Contents   Imperialism 102
Reventlov [1–4]
Kautsky. “Socialism and Colonial Policy” [21–22]
Engels (Letter of September 12, 1882) – pp. 23–25   Quadflieg
[27–40 and 17–20]
REVENTLOV. “GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY, 1888–1913” “Germany’s Foreign Policy, 1888–1913” by Count Ernst Reventlov. Berlin, 1914. Fourth Section.
“From 1903 onward, a menacing specter emerged—the German project for the Baghdad Railway, which had been endorsed by Turkey” (p. 314).
“If we add to this the fact that the Balkan Committee’s primary task was the deliberate cultivation of political propaganda, then it becomes abundantly clear how powerful—and yet how reckless—a tool this committee, wielding vast financial resources, served as in the official policies of England” (p. 314).
“The ideological link between the Sanjak Railway and the future Baghdad Railway was unmistakable” (p. 317).
“In 1906, the Paris-based Revue Slave argued that all Slavic peoples of Central Europe and the Balkans ought to strive toward the establishment of a large customs union with Russia, Hungary, Romania, and Greece. ‘All these nations would undoubtedly benefit from such a union far more than they would from a customs union with Germany…’

The revitalized might of Russia would become unshakable—as long as all Slavic elements, united under its moral banner, stood resolutely opposed to any POLICY based on brute force’” (p. 318).
“From the very beginning, the movement bore a strong Jewish imprint, which bound it closely to the centers of European capital. The Young Turk movement consistently received support from France and England, particularly through the Balkan Committee” (p. 319).
“On July 19, 1908, King Edward VII paid a visit to the Russian Tsar and met with him off the coast of Revel. This meeting marked the culmination of Anglo-Russian rapprochement and sent shockwaves through the political world of Europe” (p. 319).
“In any case, we must recall the atmosphere of anxiety that prevailed across Europe in 1906–1908—especially in Germany. We have seen how, in 1906–1907, the real political significance of the aptly coined phrase about Germany being “encircled” by the policy of agreements pursued by King Edward became increasingly evident. The Mediterranean Agreements and the treaty with Russia seemed to complete the circle” (p. 320).
“The discussion revolved around a far‑reaching plan for the partition of Turkey” (p. 322).
“In London, just as in Paris, they were caught completely off guard” (p. 327).
“There could be no doubt: if Germany were to support the Dual Monarchy only conditionally and with reservations, the latter would come under intense pressure from the Entente Powers—meaning that, at a certain point, England and Russia would work to reverse this stance, seeking to demonstrate through such pressure that it would be far more advantageous for Austria-Hungary to join the Triple Alliance; for Austria-Hungary itself, this would prove more beneficial than an alliance with the German Empire” (p. 332).
KAUTSKY. “SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY”
Karl Kautsky. “Socialism and Colonial Policy.” Berlin, 1907. “However, the role of the capitalist mode of production as the most powerful stimulus for the development of the productive forces

THE NOTEBOOK “IMPERIALISM” had already been fulfilled. As early as the 1880s, the capitalist mode of production had reached a threshold beyond which it increasingly became an obstacle to the further development of the productive forces. Not yet in the sense that it rendered impossible any further growth of those forces—in fact, such growth was still taking place—but rather in the sense that a mode of production had emerged whereby the development of productive capacity could proceed more rapidly than under the capitalist mode of production; indeed, in order to preserve itself, the capitalist mode of production was compelled to erect ever greater obstacles to the advancement of productive capacity” (p. 35).
“Socialism has now become an economic necessity. The question is merely one of timing—when that moment will arrive. To forge this power for the proletariat through organization and educational work is, more than ever before, the paramount task of social democracy. There is nothing more paradoxical than those socialists who believe that, alongside this, they must also concern themselves with the continued expansion of capitalist power” (p. 37).
ENGELS. LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1882 *
Letter from Friedrich Engels (September 12, 1882)
[“For a quarter of a century—1907–1882 = 25 years—Germany had been engaged in a movement for colonial expansion. While I was occupied with studying this movement, I once asked Friedrich Engels how English workers viewed their own colonies.”] **
To this, Engels replied on September 12, 1882, as follows:
“You ask me what English workers think about colonial policy? They think the same as they think about politics in general. There is no distinct workers’ party here; there are only the Conservative Party and the Liberal–Radical Party—and THE WORKERS, IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS, JOINTLY WITH THESE PARTIES, PROFIT FROM THE COLONIAL MONOPOLY

* Engels’s letter—accompanied by a preface and postscript by Kautsky—is appended at the end of Kautsky’s pamphlet (see above). Ed.
** This paragraph, which serves as Kautsky’s preface to Engels’s letter, was crossed out by V. I. Lenin. Ed.

ENGLAND AND ITS MONOPOLIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKET *.
In my view, the so‑called “colonies”—that is, lands settled by European populations—such as Canada, the Cape, Australia—will all eventually become independent. By contrast, only those territories occupied by indigenous peoples—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies—will require the proletariat to assume temporary oversight and to guide them toward independence as swiftly as possible. It is difficult to say precisely how this process will unfold. India may well undergo a revolution—or perhaps even more likely, given that the emancipating proletariat cannot wage colonial wars, we must come to terms with that reality, though of course such a transition will inevitably entail considerable destruction. Yet such upheavals are inseparable from every revolution. The same dynamic could play out in other regions as well—for example, in Algeria and Egypt—and for us, ** this would undoubtedly be the best outcome. We have ample work to do at home. Once Europe and North America have been reorganized, they will generate such immense power and set such a powerful example that semi‑civilized nations will naturally follow our lead; economic necessity alone will drive this process forward. As for the social and political stages these countries must traverse before they too attain socialist organization, I believe we can only offer rather speculative hypotheses on that matter. One thing is certain: the victorious proletariat cannot impose any form of “blessed salvation” upon foreign peoples without undermining its own victory **. Of course, this does not preclude defensive wars of various kinds ***.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 270. Ed.
** Italics in Kautsky’s pamphlet. Ed.
*** See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 336–337. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “IMPERIALISM”
The Egyptian affair was initiated by Russian diplomacy. Gladstone is offered the opportunity to seize Egypt—which is far from being firmly in his grasp, and even if he were to succeed, it would by no means guarantee that he could retain control over the country—for the sake of enabling Russia to take possession of Armenia. According to Gladstone, such an acquisition would once again constitute the liberation of a Christian nation from the yoke of Muslim rule. Everything else in this matter is mere pretense, a farce, a pretext *. Whether this scheme succeeds remains to be seen—soon enough, we shall see.” 103.
“The closing remarks of the letter refer to the British occupation of Egypt following the Egyptian uprising led by Arabi Pasha. Recently, Engels’ letter of August 9, 1882, on this very topic was published, in which he cautioned against approaching the Egyptian national movement solely through the lens of sentiment. From this, some concluded that Engels had welcomed the British annexation of Egypt with particular favor. But we now see just how little that accords with reality” ** (pp. 79–80).
QUADFLIG. “RUSSIAN POLICY OF EXPANSION, 1774–1914”

* Italics in Kautsky’s pamphlet. Ed.
This paragraph serves as Kautsky’s postscript to Engels’ letter. Ed.
“Russian Policy of Expansion, 1774–1914” by Dr. Franz Quadflig. Berlin, 1914. “Meanwhile, through the Kuwait Agreement, England shifted its longstanding disputes with Russia over the Turkish question to Armenia and Asia Minor; Russia has been quietly working in Armenia, France yearns to seize Syria, while Germany seeks to dominate the region along the Euphrates. Thus, with only brief interludes, the Turkish question will likely continue to trouble Europe for another century—and Russian diplomacy must devote greater attention to the South Asian question. Russia’s policy of gigantic expansion into Asia must mean that its future lies on the seas; without a strong navy, free to move as it pleases, there can be no true Russian Asia. The passage through the Sea of Marmara assumes even greater significance for Russian maritime policy, especially since Russia lost its favorable position in East Asia in 1905” (p. 96).

“Even after the division agreement of August 7, 1907, the aforementioned projects could be carried out without violating the rights established in the treaty. This 1907 agreement divided Persia into three zones: the Russian and British spheres of influence, and a common zone shared by both powers. The governments of England and Russia mutually pledged not to acquire political or commercial concessions within their respective spheres of influence, nor to assist their own nationals—or the nationals of third states—in obtaining such concessions. All of northern Persia—that is, north of the line Kasr-e Shirin–Isfahan–Yazd–Kah to the point where the Persian–Afghan–Russian border intersects—was granted to Russia, while England was to exercise influence in the east, namely southeast of the line Bandar Abbas–Kerman–Birjand–Ghazik” (p. 134).
“The final act of Anglo-Russian policy was the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of Hakkı Pasha in London, 1913—a development to which we will return when examining Russian policy in Asia Minor. Under this agreement, England secured the final section of the Baghdad Railway, Basra–Baghdad—that is, yet another segment of the Cyprus–India line. Furthermore, Turkey relinquished the Emirate of Kuwait, which, though always only loosely dependent on Turkey, was now to become a vassal state of England. In doing so, the entire southwestern coast of the Persian Gulf—from the mouth of the Euphrates to the Strait of Hormuz—became British territory” (p. 135).
“The successes of Russian policy in Persia lag behind those of English policy, since England can threaten Persia from the sea” (p. 136).
“In recent times, Russia has returned to its former policy of fomenting uprisings; that is, it once again employs its Armenian subjects as agents to incite rebellions in Turkish territories—though, of course, much remains to be said about this. By contrast, England took advantage of the Balkan turmoil of 1913 to pursue reforms through peaceful means, so that Russia would have no grounds to intervene in Turkish affairs; and should intervention prove necessary, England would be called upon to act, for Turkey had pledged to carry out reforms— THE NOTEBOOK “IMPERIALISM”
Under the Kuwait Agreement, England guaranteed the Sultan’s Asian territories for a period of forty years—thereby securing itself the right, in the event of Russia’s renewed attempts to assert itself as Turkey’s protector and to reclaim any gains Russia might have made, to once again step in as Turkey’s defender. In return, Turkey undertook to implement reforms in Armenia, Anatolia, and, more generally, in those regions of Asia Minor with significant Christian populations” (pp. 146–147).
“According to the reports cited above, England pledged to safeguard the territorial integrity of present-day Turkey for forty years—and this is particularly significant today, given Russia’s subversive activities in Armenia,” writes Rorbach* (p. 147).
“This network of transportation routes—comprising railways, waterways, and military roads—demonstrates that Russia does not regard the South Asian question as settled. On the contrary, this systematic development underscores that, when the time is right, the question of who shall be the sole master of South Asia must be resolved by force” (p. 171).
“As early as 1903, Prince Ito had advocated for a Russo-Japanese alliance, arguing that such an alliance would greatly simplify the partition of the Chinese Empire while still allowing each party to secure its own interests” (p. 173).
“The treaty signed on July 17/30, 1907, between Russia and Japan pointed toward a new direction in both Russian and Japanese policy. England thus found itself isolated, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lost much of its strategic value” (pp. 173–174).
“Shortly after the Russo-Japanese Agreement, England concluded a convention with Russia on August 7, 1907, under which Russia temporarily renounced further expansion into Afghanistan” (p. 174).
“The policy of Russo-Japanese rapprochement found its continuation in the treaty of July 4, 1910—a document strikingly similar to a defensive alliance” (p. 219).

* “Münchner Neueste Nachrichten,” No. 280, April 4, 1913. Ed.
“This treaty was expanded through an additional agreement dated May 7, 1911. Both states pledged to mutually respect their respective spheres of interest in Manchuria and to resist any foreign interference. In return, Japan granted Russia complete freedom of action in MONGOLIA” (p. 220).
“But at this very moment, Russia began to raise the Mongolian question—something it had secured the consent of the Japanese for under the treaty of May 7, 1911. Building upon the revolution and the realization that China’s resettlement policy—where military contingents followed peaceful settlers—had violated the treaties existing between the Manchus and the Khalkha tribes—the Mongol princes declared the independence of their domain. Russia hastened to recognize Mongolia’s independence, even though it had played no role whatsoever in bringing about that independence” (pp. 220–221).
“Although, in this way, China retained the semblance of supreme authority over Mongolia, the Russian newspapers were not entirely wrong in asserting that Russia had brought Mongolia under its own protectorate. The same results were achieved here that Russian diplomacy had secured in Korea prior to 1904. This time, with Japan’s approval, Russia may prove more fortunate than it had been when it had to contend with that power’s resistance” (p. 221).
“The only question is whether China can undergo genuine reorganization. China is a compact mass of 300 million people—people who love their homeland and are deeply resentful of the way foreigners have treated their country. In 1911, a revolution broke out, culminating in the removal of the Manchus. In doing so, China accomplished its first task: the overthrow of foreign rule—a goal it had sought so often, yet always without success. Will Yuan Shikai—or some other figure—become China’s reformer? Once awakened, China will prove a far more formidable opponent to Russia’s expansionist policies than Japan; and Prince Ukhtomsky is absolutely right when he says: ‘China will rise again through its own internal forces—as it has done so many times throughout its millennia-long history. That revival may be slower, but it could also be more enduring than in Japan—and then the question will no longer be: Russia or Japan—but rather: Russia or China.’” (p. 222)
“The guiding principle of Russian Balkan policy in the 19th century was to seek control over Turkish territories—whether through state‑legal incorporation…

The notebook “Imperialism” the incorporation of these territories into the Russian Empire—or, alternatively, by securing a dominion over Turkey itself, grounded in international law, or over the federation of Balkan states that emerged from the Turkish Empire. This dominion could subsequently be transformed into a state of a distinctly political and legal character.
However diverse Russia’s ultimate objectives in Central and South Asia—extending even to Asia Minor—might have been at different historical junctures, they can nonetheless be reduced to a single formula: The ultimate goal is first to bring under Russian influence the entire array of states situated here—Armenia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the smaller states bordering upon them—then to impose a Russian protectorate over these lands, with the eventual aim of incorporating them into the Russian Empire” (pp. 227–228).
“Temporarily, they relinquished Korea and part of Manchuria, but they drew closer to the Japanese in order to more securely annex Mongolia and Northern Manchuria to the empire. At present, through the astute exploitation of the unique political and social relations that had long existed between Mongolia and its dominant neighbor—China—this policy, apparently with the consent of the Japanese government, is now bringing its objectives to fruition. From this it follows that, in East Asia as well, expansion proceeded systematically, according to a premeditated plan that was adapted to changing circumstances yet remained fundamentally unchanged in its essential features—aiming at the direct conquest of vast territories stretching all the way to the Great Wall of China and at the attainment of hegemony in East Asia.
It is therefore entirely correct to conclude that the central idea underlying Russian policy in the nineteenth century was the creation of a world empire—and by “world empire” we must understand a state whose final borders are determined without regard to any of those factors that typically serve as criteria for the formation of national states. The boundaries sought do not coincide with the boundaries of nationality, nor with the boundaries of a common language, nor with those of race, and certainly not with religion—which is taken into account even less; they are not defined by the contours of the terrain and, consequently, do not everywhere align with the natural boundaries established by nature” (pp. 230–231).
“The great powers,” Zerzing observes, “have always monopolized land—the source of all material wealth.” The modern great powers—Russia, Britain, and America—are going further. They have expanded their empires, or seek to expand them, not in the literal sense, but in such a way that every resource the earth can yield may be extracted within the confines of their imperial domains. Britain has already reached this stage: it occupies a quarter of the Earth’s habitable surface, and, as Chamberlain proudly declared at the Colonial Prime Ministers’ Conference, there is no commodity that cannot be obtained in some corner of its sprawling empire. Should Russia and America succeed in realizing their plans to build world empires, they will come to control the next two quarters of the Earth’s surface, finding themselves in a position as advantageous as that of the British Empire” (p. 234).
“Another path, one particularly relevant to Germany, is characterized by Schmoller as follows: ‘We neither wish nor intend to pursue a chauvinistic foreign policy. We will not follow the path of endless naval expansion and maritime supremacy, but we aim to expand our trade and our industry to such an extent that we can sustain the lives and livelihoods of an ever-growing population; we seek to protect our colonies and, where possible, to acquire a German agricultural colony somewhere abroad; we will oppose, wherever we find it, the excessive, predatory mercantilism and the like—a division of the world among the three great powers—Britain, Russia, and North America—which seek to exclude all other nations while simultaneously destroying their trade.’ Yet only a few great powers can now hope to follow this latter path with any real prospect of success” (p. 237).
“Britain has always been a friend to the weaker power—seeking to reduce the stronger power to a level at which it no longer poses a threat to Britain. First, Britain allied itself with the Netherlands in order to destroy the might of the

* Italicized by Quadflieg. Ed.

The notebook “Imperialism”
Spaniards; then it joined forces with France to put an end to the Dutch monopoly of the seas; later, it supported Frederick the Great in order to gain a better opportunity to dismantle France’s colonial empire; it forged an alliance with Japan to counter the alarming rise of Russian power in East Asian waters; today, it has become a friend to either France or Russia—seeking to undermine Germany’s formidable position on the seas; and when the time comes, it will ally itself with Germany—as soon as Britain no longer needs to fear the German navy—whether because the German fleet has been destroyed, or because Germany voluntarily renounces competition. For then, the next adversary of Britain may very well be the Tsarist Empire” (p. 246).
The following table illustrates the growth of the Russian railway network (p. 239):
Total   Central Asia   Siberia and
Length   Region       Manchuria
1858    1,165 km     km           km

1878 22 910 » » »
1890 32 390 » 1433 » »
1908 73 699 » 4 519 » 10 337 »
1909 76 284 » 6 544 » 10 337 » “The Central Powers of Europe—Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—had forged an alliance against the aggressive tendencies inherent in Russian and French policies. This alliance endured for a considerable period, as the differences among its three members were relatively minor; such divergences existed only between Austria and Italy, since Austria still harbored a sizable Italian-speaking population along its border with Italy—and this rift was further exacerbated by the machinations of Italian irredentists in Trieste and in Italian Tyrol. Thus, while it would be premature to dismiss outright the possibility that this rather loosely knit international coalition might one day evolve into a more robust and enduring association. In this way, the foundations were laid for a European association of states. The three great powers of Europe, each devoid of expansionist ambitions, united in order to counter the advance of Slavic influence—or, more precisely, the expansionist drive of Russia and the small Slavic states of the Balkan Peninsula under the leadership of the Russian government” (pp. 248–249).
“The unity of the European continental powers, so crucial in the face of the global powers of England and Russia—and now joined by the North American Union, whose Pan-American aspirations had advanced significantly following the Monroe Doctrine—was thereby disrupted. As long as the European states remained divided, the three aforementioned powers could continue to carve up the rest of the world at their own pace. During the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, it became clear that, aside from these two powers, the remaining European states played but a secondary role. As noted above, over the course of the century, Russia periodically expanded its empire, sometimes here, sometimes there, in brief intervals; similarly, no decade passed without England—beginning with its occupation of Malta in 1800 and culminating in the conquest of the Boer republics in 1900—adding new territories to its vast imperial domain. While Russia and England partitioned the non-European world between themselves, the North Americans specifically reserved the entire American continent as a target for conquest. In this light, Russian expansionist policy merely mirrored British imperialism and North American Pan-Americanism; though outwardly distinct in their particular aims, all these endeavors shared a common ultimate goal: the establishment of an independent world state, shielded from the outside world by a high tariff wall. In the nineteenth century, the movement toward the formation of global powers had begun; in the twentieth century, it would become the defining feature of state foreign policy. This tendency would manifest itself both in the expansionist drives of the major powers and in the alliances forged by smaller nations—and by those powers that entered the stage too late, namely, the European states, with the exception of England and Russia. It would be confirmed what Chamberlain had proclaimed in his speech on January 17, 1903, in Johannesburg: ‘The age of small states and petty rivalries is past; the future belongs to the great powers’” (pp. 254–255).