Contents
1) Marx’s Correspondence with Engels
2) Notebooks on Marxism and Imperialism 97
1) “New Materials for the Biography of K. Marx and F. Engels” by F. Mehring, pp. 1–11
2) “The Expansion of England” by J. R. Seeley, pp. 15–26
3) “On German Colonial and World Politics” by Paul Dehn, pp. 27–46
MEHRING. “NEW MATERIALS FOR THE BIOGRAPHY OF MARX AND ENGELS”
F. Mehring, “New Materials for the Biography of K. Marx and F. Engels.” Die Neue Zeit, 25th year of publication (1907). “I regard Mazzini’s politics as fundamentally misguided. In urging Italy to break with Austria without delay, he is acting entirely in Austria’s interests. On the other hand, he forgets that he ought to have turned to the peasants—the segment of the Italian population that has been oppressed for centuries—and, in forgetting this, he merely paves the way for a new bulwark of counterrevolution. Mr. Mazzini knows only the cities, with their liberal aristocracy and ‘enlightened citizens.’ The material needs of the Italian rural masses—those from whom every drop of vitality has been wrung, and who, like the Irish peasantry, have been systematically driven to utter exhaustion and intellectual dullness—are, of course, far too lowly to be worthy of the lofty rhetoric of his cosmopolitan, neo-Catholic, ideologically charged manifestos. Yet it undoubtedly takes great courage to declare to the bourgeoisie and

NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM” to the nobility that the first step toward Italy’s independence lies in the complete emancipation of the peasants and in the transformation of the system of sharecropping into free, bourgeois ownership. Mazzini, it seems, believes that a loan of ten million francs carries more revolutionary significance than winning over ten million people to his cause. I very much fear that, at the critical moment, the Austrian government itself will alter the form of land tenure in Italy and carry out a reform ‘along Galician lines’” (pp. 58–59) 98.
“As for me, I neither deserve credit for having discovered the existence of classes in modern society nor for having uncovered the struggle between them. Bourgeois historians had long before me laid out the historical development of this class struggle, and bourgeois economists had already provided the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to demonstrate the following: 1) that the existence of classes is tied exclusively to specific historical phases of the development of production; 2) that class struggle inevitably leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) that this dictatorship itself constitutes nothing more than a TRANSITION TO THE ABOLITION OF ALL CLASSES and to a classless society *. Ignorant simpletons like Heinzen, who deny not only the struggle but even the very existence of classes, thereby prove only that, despite all their bloodthirsty and ostensibly humanitarian wars, they regard the social conditions upon which bourgeois domination rests as the final product, the ultimate limit of history—proving, in short, that they are nothing more than servants of the bourgeoisie. And this servility becomes all the more repulsive the less these blockheads also comprehend the greatness and transitory necessity of the bourgeois order itself” (pp. 164–165) 99.
“On January 2, 1870, the General Council issued a confidential circular, drafted by me in French (for influence on England, only French, not German, newspapers were suitable), concerning the connection between Ireland’s national struggle and the liberation of the working class and,

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 25, p. 383. Ed.

and consequently, the position that the International Workingmen’s Association ought to adopt toward the Irish question. I shall briefly outline the main points here for you.
Ireland is the citadel of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of this country not only serves as the primary source of its material wealth—it also constitutes its greatest moral strength. The English aristocracy virtually embodies England’s dominion over Ireland. For this reason, Ireland is the most crucial instrument through which the English aristocracy preserves its rule within England itself.
On the other hand, if the English army and police were to withdraw from Ireland tomorrow, an agrarian revolution would immediately erupt there. But the downfall of the English aristocracy in Ireland necessarily entails—and is inseparable from—their own decline in England. In this way, the preconditions for a proletarian revolution in England would be set. Since, in Ireland, the land question remains, to this day, the exclusive form of the social question; since it is a question of existence, a matter of life or death for the vast majority of the Irish people—and at the same time is inextricably linked to the national question—then the destruction of the English landed aristocracy in Ireland is an infinitely easier undertaking than in England itself, not to mention the fact that the Irish are far more passionate and far more revolutionary in character than the English. As for the English bourgeoisie, it is, above all, jointly interested with the English aristocracy in turning all of Ireland into one vast pastureland, capable of supplying the English market with meat and wool at the lowest possible prices. It is likewise in its interest to reduce the Irish population, through the eviction of tenants from estates and forced emigration, to such a small number that it allows English capital—rental capital—to function “reliably” in that country. It is equally interested in “cleansing” the Irish estates, just as it was once interested in cleansing the rural districts of England.

NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM” and Scotland. Furthermore, one should take into account the 6,000–10,000 pounds sterling of income of landowners not living on their estates, and other Irish income, which now flows annually to London.
But the English bourgeoisie has even more substantial interests in the modern Irish economy.
Thanks to the ever-increasing concentration of leaseholds, Ireland constantly supplies its surplus [labor] to the English labor market and thus puts pressure on wages
AND ON THE MATERIAL AND MORAL CONDITION
OF THE ENGLISH working class. And, finally, most importantly! All the industrial and commercial centers of England now have a working class that is divided into two hostile camps: the English proletariat and the Irish proletariat. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his average standard of living. He feels himself in relation to him as a member of the dominant nation and precisely because of this becomes a tool in the hands of his aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland and thereby strengthens their domination OVER HIMSELF. He harbors religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. He treats him approximately the same way that poor whites treat blacks in the former slave-owning states of the American Union. The Irishman pays him back in the same coin with interest. He sees in the English worker both an accomplice and a blind instrument of English domination in Ireland.
This antagonism is artificially maintained and intensified by the press, church sermons, humorous magazines, in short, by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It also contains the secret of the continuing power of the capitalist class. The latter is fully aware of this.
But the evil is not limited to this. It spills over across the ocean. The antagonism between the English and the Irish is the hidden basis of the conflict between the United States and England. It makes any serious and sincere cooperation between the working classes of both countries impossible. It enables the governments of both countries, whenever they see fit, to defuse the social conflict by pitting both countries against each other and, if necessary, by war between them.
England, as the metropolis of capital, as the power that still dominates the world market, is for the time being the most important country for the workers’ rev o-l u t io n, and moreover the only country in which the material conditions for this revolution have reached a certain degree of maturity. Therefore, the most important goal of the International Workingmen’s Association is to accelerate the social revolution in England. And the only means to that end is to make Ireland independent. Therefore, the International must set itself the task of everywhere highlighting the conflict between England and Ireland and everywhere openly taking the side of Ireland. The special task of the Central Council in London is to awaken in the English working class the awareness that the national liberation of Ireland is for it not an abstract question of justice and philanthropy, but the first condition of its own social liberation” (pp. 226-228) 100.
“ON WAGE-CUTTING FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TOWARDS THEM”
“On Wage-Cutting Foreign Workers and the Attitude of the International towards Them.” “Die Neue Zeit,” 25th year of publication (1907).

NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM” “Inviting the English trade unions to participate in the Brussels Congress of 1868, the General Council declares:
‘The fundamental principle of the Association is that the product of labor should belong to the worker, that the basis of society should be the brotherhood of labor, and that the workers of all countries should cast aside petty rivalry and national antipathies in order to wage a united struggle against capital. Labor has no fatherland. The worker has to fight the same evil everywhere. Capital represents only accumulated labor. Why should the worker be a slave to his own product? For too long the capitalists have benefited from the national disunity of the sons of labor. Foreign competition always serves as a convenient pretext for lowering wages’” (pp. 511-512).
“The constant cries of the English capitalists that the longer working day and lower wages of continental workers make the reduction of wages inevitable can only be successfully countered by the desire to bring the working day and wages to the same level throughout Europe *. This is one of the tasks of the International Workingmen’s Association” (p. 512).
“In fact, this is the only way to secure the conquests of that part of the international proletariat which is in a more favorable position. These conquests will always be in danger as long as only a minority enjoys them, and the danger will be all the greater the lower the level of the majority of the proletarian mass compared to this minority. This applies to the masses both within one country and within the limits of the entire

* Italics in “Die Neue Zeit.” Ed.

dialectics. The advanced proletariat can defend itself by forging solidarity with those left behind, rather than isolating itself from them, drawing sharp lines of demarcation, or seeking to suppress them. Where, under the influence of short-sighted, narrow-minded trade-unionism, the proletariat clings to the latter approach, that method will inevitably fail—and in time it becomes one of the most dangerous tools for undermining the proletarian struggle for liberation” (p. 512).
SILLY. “ENGLAND’S EXPANSION” “England’s Expansion” by J. R. Silly, Master of Arts. “A fundamental characteristic of the European states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—often overlooked—is the fact that each of the five major Western powers in Europe possessed its own empire in the New World. By the seventeenth century, this pattern was only just beginning to take shape; by the eighteenth century, it had already begun to unravel. The immense, almost unfathomable consequences of Columbus’s discovery unfolded at a glacial pace: more than a full century passed before most of these European nations finally stirred themselves into action and began to stake their claims to a share of the New World. Even by the end of that century, there was no independent Holland—much less a “Great Holland.” England and France, too, had not yet become colonial powers in that same century. To be sure, France had already contemplated establishing a colony in North America—witness the very name “Carolina,” derived from the French King Charles IX—but the Spanish in neighboring Florida thwarted those plans. A few years later, the colony founded by Sir Walter Raleigh near the same region vanished without a trace. Thus, for nearly the entire course of that century, the New World remained under the sway of the two powers that had done the most to bring it into view: Spain and Portugal—though Spain’s gaze was directed primarily toward the Americas, while Portugal’s looked toward Asia, until, in 1580, both these states merged— NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM”
into a union that would endure for sixty years. Beginning in the seven-year span from 1595 to 1602, the Dutch launched a broad campaign to build their own empire; soon after, France and England followed in the early years of the seventeenth century—during the reign of our King James I.
In the nineteenth century, the rivalry among these five great powers in the New World came to an end. It ended for two primary reasons: first, through a series of wars of independence that saw the transatlantic colonies break free from their metropolitan rulers; and second, through England’s colonial conquests. I have already described the Hundred Years’ War, during which the territories of Great France were absorbed by Great Britain. Great Holland also suffered significant losses, losing the Cape of Good Hope and Demerara to the British. Yet even today, we can still speak of the existence of Great Holland—especially when we consider its magnificent colony of Java, home to a population of no fewer than nineteen million. The fall of Great Spain and Great Portugal occurred in our own century, witnessed by people who still live among us. If we judge historical events not so much by the immediate stirrings they provoke, but by their undeniable long-term consequences, then we must regard this moment as one of the most pivotal in the history of the globe—since it marked the dawn of independent life for nearly all of South and Central America. This process unfolded primarily in the 1820s, arising out of a series of uprisings; tracing their origins, we find that they were the direct result of the blow dealt to Spain and Portugal by Napoleon’s invasion. In fact, one of the principal—and perhaps the most crucial—consequences of Napoleon’s actions was the downfall of Great Spain and Great Portugal, and the subsequent emergence of an independent South America.
The consequence of all these great upheavals—about which, I believe, only a few of you may know anything—is that the Western European powers, with the exception of England, were largely cut off from the New World. Of course, this is only an approximation. Spain still holds Cuba and Puerto Rico; Portugal maintains extensive African territories; and France has begun to forge a new empire in North Africa. Meanwhile…

The international standing of these four powers, too, underwent a profound transformation. Once again, they had become predominantly purely European states—just as they had been before Columbus crossed the Atlantic Ocean” (pp. 62–64).
“Thus, we see that the seventeenth century—and even more so the eighteenth century—constituted a period during which the New World was intricately intertwined with the five Western states of the European system. This interconnection not only shaped but also determined all the wars and treaties of that era, defining Europe’s entire network of international relations. In the previous lecture, I pointed out that the struggles between England and France during these centuries cannot be fully understood if one confines oneself to Europe alone, for the true belligerents were, in fact, two global powers: Great Britain and Great France. Now I would like to emphasize that, in the history of this period, we must always read “Great Holland,” “Great Portugal,” and “Great Spain” instead of “Holland,” “Portugal,” and “Spain.” I also note that this order of things has now come to an end: the Spanish Empire—and, to a large extent, the Portuguese and Dutch Empires—shared the same fate as the French Empire. Yet Great Britain still endures. Thus, we begin to grasp the historical origins and distinctive character of this empire” (pp. 64–65).
“We were drawn into two great wars primarily because of our colonies, and the final rupture was brought about less by England’s pressure on the colonies than by the colonies’ pressure on England. When we imposed taxes upon them, it was done solely to repay the debts we had incurred in support of those very same colonies—and we felt a natural bitterness at the thought that we ourselves had helped our colonies dispense with our guidance, destroying, in their interest, French hegemony in North America” (p. 75).
“In the Middle Ages, England was not an advanced economic power; rather, it was a relatively backward country. The leading commercial nations likely looked down upon it. Just as England today regards the older, more traditional commercial and banking systems of countries like Germany—even France—as quaint and outdated, so too did the Italians of the Middle Ages view England. In an age characterized by urban life, extensive commercial networks, and remarkable resourcefulness…

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In their commercial dealings, they were bound to regard England—as they regarded France—as one of those old-fashioned, agrarian, feudal strata lying outside the mainstream currents of thought of their time” (pp. 96–97).
“The rivalry among the five maritime powers of Western Europe over the New World—this is the formula that encapsulates the majority of historical events in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is one of those generalizations that tend to elude our attention when we study the history of individual nations alone” (p. 108).
“How did we conquer India? Was not this conquest a direct result of our trade with India? But this is only one of many striking examples illustrating the law that governed English history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the law of close interdependence between war and commerce, whereby, throughout this entire period, trade naturally led to war, and war, in turn, nourished trade. I have already pointed out that the wars of the eighteenth century were far larger and more burdensome than the wars of the Middle Ages. The wars of the seventeenth century were also significant, though not to the same degree. It was precisely during this era that England increasingly transformed itself into a trading nation. And as its trade expanded, England became ever more militaristic” (p. 120).
“In truth, it is not easy to justify the conduct of those who forged Great Britain” (p. 145).
“Perhaps you may ask: can we expect—or even hope—that it should flourish if it arose on the basis of crime? But the God who reveals Himself in history seldom judges in such a way. We do not see in history that the unlawful conquests of one generation are inevitably, or even remotely, undone by the next” (p. 146).
“In the seventeenth century, both the colonial empire itself and our involvement in the slave trade gradually expanded. The Treaty of Utrecht effectively legitimized this involvement, making it ‘the central object of English policy’ (a phrase borrowed from Mr. Lecky—see History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. II, p. 13). I fear that from this point onward, we took the lead in the slave trade and stained ourselves more deeply than any other nation through its monstrous and abominable atrocities” (p. 148).

“I have already pointed out that in the modern world, distance has largely lost its significance, and that certain signs indicate the advent of an era in which states will be far more expansive than they have ever been before” (p. 308).
P. DEN. “ON GERMAN COLONIAL AND WORLD POLICY”
“On German Colonial and World Policy” by Paul Dehn. (Second Edition, Berlin, 1907.)
“At present, aside from military vessels, roughly 40,000 large merchant ships—steamers and sailing vessels—ply the seas, boasting a net tonnage of 25 million registered tons and a total carrying capacity of 61 million metric tons, each vessel capable of transporting 1,000 kilograms” (p. 37).
“Each year, he * provides the British with more than 180 million marks, the Germans—with 220 fishing steamers—around 25 million marks, while the French receive 10 million marks” (p. 39).
“The German coastline stretches for only 1,270 kilometers, accounting for just one-quarter of its land borders, whereas France is bordered by the sea on three sides and boasts a total coastal length of 3,175 kilometers” (p. 41).
“According to Professor Eckert’s calculations in his book The Maritime Interests of the Rhineland and Westphalia (1906), one-third of Germany’s total maritime imports—and well over one-fifth of its total maritime exports—pass through Dutch and Belgian ports” (p. 42).

* Fishing in the open sea. Ed.
“In early 1907, the Veritas Agency counted 14,656 steamships with a total registered tonnage of 18.9 million tons. Of these, England accounted for 6,249 vessels totaling 9.8 million tons; Germany operated 1,351 ships with 2.1 million tons; the North American States had 885 vessels carrying 1.2 million tons; and France managed 586 ships with 0.7 million tons. Among the total of 26,579 sailing vessels, with a combined registered tonnage of 7.5 million tons, England held the largest share—6,338 ships representing 1.8 million tons. Next came the North American States with 3,695 vessels and 1.5 million tons; France followed with 1,356 ships and 0.5 million tons; and Germany contributed 991 vessels, each carrying 0.5 million tons. From 1882 to 1905, the tonnage of British shipping through the Suez Canal

NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM” increased by 103%, while German tonnage surged by an astounding 1,561%!” (p. 43).
“According to U.S. statistics, the total area of coal deposits across the globe amounts to roughly 1,500,000 square kilometers. Of this, 520,000 square kilometers are located in China, 500,000 in the North American States, 169,000 in Canada, 91,000 in British India, 62,000 in New South Wales, 52,000 in Russia, 31,000 in England, 14,000 in Spain, 13,000 in Japan, 5,400 in France, 4,600 each in Austria, Hungary, and Germany, and 1,300 in Belgium. The exploitation of these resources depends on the depth, quality, and geographic location of the coal deposits.
* *
*
“According to British reports, in 1905 approximately 840 million tons of hard coal were mined, with a total value of roughly 6 billion marks.
Worldwide hard coal production in 1905
In millions of % relative to per capita tons population
North American States 350.8 41% 41/4 tons
Great Britain 236.1 28 51/2
Germany 119.3 14 2
France 34.8 4 1
Belgium 21.5 2.7 3
Russia 19 2.3
Japan 10 1.2
British India 8.4
Canada 7.8 3.5
Australia 9.8
British South Africa 3.6
Other countries 19.1
840
83% of total output was concentrated in just three nations—the largest coal-producing countries” (pp. 46–47).
“From 1883 to 1903, coal consumption in England increased by 24%, in Germany by 102%, and in the North American States by 129%” (p. 47).
“Nearly three-quarters of British coal exports are destined for continental Europe and the Mediterranean region” (p. 55), “At their military naval bases—roughly 40 in number, scattered across every corner of the globe—the British have established vast coal storage facilities” (pp. 56–57).
“The reserves stored there are measured in the millions of tons. Peats once described these coal depots as milestones marking the extent of British maritime dominance” (p. 57).
“If we calculate the average freight rate for British coal exports to various countries at just 5 marks per ton, then with a total export volume of 58 million tons in 1906, British shipping would generate annual freight revenues of approximately 300 million marks” (pp. 57–58).
“Unfortunately, it has so far proven impossible to displace British coal from the North Sea and Baltic Sea regions. Even Berlin still receives one-sixth of its required coal—mostly coke—from England” (p. 62).
“The dire situation facing German industry in terms of cotton supplies was vividly illustrated by State Secretary Dernburg’s figures. A price increase of 4 pfennigs per pound raises global cotton consumption costs by 320 million marks. Yet the cumulative impact of price hikes since 1899 has amounted to billions! In 1905, Germany consumed 1.6 million bales of cotton—and, depending on fluctuations in prices dictated by New York speculators who profited from upward trends—was forced to pay annually between 150 and 200 million marks more than before, that is, 5 to 7 times the amount it had previously allocated to its colonies. It must now find a way to free itself from this tax, from this tribute paid abroad.
To avoid the influence of stock market speculation, British merchants and manufacturers are increasingly turning to the Southern states, where they procure the raw materials they need directly on site. English manufacturers have acquired large tracts of land in Texas, either to cultivate cotton themselves or to lease the fields to local farmers” (p. 81).
“In the United States, the number of spindles rose from 14.6 million in 1890 to 23.2 million in 1906” (p. 82).

* Italics added by Dehn. Ed.
“U.S. consumption in 1906 reached 4.8 million bales (compared to just 3.6 million bales in Great Britain and 1.6 million in Germany). In the early 1860s, the United States…

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The United States consumed 20% of its own harvest; in the 1980s, this figure rose to 32%, and by the 1990s it had reached 35%. From 1900 onward, consumption climbed to 40%” (p. 82).
“If the United States is no longer compelled to seek outlets abroad for the bulk of its cotton, then the supply of the global cotton market will become a question of power” (p. 83).
“By dominating the cotton market, the United States possesses within its system of export tariffs an extraordinarily sharp weapon against Europe. European states must, at all costs, rid themselves of this Damoclean sword. No sacrifices should be spared in this endeavor. Ultimately, what is at stake here is a question of power—but one that can, after all, be resolved through peaceful means” (pp. 87–88).
“At the initiative of the Colonial Economy Committee, representatives of the European cotton industry, following the excesses of the New York cotton speculation of 1903, convened at international congresses: in mid-1904 in Zurich, in April 1905 in Brussels, in June 1906 in Manchester, and in May 1907 in Vienna, in order to formulate countermeasures” (p. 88).
“Promoting cotton cultivation under the German flag is one of the most important tasks of German colonial economy and colonial policy. Bismarck already understood this” (p. 90).
“Fostering cotton production in the colonies not only opens up prospects for securing Germany’s supply with the most essential raw materials, but also contributes to the steady prosperity of the colonies themselves, which will develop as consumers of industrial goods.
Social Democrat Kalver anticipates benefits for German workers from the establishment of cotton cultivation in German colonies…” (“Sozialistische Monatshefte,” 1907, Issue 3) (pp. 96–97).
“England operates 18,369 kilometers of railway lines in Africa; France has 5,657; Germany, 1,398; Portugal, 1,173; Italy, 115; and the Congo State, 642 kilometers” (p. 104).
“With the exception of social‑democratic nihilists, opponents of colonialism, despite all their arguments, still shied away from drawing definitive conclusions—they did not dare to assert that territories requiring such substantial appropriations were devoid of any real value; they refrained from calling for the abandonment of these territories—and in doing so, they acted wisely, for such a final conclusion would have exposed the fundamental flaw in their entire position” (pp. 113–114).
“Especially fierce campaigns against German colonial policy were launched by social‑democratic agitators and the press in the run-up to the 1907 elections; the central organ declared that this policy ‘seeks to establish a new German slaveholding state at the cost of the wealth and blood of the German proletariat.’ In their view, this policy ought to be dealt a ‘crushing defeat.’
Despite all this, voices advocating for the colonies could still be heard within the social‑democratic camp, and those who dismissed German colonies as little more than sandy deserts of no real value were roundly rejected.
In early 1907, former social‑democratic deputy Kalver spoke out in “Sozialistische Monatshefte” in opposition to the sharply negative stance taken by social‑democrats toward German colonial policy” (p. 121).
“T. Kalver demonstrated that he understood the demands of the global situation when, in March 1907, he published an article in ‘Sozialistische Monatshefte’ opposing the hostile attitude adopted by the social‑democratic party leadership toward the German navy” (p. 130).
“Kalver rightly ridicules those comrades who believe that one can, without much thought, raise wages in Germany to the level of England or North America—without first securing Germany’s position in the colonies and on the world market” (p. 132).
“In 1905/6, imports into Persia totaled approximately 140 million marks. Of this amount, Russia accounted for 70 million marks, England for 30 million, British India for 16 million, France for 8 million, Austria-Hungary for 5 million, while Germany’s share was a mere 3 million marks” (pp. 148–149).
“If the Baghdad Railway is ever truly completed under German leadership—and if the British do not abandon their intended objectives—then, up to this point…

NOTEBOOK “ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM” “The isolated Persian Gulf may become a hotbed of global political upheaval” (p. 158).
“Stakeholder states—above all Britain, but also France, the Netherlands, and Denmark—must, in light of the Monroe Doctrine, reckon with the prospect of losing their colonies in the near future” (p. 196).
“According to semi‑official estimates, German capital invested in land ownership, industry, railways, and commerce totaled between 5 and 6 billion marks in the Americas by the end of 1904, with between 2.8 and 3.4 billion marks flowing into Central and South America alone” (p. 229).
“It is believed that over 2 billion marks of capital from the United States have been poured into Canadian lands and factories.
According to semi‑official reports dating from mid‑1907, U.S. capital in Mexico had reached roughly 3½–4 billion marks” (pp. 232–233).
“Under the agreement that was concluded, the two largest electrical companies in Europe and America—the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft in Berlin and the General Electric Company in New York—divided the global market into two spheres of interest. In doing so, the American company managed to secure for itself, as an exclusive domain of its operations, not only Central and South America but also the entire Caribbean region” (p. 249).
“Where preferential tariffs were introduced, they proved insufficient to displace foreign trade. Such preferential tariffs will always be imposed only to a very limited extent, since local interests—especially those of emerging industries, but also the interests of a declining agricultural sector—demand not only a certain degree of protection, but also the elimination of all foreign monopolies. This resistance is so formidable that it will prevent proponents of British imperial and Pan-American customs levies from achieving their ultimate goal: the creation of a completely closed customs union.”
Both of these formations ran counter to the entire trajectory of modern global economic development—a development characterized by an inherent drive toward expanding international exchange by overcoming artificial barriers, along with the corresponding need of powerful states to secure a free arena for economic activity beyond their own national borders and even beyond their own regions of the world. In fact, the aspirations to form large, self‑sufficient customs unions receded into the background” (pp. 254–255).
“There is no struggle for hegemony in Europe. Should such a struggle be provoked by Britain, it does not necessarily have to lead to war. As long as a liberal ministry remains in power, peace is assured, for among its most steadfast supporters are precisely those British friends of universal peace who harbor no animosity toward Germany” (p. 329).