 1911 article, Kautsky failed to cite the following sections in 1915:

1) In § 1: “Dynastic War and Popular War.” NB ((emphasis mine)).
…“In the 18th century, princes regarded states merely as their own fiefdoms…
…Today, capitalists of various European nations—and of the United States—treat the diverse peoples outside the orbit of European civilization as their own fiefdoms, and the conflicts between different capitalist governments arise solely from the drive to expand or consolidate these fiefdoms—these colonies and “spheres of influence.” It is much like the dynastic rivalries of the 18th century. And the welfare of the peoples of Europe today is no more involved in this than it was two centuries ago…” (p. 99).

2) “There is growing confidence that the European war, with its inevitable inevitability, must end in social revolution. This serves as a powerful, perhaps even the most powerful, incentive for the ruling classes to maintain peace and to call for disarmament” (p. 100).

3) “Following war, with its inescapable necessity, comes revolution—not as the product of a social-democratic plan, but as the iron logic of historical development. Modern statesmen themselves are already reckoning with the possibility of this outcome” (p. 106). …“Whether revolution arises as a result of the arms race or as a result of war—in any case, it will be an international phenomenon” (p. 106)…
…“But even if revolution does not emerge as a reaction against the oppression of armaments or against the horrors of war, but instead occurs due to other causes—and even if, at first, it remains confined within the borders of a single state—it will, under contemporary conditions…

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such a situation cannot endure for long. It (revolution) must spread to other nations” (p. 107)—and from this, Karl Kautsky drew the conclusion that the United States of Europe “would ultimately transform into the United States of the entire civilized world.”
p. 105: Karl Kautsky defined the United States of Europe as a union “with a common trade policy” (+a single parliament, etc., a single army).
In § 1 of this article (p. 97), Karl Kautsky characterized the “transformation of the global situation” (“over the past
two decades”) …“Industrial capital has been transformed into financial capital; it has merged with monopolistic landowners.” “Social reforms have come to a complete standstill”…
“And yet” (despite all the difficulties in realizing the United States of Europe) “the aspiration to peacefully unite the states of Europe into a single federative whole is by no means hopeless. Its prospects are bound up with the prospects of revolution” (K. Kautsky’s emphasis, p. 106).
Die Neue Zeit, 1911, vol. 2, p. 96: a summary of Ommo Bauer’s article in the collection “Struggle” (1911, no. 3): “The World War of Capitalism—its final word… If the Turkish Revolution leads to a pan-European war, then the inevitable consequence of this will be a European revolution.”
Die Neue Zeit, 1911, vol. 2, p. 179:
an article by Rotstein on the Coventry Congress (1911), where the British Socialist Party adopted a resolution
calling for “the maintenance of a fleet large enough to ensure national self‑defense.”
…“In doing so, the party congress not only abandoned the ground of international social democracy, but in fact aligned itself with the worst jingoists” (p. 182)…
against the agitation of Heyndman “No matter how aggressive Germany may be, its aggression is directed toward objects that hold as little significance for the English people as gold deposits in the Transvaal… But if, on the other hand, we were to endorse or tolerate those actions of the English…

the ruling classes—manifested in a policy of encirclement directed against Germany (etc.)... then, indeed, the moment may arrive when even the proletariat is compelled to take up arms and, in defending its own country, to serve the cause of the capitalist class”... (p. 183).
“Die Neue Zeit,” 1911, Vol. 1, Askyu’s article on British colonial policy in Egypt,
“FINANCIAL ARCHIVE”: 1915 “Finanz-Archiv.” Volume XXXII, 1915. “French Capital in Russia” (pp. 125–133). Index for the thirty-second year of publication. (Almost nil.)
“Finanz-Archiv.” Volume XXXI, 1914.
“Colonial Debts and Colonial Loans.”
In 1901, London’s stock exchanges held colonial securities totaling 600 million pounds sterling—equivalent to 12 billion marks (p. 8). The vast majority of these were issued by Britain’s colonies.
France granted loans to its colonies between 1897 and 1907 (p. 16) totaling no more than 400 million francs.
Belgium extended loans exceeding 250 million francs.
Germany—by 1911—had borrowed up to 137.4 million marks (p. 28). Multiplying 137.4 by 1.25 yields 171.750 million francs. The figures in francs are: 15 million, 400 thousand, 250 thousand, 171.75.
EMISSION STATISTICS. EGGENSCHWILER. KRON (ON ARGENTINA)
Walter Eggenschwiler (Zurich). “Statistical Material on the Problem: War, Industrial Progress, and Price Movements.” Schmoller’s Jahrbuch. 1915, No. 4.
(The author provides only weather data.)
Public Emissions: Average per Year – Minimum–Maximum
Worldwide: billions of marks
1871–1880: 76.1 ÷ 10 = 7.61; 1.7 – 15.6
1881–1890: 64.5 ÷ 10 = 6.45; 3.3 – 12.7
1891–1900: 98.0 ÷ 10 = 9.8; 2.5 – 17.8
1901–1909: 136.1 ÷ 9 = 15.1; 7.9 – 21.5

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The total volume of emissions (all types): [The author provides only weather data]!
England (in millions of marks) France (in millions of francs) (my calculations) / 80% \ millions \ marks / Germany (in millions of marks)
1903–7: 13187 ÷ 5 = 2637; 18469 = 14775; 16630
1908–12: 21309 ÷ 5 = 4262; 23122 = 18497; 19783 (Over 10 years): 34496 ÷ 10 = 3449; 41591; 33272; 36413 ÷ 10 = 3641
Ibidem (No. 2). G. F. Kron. “Argentina in the Anglo-German Economic Struggle” (cf. p. 114 in Zollinger’s work on Argentina’s typical role)...
a splendid illustration of imperialism!!
WALTER ZOLLINGER. “THE BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF VALUE”
Walter Zollinger. “The Balance of International Movements of Value.” 1914.
(p. 106) cites Neumark (“Bulletin de l’Institut International de Statistique,” Volume XIX, Issue II, 1912),
Figures in France *
1871–80. 1881–90. 1891–1900. 1901–1910. 76.1, 64.6, 100.4, 197.8 billion “”
(= 438.8)
Ibidem) Total Securities ** (1910, maximum) Other countries in 1902:
Great Britain: 142 billion francs (32 billion)
United States, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, Other Countries: 132, 110, 95, 31, 24, 14, 12, 40 » » » » «» » » » » » «» » Netherlands: 10, Belgium: 6, Spain: 6, Switzerland: 5, Denmark: 3, Sweden, Norway, Romania, and so on: 2
= 600 = 32

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 227. — Ed.
** Ibid. — Ed.

KALMES. “RECENT LITERATURE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT”
Albert Kalmes (Professor at the Academy in Frankfurt am Main). “Recent Literature on Capital Investment.” Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie, Series III, Volume 47 (Volume 102), 1914, p. 522. He praises the book by the Swiss scholar
A. Meyer, “Capital Investment.” Zurich, 1912 (p. 525: “excellent”—so he says—regarding the general section).
F. Ehrenschperger. “Modern Capital Investment.” Bern, 1911. F. Böttger. “Money Investment and Capital Management.” Leipzig? (193 pages) (“discusses in greater detail” the ‘reading of balance sheets,’ p. 525).
Henry Löwenfeld. “The Art of Capital Investment.” (“Everything About Capital Investment.”) Berlin, 1911 (“Leitmotif”: “the geographical distribution of capital investments”).
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. “The Art of Placing One’s Wealth and Managing It.” Paris, 1912 (451 pages) — highly praised.
Kalmes himself, in Volume 105 (1915, Issue 5), examines new literature on financial management.
There, in Series III, Volume 39, 1910, one finds Moosao’s article on “capital investment” in France and England,
PAISH’S ARTICLE IN THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY.

JANUARY 1911
British capital invested in Indian, colonial, and foreign loans and companies—and the income derived from them in 1907–08 (Paish, p. 168):

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My summary is divided into three major groups: | A, B, C Capital (in thousands of pounds sterling) Income
(idem) %
A) Loans (governmental and
municipal) B) Railways 757 460 1 198 991 366022 243 386 127 879 29 938 52 839 21870 26145 8 999 3.94.4
Banks and Others C) | Mines, Kerosene, and More
C) 737 287 57 014 7.7
Total 2 693 738 139 791 5.2
The author’s table is not organized according to the three groups (A, B, C), but rather according to
a great many categories
A) % = 3.2%–4.7%
B) = 3.8%–4.7%
C) = 3.3%–30.5%
In 1910 (in thousands of pounds sterling), the colonies of Britain included:
Canada and Newfoundland, the Australian Federation, New Zealand, all of Australia, Africa, India and Ceylon, the Straits Settlements and the Malay States, various British possessions,
Southwestern (my own)
A) 92 948 198 365 64 721 263 086 115 080 8 541 182 517 7 943 6 969 677084
B) 223 740 2 951 761 3 712 9 354 – 133 519 – 1717 375 042
C) 503026
373 541* 301 521 78 529 380050 351368 29 498 365399 22 037 33 259 <*>1555152
(*) Note: Paish’s total comes to 1 554 152, since Canada is listed in the summary table as 3 7 2 541 (p. 186), while in the main table (p. 180) it appears as 373 541.

United States, Cuba, the Philippines, Japan, China, various foreign countries
A) 7 896 2 282 – 42 784 22 477 818
B) 586 227 17 387 7 902 8 910 – 4 521
C) 93 955 3 031 300
688 078 22 700 8202 53 705 26 809 61907
Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, various American countries
A) 38339 8276 40 221 17 071 9 860 81 3 833
B) 186 126 54 306 29 961 12 646 21194 6 476 11681
C)
269 808 87 335 94 440 46 375 35 255 31987 22 517
Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, Germany, other European countries—excluding Egypt:
A) 19109 9 650 14 044 1885 4164 1336 1351 22 870 74 409 60365
B) 2 013 6146 1916 5 473 3 284 4 432 – – 495 23 759 21843
C) 27793 7 071 90199 62406
38388 18320 43753 18808 11513 8134 7 071 6 061 36 319 188367 144614

The notebook “ι” (“IOTA”)
“Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,” Volume LXXIV. January 1911.
The article by Pei Gui’a—and the ensuing debate within the Statistical Society regarding it (the article spans pages 167–187, while the discussion extends from page 187 to 200)—demonstrates that the author approached his work with great caution and meticulous care.
He excluded conversions, opting instead for issue prices rather than nominal values when assessing securities—thus avoiding double-counting—and he accounted for income derived from securities, among other considerations. Consequently, the value of his data far surpasses the crude, generalized “data” available on France and Germany.
His principal work dates back to 1907–1908.
Millions
£ sterling: 1907–1908, 1908–1909, and 1910–1910
Colonies: 1,312 + 228 = 1,554
Foreign countries: 1,381 + 288 = 1,637
Total: 2,693 + 516 = 3,191
N. V. Alfred Neumark. “Modern Finance.” Volumes VI and VII. “French Savings and Securities, 1872–1910.” Two volumes. 8°. Paris, 1911.
MÜLLGAUPT. “THE MILK CARTEL”
Dr. Engelbert Müllgaupt. “The Milk Cartel: On the Question of Cartels and Milk Prices.” Karlsruhe, 1912.
“Economic Research at the Higher Schools of Baden.” New Series. Issue 9.
A highly interesting and practical little book, which describes phenomena of extraordinary significance.
Among relevant literature: F. Arnold in “Conrad’s Jahrbücher,” Volume 41, 1911, as well as in the article “On the Statistics of the Kingdom of Bavaria,” Volume 41 (1910).
“Dictionary of Public Administration.” Volume 6 (3rd edition) (“Dairy Farming”).
Nakhimson. “The Milk War.” “Die Neue Zeit,” 1911 (29th year of publication), Volume 2 (pp. 668 et seq.).

In this domain, cartels are underpinned by the monopolistic position of agricultural enterprises—particularly within a radius of 50–100 kilometers surrounding major cities—as well as by the proliferation of cooperatives.
Following the invention of the centrifuge, dairy processing cooperatives sprang up like mushrooms after a warm spring rain:
o Number of agricultural cooperatives (p. 24):

1870 – 1,1903 – 2,245, with 1,813,225 members; 1909 – 3,039, with 270,692 members (p. 5); 1890 – 3,000; 1900 – 13,600; 1910 – 24,900
According to Petersilie, “Reports on German Cooperative Statistics.” Berlin, 1911. The rise in prices for concentrated feed, etc. (+13–50%, 1896–1906, p. 7), along with other factors, did not lead to a significant increase in prices until around 1900—until the advent of vigorous cartel activity (p. 7).
For cartels, the immense importance of large-scale milk production (in terms of cost efficiency, hygiene, and so forth) cannot be overstated.
Berlin requires 1 million liters of milk per day.
Hamburg, including its suburbs: 0.5 million liters.
Vienna: 0.9 million liters.
Munich: 0.25 million liters (p. 16), and so on.
Immediately after milking, milk contains approximately 9,000 bacteria per cubic centimeter (centimeters… or millimeters?); after 2–3 hours, that number rises to 12,000; after 9 hours, it reaches 120,000; and by 24 hours, the count can soar into the millions (page?).
Most deliveries are made by rail—typically within a range of 50–100 kilometers from urban centers. In practice, local farmers engaged in dairy farming find themselves in a de facto monopolistic position.
“Cooperation has cultivated the rural landowner for the cartel” (p. 25).
The history of several milk cartels.
“The Berlin Milk Ring.” Founded in June 1900. A fiercely contested struggle against wholesale merchants—though public opinion was largely on the side of the merchants.

The notebook “ι” (“IOTA”)
Bolle (the largest dairy trading firm in Berlin, with an annual turnover of 45 million liters; capital of 10 million marks; dividend rate of 8%, p. 91) reached a settlement with the milk cartel in 1903. (Bolle quickly became a millionaire—just like Pfund in Dresden, whose turnover amounted to 21 million liters.)
Hygienic conditions consistently improve under the auspices of dairy syndicates.
However, the firm was poorly positioned financially and collapsed on February 27, 1907.
Hamburg. Founded in June 1900. Over the course of ten years, it distributed 10.3 million marks to its members (p. 53), raised prices—from 11.2 pfennigs to 14.1 pfennigs—and entered into agreements with major traders.
Frankfurt am Main. When it emerged in 1911, it was already quite powerful.
It concluded an agreement with merchants, then demanded that they raise their prices from 16 pfennigs to 17.
“Because of this single pfennig, a three‑month-long, bitter conflict erupted between rural landowners and merchants—into which both the Social Democratic Workers’ Union and the Liberal Workers’ Association, as well as the Federation of Trade Unions, threw themselves” (p. 54). The merchants ultimately conceded.
“The struggle ended with the milk merchants, to the great surprise of consumers, entering into an agreement with the ‘Vereinigte Landwirte’ (the cartel’s official name), whereby the latter pledged not to supply milk to any merchant who failed to implement the aforementioned price surcharge” (p. 55).
Large-scale production!!
In Vienna, there exists a massive syndicate. It reduced its costs—specifically those related to milk distribution—from 7.67 groschen per liter in 1900 (with a turnover of 0.56 million crowns) to 3.775 groschen per liter in 1910 (with a turnover of 6.74 million) (p. 57).
What impact do cartels have on producers?
Prices rose, on average, by 2 pfennigs between 1900 and 1910—compared to the period from 1890 to 1900 (p. 61).
The cause of this price increase lies precisely in the emergence of cartels—and without them, the rising costs of production would not have triggered such a surge in prices.
“How else could one explain the striking fact that prices began to rise precisely during the years when the milk cartel first appeared?” (p. 63).

“Finally, how could one account for the fact that price increases were most pronounced precisely in those regions renowned for their dairy abundance—Switzerland and Württemberg—without invoking the existence of cartels?” (64).
The intensification of milk sales also undermines livestock feed (p. 66)—and the food supply for the population at large (p. 67).
In Switzerland, milk consumption per capita, in liters per day
1903–1805 – 1.01
1906–1909 – 0.98 (p. 68)
The same pattern held true in Germany.
What impact on trade? Its revenue declined from 7–8 pfennigs per liter to 6–7 (p. 72)—a gradual displacement of commercial trade.
And what about consumers? Improved quality, enhanced hygiene, and so forth.
The situation was best in Basel, where the consumer union stood in direct opposition to the dairy farmers’ union. While urban dairy farming operated with exemplary efficiency, the final price paid by consumers still depended on the rural producers!!
“According to Prof. Kazdorf, in Austria a single cow yields an average of 5 liters of milk per day; in Germany, 8–10 liters; in Denmark, as many as 12 liters” (p. 83).
In the large-scale dairy operations of Archduke Friedrich near Vienna, milk production rose steadily:
1853 – 3.00 liters per cow
1880 – 4.67
1890 – 6.27
1900 – 6.86 (p. 84)
1910 – 8.00
Small-scale milk trading still predominated overall—in Munich, in 1910 there were 1,609 specialized milk dealers, including
250 operating on volumes up to 50 liters, and 1,310 (81.4%) handling up to 150 liters.
Such practices were far from hygienic: milk transfers were often left unprotected against dirt and other contaminants, and “the waste of time, labor, and capital was truly staggering” (p. 87). Milk had to be transported over long distances, much of it went unsold, and in some households two or three different suppliers would deliver milk—day after day, year after year.

NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
“Social Impacts of the Dairy Cartel” (Chapter V) — a “war of attrition” (p. 95) loomed between town and country, a direct confrontation between consumers and sellers, as in Basel.
In Basel, consumer prices were entirely determined—at least in terms of pricing—by the cartel of dairy farmers.
Switzerland as a whole was organized more effectively than any other nation into cartels of milk-producing farmers—and as a result, milk prices soared to unprecedented heights!! The power wielded by these cartels was unparalleled!!
“The General Consumer Union (in Basel) proved utterly powerless against the pricing policies of producer cartels” (p. 77).
“Even in Switzerland, where farmers and workers maintained closer personal ties than in most other countries, fierce clashes and bitter struggles over pricing frequently erupted between them” (p. 95),
CAPITALISTS’ ALLIANCES AND WAR
Capitalists’ Alliances and War “Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik” (Edgar Jaffé), Volume 41, Issue 1, September 1915, pp. 296–297—“Business Organizations’ Views on the War.”
…“Thus, according to business organizations, the goal is to foster—or even to accelerate—the development of a distinctly German type of society; after all, that is why the war is being waged. In essence, this perspective fully aligns with the interests of entrepreneurs. They have come to realize that, in the aftermath of war, entrepreneurs might well hear the admonition: ‘vestra res agitur’ (the matter concerns you)—that the stakes are your very skin and your own vital interests! The war is being fought to determine who will play the leading role in the global marketplace!” (“Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung,” February 7, 1915). It became abundantly clear that all socio-political tendencies—and indeed all efforts to cover military expenditures through the exploitation of entrepreneurial profits—would meet with widespread sympathy. But if the war is waged in the name of culture, if it is not profit that is at stake but rather a particular cultural ethos, then the entire society must bear the burdens of war; no single class should be privileged, with the war serving primarily to advance its own narrow interests.
As for the war’s impact on the country’s domestic political landscape, business leaders regarded it as overwhelmingly beneficial. Above all, they emphasized the strategic advantage of influencing the socialist party. Here, “fate itself was hailed as a teacher.” During the war, national unity was forged, and the very foundations of the finest socialist theories were shaken to their core. (Ibid., August 2, 1915.) Only in this war did the people truly become a people—as Treitschke put it—and in that alone lay the justification for war. …For centuries to come, war would remain the sole means of resolving conflicts between states—and this form of conflict resolution was welcomed, for war had delayed the march toward democracy: “We had reached the limits of laxity, the brink of pettiness and softness. Yet fate—a fate that seemed to have ordained a special mission for our German people—saved us from the abyss, from that ultimate descent into utter ruin.” (Ibid., August 16, 1914.) “Thus, the meaning of war is increasingly sought in the renewal of the soul; the economic and political significance of war is downplayed, while its grave political and economic consequences are dismissed.”
…“It is rightly pointed out that the German government’s subsequent measures were aimed at regulating consumption, whereas the goal of socialism is the socialization of the means of production. (Ibid., February 28, 1915.) Accordingly, all such measures ought to vanish once peace is restored. These views are perfectly aligned with the interests of entrepreneurs—and perhaps nothing could be more revealing of…”

NOTEBOOK “ι” (“IOTA”)
The antagonism between the class interests of entrepreneurs and workers is far more pronounced than the fact that war, in the ideological realms of these two classes, has been reflected in utterly opposite ways. Yet this opposition manifests itself in a variety of shades. Socialists of an opportunist, revisionist persuasion view war as an economic war. They maintain that war is imperialist in nature; they even uphold the right of every nation to pursue imperialism, thereby concluding that the interests of entrepreneurs and workers within a single nation are fundamentally aligned—and logically ought to lead them, in a consistent manner, down the path toward becoming radical bourgeois reform parties. In contrast, the radical wing of the socialist labor movement, while acknowledging that war is—albeit with certain qualifications—imperialist in character, rejects precisely this line of reasoning: it sees the intensification of class struggle as an inevitable consequence of war and insists on emphasizing the proletarian perspective even during wartime. Entrepreneurs, as we shall see, deny the imperialist character of war altogether. They do not wish to be told: “Tua res agitur” (the matter concerns you). They reject the affirmative, affirming stance taken by revisionist socialists toward imperialist war just as readily as they reject the critical stance adopted by radical socialism—and instead seek salvation in the “cultural significance” of war, in a conception that places no specific class squarely responsible for the outbreak of war and attributes no special gains from war to any one class. Thus, we are confronted with a curious picture: while governments everywhere adhere to the standpoint of imperialist theory—or at least, in a rather charmingly disingenuous way—“highlight the decisive role of economic interests on the opposing side,” the leading representatives of economic interests advance exclusively
Well said!

the purely cultural significance of war. The result of this is that they converge with views also held within the camp of radical socialism; they regard war, from an economic standpoint, only as an intermediate phase; all phenomena occurring during wartime, all state measures enacted in response to the war, are driven by this very situation and must, without question, disappear once the war itself comes to an end. Even the entrepreneurs’ views on war, however seemingly grounded in some central idea, must therefore be understood solely as a (class-based) ideology” (pp. 295–297). (End of article.)
Note, pp. 293–294:
“Particularly instructive is the foundational article published in the Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung (August 15, 1915), which most decisively rejects tendencies toward a new (democratic) orientation in domestic policy…
…Above all, social democracy must undergo further “re-education”: it must demonstrate—not only during but also after the war—whether the process of transformation to which it refers has truly become part of its very being. Only when this fact has been fully established over a more or less extended period can we speak, with due caution, of whether certain of these changes might indeed be realized in Germany’s domestic political landscape.” …In any case, at present there are still no preconditions for a future domestic policy oriented along the lines of the left-wing parties… on the contrary, “the harsh school of war offers us the strongest arguments imaginable against any further democratization of our state structure”… (p. 294).

CRAEMMUND. ENGLAND AND GERMANY
“Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,” July 1914 (Volume LXXVII, Part VIII) (pp. 777–807).
Edgar Craemmund. “The Economic Relations Between the British and German Empires.”
Together, these empires accounted for 39% of global international trade in 1911—26.9% for England and 12.5% for Germany—while commanding 53% of the world’s merchant fleet.
Germany    United Kingdom
Population   1872: 41.23 million   31.87 million
1888: 48.17 million   36.88 million
1910: 64.92 million   45.22 million
+ (1872–1910): +23.69 million   +13.31 million
Birth rate per 1,000 births: 29.5 (1911)   24.4
Death rate per 1,000 inhabitants: 18.2   14.8
Urban population share: 57.4% (1905)   71.3% (1901)
Value of mining output:
(1911) £102 million   £124.5 million
United States   United Kingdom
Germany
Coal production, 1911: 450.2 million tons   234.5 million tons   276.2 million tons
1886: 103.1 million tons   73.7 million tons   160.0 million tons
+ 347.1 million tons   + 160.8 million tons   + 116.2 million tons
+ 336.6%   + 218.1%   + 72.6%
Also, crude steel production, 1910: 26.5 million tons   13.7 million tons   6.1 million tons
1886: 2.6 million tons   0.9 million tons   2.4 million tons
+ 23.9 million tons   + 12.7 million tons   + 3.7 million tons
+ 910.3%   + 1,335%   + 154.3%
United Kingdom
Germany
Exports of cotton goods, 1887: £10.0 million   £72.0 million
1912: £24.3 million   £122.2 million
Bank deposits: £468.0 million   £1,053.0 million (1912–1913) Savings banks: £839.0 million   £221.1 million
(my own figures) £1,307.0 million   £1,274.0 million

Germany    United Kingdom
Net tonnage of the merchant fleet: 1880: 1.2 million tons   1911: 3.0 million tons   6.6 million tons   11.7 million tons
+ 1.8 million tons   + 156%   + 5.1 million tons   + 77.7%
Total ship tonnage, 1880: 13.0 million tons—of which 39.1% were German vessels—49.7 million tons (of which 72.2% were British ships)
1911: 49.5 million tons (50.1% German vessels) + 138.9 million tons (59% British vessels)
Shipbuilding: annual output, 1898–1904   1913: 240.8 thousand tons   618.8 thousand tons   898.0 thousand tons   2,203.0 thousand tons
Ship tonnage passing through the Suez Canal, 1892: 809.0 thousand tons   1912: 4,241.0 thousand tons   8,102.0 thousand tons   17,611.0 thousand tons
Percentage of all ships passing through the Suez Canal, 1892: 7.4%   1912: 15.1%   74.5%   62.9%
Gross revenue from railways, 1888: £58.4 million   1910: £149.5 million   + 156%   72.9%   127.2%
+ 74.3%
Foreign trade, 1888: £23.6 million   £558.1 million (export + import) 1912: £982.6 million   £1,120.1 million
+ 204%   + 659.0 million pounds sterling   100.7%   + 562.0 million pounds sterling
Military and naval expenditures (1912): national wealth; national income (Helferich for Germany): overseas capital investment, £70.0 million   £102.4 million   £15,000   £25,000 (*)   £2,000   £3,400   £10,000   £38,000 = 6.6% of national wealth (=23%). Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom alone,
(*) This figure includes the entire empire—including colonies—totaling 16,500.

Notebook “ι” (“IOTA”)
¦
Germany vs. Great Britain – A Comparative Study of Capital Flows Abroad (1912)
50.0 million pounds sterling 185.0 »
Revenue from Shipping: 30.0 » » » 100.0 »
National Income, 1896: (Germany, according to Helfferich) 1912: 1075 «2 000 » » » «» 1430 2140
Annual Growth in National Wealth over the Last 18 Years for Germany (and the Last 28 Years for Great Britain) = 272.0 » » » 230.0 »
Over the past five years, the figures have remained roughly comparable.
SAYL. JAPAN VERSUS ENGLAND
A highly instructive article appeared in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Volume LXXIV, April 1911.
Charles W. Sayl, “Some Statistical Data on Japan,” pp. 467–534.
Particularly enlightening is the comparison with the United Kingdom:
United Kingdom Japan
Area (sq. miles) 147,648 121,390 Population (1910) 49,587,000 44,538,000 “per sq. mile” 335 367 Birth Rate (per 1,000) 31.30 27.95 Death Rate (per 1,000) 20.70 16.89
Natural Increase (+10.60 +11.06) Grain Crops, Vegetables, Industrial Crops, etc. 12,894,000 (acres) 13.%, 12,437,000 = 16% Pastures and Grazing Lands 3,006,000 3.2 34,565,000 = 44% Forests 55,083,000 = 58.0 3,070,000 = 4% Land Value (+Livestock, etc.) 1,299 (million pounds sterling) 1,220 = 11% = 57% of total national wealth

Production (1907): Japan United Kingdom
Rice, Wheat, Barley, Oats = 372.8 (million bushels) 307.3
Potatoes 3.9 (million tons) 5.2
Turnips, Swedish
Kohlrabi very little 36.3 (million tons)
Turnips 2.3 (million tons) – Hay very little 15.6 »
Net Imports of Beverages, Foodstuffs, and Tobacco 3.46 (million pounds sterling) 212.4
Cattle (1908) 1.3 (million head) 11.7
Horses (1908) 1.5 » 2.1
Sheep 87,000 (= 0.08 million) 31.3
Pigs 0.28 (million head) 4.0
Number of Coal Miners Working Underground (1903) 126,999 796,329
Coal Output (in tons) 14.8 (million tons) 261.5
Coal Output per Miner per Year 117 328 116.6
Value in Pounds Sterling 6.5 (million tons) 8 sh. 9 p. 8 sh. 11 p.
Coal Exported 2.86 (million tons) 62.55
Value of Exported Tons 12 sh. 1 p. 12 sh. 8 p.
Length of Railways (1908), in Miles 5,020 23,280
Passengers (million) 146.9 1,265.1
Freight Carried (million tons) 25.4 499.9
Gross Revenue (per Mile of Railway Line) 1,690 pounds sterling 4,854 3,133
Expenses (- » -) 868
Net Revenue (- » -) +822 +1,721
Steamships (100 tons and above, gross tonnage 18,059,037
and higher) 1,146,977
Ships Entering Chinese Ports in 1902: 7,350 (13.6%) 18,949 (21.8%) 26,950 (49.9%) 34,027 (39.2%)
Total Output Value of Textile Factories (1907) Labor Costs per Worker 37.77 (million pounds sterling) 355,000 106 pounds sterling 247.27 808 398 306 pounds sterling.

Notebook “ι” (“IOTA”)
United Kingdom
Japan
Imports + Exports, 1889: 20.99 (million pounds sterling) 744.0
(Including Re-exports) 1909: idem per capita 82.35 1,094.»
1899: 10 sh. 6 p. 19 pounds sterling 19 sh. 10 p.

1909: 1 pound sterling 12 sh. 10 p. 22 pounds sterling 5 sh. 8 p.
Government Expenditures (1909) 64.9 (million pounds sterling) 152.3
Contributions to Postal Savings Banks (1909)
Number of Depositors 8.66 (million) 11.1
Total Amount of Deposits (in millions of pounds sterling) 10.8 (million pounds sterling) 160.6
> Per Depositor 1 pound sterling 5 sh. 1 p. 14 pounds sterling 11 sh. 7 p.
Value of Agricultural Products 126 (million pounds sterling) 174.8
Number of Workers on Farms (Including Peasant
Owners) 11.50 (million) 2.05 “With a workforce less than one-fifth the size, output in the United Kingdom is greater—and its value is 40 percent higher” (p. 488)...
Agriculture in Japan is distinctive. Sixty percent of the population is engaged in farming (p. 481). There are a total of 9,250,000 households in Japan. Of these, 3,748,000 are exclusively engaged in agriculture; another 1,662,000 combine farming with other occupations. There are 70,000 part-time farmers; 43,000 landowners—totaling 5,523,000 individuals.
Land is heavily taxed. Farming is extremely labor-intensive:
% of Farms (p. 482)
Farm Size: Less than 1¼ acres (5 tan) 37.26
From 1¼ to 2½ acres (5 tan – 1 cho) 32.01
From 2½ to 5 acres (1–2 “) 19.62
From 5 to 12¼ acres (2–5 “) 9.37
More than 12¼ acres (5 cho) 1.14
100.00

The productivity of agricultural labor is exceedingly low, primarily due to small-scale farming practices and the lack of mechanization.
In Japan, producing rice on one acre requires 110 working days.
In Texas and Louisiana, producing rice on one acre requires just one person for two days—and a team of draft animals for an additional 1½ days.
(“American Economic Association Journal,” November 1904)
ARTICLE “FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS AND EUROPEAN WAR DEBTS” “The Economist,” May 13, 1915. Article “Financial Agreements and European War Debts”...
…“The more one peers into Europe’s financial and political future after the war, the darker and more daunting its challenges appear. Yet this only underscores the greater need for independent thinkers—those endowed with knowledge, insight, and a gift for foresight—to reflect upon the geopolitical and economic implications of this conflict. Never before has there been such a clash of powers, nor such vast destruction within so brief a span of time. Never before has it been so difficult—or so imperative—to assess the scale of the catastrophe, to calculate the costs, to anticipate the consequences of war for human society, and to take decisive action against them. Philanthropists hope that the conclusion of peace will lead to a significant reduction in the armies and armaments of all nations, thereby enabling peoples to manage their new war debts and avoid financial ruin. Undoubtedly, the fear of bankruptcy will play a role—but without such fears, the conclusion of peace might merely pave the way for yet another round of wars. Those who truly understand the forces that govern European diplomacy, however, harbor no illusions. In the long run…”
NB: The prospect looms of bloody revolutions and fierce class struggles—between labor and capital, or between the masses and the ruling classes of continental Europe.” (End of article.)