Contents
Demorni [1–4] Egger [5–11]
DEMORNI. “THE PERSIAN QUESTION AND THE WAR”
G. Demorni. “The Persian Question and the War.” Paris, 1916.
((The author is a legal counsel to the government in Persia and a professor at the School of Political Sciences in Tehran. He is the author of numerous works and articles on Persia—both in Persian and in French.))
The book is profoundly instructive, offering a stark portrayal of Persia’s truly lamentable condition, as it is subjected to the most brazen forms of exploitation and plunder by three great powers—above all, three great powers: Russia, Britain, and Germany. The author is, of course, a staunchly French “patriot.” All the more remarkable, then, that he is compelled to relentlessly expose the bitterest of conflicts—the most virulent rivalry—between Russia and Britain.
Persia remains formally neutral in this war. In reality, however, both the Russians and the British, on one side—and the Turks and Germans, on the other—are waging war and pillaging across Persian territory.
p. 277: On August 27, 1915, the German vice-consul Schönemann attacked the Russian and British consuls, among others.

A map of Persia is appended to the book, clearly delineating the “spheres of influence” of Russia and Britain.
The 1907 Treaty between Russia and Britain concerning the division of the two powers’ respective “spheres of influence” in Persia failed to satisfy them—“the implementation of the 1907 Treaty did not achieve its intended purpose” (p. 67)—and the rivalry and mutual distrust (“Anglo-Russian competition,” p. 64 and elsewhere) between them persisted. Germany took advantage of this situation, and its treaty with Russia (the meeting at Potsdam in October 1910) was hailed as “a triumph of German diplomacy” (p. 57)—an attempt to carve up Persia between Germany and Russia. “Let us divide Persia between ourselves and exclude Britain” (p. 57)—this is how Demorni conveys the content (or rather, the meaning and essence) of that treaty.
“Anglo-Indian Imperialism” (p. 65 et seq.).
In fact, even within the “neutral” zone (deep inside Persia), Britain exercises complete control, while the struggle against Russia continues unabated.
“Starting from the government itself, everything of significance in the country comes under the protection of either Russian, German, or British interests” (p. 78).
He frequently cites Morgan Shuster’s “The Strangling of Persia,” New York, 1912. Shuster was forced to leave (January 11, 1912) by the Russians, who accused him of “dictatorial tendencies.” The British defended him, but ultimately failed to protect him. The author describes Shuster’s book as “bitter” (“a bitter book against Persia, Russia, Britain, and Germany,” p. 86) and remarks that Shuster “did not understand the situation”; indeed, he “was not a diplomat” (“a poor diplomat,” p. 85).
Foreign powers may not obtain concessions in Persia without the consent of either Russia or Britain (p. 80).
Let us not forget—after all, we French—when calculating the costs of Syria (p. 82)…
The consuls of all three great powers engage in shameless intrigues, bribing gangs, stoking conflict, indulging in “consular frenzy” (pp. 100 et seq.), persecuting “moderate” ambassadors, and so forth (pp. 89 et seq., particularly regarding Russia).
“The control over state finances that they seek to establish has become a new formula for a disguised protectorate—a formula that is currently extremely fashionable” (p. 93, note).

NOTEBOOK OF MATERIALS ON PERSIA
“Russian Imperialism” (p. 120 et seq.)… ||| NB
…“The concession for the Julfa–Tabriz–Rezaiye–Tehran railway was granted on January 24–February 6, 1913, to the Russian Accountant Bank in Tehran” (p. 168)…
“From 1912 to 1914, Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia continued in much the same forms” (p. 196).
…“There was also the long‑discussed question of a major trans-Persian railway… On this very ground, Anglo-Russian rivalry—skillfully fostered by the Persian government—was adeptly exploited by Germany. And on this same ground, the interests of France have, until now, been subordinated to the secret machinations of certain financial groups” (p. 262)…
“On December 24” (1915, or July 1914?) “a bomb intended to destroy the Russian, French, Belgian, and British envoys exploded in Tehran—but the assassination attempt failed; the bomb killed one of the conspirators, a member of a German–Turkish gang. The German diplomatic mission did not lose heart; it recruited a thousand bandits, paying each 90 francs per month and arming them. The bandits hurried to sell their guns and ammunition and flee” (p. 273).
SIC!!
At a gathering of Russian industrialists in Moscow on November 23, 1910, the assembly opposed the trans-Persian railway, arguing that it would only facilitate increased competition from British and German interests (pp. 266–267).
(In Persia, by 1915,) “there are no longer any distinct spheres of influence; Russians and Britons are now moving toward one another in order to counteract the Germans. Three hundred Cossacks left Mashhad in pursuit of four German officers and 83 Bakhtiari warriors who had recently departed the city and were heading toward Afghanistan, where they hoped to incite an uprising” (p. 296).
And so on, and so forth.
According to trade statistics, Persia’s total trade volume amounted to 628 million “krans” (= 0.45 francs).
1) Russia accounted for 63% of all trade (p. 247)
2) Britain accounted for 25%
3) Turkey accounted for 9%
4) Germany (24 million kran)
5) France (I)
6) Italy

EGGER. “PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN QUESTION”
Professor Dr. T. Egger (Hamburg). “Persia and the Persian Question.” Weimar, 1916. (“German Eastern Library,” published by Ernst Eck, Volume XIV) (p. 179).
NB: This book is superior to the previous one.
It is an exceptionally well-written work—thorough, clear, meticulously documented, and rich in direct quotations from primary sources. The map of Persia, with its delineation of Russia’s and Britain’s spheres of influence, is superb. Of course, the author is nothing less than an imperialist scoundrel.
Reference is made to a book titled “Persia and the European War,” published just as this book was being printed, authored by a “Persian patriot.” (What was the price? Where was it published?)
Egger quotes Kerson at various points. “Persia,” London, 1892, 2 volumes.
The book begins with a quotation from Peter the Great’s “Testament,” which Napoleon I allegedly “dictated in the form of key propositions when, in 1812, he sought to stir up public sentiment in preparation for his campaign against Russia” (p. 9).

1722–23: Peter the Great conquered Derbent, Baku, Rasht, and much of Gilan (a province of Persia located in the northwest, near the Caspian Sea). By 1735, Gilan, Derbent, and Baku had once again returned to Persian control. In 1802, Georgia became a Russian province. In 1800, Napoleon I, together with Paul I, plotted an invasion of India.

1807: Napoleon I dispatched a military mission to Persia—comprising 70 officers and other personnel, led by General Gardane.

1808: Britain sent a special envoy to Persia; it provided assistance to Persia in its war against Russia.

1813: Persia suffered a crushing defeat in its war with Russia. The Treaty of Gulistan was signed. Persia ceded Derbent, Baku, and other territories, and pledged not to maintain warships on the Caspian Sea.

1814 – The Treaty between England and Persia: a “defensive and offensive alliance” (13)...

1825 – The Persian–Russian War (which, in turn, drew Persia into the conflict—much as England had drawn the Boers into war in 1899).

NOTEBOOK OF MATERIALS ON PERSIA
England deceived Persia: “This does not conform to our treaty!” 1828 – Persia was defeated in its war with Russia. The Treaty of Turkmenchay (Persia ceded Nakhichevan, Yerevan, and other territories); Russia received military indemnity amounting to 3.5 million pounds sterling. 1890 – England (through a single English company) secured a concession for a tobacco monopoly lasting fifty years, paying 300,000 marks plus one-quarter of net profits. The company, with capital totaling 13 million marks, realized net profits—after all deductions—of 7.5 million marks, representing over 50% (p. 17).
Popular unrest ensued as a result of these developments (“several hundred killed”!! p. 17)—and by 1892, the Persian government had redeemed the concession for 10 million marks (!!). These 10 million were borrowed from England at an interest rate of 6%!!! August 5, 1906: The Shah of Persia promised the people a constitution and a parliament. 1909 – At England’s insistence, Russia’s representative in Persia, Hartwig (von Hartwig), who had been fomenting intrigue with the most brazen recklessness (he was transferred to Belgrade, where he “ranked among the chief instigators of the assassination of the Archduke heir to the throne and his consort,” p. 21), was removed from his post. June 23, 1908: A state coup took place in Persia. The Majlis was dispersed with the aid of Lyakhov. May 31 – June 13, 1908: Lyakhov’s letter to the General Staff of the Caucasus Military District (full text) – from Brown. “The Persian Revolution” of 1905/9. Cambridge, 1910, p. 222. The most blatant plan for counterrevolution in Persia, involving bribery, pogroms, and the like ((pp. 26–28 in Egger’s work)). November 29, 1911: Russia issued a second ultimatum to Persia:
the removal of Morgan Shuster and others. Russia was steadily advancing into Azerbaijan. (Work had begun on the railway line from Julfa to Tabriz.) A series of quotations from Brown concerning the most shameless plunder and violence perpetrated by the Cossacks… (pp. 38 and following)… The Cossacks hanged Muslim clerics (p. 41) and more!
A letter from a Frenchman on the same subject (“S i e s I e,” January 11, 1910) – p. 39.

To maintain order, Swedish gendarmes were called in… (p. 42) 1914 – The Russians began resettling Russian peasants in Azerbaijan…
In Persia, there was neither a “modern bureaucracy” nor “real money” (p. 49). Tax collection was entrusted to private contractors. Morgan Shuster is quoted: “The Strangulation of Persia.” 1912. ((At a cabinet meeting, Morgan exposed one minister for embezzling 83,000 tomans—equivalent to 332,000 marks. The minister’s response: “I was unaware of this; it was my private secretary who did it!”)) Belgian customs officials were doing the same (de Noose had purchased a castle with funds “gained” in Persia (p. 53)). Persia covered an area of 1,645,000 square kilometers. Its population was approximately 4 million (a figure that was likely exaggerated—10 million was an overestimate, p. 60).

1900/1 – 1912/3
Persian Trade: Exports amounted to 60.2 million marks, while imports totaled 165.8.
Imports: 119.4, 215.7
Exports: 179.6, 381.5
Russia accounted for 62.7% of trade—compared to England’s 20.9%.
83.6%
Persia’s imports from Germany: 0.9 million marks, compared to 4.6 million for Russia.
Russia: 45.5 – – – 131.6
British Empire: 50.1 – – – 60.0
France: 9.5 – – – 4.4
Turkey: 5 – – – 9.5
Persia’s exports to Germany: 0.07 – – – 7.8
Russia: 35.3, 120.0
British Empire: 10.2, 20.3
France: 2.6, 1.9
Turkey: 7.2, 15.3
Russia regarded Persia as “its own” territory and refused to allow free transit through Persia (p. 67)… To circumvent this restriction, postal parcels were sent:
in total, including Germany (pp. 68–69)
1904: 10, 1!!
1913: 384, 368, 193, 816

NOTEBOOK OF MATERIALS ON PERSIA
Russia attempted to ban the shipment of postal parcels starting February 1, 1914—but all major powers opposed this measure (including both England and France), and Russia was ultimately forced to back down (pp. 70–71).
In 1902, Russia concluded a trade agreement with Persia, securing a market for “its” sugar, kerosene, and other goods (p. 71)…
Morgan Shuster argued that this tariff was highly detrimental to Persia yet advantageous for Russia (p. 73) — as noted in the 270th page of Shuster’s book…
In this way, Russia established a monopoly (p. 74) in northern Persia, compelling the Persians to pay exorbitant prices for substandard goods!!
Competition for influence in Persia: schools (Russian, French, German), hospitals (Russian, English, German), and more. German pharmacies (p. 88), the Carpet Trade Association (p. 89).
Russia’s conquest of Central Asia from 1861 to 1891 (estimates from 1911)
Square kilometers | Population
598,090 | 451,000
203,430 | 1,500,000
67,430 | 800,000
489,240 | 1,874,000
142,790 | 2,069,000
87,560 | 1,184,000 (1869–1873) Transcaspian Region, Bukhara –
(1873) Khiva
Syrdarya – 1884 (1875–76) Fergana
Merv, Samarkand – 1,588,540 | 7,878,000
May 5, 1903: Lord Lamington delivered a speech in the House of Lords (pp. 100 and following) (opposing Russia: “We need the Persian Gulf—after all, it serves as a bulwark for India’s eastern frontier…”)
The same Lord Ellenborough remarked: “…I would rather see Russia in Constantinople than one European arsenal on the shores of the Persian Gulf” (p. 111).
The Russo–English Treaty of August 31, 1907 (text: pp. 114 and following) (“The Russo–English Agreement on Partition”)… Russia’s sphere of influence encompassed 790,000 square kilometers.
England’s sphere of influence was 355,000 square kilometers (p. 119)…
The joint note from the British and Russian ambassadors to Persia (dated February 18, 1912) – pp. 124 and following – offered loans of 100,000 pounds sterling at 7% interest—and more… Of course, the ministers appointed by Russia readily agreed.

The Potsdam Agreement of August 19, 1911 (text: pp. 130 and following). Germany recognized Russia’s sphere of influence in Persia, while Russia agreed not to oppose the construction of the Baghdad Railway.
The Reich Chancellor’s address to the Reichstag (October 10, 1910) touched upon the same issue…
Russia first divided spheres of influence with England, then sought to hedge its bets with Germany!
For Germany, a railway route to Persia and India was essential—not for military purposes, of course, but purely for trade—surely! The Baghdad Railway terminated at the Persian Gulf; this arrangement was far from ideal, since England could easily block access to the Gulf. It was imperative that the railway terminate in Bandar Abbas (!!)—Oman was, in fact, firmly under British control (p. 144). Tabriz (population: 220,000). Trade (1906/7)
Exports: 23.4 million marks
Imports: 30.9 million marks
Of these, Russia accounted for 34.0%; England: 31%; Austria: 10%;
Turkey: 4.2%; France: 3%; Italy: 5.6%; Germany: 4.5%; Total: 92.3 (p. 150)
(p. 151)!!
(This did not correspond to Germany’s actual commercial strength.) Summer 1914: An agreement was reached regarding the division of Anatolian railways. France secured 4,522 kilometers of railway lines in Turkey.
Germany claimed 4,909 kilometers.
Afghanistan is a mountainous region.

624,000 sq. km., 4,450,000 inhabitants. On paper, it is entirely independent. In practice, however, its entire foreign policy lies in the hands of Britain; the emir serves on a British salary. According to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907, Britain recognized freedom of trade in Afghanistan, while Russia acknowledged that Afghanistan lay “beyond the sphere of its influence.”
The British do not even permit foreigners to enter Afghanistan!! (p. 154).
In military terms, the Afghans are “by no means adversaries who can be underestimated” (p. 157).

NOTEBOOK OF MATERIALS ON PERSIA
Britain is exceedingly cautious in its dealings with them: “Herein lies the wisdom of Britain’s ‘velvet-glove’ policy—because they treat the Afghan emir with greater care and circumspection than they treat anyone else” (p. 158). “In fact, the British can hardly treat anyone at all with anything approaching the respect they accord the Afghan emir.”
Turkestan (= Central Asia). The regions of Ural, Turghai, Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Fergana, Samarkand, Semirechye, Syr-Darya, and Trans-Caspian (p. 161)—covering 3,488,530 sq. km. and home to 10,957,400 inhabitants—plus Khiva and Bukhara
= 3,760,000 sq. km., 13.25 million residents.
The population is almost exclusively Muslim.
“A special embassy from these lands—especially from the Kyrgyz region—is currently touring the courts of the four Allied Powers and the neutral states, bringing them their complaints about Russian oppression and demanding liberation from Russian rule and the restoration of their former sovereign states” (p. 162).
For information on Turkestan, see the “memorandum” (perhaps by Krivoshein?), translated into German, as well as “Russian Turkestan,” the report prepared by the Belgian consul (“Belgian Consular Collection,” Brussels, Volume 160, 1912).
The Anglo-Russian Agreement concerning Tibet (also concluded in 1907)—both parties recognized China’s sovereign rights (text, p. 169), Tibet’s territorial integrity, and so forth (thus shifting the struggle over Tibet to the “court” in Beijing)...
“The question of the Baghdad Railway… is becoming a Persian question” (p. 173)…
Baluchistan is formally independent. Britain maintains a railway line and has established a 200-yard buffer zone on either side of “British territory” (a mere “lease”!!). The entire country “stands in the closest bonds of friendship and alliance with Britain” (the nation), “of course having transferred its entire foreign policy unreservedly into Britain’s hands—but otherwise remaining a fully independent native state, much like Afghanistan or Nepal” (pp. 174–175).

The author’s conclusion:
“In contrast to this” (as opposed to the misguided policies of Britain and Russia), “Germany’s sole desire can only be to avoid positioning itself as a third party between the two brothers—Russia and Britain—so as not to risk being attacked by both under certain circumstances; rather, Germany’s goal, as in all such cases (Turkey, Morocco), is nothing less than a strong, independent Persia, granting equal rights to all—and, at best, conferring certain advantages upon Germany” (p. 176)...
German imports to Turkey / Turkish exports to Germany
1882 – 5.9; 1887 – 12; 1891 – 37; 1900 – 34.4; 1912 – 98.4 – roughly 1.2 million marks – 3.2 – 13.8 – 30.5 – 74.0 (p. 179)
July 17, 1914: The British House of Commons approved—by a vote of 254 to 18—the government’s proposal to acquire shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which held vast oil reserves along the Karun River). The author draws a parallel between this move and the British government’s acquisition of shares in the Suez Canal Company.
pp. 158–159: The testament of the old Afghan emir (Abd al-Rahman)—it is imperative to strive for an alliance among Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan in order to safeguard the entire Muslim world against Russia...