“θ”

(“THETA”)
Contents

= 1–10 ((+ Rissler 1–16)) 31
Hilferding. “Financial Capital” [3–6]
The Electrical Trust .[7–8]
Statistics on Emissions [9–10]
Rissler [1–15]
HILFERDING. “FINANCIAL CAPITAL”
Hilferding. “Financial Capital.”
(“The Newest Phase in the Development of Capitalism.”) Moscow, 1912.
First published in German in 1910 (Volume III of “Marxist Studies”).
porridge...
incorrect—should not be “likewise”
p. 13 – “According to E. Mach, ‘the ‘I’ is nothing more than the focal point where the infinite threads of sensation converge most closely… Likewise, money is the nexus within the web of social relations.’”
p. 34 – “The Quantity Theory of (Money), since the time of Tugan-Baranovsky, has quite rightly been regarded as untenable…”

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
p. 54, note—and especially pp. 54–5. Hilferding’s error; see “Die Neue Zeit,” 1912, 30th year of publication, Volume I.
(Hilferding posits that money enters circulation without any inherent value.)
p. 71, note. “It is only our act of contemplation that imparts to things the form of space” (Kantian). 33.
pp. 90–91 (and p. 91, note).
How Marx anticipated the dominance of banks over industry (NB) (“Capital,” Volume II, p. 79).

p. 93, note: bills of exchange issued annually:

p. 102 (and note). The vast majority of international trade transactions are settled through bank-accepted bills of exchange.
||| 105–6. The Role of Banks. 108. The Three Functions of Banks
1) Facilitating payments.

2) Transforming idle capital into active capital.

3) Collecting income from all classes in monetary form and lending it to capitalists.

p. 110, note. The outstanding work of Eydel’s and its limitations. 112. Countries—“international bankers”
(1) France, Belgium, the Netherlands (2) England (3) The United States and Germany.

p. 116: The Role of Banks in Production ((primarily according to Eydel’s)). 120 idem
p. 154–5, note. The Steel Trust and its interest rates.

7% on preferred shares and 2% on common shares: for years it hoards profits, then at the appropriate moment distributes them all at once.

p. 157 – Capital amounting to 5 million dominates 3.9 million.
“Tochtergesellschaft” is translated as “subsidiary company,” or “daughter company.”

p. 159. The remuneration of board members (60–70 million in income from these positions across Germany)—a matter of leveraging connections and personal relationships. 162. Six banks—751 seats on supervisory boards (Eydel’s)... In 1909, there were 12,000 such positions, with 1,970 individuals holding 2,918 seats. (Cf. ibidem, M’s organization in America.)
p. 172. The significance of “restructuring”:
(1) a profitable operation; (2) placing indebted societies under the control of banks.

p. 183 (i. f.) and p. 184 – Replacing bills of exchange with entries in bank ledgers.

p. 199. The pressure exerted by large capital on the stock exchange (and note: the example of Morgan in 1907).

p. 211 – Banks are replacing the stock exchange...

p. 222. The essence and significance of short-term trading.

p. 262. A quotation from Capital, Volume III, Part 2, pp. 144–45 (Russian translation) concerning the role of banks versus socialism (NB).

p. 274. Heavy industry. Capital tends to flow out of the sector (a path toward monopoly).
(277–) 278: The tendency of banks toward monopoly.

p. 281. NB: Kun’s discussion of cartels in “Die Neue Zeit,” XXII, No. 2, p. 210.

p. 285. “Combination” = the integration of extractive industries with manufacturing.

p. 295: Corporations and “outsiders” (NB)...

p. 298: Without the support of banks, no major industrial enterprise can survive.

p. 300–1. Engels on protective tariffs of a new type and on cartels (Capital, Volume III, Part 1, p. 95). 302–3: The evolution of cartel forms (and particularly 304). 308. The concentration of trade (cf. O. Lie in “Die Neue Zeit,” XXVII, No. 2, p. 654). 320, note. Eliminating trade does not reduce the price of the product. 322–3: Merchants—as agents and clerks (NB) {and 324}.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
p. 331. (A verbal imitation of Marx.)
p. 336. An example of founding profit: the Sugar Trust (NB) in America (70% on paid-in capital, 10% on “watered-down” capital) *
p. 338–9: Defining financial capital (and p. 341): financial capital = “capital held by banks and employed by industrialists” (p. 339).

p. 346: Cartels = “a means of hindering competition.”

p. 353. The connection between cartels and the export of capital.

p. 355: Financial capital and the “organization of social production”... (cf. pp. 353 and 354).

p. 358. As combinations grow, so too does production for self‑consumption (but still for commodity production).

p. 362. Marx on crises (Volume III, Part 1, pp. 219–220, Russian translation).

p. 364. Volume II—the “most brilliant sections of an astonishing work” (“a credit due to Tugan-Baranovsky?!,” as noted in p. 34).

p. 382. “Schemes” (from Volume II) and the significance of “proportionally with m and” ((cf. pp. 426 and +427)).

p. 447: “Economically feasible” (though “socially and politically unattainable”) is a universal cartel… one that would eliminate crises… But to “expect crises to be eliminated by isolated cartels” reveals a fundamental misunderstanding.
To Section V: “The Economic Policy of Financial Capital”
p. 454, note. A quotation from Schulze-Gevernitz (“British Imperialism,” p. 75): “Even Sir Robert Peel once said: ‘In every one of our colonies, we are creating a second Ireland.’”

p. 474: The export of capital = “the transfer of value destined to generate surplus value abroad.”

p. 487: In newly independent countries, the influx of capital “provokes resistance from peoples awakening to national consciousness…”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Volume 22, p. 221. Ed.

“Capital itself provides the subjugated peoples with the means to liberate themselves”… “a movement toward independence”…

p. 487. The problem of national movements in dependent countries (the aspiration to “liberation” among the “subjugated”)…

p. 488. The accelerated development of capitalism in newly independent countries…

p. 491: The struggle among “national banking groups” over spheres of capital deployment (Pai Shi et al.)…

p. 493: > the profitability of capital in the colonies.

p. 495. The policy of financial capital (1.2.3.)
(colonies)
(protectionism)
(monopolies)
p. 495: “The policy of financial capital pursues threefold objectives: first, to create a vast economic territory which, second, must be shielded from foreign competition by customs barriers—and thus, third, must be transformed into a domain of exploitation for national monopolistic associations…”
NB: p. 484: polemics on immigration in “Die Neue Zeit,” 25th year of publication, No. 2 (1907)
p. 505. “The most important function of diplomacy now becomes the representation of financial capital”...

506. Karl Emil on German Imperialism. “Die Neue Zeit,” XXVI, 1.

510. The National State.

511. Financial capital seeks not freedom, but domination.

512–3. Nation and Imperialism.

513–4. Oligarchy in Place of Democracy.

567. “The proletariat’s response to the economic policies of financial capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade—but only socialism.”
The restoration of free trade is a “reactionary ideal” (NB)

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Financial capital = banking capital that dominates industry.
[Isn’t it sufficient to say: “financial capital = bank—new capital”?]
Three main points:
The development and expansion of large-scale capital to a certain degree… The role of banks. (Concentration and socialization.)
Monopolistic capital (the seizure of such a large share of a given industrial sector that competition is replaced by monopoly)…
The division of land… (Colonies and spheres of influence)…
NB Hilferding: in “Die Neue Zeit,” 1912 (30th year of publication, Volume 1), p. 556… “Every capitalist monopoly inherently strives to render its economic monopoly indestructible by anchoring it in monopoly over natural resources”…
THE ELECTRIC TRUST
The trust in the electrical industry: “The Path of the Electric Trust” by Kurt Heinig (Berlin). (“Die Neue Zeit,” 1912 [June 28, 1912], 30th year of publication, Volume 2, p. 474). A superb illustration of imperialism*: In 1907, an agreement was concluded between AEG (“Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft”) (“General Electric Company”) and DEK (“General Electric Company”) 35
AEG Concern – DEK Trust

* See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 235. Ed.

In the partition of the world: DEK – the United States and Canada

AEG – Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, the Balkans.

1907: 1910: Merchandise turnover (in millions of marks) 252 298; Number of employees 28,000 32,000; Net profit (in millions of marks) 35.4 45.6
1907: 1911: 216 362 30 700 60 800 14.5 21.7
DEK (United States of America)
AEG (Germany)
298 + 362 = 660 million marks
Special agreements (secret) regarding subsidiaries—“Moreover, a mutual exchange of inventions and experiences!” (p. 475). The number of companies—in which AEG “participates, exercising dominance over them”—totals 1,750–2,000 (p. 484). In six of these major enterprises, capital amounts to roughly three-quarters of a billion; in all, the total should reach approximately one and a half billion marks*.
The number of “manufacturing companies” stands at 16.
Production of rubber—cables—quartz lamps—insulators—railway signals—automobiles—typewriters—aircraft, and more.
Characteristic of modern industry is the production of raw materials and the like by the same enterprise. 1) The number of AEG’s direct foreign offices totals 34 (including 12 stock corporations)**.

1) 1. St. Petersburg 7. Romania
and Warsaw 8. Vienna
2. Lisbon 9. Milan Total
3. Christiania 10. Copenhagen in 10 states
4. Stockholm Southwest
5. Brussels Africa
6. Paris (((a colony?)))

* See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 218. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 234. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Both firms operate in close cooperation *

. *. *.(table in image format)

* See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 235. Ed.

…“there are no other electrical societies on earth that are entirely independent of them (AEG and DEK)” (p. 474)… *
EMISSION STATISTICS
N V. “Unlike conventional emission statistics, this statistic does not track securities issued in individual countries but rather the loans those countries receive. For example, the Russian loan placed in London and Paris is reported not under England and France, but under Russia.”
“Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik” by Konrad (1913, p. 783) — Total emissions from 1883–1912
(in billions of marks)
1883– 3.4 1893– 4.9 1903– 14.8
4.0 14.4 11.7
2.7 5.3 15.5
5.1 13.5 21.5
4.1 7.8 12.4
6.4 8.5 17.2
10.3 9.2 19.9
6.6 9.6 21.4
6.2 8.0 15.8
1892– 2.0 1902– 17.8 1912– 16.4
= 51.1 99.0 166.6 (my calculations)
Total emissions
53.0
This is the global total. By country, p. 782, for the years 1910, 11, and 12.
The total for these three years billions of marks__
Germany and its colonies 7.2
England and its colonies 5.2
South Africa 0.4
Canada 3.0 (my calculations) 8..6

* See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 235. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 234. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Billions
United
States of America 10.6 (including England and its co-
Egypt) colonies 8.8
Germany and its colonies 7.2
[including France and its
Morocco) colonies 29.5*
Russia 3.2
Austria-Hungary 2.1
Belgium and its colonies 1.3
Japan 1.78.3
My total:

4 major countries 29.5
4 minor countries 8.3 the remaining
America 7.0
14 European countries 4.91
China + Persia 0.7
, 50.41
France and its colonies 4.8
Austria-Hungary 2.1
Russia 3.2
Belgium 1.0
– its Congo 0.3
Total (my calculations) l.3
The Netherlands and its colonies 0.6
Luxembourg 0.01
Spain 0.6
Portugal and its colonies 0.1
Denmark 0.2
Sweden 0.1
Norway 0.1
Switzerland 0.7
Italy 0.7
Romania 0.4
Bulgaria 0.1
Serbia 0.2
Greece 0.5
Turkey 0.6
The United
States of America 10.6 the remaining America 7.0
Egypt 0.2
Morocco 0.; China 0.6
Japan 1.7
Persia 0.1
= 52.2
16.4
15.8
21.4 and the precise total = 53.6
4.91
From the literature, NB:
*Weltwirtschaftliches A g s h i v” by Gar-m-sa (already 6 volumes published).

* As written in the manuscript. Ed.
** As written in the manuscript. Ed.

my calculations—expansion or contraction of cases:
+ 72 – 15 = 57 + 69 – 6 = 63
Summary (my calculations) based on Konrad’s “Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik.”
On cartel statistics: Number of cartels: ((in Germany)) (pp. 903–6)
established widely
1913 38 34 15
1914 31 38 6
RISSEER. “GERMAN LARGE BANKS AND THEIR CONCENTRATION”
Dr. Risser. “German Large Banks and Their Concentration in Relation to the General Development of the German Economy.” 3rd edition. Jena, 1910.
(Some figures, though not all, were added based on the 4th edition of 1912.)
The electrical industry in Germany before 1900 (before the crisis of 1900, largely precipitated by overproduction in the electrical industry) (Risser, 3rd edition, pp. 542 et seq.) *:

7 groups (comprising 27 (sic!!) individual associations):
The number of banks affiliated with each group
Community of Interests
1902/3.
Merger
1904
1903: Consolidation—Group Siemens–Schuckert
11- I. The Siemens & Halske Group (4 associations); the AEG Group (4 associations); the Schuckert Group (4 associations)
1908: “Cooperation” — the establishment of the “Elektro-Handelsgesellschaft” association, with a capital of 30 million marks.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 234. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
6- IV. The “Union Elektrizitätsgesellschaft” Group (2 associations)
9- V. The Helios Group (“entered liquidation”: cf. p. 582 of the 4th edition) (5 associations)
8- VI. In 1910, the Lammeier Group—most of its shares were held by AEG (p. 583 of the 4th edition) (2 associations)
2-VII. The Kummer Group—collapsed in 1900 (7 associations)
many 7 groups repetitions
[There were 28 associations, not 27 as indicated by Rissler, p. 542 (p. 582 in the 4th edition). On p. 568 he also states: 28 associations]
The outcomes of the concentration process (pp. 568 et seq.).
“The most modern of all our industrial sectors”—the electrical engineering industry… 7 groups, encompassing a total of 28 associations integrated into conglomerates…
The chemical industry… 2 principal groups (see below)
The mining industry—2 syndicates (“Stahlwerkverband”; “Rheinisch-Westfälischer Kohlen-Syndikat”)…
Maritime shipping—2 associations (“Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Aktiengesellschaft” [Hapag] and “Norddeutscher Lloyd,” which were linked to one another and to a single Anglo-American trust through a series of contractual agreements)…
Banking—5 groups (“encompassing a total of 41 banks, some of which were integrated into conglomerates”)
18 groups—my tally

The increasing number of associations formed on the basis of shared interests between major banks and provincial banks (p. 505). The growing trend toward concentration (p. 542 in the 4th edition):

1881—1; 1908—32 (41)
1895—2; 1911—26 (46)
1902—16 (Rissler, pp. 547 et seq.) The Chemical Industry in Germany (Concentration) *
My
tally share capital (“Double- (”Triple- 20 union” union”)
1904 “Consolidation” 1908 exchange (exchange 20 shares shares)
has in management (3.2) 3
43
“Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik” in Ludwigshafen (share capital: 21 million marks).
“Farbenfabrik,” formerly Friedrich Bayer & Co. in Elberfeld (21 million marks). “Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation” in Treptow near Berlin (share capital: 9 million marks).

1904 consolidation
21
1905 “Triple- 21 union”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 192–193. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
43%
43%
Between Group I and Group II, already 14% 9 “convergence” had begun in the form of 100% 51
“price agreements” and the like—profits
p. 560 et seq.: “The Mining Industry.”

Two prominent figures: August Thyssen and Hugo Stinnes. Their colossal role—in the coal and iron industries—grew by 36.
…“Thanks to the conclusion, on January 1, 1905, of an agreement establishing a community of interests between ‘Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft,’ ‘Aachener Hütten-Verband Rothe Erde,’ and the Thyssen-owned ‘Schalker Gruben- und Hüttenverein,’ a step was taken that, on the one hand, brought together in a single joint venture a number of competing banks—namely, ‘Disconto-Gesellschaft,’ ‘Deutsche Bank,’ ‘Dresdner Bank,’ and ‘Schaffhausen’sche Bankverein’—but at the same time further strengthened the power of Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen, who entered the joint committee of this amalgamation as members” (p. 563) (p. 603 in the 4th edition).
(p. 577) idem, p. 624 in the 4th edition
1882—28 banks with 50 or more employees: 2,697 employees—
11.8% of the total workforce
1895—66 » » » » » » 7,802 employees— 21.6%
+189.3% to 5 employees +59.9%
6–50 » +34.5%
By 1907, roughly one-third “Deutsche Bank” in 1907—4,439 bank employees (p. 578); in 1908—4,860
“I estimate the number of bank officials in the six major Berlin banks at 18,000 by the end of 1910” (p. 625 in the 4th edition).

At the end of his book, Rissler’s polemic with the socialists is both patronizing and preachy about harmony—indeed, Rissler often adopts such a tone.
And yet, the prediction of socialization “did not come to pass” (p. 585).
p. 582 (p. 629 in the 4th edition):
“Banks and the Stock Exchange” (italics added by Rissler): “As for the impact of the concentration process on the functions and condition of the stock exchange, it is a fact that, owing to the accumulation of orders at large banks, the latter, in turn, assume, through offsetting purchases and sales, to a certain extent the functions of the stock exchange, submitting to the exchange only that portion of these orders which cannot be offset. This holds true equally in the realm of securities trading—that is, both in the capital market and in the field of discount operations, i.e., in the money market.”
As a result, the stock exchange—already severely disorganized by exchange legislation—is increasingly deprived of the vast array of securities necessary for the proper determination of market prices, thereby becoming even weaker; and this, in turn, leads to extremely dangerous consequences, especially during critical moments—as the unfortunate examples of recent history have amply demonstrated (note: in modern times, it suffices to point here to the very day the Russo-Japanese War broke out).
From this it follows that the stock exchange is losing ever more of the qualities that are absolutely essential for the entire economy and for the circulation of securities: namely, not only to serve as the most precise instrument of measurement, but also to function “almost automatically as a regulator of economic movements converging upon it” * (Note: quotations from Rissler: “The Need to Revise the Stock Exchange Law”; Berlin, 1901), as well as

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 206–207. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Increasingly, it has become impossible—on the one hand—to adequately reflect, through fluctuations in market prices, the prevailing public opinion regarding the creditworthiness and governance practices of most states, municipal authorities, joint-stock companies, and corporations; and on the other hand, to effectively regulate or control that very same public opinion.
Thus, the process of setting security prices and quoting them on the stock exchange—which, in earlier times, had offered, as far as possible, a remarkably precise picture of economic processes that were “nowhere so fully integrated nor so clearly comprehended in their totality”—and which, consequently, provided an accurate depiction of the interplay between supply and demand—has now begun to lose both its precision and its stability and reliability. This is deeply regrettable from the standpoint of the public interest.
Moreover, there is reason to fear that, along this path—whereby intermediary institutions (brokers, etc.) are increasingly being phased out—there may arise, over time, an ever‑more acute conflict between banks and the stock exchange, a conflict that would prove highly dangerous. Such a conflict would not only manifest itself in the familiar tensions that have long been observed—and repeatedly noted—between banks and other circles with interests tied to the stock exchange; it would also come to bear upon the very core of the stock exchange’s operations: the determination of market prices.
In fact, even among seasoned experts today, some regard banks and stock exchanges as entirely equivalent in function and purpose—though this view is fundamentally mistaken (note: this is precisely how Eschenbach defines them in his “Debates of the Association for Social Policy,” September 16, 1903: “Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik,” Volume CXIII); while others, conversely, characterize them as institutions that are diametrically opposed to one another—a view that is equally flawed (note: see Ernst Löbe in the Nationalzeitung, April 18, 1904, No. 244) (p. 583) (and p. 630 in the fourth edition).

Risser (3rd ed., 1910), p. 499:
Growth of Bank Capital in the Largest Banks (as of 1908):
Germany * 1870 1908 1911
1. 2. 3. 4. “Deutsche Bank” “Dresdner Bank” “Disconto-Gesellschaft” “Darmstädter Bank” 15 9.6 3025.8 200 180 170 154 200 200 200 160
(millions of marks) 80.4 704 “Schaffhausenische Bankverein” 15.6 16.8 145 100 145
“Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft” 110
= 112.8 959 1 015
1870
France
1. “Crédit Lyonnais”
2. “Caisse Nationale” …

3. “Crédit Industriel” …

4. “Société Générale”
1908
20 – – 250
50 – – 150
15 – – 100
60 – – 300 (millions of francs) 145 – 800
= millions of marks 116 – 640
The three largest banks: Germany: 54.6 – 550 (marks) France: 130 – 700 (francs) (104 – 560 (marks)) The two largest banks: Germany: 24.6 – 380 (marks)
France: 80 – 550 francs (64) (440)
p. 367 | idem p. 398 |
Incoming and Outgoing Letters (Number) **:

1852 6 135 6 292
1870 85 800 87 513 (“Disconto-
1880 204 877 208 240 Gesellschaft”)
1890 341 318 452 166 Berlin’s Major Bank
1900 533 102 626 043 (units)

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 203. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 202. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Risser, 3rd Edition, p. 693 (Appendix VIII) (p. 745 in the 4th Edition):
The Course of Concentration Within Individual Large Banks and Banking Conglomerates
Eight major banks in Berlin possessed *:
Branches Deposit Accounts Commission- Permanent
In the Con- (offices, cash desks, and dits Participation in German- Total
de and Branches) Exchange Operations Manufactory Shares Institutions
banks in Germany
# # # # #
1895 16 18 (5) 14 23 (12) 11 13(-) 1 2(-) 42 56 (17)
1896 18 20 (5) 18 27 (12) 11 14(-) 1 2(-) 48 63 (17)
1900 21 25 (5) 40 53 (17) 11 12(-) 8 9(5) 80 99 (27)
1902 29 33 (7) 72 87 (35) 10 11(-) 16 16 (5) 127 147 (47)
1905 42 46 (8) 110 149 (44) 8 12(1) 34 34(11) 194 241 (64)
1908 – 69 (10) – 264 (73) – 12(2) – 97 (31) – 442 (116)
1911 104 104 (9) 276 276 (93) 7 7(2) 63 63 (15) 450 450 (119)
p. 747
4th Edition
[NB: The 3rd edition lists 8 banks; the 4th edition lists 6.] # Figures from the 4th edition, p. 745 (for 6 banks: “Darmstadt Bank,” “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft,” “Deutsche Bank,” “Disconto-Gesellschaft,” “Dresdner Bank,” and “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”).
(Figures in parentheses refer to “Deutsche Bank.”)
N In “Deutsche Bank.” Turnover:

1870 1875 1885 1895 1905 1908 1911
2 3 9 million 5.5 billion 15.1 billion 37.9 billion 77.2 billion 94.5 billion 112.1 billion
See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 201. Ed.
Among these 8 banks, first and foremost are five banks that form “groups”: “Darmstadt Bank” (“Bank für Handel und Industrie”), “Deutsche Bank,” “Disconto-Gesellschaft,” “Dresdner Bank,” and “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”—followed by three additional banks: “Berliner Handels-

Gesellschaft,” “Kommerz- und Disconto-Bank,” “Nationalbank für Deutschland.”
These “groups” [“Associations Based on Shared Interests”] of 5 banks and their “capital strength” (pp. 4–84 and following):
Acquired Private Banking Offices
Millions of Marks
Millions of Banks (p. 520) Banks
1. Group D. V. “Deutsche Bank” 12 929.5 1266.41) 786.8 1045.41) 31 21
2. “D. G.” “Disconto-Gesellschaft”…

6 662.6 – 564.7 23 8
3. “Dr. V.” “Dresdner Bank”
8 321.3 – 285.7 7 1
4. “S. BV.” “Schaffhausenische Bank-Verein”
4 209.9 – 278.5 11 6.

5. “Dm.B.” my co-reductions “Darmstadt Bank” (“Bank für Handel und Industrie”)
5 260.6 – 297.4 17 7
5. 35 2720.7 2471.7 89* 43
23/4 billion \ i.e., nearly p. 500 21/2 billion marks
NB: This figure accounts only for shareholders’ equity and reserves—i.e., one’s own capital, excluding third-party funds.

* The total of “89 private banking offices” is linked in the manuscript by an arrow to the same figure in the subsequent table (“Banks Included in Conglomerates”) (see p. 327 of this volume). Ed.

1) This includes “friendly banks.”
p. 537: September 30, 1911
Acquired:
Private Banking Offices
Dm.B. – 8–3 D.B. – 45–30 D.G. – 61–11
Dr. V. – 2–1.

116 45
| p. 697 |
41 banks, included in conglomerates of five groups
By December 31, 1908, the 41 banks included in the conglomerates—those belonging to five major banking groups—had:
241 branch offices
325 agency outlets
18 commission-based branches
102 deposit accounts
89 private banking offices
43 banks acquired through associations based on shared interests,
via shareholding and share exchanges
16
as of October 1.

1911
- 285
- 377
- 21
- 126
- 116
- 45
- 20
In total, by December 31, 1908, all major banks and their associated financial conglomerates had absorbed 60 private banking houses—plus an additional 60 banks, as noted in NB (p. 500).

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)

In 1899, England was home to 12 banks, each with 100 or more branches; together, these banks operated a total of 2,304 branches (“Niederlassung”). In 1901, England boasted 21 banks, each with 100 or more branches—altogether, these institutions maintained 6,672 branches (p. 521) (p. 558).
“By early 1905, the London City & Midland Bank alone had 4,470 branches—257 more branches than all the major Berlin banks combined, including the 52 provincial banks that had been incorporated at the end of 1904. According to The Economist, as of December 31, 1907 (#), England’s joint-stock banks—of which there were only 74 at the time (excluding colonial and foreign banks), 35 of which held the privilege of issuing banknotes—operated no fewer than 6,809 branches and sub-branches” (p. 522).
Continuation from Rissler (#) In the 4th edition (p. 558), it is stated that on December 31, 1908, deposit banks in Great Britain and Ireland—then numbering 63—had at least 6,801 branches and sub-branches. By the end of 1910, the number of branches had risen to 7,151. At this time, four banks in England and Wales each had more than 400 branches, namely:
“The London City & Midland Bank.” * * * 689 (315 in 1900)
“Lloyds Bank” 589 (311 » » ).
“Berkeley & Co.” 497 (269 » » )
“Capital & Counties Bank” 447 (185 » » )
Another four banks had over 200 branches, and 11 banks—including 20 Scottish and Irish institutions—each maintained more than 100 branches” * (p. 559).
In France, the number of agencies and branches (p. 522) (p. 559):

1894 1908
In Paris In Paris beyond the and pre- in pro- and pre- in pro- borders (and in
Banks: suburbs of the province suburbs of the province Algeria)
“Crédit Lyonnais” 27 – 96 62 – 175 20 “Comptoir d’Es- contes” 15 – 24 49 – 150 –
“Société Générale” 37 – 141 88 – 637 2

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 201. Ed.
In “Appendix VII” (p. 666 et seq.), lists are provided of corporations and banks that fall under the umbrella of major banking conglomerates. From this section, I select the following overseas banks:
Sphere (by location of branches) (Number of branches)(-) Bank Location Bank Name Capital in millions of marks (and so forth) 6 florins Which major Berlin banks established this institution—or are actively involved in its formation?
Amsterdam – Dam “The Amsterdam Bank” – “Darmstadt Bank”
China, Japan, India, and so on (12) Shanghai – “Deutsche Asiatische Bank” 7.5 taels – “Darmstadt Bank” + “Berliner Handelsgesellschaft” + “Deutsche Bank” + “Disconto-Gesellschaft” + “Dresdner Bank” + “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”
Italy (33) Milan – “Banca Commerciale Italiana” 105 lire – “Darmstadt Bank” + “Berliner Handelsgesellschaft” + “Deutsche Bank” + “Disconto-Gesellschaft” + “Dresdner Bank”
(? Belgium) (-) Brussels – “Banque Internationale de Bruxelles” 25 francs – “Darmstadt Bank” + “Berliner Handelsgesellschaft” + “Disconto-Gesellschaft” + “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”
(? England) (-) London – “Bankers Trading Syndicate” 0.1 pound sterling – “Darmstadt Bank”
Romania (-) Bucharest – “Banca Marmoroș-Blanck” 10 lei – “Darmstadt Bank” + “Berliner Handelsgesellschaft”

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Sphere (by location of branches) (Number of branches)(-) Bank Location Bank Name Capital in millions of marks (and so forth) – 25 marks Which major Berlin banks established this institution—or are actively involved in its formation?
(? America) ? – “America Bank” – “Darmstadt Bank” (? England) (-) London – “London & Hanseatic Bank” – 0.4 pound sterling – “Commerz- und Disconto-Bank”
(South America, etc.) (22) Berlin – “Deutsche Überseeische Bank” – 20 marks – “Deutsche Bank”
East Africa (?) Berlin – “Aktiengesellschaft für Überseeische Bau- und Unternehmungen” – 2 marks – “Deutsche Bank”
Central America (?) Berlin – “Central-America o Bank” – 10 marks o – “Deutsche Bank”
Mexico (?) Mexico City – “Mexicanische Bank für Handel und Industrie” – 16 pesos – “Deutsche Bank”
Polynesia (?) Hamburg – “Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südsee-Inseln” – 23/4 marks – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”

New Guinea (?) (?) ¦ – “Neu-Guinea Company” – 6 marks – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
Brazil (5) Hamburg – “Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland” – 10 marks – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
Chile and Central America (9) Hamburg – “Bank für Chile und ¦ Deutschland” – 10 marks – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
Romania (2) Bucharest – “Banca Generală Româna” – 10 lei – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
Belgium (?) Antwerp – “Compagnie Commerciale Belge” – 5 francs – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
German Africa (15) (?) – “Deutsch-Afrika Bank” ¦ – 1 mark – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
Bulgaria (?) Sofia – “Bank de Crédit” – 3 leva – “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
German West Africa (4) Berlin – “Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank” – 1 mark – “Dresdner Bank”
Asia Minor, Turkey, Thessaloniki, and beyond (12) Berlin – “Deutsche Orientbank” – 16 marks – “Dresdner Bank” + “Nationalbank für Deutschland” – + “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”
South America (3) Berlin – “Deutsch-Südamerika-Nische Bank” – 20 marks – “Dresdner Bank” + “Schaffhausenische Bankverein”

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)

On the question of colonial banks—almost all of which were founded by major Berlin banks—the conclusion reached by Rissler is as follows (with additions for 1910 drawn from the 4th edition, p. 375 *): “In the late 1890s, there were only 4 German overseas banks; by 1903, their number had grown to 6, with 32 branches—and by early 1906, 13 banks, each holding capital of at least 100 million marks, already operated more than 70 branches.
Nevertheless, compared with the achievements of other nations in this field, these figures remain relatively modest: for example, by 1904, England had already established 32 (compared to 36 in 1910) colonial banks, with headquarters in London, and 2,104 (compared to 3,358 in 1910) banks whose headquarters were located in the colonies themselves; moreover, 18 (compared to 30 in 1907, and 36 in 1910) other English banks operated abroad, managing 1,750 (compared to 2,091 in 1910) branches. By 1904–1905, France already possessed 18 colonial and overseas banks, with 104 branches; the Netherlands, meanwhile, had 16 overseas banks, operating 68 branches” (p. 346).

1910 | 1904
Thus: Germany 13–70
72–5 449 England 50–2 279
France 18–104
Netherlands 16–68**
The first figure denotes the number of colonial and, in general, overseas banks; the second indicates the number of branches these banks maintain—or, equivalently, the number of individual banks operating within the colonies.

* Within parentheses, we have inserted into the text those supplementary remarks that V. I. Lenin added to the fourth edition of the book (p. 375) and which were penned in the manuscript at appropriate points, either between the lines or above or below the main text’s corresponding figures with which they are correlated. Ed.
** See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 232–233. Ed.
On the Question of the Relationship Between Banks and Industrial Enterprises (p. 383) (based on Eidel’s work) (1895–1903)
Number of Industrial Issuances by Year: Bank Branches Specialized in Industrial Enterprises (p. 284) |
p. 413 p. 307 Over Seven Years: Number of Industrial Issuances — Number of Societies for Which These Issuances Were Made p. 306 (from p. 463) — Number of Industrialists Serving on Bank Supervisory Boards 1)
1895–1910; 1904–1910
My abbreviations p. 414 1895–1910 (1903/4) (1911) (1908) (1910) (p. 501)
424 204 – Dr. V. “Dresdner Bank” – 220 – 181 – 368 – 191 – 504 – 11 – 8
361 174 – S. BV. “Schaffhausenische Bank” – 187 – 207 – 364 – 211 – 290 – 19 – 17
312 142 – V. HG. “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft” – 170 – 149 – 281: – 95 – 153 – 15 – 13
302 151 – D. G. “Disconto-Gesellschaft” – 151 – 154 – 290 – 111 – 362 – 4 – 2
456 306 – D. V. “Deutsche Bank” – 150 – 139 – 419 – 250 – 488 – 4–5
314 166 – Dm. V. “Darmstädter Bank”… – 148 – 140 – 285 – 161 – 313 – 4 – 6*
1) Among them were directors from firms such as Krupp (Dr. V.); the firms Hapag “Norddeutscher Lloyd” and “Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft” (D. Ges.); Hibernia; “Harpenersche Aktiengesellschaft,” “Ober-Schlesische Eisenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft,” and others (V. N, Ges.), and so forth.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 208–209. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)

Number of Overseas Banks Established by Major Banks (listed by Rissler, pp. 327 and following) (pp. 354 and following)
D.B. D.G. Dr. V. Dm. V. B.HG. S.BV. N. B. f. D. Total
11 1880–89 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 11
22 1890–99 4 6 2 2 2 4 2 22
1900–4 3 3 1 1 8
24
1905, 1906–8 2 3 5 1 1 3 1 16
Not throughout the entire decade—only up to 1908–9.

* As per Rissler. Ed.
R. E. May (in “Schmol-ler’s Jahrbuch,” 1899, pp. 271 and following) (p. 83) presents a breakdown of Germany’s national income (by population): Per capita income in billions (millions) of marks (from p. 82), based on data provided by Prussia’s Finance Minister Reinbaben in 1908—millions of marks per capita, % of total income, % of tax burden (pp. 99–100). In Germany, their number was calculated according to the following categories: Capital stockholders—shareholders—corporate entities—billions of marks.
Up to 900 181/3 123/4 marks 17.9 = 47.22 0
900–3,000 32/3 61/2 16.2 = 42.5 483.7 = 34.26 1883–1311 –3.9
Over 3,000 1/3 53/4 1.9 = 5.50 66%* 1896–3 712 –6.8
36.0 95.26 1900–5 400 –6.8 (7.8)
= 221/3 25
Over 9,500 marks 0.87% of the population, 4.3% of tax revenue 1908–6 249 –9.4
Self‑initiated NB population
/ Rissler does not provide a table but rather a list. Appendix IV: The number of industrial and commercial societies in which banks hold seats on supervisory boards. Industries:
Mining, metallurgical plants, and salt works; silicate industry; metalworking; machine building (1); chemical industry; soap, oil, etc.; textile and leather industries; paper and pulp production; food and flavoring industries; trade; insurance companies; transportation; overseas enterprises; construction industry; hotel and restaurant business; rubber industry; arts and crafts; plantation societies; exhibition activities—all together.
Banks “Darmstädter Bank” 9 4 2 15 3 2 5 2 1 7 24 3 9 6 “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft” 18 1 8 10 4 1 – – – 3 16 – 9 17 1
“Kommerz- und Diskontbank” 1 2 2 7 1 – 1 – – 3 7 2 3 1 1 1 – – –
“Deutsche Bank” 13 1 3 24 1 4 6 1 – 3 28 8 6 13 2 – 1 2 – --- | 116
“Disconto-Gesellschaft” 13 2 2 8 5 2 – – 1 29 9 4 21 – – – – 2 1
6) “Dresdner Bank” 10 2 3 14 1 – 2 1 – 2 29 3 11 8 – 1 – – –
“National Bank für Deutschland” 13 4 3 18 2 3 1 – – 7 21 1 9 6 2 – – 4 2 –
8) “Schaffhausenische Bankverein” 18 2 4 15 2 1 4 – – 1 20 1 16 6 3 – – 1 – –
Total 95 18 27 111 19 13 19 4 1 27 174 21 67 78 9 2 1 7 4 1
140 4 111 + 83 + 174 + 166 + 24 = 698 (1) including the electrical engineering industry.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)

Income from banking operations amounted to 450 million francs.
“According to estimates from the Ministry of Trade dating back to 1898, England’s total revenue from banking commissions and other fees reached 18 million pounds sterling that year (roughly equivalent to 432 million krona) (p. 399) (p. 431)… From overseas trade across the European continent, ‘allegedly’ more than 6 billion marks in payments are processed annually through England”… [p. 431 in the fourth edition]
England’s revenue from freight charges totaled 1.8 billion marks annually; Germany’s stood at 200–300 million marks (p. 400) (p. 432 idem).
The 1907 survey on bank employees in Germany: responses from 1,247 firms employing 24,146 staff members (p. 579) (p. 626)
including average salaries—marks—the average salary of private-sector employees overall
264 joint-stock banks employed 16,391 staff members; 708 private banks employed 5,938; “275 cooperative banks employed 1,817.” Employees aged 20–39 numbered 1,459–3,351; those aged 40–54 numbered 3,638–4,044; those aged 55–70 numbered 3,899–2,592. 1,467–2,380; 2,413–2,358; 2,264–1,879.
“The number of current accounts, which stood at 3,245 in 1876, had risen to 24,821 (24,982) by 1908 (1910), yet—with the exception of state treasuries—these accounts were primarily maintained by large commercial and industrial enterprises. Thus, even today, the State Bank’s current account turnover retains a distinctly plutocratic character” (122) (p. 131).
In 1907, the average balance per account (the State Bank’s current accounts) was 24,116 marks. Turnover reached 260.6 billion marks, rising to 354.1 billion in 1910 (p. 132). Check turnover at postal savings banks (1909) involved 23,847 account holders, THE NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
49,853—in 1910—and their total assets amounted to 94 million marks
(p. 132) ___
The volume of settlements processed in clearing houses (p. 123) (in billions of marks)
In Germany—more than 1884, 1908, 1910
Germany’s share of the global oil market was significant, yet Germany’s 12.1% in 1908 trailed far behind France’s 45.9% and England’s 54.3%.
France’s check-based payment system was more developed, while England’s check-based payments were even stronger: 118.5 billion marks in 1908, rising to 260.1 billion in 1910, and further increasing to 299 billion by 1910.
The United States saw a remarkable surge in mutual settlement activity: 143.2 billion marks in 1908, climbing to 366.2 billion in 1910, and reaching 422 billion by 1910.
The total turnover of the German State Bank in 1908 stood at 3.0514 billion marks; by 1910, it had grown to 354.1 billion marks.
The number of cartels in Germany was approximately 250 in 1896,
(p. 137) and rose to 385 by 1905, (p. 149) with roughly 12,000 enterprises participating in these cartels.*
Deposits (across all banks) and savings account holdings, in billions of marks (pp. 162–163)
Germany including savings deposits—around 10 billion marks in 1900,
over 13 billion marks in 1906, and 15.5 billion marks by 1909.
England (1903–1905): 10.5 billion marks.
The United States… (1905): 47 billion marks (rising to 59 billion in 1909).
France (only bank deposits as of 1905): 4 billion marks.
Germany (only bank deposits as of 1900): 1 billion marks.
In 1906: 2.5 billion marks.
England (only bank deposits as of 1905): 6.25 billion marks.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 190. Ed.
The United States (only bank deposits): 15 billion marks.

NB. “From the foregoing comparison, it is evident that German deposits still do not hold a prominent position relative to deposits in England and the United States—and, similarly, they appear to lag considerably behind French deposits” (p. 164) (ibid., p. 177).
Risser, p. 354 (p. 384):
“The relatively rapid progress of the preceding era (1848–1870) bears a striking resemblance to the pace of development across Germany’s entire economy—and, in particular, its banking sector—during this very era (1870–1905), much as the speed of a good old-fashioned stagecoach compares to the velocity of a modern automobile,” which “flies… so swiftly that it becomes perilous not only for the carefree pedestrian but also for those riding in the vehicle itself”... *
And yet, in the very next sentence, this bourgeois philistine—utterly petty-bourgeois in spirit and a mere lackey of the moneybags—Risser nonetheless sees the guarantee of “social security” and “true progress” in the “greatest virtue” of a leader: the observance of moderation!!!
On the following page (p. 355, or p. 385), he acknowledges that banks are, in essence… “enterprises whose tasks and whose developmental trajectory ‘do not remain purely private-sector in character’”—rather, they increasingly transcend the realm of purely private-sector regulation,”**
1) From Risser’s speech delivered at the First All-German Banking Congress in Frankfurt am Main on September 19 and 20, 1902.
Yet this admission does not prevent this bourgeois idiot from writing:

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 286. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 288. Ed.

THE NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
“But another consequence of the concentration process—predicted by socialists—that ultimately
!!ha-ha!! ‘disproved’…” would lead to the socialization of the means of production, long desired by them and destined to be realized in the ‘state of the future’—this outcome has not materialized in Germany and is unlikely to do so in the future,” * (p. 585)
(p. 633).
(The Deutsche Bank alone boasts a turnover of 9.4112 billion marks (p. 361) (112.1 billion marks in 1910, p. 391), is affiliated with a group of 12 banks, holds capital totaling 1 billion marks—the capital of this group and its ‘friendly’ banks—has absorbed 52 banks, operates 116 branches, cash offices, and the like throughout Germany, and sits on the supervisory boards of 120 commercial and industrial associations, among other things. And this is hardly ‘socialization’!!!!!!) The Deutsche Bank:
Own capital = 200 million marks + 100 million marks in reserves
Turnover = 9.4112 billion marks
Gross profit = 55 million marks (1908) (p. 352)
= 62.9 million marks (1910) (p. 382)
The number of bank employees at the Deutsche Bank
48,600 (1908)—p. 57,8 ((in 1895, 66 banks with 50 or more employees employed 7,802 staff, ibidem))
Speaking on pp. 114 and following about maritime trade and its development in Germany, Risser notes the following:
N.-A. P. A.-G. (Hamburg–America), with capital of 125 million marks in 1908 (+76 million marks in bonds), operated 162 steamships (valued at 185 million marks).
“Norddeutscher Lloyd,” with capital of 125 million marks in 1908 (+76 million marks in bonds), operated 127 steamships (valued at 189.1 million marks). 125 + 76 = 201,

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 288. Ed.

“Both of these companies entered into essentially identical agreements in 1902–1903 with the ‘International Mercantile Marine Company,’ founded by American bankers and shipowners on January 1, 1903, with a capital of 120 million dollars (= 480 million marks) and encompassing nine American and British shipping lines” (p. 115). This was the so‑called Morgan Trust.
The terms of the agreement included profit-sharing and route allocation (German companies relinquished Anglo-American freight contracts; it was agreed upon which ports each vessel would call at, and so forth). A joint supervisory committee was established. The contract was valid for 20 years (with a one-year notice period for termination). In the event of war, the agreement was to be canceled (p. 116, at the end) (p. 125 in the 4th edition)*. And this, too, was no “socialization”!!
NB
A negligible number of entities were creditworthy.
“As for the Reichsbank, according to the Bank Survey Commission’s report dated September 1, 1906 (p. 179), the total number of firms and individuals who were, in general, creditworthy based on their bill-of-exchange transactions across Germany stood at 70,480”:
Specifically:
a) Merchants and trading firms—29,020, or 41%;
b) Industrialists and industrial enterprises—21,887, or 31%;
c) Rural landowners and agricultural, craft, and factory enterprises—9,589, or 14%;
d) Cooperatives of all kinds—883, or 1%;
e) Rentiers, artisans, and individuals engaged in professional activities—9,101, or 13%;
70,480 out of 100*.
p. 194, ibid.
The Düsseldorf-based “Stahlwerkeverband” was founded on March 30, 1904 (for a term of three years, extended for an additional five years on April 30, 1907). Its output in 1904 reached 7.9 million tons (p. 141) (p. 153).

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 238–239. Ed.

The notebook “θ” (“Theta”)
On November 28, 1904, he concluded a rail-export agreement among England (53.5%), Germany (28.83%), and France and Belgium (17.67%)—with France accounting for an additional 4.8–6.4%, bringing the total to 104.8 and 106.4% respectively (p. 147) (p. 159).
Now, following the merger with “United States Steel Corporation,” Germany’s share has risen to 21%.
The cartel for the sale of beams (beam exports) was divided as follows:
Germany: 73.45%
France: 11.50%
Belgium: 15.05% “In February 1909, the ‘International Zinc Smelting Association’ was also founded (p. 159), initially operating until December 31, 1910, and subsequently extended, apparently for a period of three years. This association—organized according to the geographical location of the smelters—was composed of three distinct groups: Group A, encompassing all German smelters along with certain Belgian smelters; Group B, comprising ten smelters in Belgium, France, and Spain; and Group C, which included English smelters. Of the total European production, which in 1908 amounted to roughly 513,000 tons, Germany accounted for… 226.9 thousand tons at that time; Belgium contributed 165 thousand tons; France and Spain together produced 55.8 thousand tons; and England accounted for 54.5 thousand tons. The smelters within the association collectively produced approximately 92% of all European output.”
Under the latest agreements, despite the fixed quotas stipulating each member’s share of production, every member of the association was permitted to produce any quantity—as long as, by a specified date (initially March 31, 1911), stockpiles on hand reached a minimum of 50,000 tons. Under these conditions, production would be proportionally reduced in accordance with each member’s established share of output” (p. 160, 4th edition).

Banks were grouped together—into consortia or syndicates—for particularly large undertakings:
I. a) The “Preußen Consortium”—in 1909, it comprised 28 banks (p. 310)
b) The “Reichsanleihe Consortium”—29 banks
(311)
c) The Rothschild Group—by 1909, it had grown to 13 banks (312),
including three Rothschild firms: the Vienna Bank, the London Bank, and the Paris Bank.
2. A group dedicated to Asian operations, and so on and so forth.
“Political clashes between advanced factions are often played out on the financial stage. Yet the timing of these clashes—and the very methods employed in these financial skirmishes—are determined solely by the responsible leadership of our nation’s foreign policy” (p. 402) (p. 434).
French capital in Tunisia and Morocco
» » » Russia
» » » Italy (the beginning of a political rapprochement through
financial channels)
German capital in Persia (in competition with Britain)
The struggle among European financial capitals over loans to China and Japan—French and British capital in Portugal and Spain, and so on (p. 403)*
The first edition of Rissers’s book bears a preface dated
July 4, 1905. /
Germany’s bill turnover—calculated based on bill taxes—rose from 12 billion marks in 1885 to 25.5 billion marks in 1905, then to 31.5 billion marks in 1907 (p. 228)—and further to 33.4 billion marks in 1910 (p. 246).

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 282–283. Ed.

The notebook “θ” (“Theta”)
Germany’s national wealth (Melchior, 1895: 150) ranged from 130 to 216 billion marks (Risser); according to Steinmann, it stood at 200 billion marks (p. 76).
Germany’s national income was estimated at 25–30 billion marks (p. 77).
France: National wealth—Melchior (1895) reported 198 billion marks; Fauvillier (1902) recorded 161 billion marks; Leroy-Beaulieu (1906) put the figure at 205 billion marks; Terrier (1906) cited 161 billion marks.
National income was estimated at 20 billion marks (Leroy-Beaulieu) (p. 78).
England: 204 billion marks (Giffen, 1885)—235 billion marks (Melchior, 1895)—228 billion marks (Kiotsa-Moné, 1908).
The United States: national wealth totaled 430 billion marks (1904, Census Bureau).
In Germany, “roughly 1.2 billion marks—about one-third—of the nation’s annual savings are annually invested in securities” (p. 81)—(p. 86, idem).
From the literature cited by Risser (particularly noteworthy or especially significant works are marked with *).
* Walter Lotz, “The Technique of Emission Business,” 1890. Alfred Lansburg, “German Banking,” 1909.
* ” ” “Managing National Wealth Through
Banks”—published in the journal Die Bank, 1908.
Schumacher on bank concentration, in Schmoller’s Yearbook, XXXth year of publication, issue 3.
Warshauer, “On the Question of Supervisory Boards,” in Conrad’s Yearbooks (Vol. Ill, XXVII).
Theodore E. Burton, “The Financial Crisis, etc.” New York, 1902.

**J. W. Gilbert, “A History of Banking, etc.” London, 1901.
Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik.
Volume CX and Volume CIX, and others. (The Crisis of 1900.) Volume CXIII: “Lessons from the Crisis.” —Zombart, “The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century.”

Second edition, 1909.
L. Pohl, “The Development of German Economic Life in the Nineteenth Century.” Second edition, 1908.

A. Sauke, “Has Large-Scale Enterprise… in Industry… Gained in Strength?” Conrad’s Yearbooks, Vol. III, No. XXXI. Von Halle, “The German National Economy at the Turn of the Century,” 1902. May on the Distribution of National Income. Schmoller’s Yearbook, 1899. *Glir, “The American Iron Industry.”
Schmoller’s Yearbook, 27th year of publication, issue 3; 28th year of publication *idem, Conrad’s Yearbooks, Volume XXXV (1908). Eduard Wagon, “The Financial Development of German Stock Companies, 1870–1900.” Jena, 1903. Jenks, “Trusts.” Conrad’s Yearbooks, Series III, Volume I (1891). Fölker, “The German Iron and Steel Industry.”
Revue économique internationale, Vol. III, No. 4 (1904). Kolman, “The Union of Steelworks.” Die Nation.

1905 (22nd year of publication). Waldemar Müller, “The Organization of Credit in Germany.”
Bank-Archiv, 1909 (8th year of publication).
Warshauer, “The Physiology of German Banks,” 1903.
E. Jaffe, “English Banking,” 1905.

3. Buff. “Check-Based Circulation in Germany,” 1907.
*Ad. Weber. “The Rhine–Westphalian Banks and the Crisis,” 1903.
» idem. “Writings of the Association for Social Policy,” Volume CX. *The same author. “Deposit Banks and Speculative Banks.” ** Otto Eidel’s “The Relationship Between German Major Banks and Industry.” “Schmoller’s Yearbook.”
(? “Studies”?) 1905. ** V. Prion. “German Discount and Bill-Discounting Practices,” 1907.
“Schmoller’s Research.” Issue 127. Fr. Leitner. “Banking and Its Techniques,” 1903. ** The Buchwald Brothers. “The Techniques of Banking Enterprises,” 5th Edition, 1909. G. Zattler. “Stock Exchange Banks,” 1890. (Risser does not offer high praise.)
NB [Preface by A. Wagner. Risser is exceedingly angry with the state socialist Wagner!!]
Fr. Eilenburg. “Supervisory Boards.” “Conrad’s Yearbooks.” Series III, Volume XXXII.
» » “The Contemporary Crisis”... ibidem, Series III, Volume XXIV.

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
J. Diurich. “The Expansion of German Banks Abroad,” Paris, 1909.
R. Rosen­dorf. “German Overseas Banks.” “Blätter für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft etc.”, 3rd year of publication, 1908.
A. P. Brüning. “The Development of Foreign Banks,” 1907.
R. Rosen­dorf. “Overseas Connections of German Banks.” “Schmoller’s Yearbook,” Volume XXVIII, Issue 4.
R. Steinbach. “The Costs of Managing Large Berlin Banks.” “Schmoller’s Yearbook,” 2nd issue of the 9th year of publication.
E. Moll. “The Profitability of Joint-Stock Companies.” Jena, 1908.
K. Hegemann. “The Development of Major French Banks,” Münster, 1908.
Ch. J. Bellak. “The Concentration of Banks.” “The Atlantic Monthly,” August 1903.
G. Fölkner. “Forms of Consolidation and Profit Sharing in German Heavy Industry.” “Schmoller’s Yearbook,” Volume XXXIII.
L. Eschwége. “Revolutionary Tendencies in the German Iron and Steel Industry.” “Die Bank,” April 1909.
J. Cockburn MacDonald. “The Economic Impact of Capital Concentration in Few Hands.” “Institute of Banking,” October 1900. NB (?)
p. 70 and following (abridged)
Table: Overview of the Most Important Events That Shaped the Development of German Banking in the Second Era:

1871–72: The War Comes to an End. 5 billion. A “booming” upswing…
“The Beginning of Industrial Cartelization”… 1873. The Crisis of 1874–78. A Period of Depression.

1879–82: An Economic Upturn. Gründerzeit. 1883: The Gold Standard. (Alliance with Austria.) 1883–87: A Period of Depression. (1887: Alliance with Italy.)

1888–90: An Upturn. Gründerzeit. Speculation.

1891–94: A Period of Depression.

1891: The Collapse of Many Berlin Banks.

1895: The Onset of an Upturn.

1896–97: Intensified Upturn. Brilliant Development of the Electrical Engineering Industry.

1897: The Formation of the “Rheinisch-Westfälische Revisionsbank.”

1898–1900: A Strong Boom.

1899: The Peak of Reorganizations, Institutional Establishments, and Issuances.

1900/1: A Crisis. The Decline of Mining Securities, the Collapse of Numerous Banks. “Energetic Intervention by Major Banks. Accelerated Concentration…”

1901/2: “A Prolonged and Particularly Elevated Demand for Money”… the founding of “United States Steel Corporation.”

1902–06: “Recovery.”

1904: The Establishment of “Stahlwerkverband.” Rapid Advancements in Concentration.

1907: The American Crisis. The Discount Rate Rises to 771/2%.

1908: The End of the Acute Crisis in America. “Recovery.” Increased Liquidity of Money.

1909: Enhanced Liquidity of Money, etc.

1910: Progressive Improvement… (4th Edition, p. 76)
1895–1900: “For the First Time, Immigration Surpluses” (p. 75)
From New Literature
NB: Dr. Max Augstin. “The Development of Agriculture in the United States.” Munich, 1914. (4 marks.)
V. Wick. “Little Mercury.” Zurich, 1914. (416 pages) (“Commercial Handbook”).
In the 4th edition, Risser discusses foreign (overseas) capital holdings (pp. 426ff.):

NOTEBOOK “θ” (“THETA”)
Germany (in 1905) held at least 24–25 million marks—now “undoubtedly” “far exceeded,” p. 436 in fine—including 16 billion marks in foreign securities…
“Of the total volume of French securities that Edmond Théry (‘The Economic Progress of France’… p. 307) estimated at 100 billion francs at the end of 1908, Neumark, in 1906, put the figure at 97–100 billion francs (with a yield of 4.5 billion francs). According to Théry’s calculations at the end of 1908, roughly 38.5 billion francs were accounted for by foreign securities.
While estimates vary widely, all agree that annual growth—at least 1 billion francs—is substantial. Henri Germain, former director of Crédit Lyonnais, calculated this annual increase (in the years immediately preceding 1905) at 1.5 billion francs; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu recently even estimated it at 2.5 billion francs.
The renowned British financial statesman Sir Edgar Speyer, in his report to the Institute of Banking (“Some Reflections on National Finance”) on June 7, 1900, placed the total value of British overseas investments at 2.5 billion pounds sterling—roughly 50 million marks—with an annual income of 110 million pounds (x). Yet by the end of 1910, in a report delivered to the Liberal Colonial Club, he revised this total upward to 3.5 billion pounds sterling—or about 70 billion marks.
This estimate roughly corresponds to George Pease’s assessment for 1907/08, which pegged the figure at 2.7 billion pounds, or around 54 billion marks—a sum distributed almost equally between India and the colonies on one hand (1.312 billion pounds), and overseas on the other (1.381 billion). The same author projected 3.192 billion pounds—or roughly 64 billion marks—for the end of 1910, and in a report presented to the Royal Statistical Society, he estimated the income from British overseas investments for 1911, based on the annual reports of the Commissioners of the Home… to state revenues, amounting to roughly 180 million pounds; however, Sir Felix Schuster, during the debate on Speyer’s report of May 27, 1911, regarded this figure as an exaggeration” (p. 427).
“Incidentally, this report quite rightly points out that increased exports, vigorous issuance of foreign securities, and a major upswing in business activity are merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. In the second report, one section is titled: ‘The Export of British Capital—The Primary Cause of the Empire’s Prosperity’” (p. 426).