NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)

“β”

(“BETA”)
Contents
Notebook β. Pages 1–106 (108)
1. Ditzel, Schumpeter, Vogelstein (a few remarks).
2.– – – 3–16. Excerpts from the journal “Die Bank,” 3–16; 92–103.
17. Securities Statistics…
18–30. Schiller. Volume One of “Trends in the Development of the World Economy.”
31–33. Plenge. “Marx and Hegel” *.
34–36. Gerhard Hildebrand. “The Tremor, etc.”
37–39. P. Tafel. “North American Trusts, etc.”

×||40. A Note on K. Kautsky versus Imperialism||

41–62. E. Agad. “Large Banks and the World Market.”
62. Ballod. Statistics.
63. Otto. German Banks Across the Ocean.
63–65. Diurich. The Expansion of German Banks Abroad.
66. Kaufmann. French Banks.
66. Hegeman. French Banks.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 38, pp. 388–391. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
67. Gulftegger. “The Bank of England.”

Jaffe. English Banks.

Merenz. French Banks.

Wallich. The Concentration of German Banks.
68–69. Zöllinger (the International Balance Sheet) and Neumark
70–74. Taylor (“The Principles of Scientific Management”).
74–75. Seibert. “From the Practice of the Taylor System.”
76–77. Gilbreth. “Motion Study.”
78–90. Eidels. “The Relationship Between Large Banks and Industry.”
91. Stiplich and “The World Economy” (Halle). A Note.
92–103. The entire run of “Die Bank” has been reviewed, with the exception of the years 1908 and 1915.
×
NB: 103 Notes

NB ((On Financial Capital in General))

104. Chirshki
105–106 + 0 Turnover + 108. (NB) Gehman
×
0 Turnover

NB on the Question of Imperialism

Literature References: 1. 10. 16. 17. 40. 91. 98 (French).
DITZEL, SCHUMPETER, FOGELSTEIN
Zurich Cantonal Library.
Dr. Heinrich Ditzel. “The World Economy and National Economy.” Dresden, 1900. (= “Yearbook of the Gehe Foundation,” Volume V.)
{{
Nothing particularly interesting. A cursory review reveals that the work is little more than polemics against autarky in favor of a world economy. Nil. (“Nationalization”)}

Dr. Joseph Schumpeter. “The Theory of Economic Development.” Leipzig, 1912.

((Also nil. The title is misleading—on closer inspection, it turns out to be something akin to “sociological claptrap.” Perhaps we’ll have to return to this topic later, but for now, let’s leave it at “development”—nil.))

Theodor Vogelstein. “Organizational Forms in the Iron and Textile Industries in England and America.” Leipzig, 1910.
——— This is the first volume, which is dominated by a largely uninteresting historical section and a mere enumeration of facts.
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——— See the brief excerpts from Vogelstein in another notebook *.
Frank. “Changes in Württemberg Agriculture.” Dissertation, 1902.
LITERATURE REFERENCES
Literature:
?Johann Huber. “The Participation of Workers in Capital within British Production Cooperatives and in Their Management.” 1912, Stuttgart. (Issue 4 of the “Basel Studies in National Economics.”)
Goetz Briefs. “The Alcohol Cartel.” Karlsruhe, 1912. (Issue 7 of the “National Economic Studies of the Higher Schools of Baden.”)
Kurt Goldschmidt. “On Concentration in the German Coal Industry.” Karlsruhe, 1912.
Julius Wolf. “The National Economy of the Present and the Future.” Leipzig, 1912. Nil.
I. Levin. “The Current State of Joint-Stock Commercial Banks in Russia (1900–1910).” Freiburg im Breisgau, 1912. (Dissertation.)
K. Dove. “Economic Geography.” Leipzig, 1911. (“From the Realm of Nature and the Spiritual World.”)
» » “Economic Geography of the German Colonies.” 1902.
Kurt Schwabe. “In the Land of Diamonds.” Berlin, 1910. (South Africa and the German Economy in the Colonies.)
Rud. Lesh. “The Copper Market Under the Influence of Syndicates and Trusts.” Berlin, 1910.
Leon Barreti.
“Concentration of Provincial Banks in France.” Paris, 1910. (Articles appeared in the “Annales des Sciences Politiques.”)
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* See this volume, pp. 45–47, Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Gustav Ruland. “Selected Essays.” 1910 (published by the “Union of Rural Landowners.” Against plutocracy in Germany!!).
A. G. Raunig. “The Equilibrium Between Agriculture and Industry.” Vienna, 1910.

Dr. Walter Kundt. “The Future of Our Overseas Trade.” Berlin, 1904. Nil. Empty rhetoric,
EXCERPTS FROM THE JOURNAL “BANK” “Die Bank.” “Monthly Journal of Finance and Banking.”
(Publisher: Alfred Lansburg) 1914, 2nd half-year, p. 1042.
According to data from the London Department of Trade, imports and exports in millions of pounds sterling:
(* 7 months

1/I–1/VIII) Half-Yearly Periods (First)
ImportsExports
191219131914191219131914
England296.1319.7375.9225.3257.1255.4
Germany260.6267.0269.3205.4243.1249.2
United States *215.3212.2237.7255.6271.8245.7
France *192.2196.4198.6149.0156.1153.8 (Ibidem, p. 713). A note titled “Banks and the Postal Service.” It is stated that the boundaries between banks and, for example, savings banks are “increasingly blurring.”
From this arise complaints from the banks. The Erfurt Chamber of Commerce advocates for banks against “the latest encroachment of the postal service into monetary circulation” (in the form of “issuing postal letters of credit”). The editorial staff notes that postal letters of credit operate only within the German Empire, while banks primarily serve travelers abroad—and “after all, the public exists not merely for the sake of banks” (p. 714).
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magnificent!!!
)
In the article “Thoughts on the Billion-Dollar Loan,” p. 932: “He who subscribes to the loan possesses free

* Data for countries marked with an asterisk cover January–July, while data for the remaining countries cover January–June. Ed.

dialectics, but for the most part not in the form of cash, rather as current bank accounts or deposits in savings banks, cooperative societies, and the like. In Germany, these institutions collectively hold roughly 35 billion marks in such liquid assets, about half of which can be made immediately available to their owners, while the other half—upon prior notice, usually a month in advance—can likewise be accessed by their holders.” (933)
The crucial point lies in the transfer of assets from private accounts to state accounts—and vice versa, when payments are made to suppliers, etc.
All credit institutions together hold “no more than one-half billion” marks, calculated as “the total sum of cash and deposits held at the State Bank” (933).
In 1871, France paid off its war debts totaling 5 billion marks, of which only 742.3 million were settled in gold, silver, and banknotes; the remainder—4,248.3 million—was paid in bills of exchange. (France recovered so swiftly in 1870–71 because it did not tamper with its currency and refrained from issuing excessive quantities of “uncovered banknotes.”)
pp. 903 et seq.: “The Erosion of London’s Role as the World’s Clearing House,” by Alfred Lansburgh.
A highly insightful article that elucidates the roots of Britain’s global power. The primary reason: “an absolute preponderance of British trade and monetary circulation over the trade of all other nations” (909). German trade exceeded that of other nations by “roughly 50%” (ibid.). And then there was the trade with the colonies!
NB || “Three-quarters of world trade is conducted by Britain” (910)
“This means that three-quarters of all international payments flow directly or indirectly through Britain” (910).
“The pound sterling account” still “dominates” in Japan, then in China, Chile, Peru, Southern Persia, and “most of Turkey” (910)—a fact underpinned by “the widespread familiarity with the English language among commercial circles” (910).
And then Britain finances this entire global trade network—with the lowest interest rates; with the most stable gold-backed currency; with 1 pound sterling equal to 7⅓ grams of gold, and so on, and so forth.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Britain’s “vast” financial resources, its six colonial banks (911), and so on.
The words of Kemmerer, director of the Bank of Brazil (a German):
(913) “The very first requirement for establishing an overseas banking operation is credit—a banker’s acceptance in London.”
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p. 912, note: “With regard to the difficulties encountered by German overseas banks when attempting to introduce mark-denominated bills of exchange into South America, see Jaffe, ‘English Banking,’ 2nd edition, pp. 98–101; ‘Frankfurter Zeitung,’ August 29, 1914; ‘Hamburger Nachrichten,’ September 15, 1914” (I omit further citations).
——— “For every country that transitions to a gold standard—and as is almost universally the case, such countries typically hold a substantial portfolio of English bills of exchange as a substitute for gold—not only does it subordinate a large portion of its international payment flows to London’s clearing house, but it also directly contributes to the consolidation of Britain’s global monetary supremacy. To maintain a large portfolio of English bills of exchange essentially means that the country places significant funds at London’s disposal, funds that London, in turn, can—and indeed does—employ to further finance the foreign trade of other nations, thereby strengthening its own currency and its own clearing functions. Thus, thanks to the gold content of the pound sterling, Britain is constantly able, even beyond its own massive capital reserves, to support its credit system with several additional billions of marks in foreign funds” (913–914).
To displace Britain from its dominant role, one needs “vast financial resources and low interest rates” (916). … “It is not enough merely to possess enormous financial resources; one must also be able to guarantee the unwavering stability of the currency intended to replace the pound sterling—that is, one must always be prepared to pay in gold.”

For this reason, the plan proposed by National City Bank (the Morgan bank) and ten Swiss banks—“which hold the view that a mere touch of goodwill would suffice to wrest international settlements, or at least a significant share of them, from London—a goal that, while highly desirable, can only be achieved if some other nation is able to place at the service of global trade the same mass of credit, the same array of trade, banking, and interest-rate concessions, and the same reliable monetary foundation that Britain, at least until the outbreak of war, had made available to the world’s economic transactions” (920)—is nothing short of a utopian vision.

(1914, November and December). “Covering Military Expenses and Their Sources,” an article by Alfred Lanzburg.
The author quotes Lloyd George (in IX. 1914): “In my view, the last one hundred million pounds sterling will decide the outcome of the war. Our enemies may just as easily raise the first one hundred million as we can; but, thank God, they will not be able to raise the final one hundred million” (p. 998).
And the author responds that Lloyd George was mistaken. There are four sources for covering military expenditures: 1) “first‑degree” reserves—cash in hand (in France and Russia, these are greater than in Germany; in England, they are smaller—here, Germany is weaker). 2) “second‑degree” reserves: short‑term debt claims arising from global trade. (England is far stronger: “While England is the world’s banker, keeping its funds in liquid form, France is the world’s financier, investing its capital” [1001].) 3) Net income from a country’s production plus 4) a portion of gross income allocated to depreciation—or to accumulation. And here, the author argues, we are by no means weak.
Yet at the same time, the author anticipates that exports will continue to flow, albeit covertly (“through hidden channels”), though they will not disappear entirely.
Our (Germany’s) low exchange rate for bills of exchange proves (December 1914!!!)—that exports are insufficient, failing to match “our outlays abroad” (1103).

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Compare p. 1112: “Only when exports are sufficient to fully cover imports and military expenditures abroad does a national economy truly enter a state of war footing.”
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1914, May 1. “The Bank with 300 Million,” an article by A. Lanzburg.
The Disconto-Gesellschaft absorbed the Schaffhausen Bankverein and increased its share capital to 300 million marks (p. 415) *.
“Thus, for the first time, a truly major German bank became a victim of the process of concentration” (415).
The Deutsche Bank raised its capital to 250 million marks. In response, the Disconto-Gesellschaft merged with the Schaffhausen Bankverein, boosting its capital to 300 **.
“With 300 million marks in share capital, it has now become, for the time being, the largest bank not only in Germany but in the entire world” (422).
The struggle for hegemony had seemed settled in favor of the Deutsche Bank—but now it was once again intensifying:
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“Other banks will follow the same path… and of the 300 individuals who currently wield economic power over Germany, only 50, 25, or even fewer will remain in time. Nor should we expect that the latest wave of consolidation will be confined to the banking sector alone. The close ties between individual banks naturally lead to closer coordination among industrial syndicates that are patronized by these very banks. Syndicates—and the fluctuations of market conditions—give rise to further mergers, and one fine day we shall awaken to find that before our astonished eyes stand nothing but trusts; we will then face the necessity of replacing private monopolies with state monopolies. And yet, in essence, we have little reason to reproach ourselves—save perhaps for having allowed events to unfold freely, merely accelerating their course through stock market speculation” (426) ***. (End of article.)
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* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 203. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.
*** Ibid. Ed.

“SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES,” an article by Ludwig Eshwege, pp. 544 et seq. (May 1914).
At the beginning of 1912, major banks—yielding to pressure from the State Bank—introduced a new balance sheet format. Yet thousands of stock corporations continued to prepare concise (“knappe”) balance sheets, staying well within the bounds of legal requirements—allegedly safeguarding against speculative practices through the very brevity of their reports!!! In reality, however:

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“In fact, what is achieved through this ‘conciseness of reporting’ is merely that a few better‑informed individuals can enrich themselves at the expense of the herd of shareholders—especially when, alongside these brief reports, an elaborate system of itemized allocations is employed, rendering crucial data virtually invisible to the average shareholder’s eye. In such cases, management boards and their trusted allies enjoy a double advantage: during favorable market conditions, they alone possess complete knowledge of how share prices are rising; and when downturns loom, they can evade anticipated losses by selling shares in a timely manner.”

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For instance, the Aktiengesellschaft für Federstahlindustrie in Kassel was, several years ago, regarded as one of Germany’s most profitable enterprises. Poor management, however, drove the company to such a point that dividends fell from 15% to 0% over the course of several years. As it turned out, without the knowledge of the shareholders, the board had extended a loan of 6 million marks to one of its “subsidiary companies”—the Hesse GmbH, a limited liability company whose nominal capital amounted to only a few hundred thousand marks. This loan, which nearly tripled the parent company’s share capital, did not appear in the latter’s balance sheets; legally, such silence was entirely permissible and could persist for as long as two years, since not a single paragraph of commercial law was thereby violated. The chairman of the supervisory board—who, as the responsible officer, had signed those fraudulent balance sheets—remains, to this day, the chairman— !!!||

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The notebook “β” (“BETA”)
the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. Shareholders only learned of this loan to the “Hassia” company long after it had become a costly mistake—and by then, as shares in “Federstahl” began to be dumped on the market by insiders, their value had plummeted by roughly 100%. It was only then, through a revision of the balance-sheet methodology, that the relevant entry was finally disclosed. This quintessential example of accounting sleight-of-hand—so commonplace in joint-stock companies—explains why the boards of directors of public corporations are far more inclined than private entrepreneurs to take on risky ventures. The latest advances in balance-sheet techniques not only enable them to conceal high‑risk operations from the average shareholder, but also allow key stakeholders to shift liability onto others by promptly selling off their shares should an experiment fail—while the private entrepreneur bears full personal responsibility for everything he undertakes.” (545)

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“The balance sheets of many joint-stock companies resemble those famous palimpsests from the medieval era”—pergament “on which one had to first erase what was written in order to reveal the underlying script that held the true meaning of the manuscript” (545)...#
Parchment upon which the original primary text had been erased, only to have another layer of writing applied over the erased surface.#
...“The simplest—and therefore most commonly employed—method for rendering balance sheets impenetrable is to divide a single enterprise into several parts, either by establishing subsidiary companies or by acquiring existing ones. The advantages of this approach, from both legal and illicit perspectives, are so obvious that today, large corporations that do not adopt this system are, in fact, the exception rather than the rule.” * (545–546).||

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* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 216–218. Ed.

In this way, “a certain degree of opacity is achieved in their operations” (ibidem)...
A particularly striking example is the “Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft” (with billions held in its subsidiaries)...
(
cf. 1908. Issue 8: “The Rathenau System.” “Die Bank” on AEG’s tactics
)
((
…There are more taxes, since special levies are imposed on these subsidiary companies—but in return, profits are higher, and the secrets remain well guarded!!…
)
author’s emphasis: “Subsidiary companies represent the ideal vehicle for crafting objectively false balance sheets without running afoul of the provisions of the Commercial Code” (549).
…“What matters most is that the latest systems of itemized allocation create ample opportunities for concealment” (ibidem)…
Another example:

“Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft” (pp. 550–551) lists “investments” totaling 5.2 million marks on its balance sheet.

Which investments? Privately, the author learned that 60% of the shares were held by “Gleiwitzer Steinkohlenwerke.”

(And this company carried 20 million marks in debt!!)
((End))
Ibidem, p. 340 (April) (Berlin’s major banks, February 28, 1914).
Balance sheets of Berlin’s leading banks.
Balance sheets:

February 28, 1914
Eight banks—including “Deutsche Bank,” “Disconto-Gesellschaft,” “Dresdner Bank,” “Darmstädter Bank,” “Schaffhausenische Bankverein,” “Nationalbank für Deutschland,” “Commerz- und Disconto-Bank,” plus “Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank.”
Millions of marks
Share capital = 1,140.0 million. Reserves = 350.82
Bills of exchange and the like = 1,956.16 Consortium participations = 278.29
Debtors = 3,036.63 Long-term investments = 286.81
Total balance sheet = 8,103.71

The notebook “β” (“BETA”)
Savings banks (1910) (including postal savings banks) – 11 (p. 446)
Millions of marksMillions of marks
Germany 16,780 Denmark 603
Austria 5,333 Luxembourg 49
Hungary 1,876 Sweden 961
Italy 3,378 Norway 570
France 4,488 Spain 340
United Kingdom 4,518 Romania 50
Russia 3,019 Bulgaria 36
Finland 190 United States of America 17,087
Switzerland 1,272 Australia 1,213
Netherlands 464 New Zealand 319
Belgium 830 Japan 662

p. 496: A critique of “emission statistics”:
(
For the most part, these statistics—especially in the reports of the “Frankfurter Zeitung” and “Der Deutsche Oekonomist,” which abound with speculative estimates—are highly inaccurate, often presenting maximum figures rather than reflecting actual conditions. The issuance of shares may simply amount to a conversion of debt into another form.
NB
See Dr. Hermann Kleiner, “Statistics of Emissions in Germany,” Berlin, 1914,
and Karl Marx (dissertation), “Statistics of Emissions in Germany and Certain Foreign States,” Altenburg, 1913.

1914, 1, p. 316 (Lansburg’s article), the Stock Exchange versus the Banks:
…“The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable intermediary in the circulation of securities that it once was—back when banks were still unable to place the majority of newly issued equity instruments among their own clientele.” *
NB

(March 1914), pp. 298–299: “The New Era of Concentration” in banking—coinciding with deteriorating market conditions, etc.
(The “Bergisch-Märkische Bank,” a Rhineland enterprise with assets totaling 80 million marks and 35 branches, would soon merge into “Deutsche Bank”: 298.)

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 206. Ed.

“For while consolidation does not always make a company stronger, it nonetheless masks many weaknesses and deep-seated ills from the outside” (299)—a point worth pondering when assessing the significance of mergers...

p. 94: “Bankruptcy Statistics” 12—its importance for gauging economic conditions.
NB
(From the “Quarterly Reviews of German Imperial Statistics”) especially the section on “the most severe business failures—that is, those cases where, due to insufficient bankruptcy assets, bankruptcy proceedings could either not be initiated at all, or had to be suspended” (p. 94).
[See the table on p. 61. Ed.]
During this period, the number of large cities increased from 28 to 48—and their populations grew even more—but the percentage of the most severe bankruptcies (those concluded due to a lack of bankruptcy assets) was previously below average; now, however, it has risen above average.

p. 1 (January 1914), in Lansburg’s article “Catalysts of Crises”: (NB: Market Conditions.)
ergo s

1913 ||||

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“Already for nearly a year, the economic climate in Germany has been steadily deteriorating.”
The Crisis of 1914 ||||

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“The era we are living through reveals many, though not all, of the characteristic features of a crisis”...
“The most fateful catalyst of crises… progress”... (11)
NB ||

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What is the remedy? “More effective than cartels is the trust—either one that consciously suppresses all inventions and improvements, or one that buys them up, as, for example, the major German glass manufacturers did with Owens’ bottle patent, joining forces to acquire what they regarded as an excessively risky patent, forming something akin to a purpose‑driven trust” (15)*.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 263. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
My

additions according to Risser
In the German Empire as a whole, in the large cities, declared completed
declared completed competitionscompetitions
Of these, from— re- not- but % Of the total, due to shortfalls in the competition’s
competitive pool
% Of these, from— re- not- but % Of the total, due to shortfalls in the competition’s
competitive pool
%
The upturn began in 1895
71116809.663623956.2182324313.317241046.0
1897
69976399.160773816.3177725114.11466926.3
High prosperity in 1899
77428.8
The crisis of 1901
1056910.9
1903
962715.1
The revival of 1905
935717.6
The American crisis of 1907
985517.8
1908
1157119.0
1909
1100521.6
1910
1078322.2 “Prosperity”¹) 1911
11031235121.380926828.43603123834.323252209.5
1912
12094288523.983567849.44060156338.5239524110.1

¹) “Die Bank,” 1914, p. 5 (I. 1914).

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The article “The Transport Trust” in the journal “Die Bank,” 1914, no. 1, p. 89.
A fine example! ||

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The formation is imminent—or perhaps already underway—of a Berlin Transport Trust, that is, a coalition of interests among three Berlin transport enterprises: the elevated railway, the city tramway, and the omnibus company. We have known of this intention ever since it became clear that the majority of shares in the omnibus company had passed into the hands of the two other transport companies… One can readily believe those who pursue such a goal, that by means of unified regulation of transport affairs they hope to achieve savings, some portion of which might ultimately accrue to the public. Yet the matter is complicated by the fact that behind this emerging transport trust stand banks that, if they so choose, could subordinate the monopolized transportation routes to the interests of their land‑speculation businesses. To see how natural such a supposition is, it suffices to recall that even at the time of the founding of the city electric railway, the interests of that very large bank were deeply intertwined with its establishment. Indeed, the interests of this transport enterprise were closely linked to land speculation—and in fact constituted a crucial precondition for the emergence of this transport undertaking. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was destined to traverse lands that, once the railway’s construction was secured, that same bank would go on to sell at enormous profit—not only for itself, but also for several individuals involved in the land‑holding company near Schenhausener Allee…* As everyone knows, !! ||

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* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 224–225. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“the development of new tracts of land—and thus the enhancement of their value—is best achieved through the construction of new transportation routes.” (Consider another example: no fewer than eleven lines already lead to the Tempelhof Field area. Is that not rather excessive? The reason: many directors and members of supervisory boards live there!!! p. 90)... “The monopoly of transportation routes inevitably leads to a monopoly of settlement…”
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“The Kerosene Comedy.” “Die Bank,” 1913, no. 4 (p. 388).
An excellent piece that cuts to the heart of the struggle for the kerosene monopoly in Germany.
Before 1907, “Until 1907, the kerosene concern of Deutsche Bank found itself in sharp conflict with Standard Oil Company” (389). The outcome was clear: defeat for Deutsche Bank. By 1907, Deutsche Bank had only two options: either liquidate its kerosene interests at a loss of millions—or submit. They chose the latter and entered into an agreement with Standard Oil Company (“not particularly advantageous” for Deutsche Bank). Under this agreement, Deutsche Bank pledged “to refrain from any action detrimental to American interests,” but… the agreement would become null and void should a German kerosene monopoly law be enacted.

NB:

The struggle between Deutsche Bank and Standard Oil Company¹³
And then Herr von Guinerner (one of the directors of Deutsche Bank), through his private secretary (Stauss) (“Die Bank,” 1912, no. 2, p. 1034), launched a campaign in favor of the monopoly!! The entire apparatus of the major bank was set in motion… yet they ended up muddling things. The government was wary—having already drafted and submitted a bill to parliament—of whether Germany would be able to secure sufficient kerosene outside of Standard Oil Company.
See 1913, p. 736 and following.
It was a military bill (July 3, 1913) that came to the rescue, postponing the issue. Standard Oil

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Company emerged victorious, for the monopoly (for now) did not pass *.
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The struggle between Deutsche Bank and Germany against Standard Oil Company.
———

“Die Bank,” 1913, no. 8 (August).
Alfred Lansburg. “Five Years of Activity by German Banks.”
The rise of concentration:
Total deposits (all banks with share capital exceeding 1 million marks) stood at
1907/8—6988 million marks
1912/3—9806
+2.8 billion +40%
9 major banks in Berlin
48 banks with capital exceeding 10 million marks
57
+115 banks with capital exceeding 1 million marks
57 major banks increased their deposits by 2.75 billion
Increase over 5 years (in million marks)
depositsshare capital

capital reserves all banks with capital exceeding 1 million +2818+390+148
57 banks with capital exceeding 10 million +2750+435+153
{for smaller banks, there has been an absolute decline: mergers, etc.}
Percentage of all deposits (p. 728)
NB
Berlin’s large banks (9)
the remaining banks with capital exceeding 10 million marks (48)
banks with

1–10 million marks (115)
banks with capital less than 1 million marks
1907/84732.516.54||100
1910/114933.514З1/2||100
1912/134936123||100**

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 236–237. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 199. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
1913, no. 7, p. 628 et seq.
“The State and Foreign Loans” (by Alfred Lansburg).
Has the German government banned foreign loans? What drives the banks in this direction? The fact that they are already “mired” (Mexico, China, Turkey, and others are teetering on the brink of bankruptcy).
What drove the banks to extend their first loans to such states? Profit!
…“Within the country, there is not a single business venture that yields even remotely comparable returns to the profits generated by brokering foreign loan issuances” (p. 630)… *
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important the difference between the subscription rate and the bank’s rate can reach as much as 7–8%; varying terms—such as collateral, interest rates charged over six months as a “guarantee,” and so forth—make for significant distinctions.
on the question of imperialism
Then comes “high politics” (especially France and Germany—lending money in order to secure allies and the like).
France’s dependence on Russia (“Every one‑percentage-point drop in the exchange rate of Russian securities costs France 100 million. A mere threat from Russia to suspend interest payments would mean more to its principal creditor than the loss of an entire army corps”—p. 633).
Well said!
With such loans, “it remains unclear whose tune the other is dancing to,” ibidem.
Well said!
Mexico (p. 628) had repeatedly defaulted on its obligations—without ever fully going bankrupt—but it continues to receive loans, because otherwise things could turn out far worse!!

“Competition Over Foreign Loans” (1913, no. 10, p. 1024 et seq.; editorial note).
“A comedy worthy of Aristophanes’ pen has recently begun to unfold in the international capital markets. A whole series of foreign

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 222. Ed.
vol. 28

states—from Spain to the Balkans, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil, and China—have been openly or covertly approaching major financial centers with demands, sometimes exceedingly urgent, to secure loans. The financial markets are currently in less than stellar condition, and political prospects remain far from rosy. Yet none of the financial markets dares to refuse a loan—for fear that a neighboring market might warn off the borrower, agreeing instead to extend credit while simultaneously securing certain favors in return for those services.
“benefits”

NB|||

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In such international transactions, something almost always ends up favoring the lender: a concession in a trade agreement, a coal‑mining station, the construction of a harbor, a lucrative concession, a contract for cannon production”... (p. 1025) *,
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important for the discussion of monopolies and finance capital; the “benefits” of imperialism

1913, August, p. 811, editorial note “Savings Banks and Banks”...
...“The fierce competitive struggle that erupted several years ago between savings banks and banks—stemming from both these vastly different types of institutions seeking to expand beyond their own spheres of activity and encroach upon each other’s domains—continues to occupy our chambers of commerce.” For example, the Chamber of Commerce in Bochum is calling for measures against savings banks, including a ban on their acceptance of bills of exchange, the maintenance of current accounts, and the like (while still permitting them to offer “safe deposit boxes,” checks, and cash management services)**.

The same theme: “Banking Activities of Savings Banks” (pp. 1022 et seq.).
|

|
Savings banks are increasingly becoming institutions for the wealthy: in Prussia, among

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 231, Ed.
** Ibid., p. 205. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
In 1909, of the 10.3 billion marks in total deposits, 4.78 billion—that is, 46¹⁄₃%—consisted of deposits exceeding 3,000 marks (with 15% of those deposits coming from accounts holding over 10,000 marks). Often, the wealthy maintain more than one account. Savings banks engage in risky operations—such as bill discounting, mortgage lending, and the like—driven by competition (after all, they must pay 4% and 4¹⁄₄%!!). It is proposed to “ban”…
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!!

they seek to “return” to small-scale capitalism—not to socialism

The article “The Swamp” (by L. Eschweger) (1913, p. 952 et seq.) details the fraudulent schemes of land speculators—selling plots at exorbitant prices, the collapse of construction firms, the ruin of workers who go unpaid, and so on. Gaberland, the gang leader, sought to monopolize “reference bureaus,” thereby aiming to control the entire construction industry. Particularly telling are his concluding remarks:
“Unfortunately, the inevitable trajectory of modern cultural development seems to be leading us toward a future in which the productive forces are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals, who then exploit them in a monopolistic fashion. Economic freedom, enshrined in the German Constitution, has already become little more than an empty phrase in many areas of economic life. Under these conditions, an incorruptible civil service, one that is fully aware of its responsibilities, stands as the granite rock capable of safeguarding the common good against the relentless onslaught of self‑interest. Should this rock prove eroded, then even the broadest political freedoms will fail to save us from becoming a people of unfree individuals—and even monarchy would then retain nothing more than a purely decorative significance” (p. 962).

|

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|Ha-ha!
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||only “would have”??
NB

NB
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||The author has published a book titled “Land and Mortgage

Problems.” 1913 (in two volumes)|||

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* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 226. Ed.

REFERENCES
?? Evgeny Shvidland. “The National Economy Under the Influence of the External World” (1913) (1 krona). Among its themes and chapters: “Colonies and the League of States.”

“The Colonial Handbook by von der Heydt.” (Published by Fr. Mensch and Yu. Gelman.) 1913 (7th edition) (16 marks). Comprehensive data—financial information—on all banks and joint-stock companies operating in the colonies.

? Leopold Joseph. “The Evolution of German Banks.” London, 1913. Might this be a reworking of Rissler’s work—or not?

Erh. Gübenner. “The German Iron and Steel Industry.” 1913 (5.60 marks) (the 14th volume in the “Library of the Higher Commercial School”), Paul Hausmeister. “Large Enterprises and Monopoly in German Banking” (1912). (2 marks).

Arthur Rafalovich. “The Money Market.” 1911/12, Paris, Volume 22, 1912/13.
“Compass.” 46th year of publication. 1913 (Austria’s annual financial yearbook; Volume II contains international statistics). Published by R. Ganel.
SECURITIES STATISTICS
“International Securities Statistics and Securities Issuance.” Dr. Zimmermann’s “Bank-Archiv.” 1912, July 1.
According to the publication of the International Statistical Institute (Alfred Neumark), statistics on “movable assets.”
In francs (md. = billion francs).

1. I. 1897–446.3 billion.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
1897 –

inaccurate (p. 301)

1901 –

corrected

1/I 18971/I 19011/I 1907
United Kingdom182.6– –215– – –125–130
Netherlands13.6– –15
Belgium6.1– –8
Germany92.0– –80– – –60–75
Austria-Hungary24.5– –30– – –20–22
Italy17.5– –17– – –10–12
Romania –1.2– –1.5
Norway0.7– –1.0
Denmark2.7– –2.2
France –80.0– –135– – –95–100
Russia25.4– –35– – –20–25
Spain– –10
Switzerland– –8
Sweden and others– –5

Σ =446.3Σ =562.7 ( (p. 302)

actually the amount of cash assets
)
United States of America110–115
Japan—5
Other states30–35
Billions:
1897–446.3
1899–460
1901–562.7 (342.4)
1907–732 (475–514)
1911–815 (570–600) 14
The figures in parentheses represent an attempt to account for double-counting and repetition—roughly two-thirds of the previous total (p. 301) (“assets actually held in trade and in the possession of individual states”).
See page 68 of this notebook *.
Neumark, Vol. XIX, Issue II,

p. 206

Totals for whole five-year periods:(p. 317)

Emissions in billions of francs
1871/545.0
1876/8031.1
1881/8524.1
1886/9040.4
1891/540.4
1896/90060.0
1901/583.7
1906/1910114.1*** see pp. 68–69 here **

* See this volume, p. 121. Ed.
** See this volume, pp. 121–123. Ed.
*** See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 227. Ed.

GRUNZEL. “THE TRADE, PAYMENT, AND ECONOMIC BALANCE”
Prof. Dr. Josef Grunzel. “The Trade, Payment, and Economic Balance.” Vienna, 1914.
NB pp. 26–29: A concise summary of data on capital outflows, etc. (most of this information is already widely known). Foreign capital
in Austria-Hungary: 9.809 million krona (including 4.653 million from Germany and

3.270 million from France)
Argentina9 billion marks
China3.737 million marks (government debt:

over 50 million pounds sterling in railway bonds, and 34 million in bank loans)
Japan1.765 billion yen (this represents government debt; while private enterprises hold 33 million yen in liabilities)
Canada1.750 billion dollars (including 1.050 billion from Britain;
500 million from the United States)
Mexico1.000 billion—American + 700 million British
SCHILDER. VOLUME ONE OF “TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY”
Dr. Sigmund Schilder. “Trends in the Development of the World Economy.” Volume I. Berlin, 1912. (Volume I: “Systematic?! Impacts on the World Economy”).
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And the title is far too broad, while the subtitle is downright charlatanic—after all, the author specialized in customs policy; that’s how you achieve “systematic impact”!!
========
|¯The author is secretary of the Trade Museum.¯|
p. 4 – I disagree with Sombart (and his theory of the decline in the “export quota”). On the contrary: this “quota” is increasing.
p. 6. The gradual easing of protectionism (“signs of this”) in 1910–1911.
p. 6 – “Unrest over rising prices” in France during August and September 1911. Dates (NB): in Vienna, September 17, 1911.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
27–28. And agriculture, too, is undergoing development—not just industry—but even: “sogar” (p. 28, line 8 from the bottom): “in the industrialized nations of Europe” (How delightful this “even” is!)
(
NB: Consideration of the question of adequacy—whether the “purchasing power of global agriculture” will suffice, p. 27.
)
28–29. The growth of agricultural cooperatives (even in India: 3,498 cooperatives with 231,000 members, according to “The Times,” July 27, 1911).
Especially rapid agricultural development is taking place in the United States.
In the 20th century, one might expect similar developments in Rhodesia, 30: in Canada, in Sudan (Egyptian), in Mesopotamia

31 – Governments are promoting agricultural development in the colonies “in order to secure buyers for industrial products.” (And in India—and until recently in Egypt—England deliberately “hampered” industrial development for precisely this purpose.)
35–6 – The fear of agricultural shortages is unfounded. Tropical and subtropical regions, NB. The Philippines. Of the 74 million acres of land, only 3–5 percent are cultivated. (A population density of 27 people per square kilometer.)
38: “One may even put forward a proposition that some will perhaps find paradoxical—that in the more or less near future, the growth of urban and industrial populations is far more likely to encounter obstacles in the scarcity of raw materials for industry than in the shortage of foodstuffs.”
NB
Shortages of timber: everything is becoming more expensive; the same goes for leather; the same applies to raw materials for the textile industry (39).
“Industrial associations are striving to establish a balance between agriculture and industry across the entire global economy; as an example, one can point to the International Union of Spinning Associations, which has existed since 1904—bringing together paper-spinning manufacturers in several
NB

date!

in the most advanced industrial nations; then, in 1910, the Union of European Linen Spinners was founded, modeled after it. (42) *
NB||
Within states, agreements were forged between sugar beet producers and manufacturers.
“Eastern Europe” (a concept economic and political...)|||

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The agricultural crisis, marked by falling prices from the 1870s to the 1890s—a consequence of American competition?—combined with the constrained circumstances faced by farmers in “Eastern Europe” and India (cf. Engels).
Well said!

||
(43–4) “It was only through agricultural cooperation and the improvement of rural education that the letter of the law on peasant emancipation truly came to life.”
47: The peasant uprising in Romania in 1907—launched in the spring—played a role in improving the peasants’ lot similar to that of the 1905–1907 Revolution in Russia.
NB||

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51: It was only in New Zealand that the teachings of Henry George, along with the British land nationalization movement, were put into “practical” application (the majority of the population consisted of small-scale landowners)... In Australia, beginning in 1910, “similar paths” were pursued...
cartels

1882–1912||||

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63: For roughly three decades, cartels played a significant role—through practices such as price dumping and struggles against free-trade nations—…
||

||======||

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The arguments of English protectionists. NB
======
[NB: This is what gave rise to the protectionist movement in England, Belgium, and the Netherlands: 67.]
66: The Brussels Sugar Convention (March 5, 1902; renewed August 28, 1907) brought an end to the—

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 248. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
the unification of export premiums (on sugar) among states and their respective cartels.
72. Extreme protectionism converges with free trade in that, while restricting domestic sales (due to high prices), it simultaneously stimulates foreign trade—by importing (α) cheap raw materials and the like—and by enabling (β) exports abroad, since the domestic population is becoming impoverished.
||

||

||NB
87 – It is, in fact, incorrect to claim that “trade agreements” have “failed”...
For the author who writes on matters of customs policy, there are countless details—unnecessary, tedious ones—so I tend to skip over them.
98 – Examples of trade agreements: an agrarian country needs inexpensive machinery (while its trading partner requires cheap grain): the Bulgarian tariff of March 19, 1911—alongside Austria’s treaty with Germany (1905)—covering chemical products, synthetic indigo, and the like.
(99) – Mutual concessions (as in the German–Portuguese trade agreement of November 30, 1908), etc.
Subheading of Chapter IV, “Customs Wars”:
118 – “Examples of the substantial, beneficial impact individual customs wars had on the development of international trade…”—the Russo-German War of 1893–1894, and the Franco-Swiss War of 1893–1895.
In 1906, Switzerland and Spain saw tariff reductions (from June until September 1, 1906).

The agreements came to an end with treaties between Austria and Romania (1886–1894)
and with Serbia (1906–1910)

127.
Customs wars are becoming less frequent, yet their role is increasingly shaped by threats, negotiations, and the like.
145. Free trade in England relied not only on its military might—the navy—but also on its colonial empire.
To be sure, until the 1860s, England maintained a rather indifferent attitude toward preserving and expanding its colonies (in 1864, England even ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece, without any political or economic compensation).

146–8: Beginning in the 1880s, England intensified its efforts to acquire colonies. ((Compare Hobson.)) England’s exports to its colonies accounted for roughly one-third of its total exports; this was no small share—and, NB: these exports were “particularly profitable.”
NB

149 owing to: (1) the deployment of capital in the colonies,
(2) the provision of “supplies” there—“public supplies” (of great importance!!),
(3) “Preferential tariffs for British goods in the colonies”: in most colonies,
151: For the deployment of capital, both state authority—concessions, municipal and state institutions, etc.—and trust are crucial; in this regard,
(From the factors of “imperialism”)
151 …“serves the English”—by facilitating investment—the “legend, carefully cultivated by the leading circles of the British Empire, as well as by the English press—despite Ireland, and despite certain measures taken in India, Egypt, and elsewhere—namely, the legend of a special kind of liberalism and humanitarianism allegedly inherent in the English regime at all times and in every place.” (Written in 1912.)
154: Likewise, “intercolonial preferential tariffs” were developed in the English colonies.
(((
NB: a step toward establishing a customs union across the entire empire.

My addition.
)))
England’s de facto protectorate over Portugal, partly over Spain (1901–1910),… over Norway (from 1905 onward)… over Siam (from the 1860s until 1904; in 1904, a treaty was signed with France—establishing their joint protectorate)…
“More interesting—and perhaps even more significant than the examples cited thus far” (Egypt, Zanzibar…), “are the cases in which subtropical or tropical semi-cultured countries, after relatively brief transitional phases lasting roughly several decades, either become—or appear to be becoming—genuine English colonies. Here we refer to instances where a nation of European culture may, for long periods—decades, even centuries—find itself, in effect, under British protectorate,”

The “β” Notebook (“BETA”)
While not, at least formally, deprived of any outward sign of full sovereignty.
The most well-known and most significant example of this is Portugal. Since the War of Spanish Succession (1700–1714), Great Britain had almost continuously deployed its naval forces—and at times even its land army—to safeguard Portugal’s European and overseas territories against Spanish, French, and other such aggressions and claims. The occasional conflicts between Britain, the protector, and Portugal, the protected, bore to a certain extent the character of familial disputes… such, for instance, was the British ultimatum of January 11, 1890, directed against Portugal’s then-current attempt to establish a direct territorial link between its western and eastern colonial possessions in Africa.
In any case, it is only thanks to Britain’s support that Portugal has been able to retain its admittedly small but nonetheless significant holdings—especially for a state as diminutive as Portugal—on the western coast of India, in southern China (Macau), and on Timor, despite the increasingly intense global political rivalry now unfolding in South and East Asia. In Portuguese East Africa, the political protectorate that England exercised over Portugal was even supplemented by a customs union with British South Africa… (the treaty of December 18, 1901)… “This customs union, however, has so far proven economically highly advantageous for the aforementioned Portuguese colony—even though, at the same time, it represents for British South Africa—and thus for Great Britain—a valuable acquisition both in the present and for the future.”
Throughout its more than two-century-long existence, this de facto British protectorate over Portugal proved supremely beneficial to English commerce and maritime enterprise… (the treaty with Portugal in 1703)…
“Yet since Great Britain adopted a policy of peaceful, free trade, it has been able, through diplomatic leverage, to exert an influence on Portuguese tariff policies that few other nations can hope to match—even by means such as granting commercial concessions or threatening tariff warfare. Moreover, thanks to its position as the dominant power, Great Britain is uniquely positioned to exploit to the fullest extent all those opportunities for export and investment that require concessions from the Portuguese government…” (railways in Portuguese Africa, and so forth)…
“In indirect ways—as again evidenced by its protectorate over Portugal—Great Britain not only sustains its own standing in South Africa and its influence within the State of Congo, but also secures its dominion over the seas, that firm foundation upon which rests its colonial, global-political, and economic might. Thus, Portugal makes available to the British fleet its ports and islands, both in wartime and peacetime, as training grounds and intermediate stations for navigation, for cable laying, and the like.” (pp. 159–161)*
a dictum of Bismarck

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169 – In war, England employed European states as “excellent infantry” (as Bismarck characterized them: “a sturdy fool” in the realm of world politics).
170 – England supported Belgium’s secession from the Netherlands (“splitting the Netherlands in half,” as a rival to itself), in order to prevent the emergence of a powerful state located in close proximity to London.
175–76. The struggle with Russia (England’s) over Persia—long and protracted—culminating in the agreement of June 9, 1908.
The struggle with France (England’s) over Siam—long and drawn out—finally resolved by the agreement of April 8, 1904.
178 and following: “Four Periods of British World Politics” (as designated on p. 184):
1) The First Asian Period (against Russia), roughly 1870–1885.
1870 – Against Russia’s rights in the Black Sea.
1885 – Agreement on the borders of Afghanistan.
2) The African Period (against France, partly Portugal, and Germany), roughly 1885–1902 (with Fashoda in 1898).
1885 – Agreement concerning the Congo: “independence” (England sought to devour it).
1902 – End of the Boer War.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 251. Ed.

The “β” Notebook (“BETA”)
3)
The Second Asian Period (against Russia): roughly 1902–1905.
The Treaty with Japan in 1902. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.
4)
The “European” Period (against Germany), roughly
1903 – – – (“Anti-German”) *
1903: Frictions over the Baghdad Railway.
1904: The British Empire (with its colonies) accounted for more than one quarter of global trade turnover” (reference to Volume II, Appendix IX).
Little: compare Lansburgh’s figure of three-quarters **
214. Bukharin’s table + Japan? + Portugal (216) – 2.18 square kilometers – 13 million inhabitants.
220. Peripheries often occupy a special (customs) status—distances are too great even for modern technology.

– Eastern Siberia in Russia

– The Philippines in America, and so forth.
226. Six “Special Economic Zones” in Russia: 1) Poland (“exports to Russia,” as the Poles put it); 2) the South; 3) Arkhangelsk; 4) the Urals; 5) Moscow; 6) the Baltic region (+ Finland).
237 … in 1911, aspirations emerged to create a “Greater Colombia” in the northern part of South America, opposing the United States.
237 and beyond: The consolidation of today’s gigantic global states into a single economic whole is said to represent a “move toward” universal free trade.
“As early as the 18th century, following the secession of the North American colonies from Great Britain, more farsighted colonial peoples came to realize that such a coercive colonial policy” (the suppression of all industry within the colony), “which aimed solely at the real or imagined interests of exporting manufactured goods…”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 282. Ed.
** See the present volume, p. 52. Ed.

NB

NB

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metropolises cannot sustain such a policy for any extended period. At least this holds true for temperate-zone regions with active, conscious populations whose living conditions are not vastly different from those of European peoples. Yet in tropical and subtropical regions—where populations are at a lower stage of cultural development and possess weaker military and political strength and vitality—this old colonial policy has, albeit to a lesser extent, persisted. To be sure, even in the tropics and subtropics, it is generally far from involving the crude suppression of nascent industrial activity; rather, local colonial governments tend to devote more serious attention to the development of agricultural and mining raw-material production than to any industrial‑political concerns. However, the fact that they can largely pursue this course without inflicting significant harm on the economic development of the respective tropical and subtropical regions is all the more significant, since the long-term viability of this colonial policy hinges upon it. For in today’s acutely competitive global political landscape—and with the emergence of overseas great powers such as the United States and Japan—the populations of the tropics and subtropics, deeply resentful of the violent, destructive delays imposed upon their economic development, would nonetheless retain certain means of creating difficulties for their oppressors and of dissuading them from seeking to exercise their domination through brutal methods” (240–241).
NB||

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For example, England, from Egypt, has made the country into nothing more than a cotton-producing region—of the 2.3 million hectares of arable land in Egypt in 1904, fully 0.6 million hectares were already devoted to cotton cultivation—and has actively hindered industrial development (for instance, two cotton‑processing factories established in Egypt in 1901 were met with a cotton tax—indeed, the government levied a “consumption tax” on cotton!!!) (244–245).

|“Colonial Policy in Our Day.”|

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Such, in general, is the “modern” policy toward colonies: to encourage the production of raw materials while meeting the development of industry with “indifference, if not outright hostility” (247).
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|
“However, with regard to physically and intellectually stronger peoples of the temperate zone, such a colonial policy can scarcely be pursued any longer; it is feasible only toward the weaker peoples of the tropics—and, to some extent, the subtropics—but even here, only the more powerful European metropolises—such as Britain, France, and Germany—are capable of implementing it. By contrast, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal have either lost much of their former colonial possessions or owe their continued existence solely to the good will and mutual rivalry of the more powerful colonial powers. This is especially true of Belgium’s rule over its colony.
 
||

||NB

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|||NB
…Yet even the most powerful colonial power, Great Britain, has been compelled, in its largest and most important colony—India—to significantly relax its strict adherence to the aforementioned principle of its commercial and industrial colonial policy, lest its position become even more precarious in the face of popular, hostile agitation than it already is in reality” (247–248)…
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|||NB
247, footnote.
“The fact that the United States, despite years of tenacious, bloody struggle against rebellious indigenous peoples, ultimately granted the Philippines parliamentary representation—in the form of a Congress endowed with broad powers—is a clear testament to the colonial‑political capabilities of North American statesmen. Less flattering, however, is the land policy pursued by North Americans in the Philippines, which has led to the formation of latifundia.”
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||NB NB

Americans in the Philippines
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|NB

Methods of colonial exploitation: the appointment of officials from the dominant nation; the seizure of land by its magnates; high taxes (“education in labor”)...
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“For the subtropical colonial peoples… such as the Indians of northern India and the Egyptians whose educated classes had already become deeply embedded in Euro‑American civilization, the very fact of foreign domination is an affront that they endure with great difficulty and perceive with excessive hatred” (249).
!!!|||

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In Egypt, the population is far more homogeneous—in terms of language, nationality, and so forth—than in India; moreover, “the country [Egypt] is more European than, say, certain regions of European Russia” (252).
(Similarly, roughly half the population in Ceylon, in the settlements surrounding the Straits Settlements, in Algeria, Tunisia, and elsewhere is “civilized” in this sense) (258).
NB|||

The Netherlands, like England… pursues in its colonies a “free-trade policy while, at the same time, directing its efforts primarily toward the development of production in the sphere of agricultural and mining raw materials” (259).
Germany waged a tariff war against Canada (from July 31, 1898, to March 1, 1910) over preferential tariffs in favor of England. The outcome was the retention of these preferential tariffs and the conclusion of a customs agreement between Canada and Germany.
As far as can be foreseen, the majority of the colonies of England, the Netherlands, and Germany will remain under a regime of open doors for all nations (271). Thresher contested this view (“Preferential Tariffs,” 1908), and Schielder notes that he subsequently softened his position.
With regard to state procurement (269–270), the prevailing practice everywhere is to give preference to “one’s own” country.
“Areas of ‘open doors’—of the old type: Turkey (until 1908), Romania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Morocco, Persia; of the new type: the Congo, Afghanistan—are almost always independent states—or, at the very least, formally sovereign but, for the most part, only semi‑civilized countries”... (274).
(1) These territories generally lack full sovereignty. They are often brought under the control of great powers, with individual parts of these regions being severed from their former dominion.
(2) “Certain areas within the ‘open-door’ zones are detached from the state that had previously exercised hegemony over them and, after a more or less protracted transitional period, attain full political and economic sovereignty; among such cases are the small and medium-sized Balkan states. In general, this is not as common a phenomenon as the one described under point 1” (274).
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||NB
(3) Japan is the rarest example of a country that becomes fully independent.
Ad 2. The Rise of Autonomy:

Japan in the 1890s.

Bulgaria, 1897–1909—completely sovereign!

Siam, precisely now.
Title of Section VI: “The Absorption of ‘Open-Door’ Areas by the Great Powers: The World-Economic Utility of This Historical Process, as Demonstrated by the Cases of Bosnia, Algeria, … Formosa, the Belgian Congo, and so on…”
||

||Apologist!!

These advantages—just as the benefits of autonomy for formerly ‘open-door’ areas—Section VII: the author sees in the growth of trade!! And nothing else!! The book is devoted primarily to questions of tariff policy.
Siam, especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, moves steadily toward independence (pp. 318 et seq.).
The rise of national movements in China—in Persia—in Arabia—in Egypt (p. 329) and so on and so forth.
Section IX: “The Disappearance of ‘Open-Door’ Areas—An Unstoppable, Yet Beneficial Process for the World Economy” (337)… these areas are “semi‑barbaric,” for the most part only partially civilized… “The Apple of Discord Among the Great Powers” (337–338)…
Chapter IX: “Capital Placement Abroad.”
NB||

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(Subheading of Section I: “Capital Placement Abroad as a Means of Promoting Export”.)
|||

|||no longer free competition||

||

A common condition: the use of a portion of the loan to purchase goods from the lending country (“extremely frequently,” 342).
Examples: in Paris, the loan requested by Bulgaria in December 1909 was rejected; likewise, Hungary’s loan application in September 1910 was turned down.
NB|

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… “It is precisely because of these loan conditions that the extreme intensity of competition in the global market is mitigated. International competition gives way to a more limited form of rivalry; it encompasses only those industrial enterprises within the creditor state—and even then, only through methods that hover on the brink of bribery*, targeting only certain enterprises that, for one reason or another, enjoy particularly favorable standing… for example, Krupp in Germany, Schneider & Cie. in Creusot, France, and so on.” (346)… “Although one might think that such a monopoly could not be abused excessively,”… for one could always turn to another state—but in reality, the choice is not an easy one… (346)
“Gentle” as stated||

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“Monopoly”|||

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Over the past two decades, France has resorted to this tactic with particular frequency.
348, footnote: “accumulated capital”… annually in France, more than 3 to 4 billion francs in Germany, 5 billion francs
(Delbrück, speaking in the Reichstag on February 12, 1911).
NB||

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The “tariff war” between Austria and Serbia (from July 7, 1906, to January 24, 1911, with a seven‑month hiatus in 1908–1909) was, in part, triggered by competition between Austria and France—both relatively backward countries—in the realm of military supplies for Serbia: according to Paul Deschanel’s statement in the Chamber of Deputies in January 1912, French firms delivered military materials worth 45 million francs to Serbia between 1908 and 1911 (350)**.
Another tactic: when securing a loan—or even when considering loans—to negotiate “benefits” into the trade agreement:

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 232. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
For example, England—my expressions like “plundered,” “pressed,” and the like.
Austria, under its trade agreement of December 16, 1865
France—Russia—December 16, 1905 (up to 1917)
—Japan—August 19, 1911
Sometimes, countries that hold capital themselves lend it out to others, “trading in capital”: for instance, the United States borrows from England, then lends to South America, and so on and so forth (pp. 365 et seq.).
Switzerland willingly lends to foreign countries (at higher interest rates), establishes factories in protectionist countries, and the like (p. 367).
…“In the 1909 report of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in São Paulo, Brazil, it is stated: ‘The construction of Brazilian railways is carried out largely with French, Belgian, British, and German capital; in financial operations related to railway construction, these countries secure the right to supply railway construction materials,’” (371)… *
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The report of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Buenos Aires for the year 1909 estimates capital holdings in Argentina (p. 371).
British: 8.75 billion francs (= 350 million pounds sterling) **
French: 800 million
German: 1 billion

- Foreign capital in Canada (1910): 12.687 billion francs (p. 373)
including 9.765 billion British
2.190 billion from the United States
372 million French

- Foreign capital in Mexico (1886–1907): 3.343 billion
including 1.771 billion from the United States
1.334 billion British (the remainder) German, French, Spanish, etc.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 232. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 250. Ed.

Millions of pounds sterling

British (381–2)
Average
Imports

Gross imports

Net

Excluding

Re-export

Exports

Excluding

Re-export

Surplus

of imports in foreign trade

Net
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Millions of pounds sterling (pp. 386–387)

British holdings of capital abroad and in the colonies (Seven-year periods)
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1855–59: 16.914611633 *
+
1860–64: 23.519313855235 (1856–62)
+=−
1865–69: 28.623718156196 (1863–1869)
+=+
1870–74: 34.629123556288 (1870–76)
+−
1875–79: 37.532020211894 (1877–83)
+
1880–84: 40.8344234110
+
1885–89: 37.931822692430 (1884–1890)
+
1890–94: 41.9357234123
++−
1895–99: 45.3393239154223 (1891–1897)
++−
1900–04: 53.3466290176107 (1898–1904)
+−+
1905–09: 60.7522377143792 (1905–1911)
+
1910: 67.8575431144
My conclusion: Σ=

= (1856–1911)

23.65 billion pounds sterling.
−
1911: 57.8454124
The author provides the table only on pp. 381–2 (without the + and − signs); the remaining figures (capital holdings) from The Statist appear only in the text—and, strangely enough—while presenting annual data on imports from 1870 to 1911, the author fails to break them down by seven-year periods!
The author concludes that, despite the imperfect accuracy of the statistics on capital holdings (there are no private capital holdings), the correlation between the decline in the import surplus and the increase in capital holdings is nonetheless significant (p. 392).
pp. 392–3: Five industrial nations emerge as “clearly defined creditor states”: England, France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. The Netherlands is “little industrially developed” (“industriell wenig ent-wickelt,” p. 393); the United States, while a creditor nation in the Americas **, remains primarily an agricultural country; and Italy—and Austria—

* As Schiller puts it. Ed.
** See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 264–265. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“They are only gradually making their way toward becoming creditor nations” (p. 393).
   
|| End of Volume I ||
———————

¯¯¯¯¯
p. 384, footnote: By the end of 1910, the total value of British capital holdings abroad amounted to 1.638 billion pounds sterling (= 40.95 billion francs) overseas, including 709 million pounds sterling (= 17.725 billion francs) in the United States—representing 43.3%—plus 1.554 billion pounds sterling (= 38.85 billion francs) invested in British colonies; overseas investments plus private capital totaled 1.8 billion pounds sterling (= 45 billion francs).
NB
———————

¯¯¯¯¯
GILDEBRAND. “THE SHOCK, ETC.”
Gerhard Gildebrand. “The Shaking of Industrial Dominance and Industrial Socialism.” 1910 (Jena).
A compilation—largely a collection—of figures concerning the “increasing industrial self-sufficiency of peasant countries” (p. 88)—“the independent industrial development of nations that had, until now, remained predominantly agrarian” (p. 138)...
§ 11. “The Chinese Danger”... By the 1920s–1925, China would indeed advance far beyond its current position, and so on, and so forth.
…“The industrial monopoly of the Western European cultural sphere is doomed to collapse”... (p. 203)...
p. 207: The question ultimately comes down to whether the proletariat in industrial nations can “replace or sustain the dwindling peasant base in terms of food and clothing supply”?
“To this clearly posed question, the answer must be a sharp, unequivocal, and unyielding ‘No!’” (p. 207).
p. 209: It is impossible to procure (in Europe) 200 million sheep
15–20 million bales of cotton, etc.
“It is no longer necessary for the proletariat to strive to expropriate capitalists, since the means of production in industry can no longer be put to further use” (p. 210), nor can it turn to agriculture (p. 211)...

!|| “Thus, the possibility of democratic socialism—in the sense of unified, closed regulation of all production by a mass that owns nothing yet dominates everything—is ruled out… Far more likely than the dominance of industrial democracy over peasant production is the dominance of peasant democracy over industrial production” (p. 213).
|
!|| “However, it proved utterly impossible to expect the realization of democratic socialism at the hands of industrial democracy, if we acknowledge:
  ?
1. That in the most vital sectors of organic production, the peasant household retains primacy;
2. That the vast majority of peasants adhere to the fundamental principles of private farming;
3. That peasant countries naturally seek to draw as much of industrial production as possible into their own sphere;

4. that under the prevailing conditions of international competition, especially after the entry of China, constituting a quarter of the entire population of the globe, into the world economic system and after the transformation of other formerly agrarian countries into industrial states, they can dispose quite freely of their industrial revenues, which were no longer monopolized by them (215);
5. that, on the contrary, industrial states in their supply of raw materials for the production of food and clothing are increasingly dependent on a foreign peasant base" (216)...
  !?!
... "The misfortune lies in the fact that the industrialization of the East after the penetration of Western technical culture can occur much faster than the agrarianization of the West with its industrial overstrain and, one can safely say, with its industrial degeneration" (219)...
"Agrarian educational colonies" (224) - "internal peasant colonization" (225) - these are the author's "means."

NOTEBOOK "β" ("BETA")
Conclusion (i.e., the last chapter): "The United States of Western Europe" (229)... *
  !!!
African peoples "for an immeasurable time ahead" require "guidance and education" (232)ooo "against the Sino-Japanese coalition" in 20-30 years even Russia + England + France will have difficulty (231)...
a "great Islamist movement" in Africa is possible! which will be "simultaneously revolutionary and reactionary" (233).
!!
To "delay" (p. 233 in fine) such a movement is a "vital interest" of Western Europe
———

||   !!!!

——— 234 - "therefore" "joint action" of "all Western European states in Africa" is necessary
sic!!
234 - that Russia (+Japan, China, the United States) join the agreements (on disarmament and so on) is hopeless - the Western European nations must unite.
sic!!!

NB
235: It is necessary to "slow down" (verlangsamen) "the rate of capital formation in Western Europe"... "moderate" the "industrial pace"... "strengthen the peasant base"... ... customs union... progressive income taxes etc...

!

236 a duty on bread is needed, but a "moderate" one.
238 - a democratic union of workers (down with "communist utopias") and peasants (238).
239 - "of course," "the United States of Western Europe" needs a strong army and navy.
240 - England, they say, would prefer to join than remain in "imperialist isolation"...
———————

¯¯¯¯¯
{{
A useful thing for understanding the tendencies of opportunism and imperialism within Social-Democracy!
}}
———————

¯¯¯¯¯

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 268. Ed.

P. TAFEL. "NORTH AMERICAN TRUSTS etc."
Dr. Paul Tafel, graduate engineer.
"North American Trusts and Their Influence on the Progress of Technology." Stuttgart, 1913.
(The author worked in the United States for 7 years - from the preface.)
Time of

emergence of trusts

p. 1 - The beginning of trusts (around) the 1880s.
{
According to Liefmann, "Cartels and

Trusts."
}
1900 - 185 trusts
1907 - 250 with 7 billion dollars
p. 2 - Number of shareholders (steel shares) >100000!!
pp. 8-9 - In America, the transition was directly to railroads. "Highways that can be traveled in summer and winter do not yet exist in the United States" (71, note 9)...
Lengthy discussion of the economic conditions and forms of trusts.
p. 48: "Of the Steel Trust's main rival, the Jones and Laughlin Company in Pittsburgh, it is said that its enterprises are equipped even more modernly than the enterprises of the trust. - The shareholders of the leather trust reproached the board for the fact that things were going badly because it had neglected the technical equipment of the enterprises. The American Harvester Trust is praised for the fact that it is not deterred by any expenses for equipping its factories with the latest achievements of technology, in order to reduce costs and thereby suppress competition. (Quoted from "Kartellrundschau", 1910, pp. 53 and 902.)

|||

|||

|||
Perhaps the tobacco trust has gone the furthest in this regard. The official report says about this: "The superiority of the trust over its competitors is based on the large size of its enterprises and on their excellently organized technology. The tobacco trust, from its very foundation, has made every effort to replace manual labor with machine labor everywhere on a large scale. It bought up for this purpose all patents relating in any way to the processing of tobacco, and spent enormous sums on this. Many patents turned out

NOTEBOOK "β" ("BETA")
initially to be unusable, and they had to be reworked by engineers employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were created with the exclusive purpose of buying up patents. For the same purpose, the trust founded its foundries, machine factories, and repair shops. One of these establishments in Brooklyn employs an average of 300 workers; here, experiments are carried out on inventions for the production of cigarettes, small cigars, snuff, tin foil for packaging, cigarette tubes, boxes, etc.; here, if necessary, inventions are improved" *. ("Report of a Member of the Commission on Combinations in the Tobacco Industry." Washington, 1909, p. 266.)
|||

|||

||

||

||

The dialectics of self-movement: In the realm of cognition, the interplay between contradiction and unity drives the evolution of knowledge. This dialectical process is not merely a theoretical abstraction; it is the very engine of historical progress, shaping the material conditions of human existence. Through the ceaseless struggle of opposites—between the old and the new, the particular and the universal—the forces of production are continually reconfigured, giving rise to ever more advanced forms of social organization.

Imperialism, as a stage in the development of capitalism, represents the culmination of this dialectical process. It is the final phase in the relentless drive toward the concentration of capital, where monopolies emerge as the dominant form of economic organization. These monopolies, far from being static entities, are themselves products of ongoing class struggle—a struggle that pits the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, and ultimately seeks to resolve itself in the dictatorship of the proletariat. The imperialist epoch, with its global expansion and exploitation, is characterized by the intensification of contradictions within capitalist society: between the international division of labor and the national interests of individual states; between the needs of the working class and the profit-driven imperatives of capital; between the productive forces and the relations of production that seek to constrain them.

In the context of Marxist theory, imperialism is not an end in itself but rather a transitional phase in the historical development of capitalism. It is the inevitable outcome of the inherent tendencies of capitalist accumulation, which, when pushed to their limits, give rise to crises of overproduction, financial instability, and geopolitical conflict. Yet, even in its most extreme manifestations, imperialism remains bound by the dialectical logic of history: it cannot endure indefinitely without triggering the revolutionary transformation of society. For Marxists, the task is not simply to critique imperialism but to understand its internal contradictions and to discern the conditions under which the proletariat can seize the initiative and usher in a new era of socialism.

The petty bourgeoisie, too, plays a role in this dialectical process. While often seen as a transitional class caught between the rising tide of industrialization and the entrenched power of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie is nonetheless a site of potential radicalization. Its members, though economically marginalized, harbor aspirations for upward mobility and a share in the fruits of capitalist development. Yet, as the contradictions of capitalism deepen, the petty bourgeoisie increasingly finds itself at odds with both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—a class whose interests are fundamentally opposed to those of the petty bourgeoisie. In this way, the petty bourgeoisie becomes a crucial intermediary in the unfolding of class struggle, serving as both a harbinger of revolution and a potential ally in the struggle for socialist transformation.

Commodity production, the foundation of modern capitalism, is itself a product of the dialectical interplay between labor and capital. Under capitalism, labor is alienated from the means of production, reduced to a mere commodity in the hands of the capitalist. But this very alienation, far from being a permanent condition, becomes the catalyst for the emergence of new forms of labor organization—forms that challenge the existing order and lay the groundwork for a post-capitalist society. The surplus value extracted from labor, while ostensibly enriching the capitalist, also fuels the development of technology and the expansion of the productive forces. In this way, the dialectics of capitalism reveal the inherent dynamism of human history: every advance in technology, every increase in productivity, is accompanied by new struggles over the distribution of wealth and power.

The Soviet experience offers a powerful illustration of the dialectics of revolution. The Soviets, as organs of workers’ self‑government, emerged from the crucible of class struggle during the Russian Revolution. They were not merely administrative bodies but living embodiments of the proletarian revolution—a revolution that sought to dismantle the old order and establish a new social relationship based on collective ownership and democratic control. The dictatorship of the proletariat, far from being a rigid authoritarian structure, was conceived as a temporary measure designed to protect the gains of the revolution and to create the conditions for the eventual transition to socialism. Yet even in its most radical forms, the dictatorship of the proletariat remained subject to the dialectical pressures of history: it could not exist in isolation from the broader currents of class struggle, nor could it be sustained without the active participation of the working class.

The Central Committee, the VTsIK, and the Sovnarkom—all institutions born out of the revolutionary upheaval—were themselves products of the dialectical process. They were not static bureaucracies but dynamic instruments of political action, shaped by the constant interplay of theory and practice, of principle and circumstance. The Bolshevik Party, through its leadership of the revolution, demonstrated how the dialectics of Marxism could be applied to real-world conditions, transforming abstract principles into concrete strategies for social change. The NEP, with its cautious embrace of market mechanisms, was another example of how the dialectics of socialism could accommodate the realities of a backward economy while laying the foundations for future development.

In the face of imperialist aggression and domestic counterrevolution, the proletariat found itself thrust into a situation of acute crisis. Yet it was precisely in these moments of deepest adversity that the proletariat’s capacity for self‑organization and self‑mobilization reached its zenith. The Council of Labour and Defence, established in 1918, became a testament to the proletariat’s ability to transcend the limitations of its immediate circumstances and to forge a path toward a higher form of social organization. The Council’s efforts to coordinate industrial production, to mobilize the working class for defense, and to build a network of solidarity across the country exemplified the dialectical nature of revolutionary politics: it was not enough to simply resist imperialist aggression; it was necessary to transform the very conditions that gave rise to that aggression.

The RCP(b), as the vanguard of the proletarian revolution, understood the importance of the dialectics of history. It recognized that the road to socialism would not be smooth or linear but would instead be marked by countless twists and turns, by periods of retreat and advance, by moments of triumph and defeat. The party’s strategy, therefore, was not one of rigid dogma but of flexible adaptation—of learning from experience and of adjusting its tactics in response to changing circumstances. The RCP(b) did not shy away from confronting the contradictions of its own time; on the contrary, it embraced them as opportunities for growth and for deeper understanding.

The RSFSR, as the first socialist state in history, embodied the dialectics of socialism in its very constitution. It was a state founded on the principles of equality, solidarity, and mutual aid—not on the basis of private property or hierarchical authority. Yet even in its most utopian moments, the RSFSR remained rooted in the material conditions of its time: its success depended on the active participation of the working class, on the development of a robust industrial base, and on the cultivation of a culture of cooperation and collective responsibility. The dialectics of socialism, in this sense, were not merely a theoretical framework but a practical guide for building a new world—one that sought to overcome the divisions of class, nation, and ideology and to create a society in which all people could live in dignity and freedom.

The prodrazvyorstka and the tax in kind were measures that reflected the dialectics of wartime economics. They were not simply tools of resource allocation but expressions of the proletariat’s determination to redistribute wealth in accordance with the needs of the people—and to do so in a way that minimized the burdens placed on the working class. The prodrazvyorstka, in particular, was a bold experiment in the redistribution of agricultural surpluses, aimed at ensuring that the food supply remained stable even in the face of war and scarcity. By prioritizing the needs of the working class and the peasantry, the Soviet state sought to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, between the urban and the rural, between the producers and the consumers. In doing so, it reaffirmed the fundamental principle of socialism: that the means of production must be owned collectively and used for the benefit of all.

The Council of Labour and Defence, meanwhile, was a testament to the proletariat’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances. It was not merely a military command structure but a forum for political debate, a space in which workers could articulate their demands and negotiate with the state for better conditions. The Council’s work laid the groundwork for the establishment of a socialist economy—one that was built on the principles of planned production, equitable distribution, and sustainable development. Even in the midst of war, the Council recognized that the ultimate goal of socialism was not victory in battle but the liberation of humanity from the chains of exploitation and oppression.

The dialectics of history, in the final analysis, are the dialectics of human emancipation. They remind us that no social order is eternal, that every system of domination is destined to be overthrown—and that the only true emancipation lies in the creation of a society in which all people are free to pursue their own destinies, unbound by the constraints of class, race, or gender. The proletariat, through its struggles and its victories, has shown that this vision is not merely a dream but a possibility—a possibility that can be realized if we dare to confront the contradictions of our time and to act in accordance with the principles of justice and equality.

In the end, the dialectics of history are not just a set of theoretical concepts—they are the living pulse of human progress. They teach us that change is not something to be feared but something to be embraced; that the path to a better world is paved with struggle and sacrifice—but that it is a path worth walking.

α) “Société Générale etc.”
β) “Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas” (“Paribas,” in colloquial parlance)
γ) “Banque de l’Union Parisienne”...
“The Parisian banking triumvirate, which commands billions of francs and whose principal market is Russia, controls the following Russian banks: 1) the Russo-Asiatic Bank, 2) the St. Petersburg Private Bank, 3) the United Bank—and it has listed the shares of several industrial conglomerates closely affiliated with these banks on the Paris stock exchange” (55)... *

NB
Quantity gives way to quality here as well: what began as purely banking-based fractionalism and narrow-banking specialization gradually evolves into an attempt to account for broad,

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 219–220. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
mass, national, and global relationships and interconnections—simply because billions of rubles (unlike thousands) inevitably lead toward this, inevitably converge upon it.

“During 1905–1906, large Russian capital flowed into European banks, especially those in Berlin; yet just as profoundly the brief, tumultuous sway of the unleashed masses had shaken property relations at the time, so swiftly did those same relations regain their composure once the forces of reaction once again seized the reins of power.
NB
By 1907–1908, we already witness the reverse flow of Russian capital, accompanied by the influx of new international capital” (59).

p. 59

Deposits (in millions of rubles)
×Siberian Commercial; Russian; International; Settlement; Azov-Don; Private;
“Petropari”?? (= St. Petersburg–Paris?); Volga-Kama; Northern and State.
×1906–1908 in 10 Russian banks614,875 “The figures cited above still represent a difference of only 261 million rubles in deposit accounts held by St. Petersburg banks over the two years when business was at a complete standstill.” (Italics added by Agada.)
||

||
“If we add in the Moscow banks and the provincial banks, then include Credit Lyonnais and private bankers, along with the funds kept at home, that figure would double—and it would not be an exaggeration to assume that roughly half a billion rubles of ‘frightened capital’” (italics added by Agada) “flowed out in the form of cash, first to foreign banks and then back into Russian banks”... (59)
||

||

||
“But the total amount of ‘frightened capital’ must have been far greater.
The exchange rate for Russia’s 4% gold rente stood at:
1905 – 65%
January 1907 – 73.5
October 1907 – 67
1908/9 – 88
1910/11 – 95
1912/13 – 92.5

And according to data from the Credit Office, coupon payments evolved as follows:
Millions of rubles
Abroad in Russia
1908 – 202–195
1910 – 175–233
These figures, of course, do not permit us to draw definitive conclusions, since the exchange rate fluctuated considerably at the time, and collecting in rubles within Russia could sometimes prove more advantageous.
Still, we can conclude that a substantial portion of the sums sent abroad in cash ultimately returned to Russia in the form of Russian rente. If we take just 500 million rubles for this calculation, the total amount of ‘frightened capital’ rises to roughly one billion rubles” (60).
NB
NB
… “The danger of a collapse in the ruble’s exchange rate was averted, and the financial situation—which had been on the brink of crisis by late 1905—was salvaged when the Russian syndicate in Paris, with the active participation of the English money market, took on a 5% loan in the spring of 1906.
In doing so, the government treasury once again received nearly one billion rubles in cash. In the subsequent calm years of 1907–1908, both the banking sector and the state treasury found themselves in an exceptionally favorable position—there was ample liquidity, and the very force of events delivered a powerful jolt to conventional thinking, enabling the emergence of something rational on a truly solid foundation—provided only that one chose to act.
NB

“Also”
Both of these years also had a beneficial impact on trade and industry, bringing about improvement and recovery. Private industry—that is, the kind of industry which operated independently of state orders (oil, sugar, textiles, paper, timber)—remained entirely healthy; and it was only the labor question that now assumed an altogether different, namely political, character” (61)...
NB
“The transitional years of 1905–1908 prompted many Russian capitalists to deposit their liquid funds in German banks”... (see above).

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“At that time, matters had reached such a point that one of the most conservative (and most independent) Russian banks even purchased Prussian consols as a reserve for unforeseen contingencies.
sic!!
At the time (1906), Russian banks were not particularly flush with cash. The vigorous peasant movement had wrought considerable damage in the countryside; yet workers in the cities left trade and industry relatively unscathed. It is well known that despite numerous strikes, there were only a few instances of sabotage directed against private property and commercial warehouses belonging to trade and industry (the acts of sabotage in Baku should be attributed to Armenians and Tatars) (not to mention the gross disruptions to railway operations, which, however, cannot be blamed on free‑minded workers).
NB

NB. The author, of course, is a staunch bourgeois and a nationalist in his political leanings!
===========
In reality, protest rates on bills of exchange increased only slightly at the time—and this fact struck the financial circles of the continent all the more deeply precisely because they understood little of the peasant movement then in progress” (66).
Protests on bills of exchange issued by Russian banks, based on balances as of November 1, 1905, and thereafter (p. 66):
Millions of rubles
1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911
NB
State

Bank

Bills

accepted188.8 171.4 215.7 194.3 211.8 243.8 of which protested3.9 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.6 1.1
8 St. Petersburg commercial banks

Bills

accepted352.0 376.0 445.0 523.0 677.0 788.0 of which dialectics
Tested 4.92.22.65.22.94.1 “The Berlin financial circles particularly weakened their ties with Russian private industrial and entrepreneurial circles in 1905–1906—precisely at the very moment when large sums of cash were pouring into them from all corners of Russia, The Łódź weaving and spinning mills—mostly German-owned enterprises—had, until that time, been heavily reliant on the Berlin financial market and had always served as reliable clients. Nevertheless, Berlin’s banks refused to extend substantial credit to these very firms, driving some enterprises not only to sharply curtail production but even prompting a consortium of extremely wealthy Łódź textile industrialists to head for the Caucasus, where they sought to invest in local mining and metallurgical ventures and to forge connections with both London and even New York’s financial markets. These efforts were largely thwarted by the pogroms that swept through the region at the time” (67)...
!!||

||
NB
…“It must be borne in mind that Russia’s losses in the Russo-Japanese War—including Port Arthur, Dalny, and the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway—amounted to roughly 4.5 billion rubles—that is, half of the national debt, for which Russian peasants were thus required to pay interest and principal, without ever actually receiving any capital in hand” (72).
NB
From Chapter V: “The Involvement of German Major Banks in St. Petersburg’s Banking Sector, etc.”
How does the Deutsche Bank introduce shares of the Siberian Trading Bank in Berlin?
NB

!!!
…“The Deutsche Bank holds new shares of a foreign enterprise in its portfolio for an entire year, then places them on the Berlin stock exchange with a 50% brokerage profit. The public pays 193 for every 100…” (74)*
for, “in the process, this ‘German’ major bank earns steadily—and swiftly—on the exchange rate…” (74)
…“But since the Deutsche Bank offered shares to the Berlin public at 195%, and later still at an even higher price (today the share price stands at 230, yielding a 15% dividend—meaning that the return on capital comes to 6½%). the bank’s management in St. Petersburg must, above all, keep the dividend consistently at that same level. The foreign bank unconditionally demands nothing else. That is the sole requirement it ever makes. As for how this is accomplished, it is entirely up to the bank itself…”
NB

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 220. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
—indifferent; the result, however, is rampant stock speculation and rotten Gründerzeit-style entrepreneurship—precisely the sort of behavior that St. Petersburg’s banks are being directly compelled toward under the pressure of the “participation system” (77).
“In accounting terms, from a German perspective, this transaction looks as follows:
Increase in capital since 1906–1907:
16,000,000 rubles—nominal share capital at an average exchange rate of around 200 (introduction on the Berlin stock exchange)
10,000,000—from issuances allocated to reserves
26,000,000—total
32,000,000—actual capital at 200
6,000,000 rubles—the difference—brokerage profits accruing to the Deutsche Bank and its counterparties” (78)...*
6 million rubles
…“Thus, in this case, the Deutsche Bank provided the German public with roughly 32 million rubles in the form of shares, with the sole purpose of enabling the Deutsche Bank itself to pocket a few million in profit from the exchange-rate differential” (78).
!
At the general (annual) shareholders’ meeting of the Siberian Trading Bank on March 23, 1913, a small group of shareholders led by sworn attorney Bibikov protested against the resolutions passed at that general meeting. (“Stock Exchange Gazette,” no. 14017, February 21, 1914; “St. Petersburg Gazette,” no. 51, February 22, 1914; “St. Petersburg Gazette,” no. 54, February 23, 1914.) The protesters demonstrated… “that the bank’s chief director (a certain Soloveychik, who was related to one of the directors of the Deutsche Bank) had transferred government subsidies totaling 7 million rubles into his own current account and used that sum to purchase shares in his own bank, thereby securing a majority of votes for his re-election” (79)… “Considering that these institutions are, in fact, operated by German capital—and that this particular mode of banking is patronized by the renowned Deutsche Bank—it becomes all the more significant to draw the following conclusion, which
!!

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 220. Ed.

I seek to demonstrate in this book that the “participation system” even prevents the Russian side—however serious it may be—from bringing solidity and order to the management of those credit institutions that are so vital to Russia. While the Deutsche Bank certainly has the capacity to secure a majority of votes for itself, the Russian shareholders who also participate in this bank will never obtain a sufficient majority to effectively advance truly just aspirations and rational perspectives” (80).
!!
NB

…“Beginning in 1906, further, even more substantial German financial involvement intensified in the ‘Russian Bank for Foreign Trade,’ known simply as the Russian Bank, and in the ‘St. Petersburg International Trade Bank,’ known as the International Bank; the former was closely aligned with the Deutsche Bank conglomerate, while the latter was affiliated with the Discount-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Both Russian banks operated with three-quarters of their capital—shareholder equity—financed by German funds*. The Russian Bank and the International Bank were, together, among the most significant Russian banks overall. Both were highly speculative in nature…” (82)

Increase in Capital in Millions of Rubles (from 84)

Capital Reserves
1906 1912 1906 1912
Russian Bank 20–50 (+30) 3–15 (+12)
International Bank 24–48 (+24) 12–24 (+12)

4498 + 5415 39 + 24**

ΣΣ = 78 + 32 (Siberian Bank) = 110.
NB
These banks had, in total, received 110 million rubles in share capital since 1906, with intermediary profits amounting to several million rubles being transferred into the coffers of their counterparties (84)...
NB
p. 97... “for which [the ‘The Times Russian Supplement’] is, in any case, subsidized by the Russian Ministry of Finance”...
Chapter 8: “The Total Volume of Foreign-Participated Banking Institutions in St. Petersburg and Certain Notes on the Figures.”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 219–220. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 220. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
p. 116. I am condensing the table: (October/November 1913) *
St. Petersburg Deposit Banks
External

Branches (Asset
Balance)
My columns and my totals are outlined in pencil
Millions of rubles

Liabilities (Passive Balance)
Productively (Trade and
Industry)
Speculatively (Bourse and
Finance)
Millions of rubles
Capital

and

ReservesDepositsDebts to
Other Banks and
Rediscounting
Acceptances
a) In the “System of Participations”
1) German Participation 413.7859.11272.8207.1658.8429.048.6
(4 banks: Siberian Commercial; Russian Bank; International; Clearing Bank)
2) English Participation 239.3169.1408.455.2204.8111.516.2
(2 banks: Russian Trade and Industrial; Russo-British)
3) French Participation 711.8661.21373.0234.9736.4308.029.5
(5 banks: Russo-Asian; Private St. Petersburg; Azov-Don; “Union” (headquartered in Moscow); Russo-French Commercial)

1364.81689.43054.2497.21600.0848.394.3
b) Independent Russian Banks (St. Petersburg and Moscow)
(8 banks: Moscow Merchant; Volga-Kama; Junker & Co.; St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg); Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky); Moscow Clearing; Moscow Commercial; Moscow Private) 504.2391.1895.3169.0599.6127.0– Total 1869.02080.53949.5666.22199.6975.594.3

»3949.5Z935.6

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 219. Ed.

Billions: rubles a1) 0.4 + 0.8 = 1.2 b) 1.3 + 1.7 = 3.0
a2) 0.2 + 0.2 = 0.4 0.5

¯¯ + 0.4

¯¯ = 0.9

¯¯
a3) 0.7 + 0.7 = 1.4 1.8 + 2.1 = 3.9 “In 1911, the Russian Credit Office [NB: elsewhere, its director was Davydov] initially granted Russian banks 120 million francs for exchange operations in Paris and St. Petersburg, and later extended an additional loan—totaling roughly 100 million rubles—as a subsidy for rampant banking speculation that had reached a dead end (officially, this was presented as ‘to stabilize the exchange rate of Russian government securities’)”... (86)...
p. 121: …in 1912, all Russian commercial banks operated 548 branches…
The Rise of “Mutual Credit Societies” (p. 122)
(According to the figures from the Credit Office):

Millions of rubles
Number

of MembersCapitalTotal

BalanceDepositsAccounting
1907 261 158 000 393 192 032 46
1912 776 502 000 998 994 876 87
NB

NB
(136 and others) Russian Ministers of Finance appointed bank directors—often drawn from the ranks of civil servants—and through the “Credit Office” disbursed millions in subsidies to banks, and so forth.
Well said!

“Such developments shed light on the activities of those St. Petersburg banks which, while appearing ‘Russian’ on the surface, relied on foreign sources of funding, conducted their affairs in a ‘dilettantish’ manner, and bore risks that were, in essence, ‘ministerial’ in nature—yet nonetheless grew into parasites upon Russia’s economic life. And this precedent” (the account concerned the Siberian Bank, among others) “has now become a guiding principle for the organization of St. Petersburg banks. Berlin and Paris-based directors of major banks came to regard their own interests as safeguarded, viewing as a guarantee

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
1) direct subsidies from the Credit Office to St. Petersburg banks,
2) the active involvement of the Russian Ministry of Finance (approximately 60% of its holdings in Paris and 40% in Berlin)” (137)...
!!

NB
“The Ministry of Finance transferred a series of state-guaranteed bond issues to the Russo-Chinese Bank” [the author himself had served there!!] “with the aim of providing the bank with the necessary liquidity, without concerning itself with how those funds were ultimately put to use. For example, the Ministry transferred to the bank a bond issue in European Russia consisting of railway bonds guaranteed by the government, with the resulting income first flowing into the bank’s coffers. The railways, after all, needed funds only gradually over the course of 4–5 years—while the construction was underway—whereas the bank, meanwhile, had free access to those funds and, moreover, earned interest on the bond issues themselves. This practice took root, as it was repeated several times each year” (149).

NB
!!
(The bonds of four railway companies totaled 12.8 million pounds sterling—roughly 120 million rubles.)
“The bank’s director—also serving at the time as chairman of the board—further joined, as a member of the board, a number of large railway and industrial enterprises (now numbering approximately 20), which likewise kept their surplus cash balances in current accounts at the bank, knowing full well that the Ministry of Finance had a strong stake in the bank and actively supported it” (149).
In 20

enterprises!!
NB !!
|¯¯ That is how ‘business’ is done… ¯¯|

This is discussed in Chapter 11: “The Merger of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Northern Bank (Russo-Asian Bank) and the Protest Against It at the General Meeting of 1910” (p. 147):

(This protest was lodged by the author himself.)
“At the general meeting of the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was convened to ratify the merger, most of the attendees were officials
NB !!

from the State Bank and the Credit Office—those to whom voting rights had been assigned…” (153).
The author submitted a “special opinion,” which was recorded in the minutes of the meeting on March 30, 1910 (p. 154).
“The system of participations is sheer nonsense”—this was the claim the author made—and the argument he advanced in his protest… (p. 154)
The “merger” was orchestrated by French banks (“Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas + Société Générale”), which had long been “interested” in the Russo-Chinese Bank, had witnessed its poor financial performance, sought to “extricate themselves” from its liabilities, and harbored hopes

NB

!!
“By means of consolidation” (merging the two banks into a single entity—the Russo‑Asian Bank)—“to create a ‘Russian’ institution of such magnitude that the Russian government would be compelled, under all circumstances, to ‘support’ the bank formed through this merger” (p. 151).
!!
“Upon the merger, share capital was reduced by 33%, and these funds were transferred to the reserve account; in this way, the bank was made to appear as though its reserve capital had been built up through sound management, while at the same time granting the new board of directors the ability, in the future, to distribute the entire profit (!) on the reduced capital at a higher rate of interest—since the reserve capital had immediately reached the statutory maximum, and no interest was due on that portion. Even the shareholders themselves were powerless against this maneuver, for they resided in France, while the general meetings were held in St. Petersburg”... (152)...
NB

…“When one reads today, for example, the announcement issued by the Russo‑Asian Bank, which states: Share Capital—45 million rubles; Reserve Capital—23.3 million rubles, any unbiased reader will be led to believe that the reserve arose from earned profits—that is, from sound business management. In reality, however, it was drawn from share capital, precisely because of poor management. When the two banks were merged, neither possessed a reserve” (153)…

!!

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
And yet this bank, despite boasting 120 branches (!!), in fact holds far too little capital (a balance sheet total of 785 million rubles, with share capital of 731/2 million plus reserves—January 1, 1913)—“the risk of this overextension falls upon the Credit Office” (153).
…“Moreover, it is perfectly clear that, owing to the ‘system of participations,’ whereby shareholders remain aloof from any independent assessment of their boards’ management—since all-powerful (foreign) major banks stand between them and the enterprise, exploiting both sides through more or less ‘disguised’ schemes—the management of enterprises is appointed arbitrarily and in the service of private interests, and in the end, even the most amateurish individual can become a bank director” (156–157).

NB
Ha-ha!
The Board of Directors of the Russo‑Asian Bank consists of “one former Russian bureaucrat (the bank’s Chief Director and Chairman), one former Russian Governor, one former French diplomat, and one former French lawyer” (158).
sic!!
Indeed, all of this criticism was penned in the autumn of 1913 and has since become “outdated” in light of the Imperial Rescript dated January 30, 1914.
?
Diplomacy?
The consolidation of deposit‑taking and speculative banks is harmful because it— (1) “locks up” the country’s productive resources; (2) leads to price increases, syndicates, and the like.
“If clarity and order were established in banking relations, I would like to see how trusts, monopolies, and syndicates could possibly survive” (179)…
Ha-ha!

Agreed upon!!
“Let it be stipulated by law that firms which enter into agreements among themselves—agreements that harm consumers by eliminating competition (unfair competition)—shall not be granted official bank credit; in other words, they shall also be barred from issuing new securities, and monopolies…”

Ha-ha!!

Simply!!

And syndicates will very soon be forced to dissolve” (180).
!!
Subsidies from the Credit Office (pp. 202 and 204) to St. Petersburg banks reach as high as 800–1,000 million rubles*.
The Credit Office… “encompasses the entire keyboard of credit operations within the empire.” “It is a bureaucratic apparatus without a charter and without public oversight” (200).
…“In 1910, it was… reformed, and since that time its task has been to ‘coordinate’ the activities of all credit institutions in the state**—and ‘it serves as the link between those institutions and the stock exchanges.’” St. Petersburg banks submit reports to it every 8–14 days, and more detailed reports every 3 months (201).
Four “types” of these subsidies***:

Millions of rubles (1) Direct cash payments (to banks) from the auxiliary fund—up to 150
(2) Deposits in foreign banks (as hidden collateral)—450
(3) “Provision of state‑guaranteed securities”—150 (4) “Discounting of financial bills—both reciprocal and fictitious bills—whether endorsed by a foreign bank or not”—approximately 50
Σ = 800

NB
“Deposits amount to 1,648 million rubles, plus 800 million in subsidies—totaling 2,448 million, compared to the nation’s total free circulating cash of 5,000 million, according to Mr. Davydov (the Credit Office); that is to say… half of the Russian Empire’s freely circulating cash is firmly tied up in international speculative banks due to the system of participations. Before these funds are once again collected—and returned to circulation—years may pass…” (204)

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 226. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.
*** Subsidies from the Credit Office. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Chapter 15 (p. 210): “The Balance of Power Among International Banking Trusts in the Russian Market”…
NB
“The Balance of Power of St. Petersburg Banks (the System of Participations)” (p. 211).
In millions of rubles

Assets

Control over Trade and Transportation
a) Industrial Loans—1,350 rubles
b) Shipping and Private Railways—1,509 rubles
c) Control over the Participation of Russian Private Clients—1,689 rubles
4,548

Liabilities

Banking Working Capital
a) Own Funds—497 rubles
b) Deposits (Russia)—1,600 rubles
c) Loans—942 rubles
3,039

Control over Production and Industry
a) Coal Syndicates (Produgol)
b) Iron Syndicates (Prodmet)
c) Oil Syndicates (“General Oil,” etc.)
d) Metallurgical Syndicates (various)
e) Cement and Construction Syndicates (various)—3,687
8,235

The emissions of 1908–1912 (excluding state rents)
a) in Russia: 3,687
b) abroad: 1,509
5,196
8,235
[Table on pages 211–212 is reproduced in full.] “The distribution of this capital among the three foreign banking groups is roughly as follows:
NB
(1) The French banking trio, plus five St. Petersburg banks: 55% (2) The German–Berlin “D” banks, plus four St. Petersburg banks: 35%
(3) The English–London syndicates, plus two St. Petersburg banks: 10%”*

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 220. Ed.

…“The distribution of material liabilities (all stated at nominal value), by contrast, is as follows:
(in millions of rubles)
a) Abroad
Emissions: 1,509
Banking claims (excluding counterclaims of the Credit Office): approximately 300
Participation in bank share capital: 295
» in other shares (the system of participations): 500

2,604||
b) Russia
Emissions, deposits, and miscellaneous: 4,831
Credit Office (excluding the latest railway loan): 800

5,631||

Σ = 8,235” “The clear significance of these proportional statistics is that a minority—roughly one-third of the countries exporting capital—dominates a majority—roughly two-thirds of Russia—as a country importing capital (p. 213)—and does so in such a way (through subsidies, syndicates, cartels, etc.) that it is unable to safeguard either its own interests or those of others. As a result, private interests—not least those of several major bank directors—prevail not officially, but covertly, to the detriment of all participants.”

The author sees this as the root cause of rising prices, even offering (p. 213) an approximate percentage increase in prices between 1908 and 1913—but clearly based on rough estimates alone; this is hardly serious, i.e., an unnecessary illustration rather than a genuine piece of evidence…
On p. 214, he presents the following official statistics from the “Trade and Industry Gazette”:

* — last in order, but not in importance. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Millions of rubles
Total share capital (early 1914): 3,600 plus industrial bonds: 400
» railway shares: 140

4,140
Plus government loans and guaranteed railway bonds held within Russia: 6,072
» private mortgage securities (mortgages): 2,956

13,168

NB

According to him, the St. Petersburg banks are “artificially (?) created international monetary trusts” (p. 215).
…“the agenda of the modern director of a major bank is perfectly clear and self-evident; it states:
If we, the major banks, can secure dominance over producers and consumers (through issuance, credit, and tariffs), then profits will flow into our coffers—and we shall be the masters of the situation” (emphasis added by Agad) (p. 218),
“if”

How amusing!
(“Populist”!)
========

Agad “forgot” one small detail: capitalism and the class of capitalists!!
========
One possible consequence of this, he argues, is “an exaggerated increase in tariffs,” which could lead to “open hostilities in the global market—hostilities that might even escalate into war. Such a development could, in fact, serve the interests of large banking monopolies, since, under the force majeure of war, they would be able to cleanse their balance sheets while avoiding personal liability for losses” (p. 220)… “Even” to war—this was one of the motives behind the outbreak of conflict.

On p. 234, the author quotes S. Prokopovich (on the conditions of industrial development in Russia)— capital of Russian origin:

447.2 million rubles = 21.1%, capital of foreign origin:

762.4 million rubles = 35.9%, capital “from the sale of funds”:

915.6 million rubles = 43.1%
The total sums up to 100.1%.
Here, Agad notes, the “banking question”—which the author (Prokopovich) fails to grasp—plays the most crucial role.
Regarding Russia’s trade balance, the author writes that the surplus of assets over liabilities stood at
1909: 570 million rubles (p. 238)
1910: 511
1911: 430

−1,371*
600—minus coupon payments abroad totaling 200 million rubles annually

771—“the overall surplus over three years.”
“In relation to this sum, we may therefore say that, in part—at my estimate, around 500 million rubles—it enriched the country with cash beyond the norm, thanks to an exceptionally good harvest. In any case, this figure clearly demonstrates that it was by no means only exceptionally favorable harvests that were responsible for the seemingly dramatic upturn in Russia.
To this must be added the inflow of capital from abroad through guaranteed and private issuances, amounting to roughly 1,509 million rubles—which, however, were made available to the broader market as cash only to a limited extent (primarily circulating among specialized enterprises).”

* As Agad puts it. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
The Director of the Credit Office (Davydov) defines the growth of the country’s free working capital (by which the Director understands private deposits in all banks, the increase in cash deposits in savings banks—representing a rise of 576 million in cash and securities—the current accounts of state treasuries in the State Bank, though excluding, nevertheless, the deposits of state treasuries [the Credit Office] held with foreign bankers, as well as the debts of Russian banks abroad) as follows:

1906: 2,592 million rubles

1912 – 5,000 million rubles” (p. 238).
NB
The increase amounted to roughly 2,500 million rubles, while capital inflows from abroad totaled approximately 1,600 plus 771 (the influx driven by harvests) – a total of 2,371 million rubles (p. 239) – “roughly balancing out”...
“The Russian Ministry of Finance, in this instance,” (referring to the excessively high gold reserves of the Russian state) “manages its cash holdings in just as unscientific a manner, with just as little regard for political economy, and in just as anti-national a way as most of the major continental banks in Berlin and Paris manage their deposits. Here, Russian state funds are used to secure the influence of certain Berlin and Paris banks over St. Petersburg’s banking institutions—and their Russian deposits—while, at the same time, the country’s productive economic life is weakened precisely where it ought to be strengthened” (p. 247).

Isn’t it rather the opposite?
Does the “influence” of Parisian and Berlin banks compel…?
In Russia (1913), national income (“the national budget = agricultural production, i.e., grain yields and all other commodities”) amounted to only 9 billion rubles (p. 249).
NB

——— …“The most advantageous undertaking remains the enhancement of both productivity and mass consumption” (p. 265) (emphasis added by the author).
“Populist”
———

How the author critiques Witte’s financial policies:

“Back then,” (Witte) “engaged in speculation and intricate financial maneuvers, shifting the risks onto the treasury instead of organizing…” (p. 275).
Speculation versus organization: !!The Populist!! idem 281–2 and many others.
Who is controlling whom!
The author’s reproach toward the Russian financial administration: “Neither were international speculators held to any bounds, nor were loyal foreign investors engaged in productive cooperation accorded the proper status that would duly recognize their achievements” (p. 276).
“A honest merchant
...

“Good” banks

...
…“At the same time, I once again emphasize the distinction between St. Petersburg’s speculative banks—engaged in fiscal operations—and the Russian banks that operate productively, serving the people’s economy. One cannot fail to recommend the Volga-Kama Bank, the Moscow Merchant Bank, as well as the Knöppel and Vogau banks, as exemplary models for guiding banking practice along this path—with the ultimate goal of completely eliminating speculation in deposit banks”… (p. 280).
Ha-ha!
“I have already expressed my regret that Russia too is becoming entangled in the ‘monetary circulation of the civilized world’” (p. 283).

“Every nation transitioning toward a monetary economy must reckon with the formidable power of the Jewish international organization,” yet Jews are beneficial—as long as they remain subordinate to the interests of the whole, as in Germany, where their talents are brought within the bounds of ‘reason and ethics’” (p. 284).
!!
Well said!
…“One might say: Under current circumstances, the dividends paid by certain large banks seem almost like an illicit fee for silence”… (p. 286).

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
To claim that “my” (Agada’s) program is “non-national”? Heaven forbid! I am not a cosmopolitan—I am a nationalist (pp. 287 and 288)—I stand for the self-determination of every nation, for sound banking practices, and for the success of “business.”
…“If such a program is not ‘national,’ then I ask: What, exactly, should we understand by ‘national’? Or perhaps some will argue that the establishment and successful management of enterprises that have been profitable for a long time do not qualify under this definition?” (p. 288),
a pearl of insight (for the nationalist)
Italics added by the author:

“Transformation of the continental banking system represents, in essence, the very first prerequisite for economic and political reconciliation in Europe—and this fully accords with the interests of the peoples” (p. 290).
For “peace” and for (the United States of Europe)
and the book’s final sentence:

“My concluding remarks are as follows: If the European (continental) great powers persist unwaveringly in their ‘time-tested system,’ they will ultimately be forced to alter it through a world war. Whether through war or through prudent measures, let the free flow of the money market and the free flow of the global market—each may choose its own path—but let it be clearly understood that the ruling classes of Europe bear full responsibility.”
the threat of “world war”
The End
BALLAD. STATISTICS
Prof. Dr. Karl Ballad. “Fundamentals of Statistics.” Berlin, 1913, —
|| Ballad

=======
A remarkably thorough compilation of numerical data—indeed, the author’s primary interest lies in production statistics (the quantity of goods produced)—cf. Atlantikus!!—
——————
|

|
Ballad estimates that in Germany there are 2 iron slaves (machines) for every worker|

|
——————

§ “Technical Productive Forces.”
Incomplete (steam-powered)

machines steam-water-electric- tric-

The dialectics of self-movement: A study in the logic of historical development
Germany (1907) boasted 8.8 million horsepower in industry—comprising 7.3 million from steam engines, 0.9 million from electric motors, and 1.5 million from internal combustion engines.
America (the United States) harnessed 16.0 million horsepower in industry—split between 14.2 million from steam engines, 1.8 million from electric motors, and an unspecified share from other sources.
England (*) (1907) generated 10.7 million horsepower in industry.
In total, locomotives alone accounted for 13 million horsepower by 1895.
==========
England (*) The figures for England are drawn from the journal Die Bank, 1913, p. 190—and are based on data provided by the Ministry of Trade. According to the “Production Census” for industry as a whole, the gross sales value amounted to 1,765 million pounds sterling; the cost of raw materials totaled 1,028 million pounds sterling; and contracted work delivered reached 25 million pounds sterling. Net value [1 − (2 + 3)] stood at 712 million pounds sterling. The number of workers was 6,985 thousand; machinery totaled 10,755 thousand horsepower. [In agriculture, the value of output was 196 million pounds sterling, with 2.8 million workers.] Total capital invested in industry reached 1,500 million pounds sterling.
==========
Hydropower capacity:
millions of horsepower
Switzerland: 1½–3
Sweden + Norway: 8 (roughly 28 million)
Finland: 4–6 (p. 255)
Niagara Falls: 4–5 (with only about one-tenth actually utilized)
The Congo Falls (Africa): 28
South America (??): 1–2
OTTO. GERMAN BANKS ACROSS THE OCEAN
Dr. Walter Otto. “The Evolution of Loans: Operations of Germany’s Major Banks Overseas in Establishment and Participation.” Berlin, 1911.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
(A list of each enterprise, along with tables detailing the “shareholdings” of major banks; Part I organized by continent and country; Part II arranged by individual bank. Raw materials.)
While certain enterprises occasionally disclose the percentage holdings of British, French, and North American groups, no comprehensive summary exists.
On p. 245, we find the table: “Total Active Capital of German Overseas Banks” (10 banks)—a compilation drawn from annual reports:
1889: 45.6 million marks
1890: 41.3 million marks
1900: 206.5 million marks
1905: 329.3 million marks
1908: 607.1 million marks
DIURICH. THE EXPANSION OF GERMAN BANKS ABROAD
Georges Diurich. “The Expansion of German Banks Beyond National Borders: Its Relationship to Germany’s Economic Development.” Paris (and Berlin), 1909 (p. 798).
This monumental volume offers a wealth of data; some of it has already been analyzed by Rissler; I select a few additional insights:
p. 37: According to statistics published in Der Deutsche Oekonomist (1906, p. 452), German banks held a total capital of 11,394 million marks—comprising both their own funds and external capital.
Of this sum, 3,335 million marks were allocated to the Deutscher Bank group, encompassing 17 banks;
2,145 million marks went to the Dresdner Bank and the Schaffhausen Bankverein, together with 13 banks;
1,843 million marks were invested in the Disconto-Gesellschaft;
908 million marks were placed in the Darmstädter Bank; Σ = 8,231 million marks across 44 groups.
+ 4 smaller, less powerful groups
ΣΣ = 9,566 million marks—representing roughly 80% of total capital.

“Commerz-und-Diskonto-Bank” “Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank”
“Nationalbank für Deutschland” “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft”

From 84… French capital invested abroad:

According to the Journal Officiel dated September 25, 1902, Europe: 21,012 million marks (sic! Is this a typo?). Now, estimates suggest that this figure has risen to as much as 40 billion marks.
Asia: 1,121 million marks
Africa: 3,693 million marks
America: 3,972 million marks
Australia and Oceania: 57 million marks
29,855 million marks in total.
On pp. 126–127: “The Ties Between Major German Banks and Industrial Corporations Through Shareholdings on the Boards of Directors of These Industrial Enterprises” (a table compiled by Hans Arends and Kurt Vossner, based on data from the “Directory of Directors and Members of the Supervisory Boards of Joint-Stock Companies,” Berlin, 1903); while the author presents detailed breakdowns by industry, I will focus solely on the aggregate results:
Systems of Shareholding: Deutscher Bank, Disconto-
Gesellschaft, Darm-
Städter Bank, Dresdner Bank, Schaffhausen-
Bankverein, Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft.
Through administrators: 1013 1515 3684 0
Through members of their own supervisory boards: 1206 1508 0623 4
Via either of these two methods: 2219 2101 1331 3074
Through chairmanship of the board or via more than two board members: 984 3364 1463 33
On p. 213: The participation of key nations in the world’s maritime telegraph networks:
1898–1903
England: 68.33% → 60.2%
United States: 11.10% → 18.2%
France: 10.10% → 9.0%
Germany: 1.88% → 4.5%
Russia: 4.32% → 23.8%
Japan: 0.90% → 0.8%

On p. 239… Foreign ventures in the electrical industry (according to Fazolt’s “Seven Major Electrical

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Companies and Their Development”… Dresden, 1904); here, I focus only on Russia and its aggregate results (in millions of marks); Group
Siemens & Halske: 33.10 104.39
A.E.G.: 2.88 52.04
Schuckert: 1.60 25.68
Union-Elektrizitätsgesellschaft: 2.88 17.53
Helios: 21.60 27.70
Lameyer: -5.12
Kummer: -0.69

Σ = 62.08 233.13

On pp. 245 and 246: Crude oil production in Romania
1886: 5,300 tons
1907: 9,000,000 tons
Foreign capital invested in this industry *:
{ A rather impressive example }

German: 74 million francs
French: 31——(54)
Dutch: 22
Romanian: 16
Italian: 15—— American: 12.5
Belgian: 5—— English: 3—— Other countries: 6.5

Σ = 185
On p. 283 and following.
English colonial banks:

32 banks… 2,136 branches, with 50.3 million pounds sterling in share capital.
× 25 = 1,257.5 million francs
French colonial banks:

20 banks, 136 branches ** 326.8 million francs
Dutch colonial banks:

16 banks, 67 branches, 98.0 million florins.
× 2(??) = 196 million francs ((A vast array of monographic data on every major bank—and on several overseas branches of German banks))

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 236. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 232. Ed.

A couple of examples:

(p. 631) “Deutsch-Asiatische Bank” (in Shanghai) (founded February 12, 1889)

Distribution of 5,000 shares, each priced at 1,000 thalers.
On p. 743: “Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank” was established January 5, 1905

4,000 shares (= 2 million marks)
1. The Board of “Diskontogesellschaft” — 805 shares, 250
— Bank “Seehandlung” — 175
— Deutsche Bank — 555, 250
— Bleichröder — 555, 100
5. “Berliner Handelsgesellschaft” — 470
— Bank für Handel und Industrie — 310
— Robert Warshauer & Co. — 310, 100
— Mendelssohn & Co. — 310, 100
10. Jakob Stern (Frankfurt am Main) — 470
— M. A. f. Rothschild ( ) — 310
11. “Norddeutsche Bank” (Hamburg) — 380
12. “Sal. Osthengen & Co.” (Cologne) — 175, 100
13. “Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank” (Munich) — 175
=====
5,000 “Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft” — 2,800
— Delbrück, Leo — 100
— Hansing & Co. — 100
— von der Heydt — 100
=====
4,000 “Diskontogesellschaft” — 800
— Deutsche Bank — 555
— Berliner Handelsgesellschaft — 470
— Darmstädter Bank — 310
=====
2,135

— Bleichröder — 555
— Mendelssohn — 310
— J. Stern — 470
— Rothschild — 310
=====
1,645
KAUFMAN: FRENCH BANKS
Dr. Eugen Kaufman. “Banking in France.” Tübingen, 1911 (I Appendix to the “Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik”) *.

* See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 202. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
p. 362 (abridged): The Expansion of the French Branch Network Since 1870 (3 Major Banks: Crédit Lyonnais; Comptoir National; Société Générale)
p. 356

The Same

3 Banks

p. 37: French Savings Banks

Branches in the Provinces

Deposit Offices in ParisΣ
      Assets Shown on the Balance Sheet

Own Working Capital
Foreign Funds
Total Deposits

Millions of Francs
Number of Depositors

Millions
1870..47+17=64– –(1872)200 million francs + 427
1880..127+68=195– –253953
1890..192+66=258– –2651245
–33257.3
1900..505+120=625– –6152300
–427410.7
1909..1033+196=1229– –8874363
–4773(1906)12.5
The French Minister of Finance estimated the nation’s wealth—at least in terms of inheritance taxes—to be 200 billion francs (1903–05), a figure that fell short of reality.
!!

Of these, 55 (27%) were held by 18,000 individuals (p. 37)
75 (37%) by 45,000 individuals

p. 85: Excursus: “French Capital in Securities”
NB

Billions of francs per year
Terry’s Calculation (1907)..61.4 French…11/3 billion (p. 87)
NB ||||38.5 foreign—more precisely, 11/2 billion francs
99.9 up to 100 billion francs
Worldwide, Terry estimated (1907) that French holdings in securities totaled 730 billion francs
(*)

including 115–130 (United Kingdom)
{these figures

Neumark}
110–115 (United States)
100–100 (France)
60–75 (Germany)
385–420

==================
NB
(*) p. 287, note (E. Kaufman): “…Thus, while Deutsche Bank had a balance sheet total of 72 million marks, it dominated a group of stockholder banks that collectively held roughly half a billion in capital and 11/3 billion in foreign funds” (cf. Lansburg, “The System of Shareholdings in German Banking,” Die Bank, June 1910, p. 504)
==================
Terry’s Calculation

Russian securities—10.9 billion francs
Austro-Hungarian securities—3.65
Egyptian securities—3.05
Turkish securities—2.5
Dutch securities—1.45
Swiss securities—1.45
Italian securities—1.4
Portuguese securities—1.35
English securities (including colonies)—1.30
Belgian securities ( )—1.25
Brazilian securities—1.20
Argentine securities—1.10
Balkan states (excluding Turkey)—1.0
HEGEMAN: FRENCH BANKS
K. Hegeman. “The Development of Large French Banks.” Münster in Westphalia, 1908.
From his Table II (the number of branches and deposit offices of the same three major French banks) (p. 47).
Foreign

Branches Province ParisΣ

1870 62 62

1880 12 – 119 – 67 198
1890 24 – 194 – 66 284
1900 35 – 467 – 120 622
1906 44 – 660 – 179 883
!!
2 banks with 2,000–5,000 employees: 14 – 101 – 200; 1635 – 1 – 4
2 – 100 1–2,000 25 – 51 – 100 110 ?
1 – 50 1–1,000 148 – 21 – 50
3 – 20 1–500 261 – 11 – 20 Σ = 2,945
744 – 5 – 10

GULFTEGGER: “THE ENGLISH BANK”
Otto Gulftegger, “The English Bank.” Zurich, 1915. (Dissertation.)
p. 400: The Growth of Deposits at the English Bank (excluding government deposits) and at Certain Large Private Banks:
Deposits (millions of pounds sterling)
Increase from 1890 to 1912
1890 1900 1912
English Bank 32.99 36.96 52.95 60%
Lloyd’s Bank Limited 19.28 51.02 89.39 364%
London City & Midland Bank – 37.84 83.66 – London Joint Stock Bank 11.62 17.16 33.83 191%
National Provincial Bank of England 39.59 51.08 65.66 66%
Parra’s Bank 6.21 24.22 41.68 571%
London County & Westminster Bank – 81.69 –
JAFFE: ENGLISH BANKS
E. Jaffe. “English Banking.” 1904 (“Schmoller’s Forschungen,” Issue 109).
(p. 234/5)
Total Deposits Across All Banks (millions of pounds sterling)
Number of Bank Branches

Per Resident

Per Bank Branch
1858 2008
1872 2924 10767
1880 500 – – 510 3554 (1878)
1881 946 1
1890 660 – – 670
1891 7249
1900 840 – – 850 6512
1901 6238
1903 840 – – 850 7046

1909: 9157861 (1908) 5280

According to the “Statistical Dictionary”
Webb. “Supplement to Melholl,” 1911. August Webb.
In the United States, by 1907 there were 23,900 banks—1 bank for every 3,600 residents.

MERENS: FRENCH BANKS
Bernhard Merens. “The Emergence and Development of Major French Credit Institutions.” Berlin and Stuttgart, 1911.
(Munich Economic Research, Brentano and Lotz; Issue 107.)
p. 311: French Capital in Securities (the same figures as Neumark, as noted by Kaufman—see the previous page of this notebook) *.
French Capital in Securities:
Billions of Francs
NB
1850–9
Annual Capital Accumulation in France—according to Neumark—amounted to roughly 11/2–2 billion francs (p. 311–2) (Neumark), while according to Léroux-Bolé (p. 312, note) it reached as much as 21/2–3 billion francs.
1869–33
1880–56
1890–74
1902–90
1906–100
Total Bills of Exchange in France
In 1908, the Banque de France held 21.5 million bills of exchange totaling 12.3 billion francs, p. 2 6 3

1881–27.2 billion francs
1890–25.2 (p. 211)
1900–28.9
1907–35.9
CapitalReserves millions of francs
1892 – 250+ 69.5
1900 – 500+ 144.7
1908 – 575+ 216.2 across four banks
These are the capital and reserves of four major banks: Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir National, Société Générale, plus Crédit Industriel et Commercial (p. 240).
WALLICH. THE CONCENTRATION OF GERMAN BANKS
Paul Wallich. “The Concentration of Banking in Germany.” Berlin and Stuttgart, 1905. (“Munich Studies in National Economy,” No. 74 [Brentano and Lotz]) (p. 173).

* See this volume, pp. 116–118. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)

Judging from the review, Nil follows Rissler—though it is a small work, seemingly clear, yet far more impoverished than Rissler’s.
ZÖLLINGER (THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE) AND NEUMARK
Dr. Walter Zöllinger. “The Balance of International Movements of Value.” Jena, 1914
(“Problems of the World Economy,” No. 18, Leipzig, published by Harns).
p. 106: Neumark (“Bulletin de l’Institut International de Statistique.”
Volume XIX, Issue II, 1912) provides the following figures for emissions (ΣΣ over five years) **:

cf. p. 17 in this notebook * billion francs
1871/5 – 4576.1; 1891/5 – 40.4; 1900 – 44 – 5% with 570 billion =

= 22.8 – 28 – 25 billion francs.
1876/80 – 31.1; 1896/900 – 60
1881/85 – 24.1; 164.5; 1901/5 – 83.7; 197.5
1886/90 – 40.4; 1906/910 – 114.1

NB
p. 206
Holdings of Securities (p. 223): {A. Neumark} ***
Billions of francs
End of 1908
End of 1910
United Kingdom 130–135; 140–142 mine calculation:

= 80%
United Kingdom 142
U.S. 115–120; 130–132
U.S. 132
France 103–105; 106–110
Germany 95
Germany 80–85; 90–95
369
Russia 25–27; N.B. 29–31; N.B.
= 61%
Austria-Hungary 21–22; 23–24
Italy 10–12; 13–14
Japan 6–7; 9–12 “Other Countries” 33–38; 35–40
Total 523–551; 575–600
This is verified according to Neumark, p. 223.

* See this volume, pp. 68–69. Ed.
** See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 227. Ed.
*** Ibid. Ed.

My Calculation

1910

Approximately
12.5
7.5
7.5
6.25
3.75
2.5
====
40
(*) These “Other Countries” account for only 1902 (32 billion)*:
Netherlands 10
Belgium 6
Spain 6
Switzerland 5—| now 6, the author believes |
Denmark 3
Sweden, Norway, Romania, and others 2
===
32 billion francs

This is according to Zöllinger
================ (*)

NB

V. Zöllinger. “International Movements of Value and the Placement of Capital Abroad: Their Impact on Production and Market Conditions” in “Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft.” Year of publication 69, Issue 3.
NB
See Ferdinand Moos. “French Credit Institutions and French and English Capital Outflows Abroad.” “Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik.” Series III, Volume 39, 1910.
================
Switzerland holds up to 2.6 billion francs in “foreign securities” (p. 147),
while France holds up to 900 million francs in Switzerland (1903) (p. 148).
Swiss railways: their bonds are held by (p. 150. Zöllinger)

million francs
France – 420
Germany – 67
Belgium – 8
England – 3
Netherlands – 2
====
Σ = 500 million francs.
|

|

|——————|

|

|
Foreign workers in Swiss industry account for 24.4% of all workers (= 625,299), including 85,866 Italians, or 13.7%.
——————

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 227. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
(p. 108. Zöllinger) Emissions in Germany (according to “Der Deutsche Oekonomist”)
Securities domestic and foreign

Σ
1886–90
4.4 + 2.3 = 6.7 billion marks
1891–95
4.8 + 1.5 = 6.3
1896–900
8.2 + 2.4 = 10.6 the same figures as Neumark, p. 232

1901–5
8.3 + 2.1 = 10.5
1906–1910
12.6 + 1.5 = 14.1
Emissions in France (Zöllinger, p. III)
French

Foreign

Billions of francs
1902 – 64 + 66 = 130
1906 – 65 + 68 = 133
1910 – 69 + 73 = 142 “At the end of 1910, the world’s outstanding securities traded on various financial markets totaled 815 billion. Of these 815 billion tradable securities, between 570 and 600 billion were owned by nationals of different countries” (p. 223: Neumark).
…“Indeed, we must not confuse—this is a point we consistently emphasize—with the total value of securities traded and listed on one or more markets, and the actual amount of capital owned by capitalists in those countries. The same securities may be listed and traded simultaneously on multiple markets” (p. 203).
The author roughly eliminates these repetitions, arriving at 575–600 billion instead of 815 *.
||

||NB|

|
p. 201 and onward in “Bulletin.” Alfred Neumark. “International Securities Statistics.”
“Bulletin de l’Institut International de Statistique,” p. 201 and onward, **
Neumark’s article represents his ninth report on this topic (the remaining eight reports are contained in Volumes IX; XI, 2; XII, 1; XIII, 3; XIV, 2; XV, 2; XVI, 1; XVII and XVIII, 2).
||

||

||NB

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. 22, p. 227, Ed.
** Ibid., pp. 22v–227. Ed.

NB||

||
Among his other articles on the same subject, see the index in Volume XIX, 3, covering all 19 volumes.
||

||
19 volumes (mostly 2–3 issues per volume)

Volume 1 – 1885

Volume 19 – 1911
In this article, Neumark presents weather data on emissions from 1871 to 1910; here they are:

39.1; 76.1 − 39.1 = 37.0:7 = 5.3
/|\
1871 15.6 12.6 10.9 4.2 1.7 3.7 7.9 4.6 9.4 5.5 (1880)
[1881] 7.2 4.5 4.2 4.9 3.3 6.7 5.0 7.9 12.7 8.1
(1891) 7.6 2.5 6.0 17.8 6.5 16.7 9.6 10.5 11.3 11.9 (1901) 9.9 21.9 18.3 14.4 19.1 26.5 15.3 21.2 24.6 26.5

NB||

||

Foreign Capital
United Kingdom 85 billion francs (1910) (p. 21C)
France 40
Germany 20–25

Foreign trade (imports + exports) of all countries, in billions of francs

1867/8 – 55 billion francs: Neumann’s figures— Spallart’s (p. 219)
1876 – 70 »
1889 – 93 »
1910 – 132———} Neumark’s figure (p. 218)
↑

billions of francs
Germany –20
U.S. 25
Great Britain –25
British India 6
France –13
Japan 2.3
Belgium –6.7
Canada 3.5
Austria-Hungary –5.4
British South Africa 3
Italy –5.2
Egypt 2.2
Switzerland –2.8
42.0
Spain –2.0
80.1
80.1 + 42.0 = 122—yet the author reckoned 132!!??
And these are only those countries! !!
The world’s railways (983,868 kilometers in 1909) were valued at roughly 270 billion francs (p. 223).

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
1885–1905–1909
Europe: 195.2–305.4–325.2 thousand km.
Asia: 22.4–77.2–94.6
America: 246.1–450.6–504.2
Africa: 7.9–26.1–30.9
Oceania: 12.9–27.0–28.9

484.5–886.3–983.8
It is curious that the concluding section, § IX, is titled: “International Public and Private Wealth and Universal Peace” (p. 225)— …“Is it conceivable that peace could be shattered?… that with such staggering figures… anyone would dare risk provoking war…? …Who, then, would have the audacity to assume such responsibility?”… *
cf. Kautsky on “ultra-imperialism,” p. 16 “According to our earlier statistical data, the total value of state funds and securities—both French and foreign—held by French capitalists could reach the following figures”:
Billions of francs

Of these, foreign
Years: Late 1850–9
NB

page

289

1860–31– – – – – cf. page

67 of this notebook– di **

1869–33– – – –10
1880–56– – – –15
1890–74– – – –20
1902–87 to 90– – – –25 to 27
1910–106 to 110… … … …38 to 40
The distribution of French capital abroad by country (p. 290):
billions of francs
Russia 10–11***
NB Spain and
England ½ Portugal 3–4
Belgium and U.S. and
Holland ½ Canada 2–3
Germany ½ Egypt and the Suez Canal 3–4
Turkey and Serbia 2–2½ Argentina, Brazil
Bulgaria, Romania, and Mexico 4–5 and Greece 2–3 China and Japan 1–2
Austria-Hungary 2–2½ Tunisia and French-
Italy 1–1½ colonies 2–3
Switzerland ½ Σ (my own estimate) = 34–43½

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 274. Ed.
** See this volume, p. 120. Ed.
*** See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 230. Ed.

TAYLOR. “THEORY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION”
Frederick W. Taylor. “The Principles of Scientific Management” (“Shop Management”) (translated and supplemented by Wallisch). 2nd edition. Berlin, 1912.
Wallisch visited America in 1911. An example from the Bethlehem Steel Works (p. 17);
now before
Total expenditure on material handling
924 thousand tons 130,000 280,000 marks per ton 0.139 0.304
Wages per worker 7.80 4.80
Number of tons handled by a single worker 5716 tons!!!
Another example (in marks) (p. 32):
before now
Daily wage 10.0 14.50
Machine costs 14.0 14.00
Total daily costs 24.00 28.50
Costs: 5 {pieces per day}: 10 per piece = 4.80 = 2.85 sic!!
“Let us not overlook the fact that we must first reckon with the considerable resistance put up by the worst elements among the workers—those who will always seek, through persuasion, to prevent other workers operating under the piece-rate system from attaining maximum productivity” (28).
…“the arduous transitional period from the slow pace of conventional work methods to the rapid production characteristic of sound shop management” (29)…
p. 9: “The primary aim of systematic slowness in work lies in keeping shop management in the dark regarding the potential productivity of machines and workers.”
This form of artificial retardation is so commonplace that it is hardly possible to find a skilled worker in large factories employing standard wage systems who has not spent a significant portion of their time devising methods to work as slowly as possible—while still managing to convince their employer of their diligence” (9)...

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“Although the author had introduced his method across a wide range of industries in the United States starting in 1883, he had never encountered a workers’ strike—and he believes that strikes become inevitable only when the majority of workers belong to a union whose rules are so strict that they forbid any member from working under conditions other than those prescribed by the union itself” (25)...
||

||!!
|||

|||
||

||
Yet another example (p. 33 and following). The young women manually sorted the balls—polished steel spheres—identifying surface imperfections and the like.
Observation, control, “time studies” were implemented; the most capable workers were selected, and so on—“It turned out that until that point, a very substantial portion of the workers’ time was spent chatting idly or doing nothing at all. As a first step, the most careless of the young women were separated out, while those who proved incorrigible were dismissed” (35)...
(p. 35) before now
Results: number of young women 120–35 their weekly earnings 15–19 marks 27–35 marks
working day 10 1/2 hours 8 1/2 hours work quality 100% 158% “The System of Functions” for Craftsmen:
I) In the workshop

1. Master Adjusters—responsible for setting up the machinery (the actual work)

2. Masters who regulate the pace of work

3. Inspectors (receiving inspectors)

4. Supervisors responsible for maintaining general order and overseeing repairs (order maintenance).
II) In the office

1. Work Distributors (allocation)

2. Task Assigners (task distribution)

3. Timekeepers and Rate Setters

4. General Order Supervisors (general oversight),

NB
It is a mistaken belief that a factory operates more efficiently the fewer “non-productive” workers it employs—where “productive” refers to physical labor, while “non-productive” encompasses supervisors, foremen, and the like. On the contrary.
p. 50 (§ 133 [281–3]). The best factories have 1 “non-productive” worker for every 6–7 productive workers. The worst factories, by contrast, have 1 “non-productive” worker for every 11 productive workers.
|

|

|——————|

|

p. 63. In the outstanding “Tabor Manufacturing Company” (approximately 100 workers; they produce tools and casting machinery), Wallichs found 1 clerk for every 3 workers!!!
——————
p. 67. The conditions of “reform” ((the timeframe for this is 2–4 years!!))… “so that we may attract a cadre of workers whose productivity is exceptionally high—workers who are eager to labor strenuously in exchange for generous wages”…
…“so that the number of supervising foremen and clerical staff increases by at least a factor of two”… (67)…
((
Written reports, even in the form of printed forms or cards, from each worker—let alone from the foremen!!))
|||

|||
…“However, it will still take a considerable amount of time for people to acclimate to diligent work, making full use of every minute—and many will inevitably drop out—those who, despite their best efforts, simply cannot adapt to this new way of working” (69).
NB||
NB||

||
…“The opportunity to become a foreman or senior worker has become significantly more common, since under the new conditions, a greater number of these positions are required” (75).
(Enticing and bribing workers by transferring them to foreman roles)
|

|

|
Studying time-motion analysis is exceedingly difficult. For example, one engineer—Sandford E. Thompson (p. 81)—spent six years meticulously recording time expenditures in connection with architectural work!!! He conducted stopwatch observations himself and processed the data together with two assistants!! ((Construction sites, masons, carpenters, “concreting,” earthmoving, and so on and so forth.))
!||

||
…“Only for one of the aforementioned professions did a book emerge, spanning 250 pages—featuring both tables and text”…

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Then, down to the hundredths of a second (p. 84) (using specialized chronometers)—breaking down even the tiniest operations into discrete steps (putting aside shovels; lifting the wheelbarrow; pushing the wheelbarrow; setting down the wheelbarrow; lifting the shovel, etc., etc., etc.), measuring the cubic-meter capacity of the wheelbarrow, and likewise measuring the dimensions of the shovel, and so on and so forth.
To conduct these measurements, select the most skilled workers (91) and pay them top wages—while promising further wage increases…
Here’s another example: inspecting and cleaning boilers. The author assigned an assistant to study the task. The assistant was a novice and accomplished nothing. The author personally carried out the work, carefully timing each operation. It turned out that much time was being wasted because the work was performed in “unnatural postures” (99). Protective cushions were devised to be strapped onto elbows, knees, and thighs, and specialized tools were developed for particular tasks—and much more besides (100).
“Over all of this directive” (spanning many pages—detailing how to manage affairs, i.e., how to carry out work)—“when it was first introduced, many laughed at it”… The result? The fee for inspecting and cleaning a boiler bank rated at 300 horsepower plummeted from 250 marks to just 44 marks!!!

||

||250 and 44
The author worked for ten years at the Midvale Steel Works without ever experiencing a strike. The best workers did not join unions, because they received better—higher—wages.
“The company pursued a policy of increasing each worker’s earnings whenever possible and of giving everyone who deserved it the chance to rise through the ranks. Detailed records were kept of each worker’s strengths and weaknesses—especially the responsibility of senior workers—and in this way, every worker could be treated fairly. If, in any given enterprise, workers are paid according to their individual value, then joining forces with lower-paid workers can never serve the interests of higher‑paid workers” (101)...
|

|

|

|

|

|

|
Much has been said about the unity of interests between the working class and the employers, etc. The author viewed monetary fines as the most effective disciplinary measure… Fines were directed toward the accident insurance fund ((ranging from 5 pfennigs to 250 marks—fine amounts applied both to officials and to the workers themselves!!))…

NB
Under capitalism, “torture or mere trickery”
Wallichs’ additional chapter (“Recent Achievements”)—in America alone, roughly 60,000 workers now operate according to the principles of reorganized enterprises (with well‑thought‑out management) (109)…
only 60,000 workers
||||

||||
Gilbreth introduced innovations in masonry work, increasing the number of bricks handled per worker from 120 to 350 per hour (109) (reducing the number of operations from 18 to 5)…
Congress appointed a commission to study Taylor’s system (109)…
Of course!||||

||||
Highly influential labor unions opposed Taylor’s system (110)…
That’s right!!!|||

|||
(Wallichs): …“The phrase ‘well‑thought‑out management’ is but a mere slogan; its true meaning is better captured by the term ‘intensive production activity’” (111–112)…
Appendix: A Discussion. Many point out that Taylor conducts
“accounting without an owner”: labor organizations will not allow it (119, 116, and others).
p. 129: Oberlin Smith proposes introducing instruction in Taylor’s system into schools…
The End

ZEIBERT. “FROM THE PRACTICE OF THE TAYLOR SYSTEM”
Rudolf Zeibert, a certified engineer. “From the Practice of the Taylor System.” Berlin, 1914.
The author spent eight months studying the particularly renowned “Tabor Manufacturing Company” (Philadelphia) and promises a detailed, practical account.
||

||
p. 6: “Experts familiar with German and American conditions readily acknowledge that when it comes to the economical use of materials, German industry has advanced far ahead of its American counterpart—but, conversely, in terms of—
NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
the economical utilization of human labor power, Germany still has much to learn from the United States” (7)…
||

||

||characteristic!
“Time studies” would be better termed “productivity studies”: it is not merely time that is observed, but also the most efficient work methods that are examined and distilled (9–10)…
– “The Science of Labor” (10)
|||NB
Through cinematography, they study movement—oblique postures facilitate effortless material handling (regardless of…) etc. etc. “No superfluous or inefficient movements” (15).

|||

NB
One must conduct business with due care, in accordance with the democratic customs of America (p. 22), so as not to be perceived as engaging in “torment” (22).
|||

|||

|||sic!!!

{"src": "диалектика", "tgt": "dialectics"}
{"src": "самодвижение", "tgt": "self-movement"}
{"src": "познание", "tgt": "cognition"}
{"src": "империализм", "tgt": "imperialism"}
{"src": "буржуазия", "tgt": "bourgeoisie"}
{"src": "пролетариат", "tgt": "proletariat"}
{"src": "Советы", "tgt": "Soviets"}
{"src": "диктатура пролетариата", "tgt": "dictatorship of the proletariat"}
{"src": "классовая борьба", "tgt": "class struggle"}
{"src": "средства производства", "tgt": "means of production"}
{"src": "надстройка", "tgt": "superstructure"}
{"src": "базис", "tgt": "base"}
{"src": "мелкая буржуазия", "tgt": "petty bourgeoisie"}
{"src": "товарное производство", "tgt": "commodity production"}
{"src": "прибавочная стоимость", "tgt": "surplus value"}
{"src": "Совнарком", "tgt": "Sovnarkom"}
{"src": "ЦК", "tgt": "Central Committee"}
{"src": "ВЦИК", "tgt": "VTsIK"}
{"src": "СНК", "tgt": "Sovnarkom"}
{"src": "СТО", "tgt": "Council of Labour and Defence"}
{"src": "РКП(б)", "tgt": "RCP(b)"}
{"src": "РСФСР", "tgt": "RSFSR"}
{"src": "продразвёрстка", "tgt": "prodrazvyorstka"}
{"src": "продналог", "tgt": "tax in kind"}
{"src": "нэп", "tgt": "NEP"}

This applies only to the opening chapters of the book. It seems that Risser has pilfered from it. When it comes to attitudes toward industry, Eydel’s work is richer, more vibrant, more astute—and more scientifically grounded.
ordinary phenomenon||

||

||
p. 18: For example, the acquisition of shares in the “Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Gesellschaft” in 1904, with the aim of placing Thyssen on the “supervisory board” (!!).
p. 57: The number of (joint-stock) banks and private bankers involved in the issuance of securities by industrial corporations
banks per banker accounted for issuances per bank accounted for issuances
1871/2904.4316.1
1899342.71612.4
p. 103: The Mannesmann brothers sold their patents for “seamless pipes” for 16 million marks (!)... (1890)...
Every crisis—whether in 1857, 1873, or 1900—leads to concentration; yet 1900 was particularly significant:
“The crisis of 1900 found, alongside gigantic enterprises in the major branches of industry, numerous firms still organized as

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
to the concepts current today—outmoded, “pure” enterprises” (that is, non‑integrated firms) “which had risen to the crest of the industrial boom. The fall in prices and the decline in demand plunged these ‘pure’ enterprises into such dire straits that they were either entirely untouched by the integrated, giant enterprises—or, at most, affected only briefly. As a result, the crisis of 1900 led to industrial concentration to an incomparably greater extent than the crisis of 1873: while the latter did indeed bring about a certain selection of the best enterprises, at the technological level prevailing at the time, this selection could not give rise to a monopoly among those firms that had emerged victorious from the crisis. It is precisely such long‑lasting monopolies—monopolies of a high degree—that characterize the giant enterprises of today’s iron and steel industry and electrical engineering, thanks to their highly complex technology, their far‑reaching organizational structures, the sheer magnitude of their capital, and, to a lesser extent, the enterprises of machine building, the well‑known branches of metallurgy, transportation, and the like.” (108)... *

||

||

||

||NB
 
||

||

||monopoly
p. 111: When it became necessary to secure the merger of the Phoenix Company into the Stahlwerksverband, the Schaffhausen Bankverein acquired a majority of its shares and pushed through the required resolution.
Similarly, the Dresdner Bank “captured” two seats on the supervisory board of the Königs- und Lauchhütte steelworks (four years earlier) and ensured that its interests were fully represented…
The role of supervisory boards is exceedingly broad—in practice, it may even amount to that of a board of directors…
…“Seats on the supervisory boards are voluntarily granted to individuals of renown, as well as to former civil servants who can provide considerable assistance in dealings with the authorities”… ** (149).
|||

|||

|||sic!

(Just!)

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 197–19. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 209. Ed.

An ordinary story!||||

||||

||||
“In the supervisory board of a major bank, one usually encounters… a member of parliament or a member of the Berlin City Council” (152)... *
155 (in fine)... “But the cases cited above” (a series of ‘names’ are listed: Dernburg—director of the Darmstädter Bank; Gwinner—director of the Deutsche Bank) “clearly demonstrate that industrial leaders tend to belong primarily to the supervisory boards of companies within the same industry or the same region, whereas the directors of large banks, by contrast, are represented in the management of a wide variety of enterprises…”
1. The director of the Schaffhausen Bankverein serves as a member of the supervisory board of 33 different companies!! (p. 155).
p. 150: Consider, for example, the case of 35 supervisory board seats held in the hands of a single individual... (35).

p. 156: …“Alongside this expansion of the scope of activity for individual leading industrialists, and with the assignment of responsibility for specific industrial districts exclusively to provincial bank directors, there has been a marked increase in specialization among the managers of large banks, with each focusing on particular sectors of the economy. Such specialization is, in general, feasible only when a bank’s overall scale is substantial—and especially when its industrial connections are extensive. This division of labor proceeds along two main lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one of the directors as his specialized domain; on the other hand, each director assumes oversight over individual enterprises—or over groups of enterprises that are closely aligned in terms of their respective trades or shared interests. For some, German industry becomes the specialty—sometimes even limited to Western Germany alone; for others, it is relations with foreign states and industries, insights into the personalities of industrialists and the like, stock market affairs, and so forth.”
||

||
 
|||

|||
“supervision” over public economy||

||

||
 
|||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 209. Ed.

COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE
RCP(b)
RSFSR
PRODRAZVYORSTKA
TAX IN KIND
NEP
NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
In addition, each bank director often oversees a specific region or a particular industry: one primarily serves on the boards of electric utilities, another on chemical plants, breweries, or sugar refineries; a third is responsible for a handful of isolated enterprises, while concurrently serving on non-industrial boards—such as those of insurance companies. To illustrate this point with examples drawn from individual Berlin bank directors would take us far beyond the realm of general discussion. In short, it is undeniable that, as large banks grow in size and diversify their operations, an increasingly intricate division of labor emerges among their executives—with the aim—and the result—of elevating them, so to speak, above purely banking matters, equipping them with broader judgment, deepening their understanding of both overarching industrial issues and the specialized concerns of individual sectors, and preparing them for active participation in the industrial sphere where the bank exerts its influence. This banking model is further complemented by a deliberate effort to select individuals well-versed in industry—entrepreneurs, former civil servants, especially those who have served in the railway and mining departments*—to sit on the boards of their affiliated institutions. These individuals are not so much expected to cultivate close ties with industrial enterprises as to provide expert counsel—advice grounded less in academic training than in years of practical, business, and human experience.” (157)...
||

||
|||

|||NB

|||

|||NB
||

||

||
||

||

||“system”

...“But the bank director, as a member of the supervisory board, enjoys not only the advantage of being personally invested

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 209–210. Ed.

in the diligent performance of his duties toward the bank; he is also uniquely informed about market conditions, able to direct his extensive staff to carry out the commercial and technical tasks assigned by the supervisory board. It is precisely this broad knowledge of multiple enterprises that enables him to assess each one more accurately—protecting him from the tendency, all too common when a single individual sits on the board of just one company, to overestimate the value of any given enterprise.” (157–158).
NB||

||
overview “the whole”|||

|||

|||
By the end of 1903, major banks were represented on the SUPERVISORY BOARDS of industrial enterprises:
(p. 161–162)*, “Deutsche Bank” “Dis- conto-

Gesellschaft” “Darm- städter Bank” “Dresd- ner Bank” “Schaff- hausen-

Schärf-

Bank-

Verein”

“Berli-

ner Handels-

Gesellschaft”

Total

(my) 6

major

banks
Through directors1013151536840344
Through their own members of the supervisory board1206150806234407

Total22192101133130741040751
Through chairmanship or by more than two individuals984336413833289
Isn’t this already a departure from Rissers’ perspective? Cf. pp. 170–171:
members of supervisory boards organized by industrial sector… p. 137 and 139: industrial issuances

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 208. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
…“The universal nature of banking operations in industry—as described thus far—the capacity and necessity for large banks to systematically leverage regular commercial turnover, to extend industrial credit, to issue securities, and to assume seats on supervisory boards as instruments for forging close, long-term relationships with industrial enterprises—all of this weaves such a dense web around the bank and the industrial enterprise that competitive rivalry over individual transactions with these enterprises is often—indeed, for some institutions, permanently—rendered obsolete.” (163)…
|||

|||“universal

nature”

|||

|||“dense web”
“As we examine industrial relations in their totality, we arrive at the conclusion that financial institutions operating in the service of industry possess a truly universal character. In contrast to other forms of banking—and in opposition to certain arguments occasionally advanced in the literature that banks should specialize in a particular line of business or industrial sector if they are to avoid losing their footing—large banks strive to diversify their connections with industrial enterprises as widely as possible, both geographically and across different lines of production. They seek to mitigate the uneven distribution of capital across regions or industrial sectors—a pattern often rooted in the historical trajectories of individual enterprises.* Alongside this endeavor, there also emerges a strong impulse to build industrial ties based on regular, long-term business relationships, to give these ties substance and to provide them with the space and opportunity to expand and
|||

|||“universal

character”

||

||

||“in contrast to”

(the past)
||

||
 
|||

|||

|||

||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 211. Ed.

||

||
deepening these ties through a sophisticated system of assigning supervisory board seats; compared to these two spheres of influence, the role of issuance activities in shaping large banks’ industrial relationships tends to recede into the background. One trend seeks to make engagement with industry a commonplace occurrence; the other aims to forge those connections into something firm and intensive. While neither of these goals has yet been fully realized in the six major banks, they are already being pursued with considerable momentum—and with equal intensity.” (180)... * “trend”||||

||||

||||
|||

|||

|||
“new” industrial relationships with banks|||

|||

The connections between industrial enterprises—shaped by their new content, new forms, and new institutions—namely, the large banks that were organized both centrally and de‑centrally at the same time—emerged as a distinctive feature of the national economy no earlier than the 1890s; in a certain sense, one might even push this initial point back to 1897, with its major “mergers” of enterprises that, for the first time, introduced a new form of decentralized organization tailored to the banking sector’s industrial policy objectives. One could perhaps push this starting point even further into the future, since it was only the crisis of 1900 that dramatically accelerated the process of concentration in both industry and banking, consolidating this trend, transforming relations with industry into a genuine monopoly held by the large banks for the first time, and making these relationships far more intimate and intensive. (181)… **
“no earlier than the 1890s”|||

|||
1897|||

crisis (1900)|||

|||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 211. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 213. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
…“The sudden concentration in the Rhineland–Westphalian mining industry, the formation of steelworks associations, the mergers of major electric companies, and so on—without a doubt, all of these developments significantly accelerated the practical resolution of the question of the relationship between banks and industry” (182)…
after the crisis of 1900 (the depression)
…“Modern industrial enterprise has carried banks into entirely new spheres of economic life… to a certain extent, the bank is shifting from a sphere of purely intermediary activity to the sphere of industrial production… …In this way, large banks come into contact not only with the developmental tendencies of individual enterprises, but also with the interconnections among different enterprises within a single industrial sector—and with the broader interrelations among industrial sectors as a whole” (183)…

||||

||||

||||NB
||

||

“Anyone who has observed, over the past few years, the changing faces of directors and members of the supervisory boards of major banks could not fail to notice how power has gradually passed into the hands of individuals who regard active intervention in the overall development of industry as an increasingly urgent and indispensable task for large banks—and how, as a result, a growing divergence has emerged between these new figures and the old bank directors, often rooted in both professional and personal disagreements. In essence, the question is whether banks—as credit institutions—are suffering from this very intervention in the industrial production process, whether solid principles and reliable profits are being sacrificed to an activity that has little—if anything—to do with mere intermediation.”
|||

|||

|||NB

in the provision of credit—and which leads the bank into a realm where it becomes even more subject to the blind sway of industrial market conditions than before. This is what many of the old bank executives say; yet most of the younger generation regard active involvement in industrial affairs as a necessity no less pressing than the very forces that, alongside modern large-scale industry, gave rise to large banks and to the newest forms of industrial banking. The only thing on which both sides agree is that there are still no firm principles, no clearly defined goals for the new activities of large banks”… (184)… *
the transition… to what?||||

||||

||||

||||
1|||

2|||

3||| “Banking operations involving foreign countries and conducted abroad can be divided into three distinct phases, each corresponding to a particular stage of development: international payments, the placement of foreign loans, and participation in industrial enterprises overseas… Each of these phases left its mark on a specific period in the foreign policy of Germany’s large banks.
…On the significance of foreign loans for domestic industry, one of the leaders of the Accounting Society—which places particular emphasis on overseas operations—expressed himself ten years ago before the Stock Exchange Questionnaire Commission as follows (from the “Minutes of the Stock Exchange Questionnaire Commission,” p. 371, testimony of Russel): ‘I would consider it an extremely serious loss if… the placement of foreign loans in Germany were entrusted not to German capital and German banks—
* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 212–213. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
||

||

||

||
but rather to foreign hands. It was precisely because we sought to avoid this outcome that the Foreign Office became so strongly—and, in my view, quite rightly—interested in ensuring that we maintained trade offices, banking branches, and networks abroad. For it is only through these connections that it becomes possible to secure the kinds of contracts that are desirable for German industry overseas.”
||NB
||

||NB
 
||

||

||
…The universal complaint of our export-oriented industries is that Germany, when compared with London, lags far behind in the market for large-scale transactions. Almost all orders are concentrated in London, in this vast global marketplace—and it is only because we maintain closer ties with individual foreign enterprises that business relationships and steady work can be secured for industry” (186–187)…
||

||

||NB

“orders”
…“Since Germany’s large banks engage directly with foreign industrial enterprises, it is once again necessary to distinguish between two fundamentally different stages of development—stages that also differ substantially in terms of timing. Historically speaking, the first phase roughly coincides with the heyday of foreign loans and therefore corresponds, in various countries, to different decades: the 1870s and 1880s may be regarded as the golden age of foreign railway construction”… (187)…
||

||

||2nd stage
|||iron

roads
2 subtypes (“opposite poles”): Romanian railways and participation in American railroads.
“This first stage is characterized by a close interconnection between activities in foreign industries and lending, although domestic industry, as

|||

|||

|||
a supplier, may still derive certain benefits from this arrangement. While banks’ initiative is strong and decisive, it engages with industry only indirectly—its primary focus remains on the profitable deployment of capital in foreign securities. This situation arises when domestic industry has not yet reached the level of concentration or the capacity for expansion that would become evident from the 1890s onward.
|||

since the 1890s|||
The second stage||

||

||
On the contrary, at the second stage, the significance of external loans for banking activity recedes into the background, while large banks’ interest in foreign industries grows, becoming less dependent on other financial ties with that particular country. The establishment of industrial enterprises abroad by major banks—or with their assistance—becomes increasingly common; at the same time, in their foreign operations, large banks increasingly collaborate closely with domestic industry” (188)...
|||

|||

|||
…“If, when expanding overseas, domestic enterprises are far more heavily reliant on banks than they are in their own domestic factories… then, conversely,” (in contrast to their home country), “abroad the bank is already at home: it maintains its own branches, dominates international payment flows, and may even enjoy a specific relationship with the host country’s government—thanks to its role in organizing bond issues” (189)…
4 forms|||

|||
“One can distinguish four forms of banks’ involvement in foreign industrial enterprises: 1. The founding of branches or subsidiaries for domestic industry…

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
…2. The establishment of separate foreign enterprises that maintain only tenuous ties with domestic industry—or no ties at all… But the truly characteristic case lies in the latest exotic railway ventures and the East Asian enterprises of major banks, which jointly participate in the ‘Deutsche Asiatische Bank’…” These already represent “a link in the conquest of economic spheres” (190).
|my italics
(Baghdad, – China, etc., colonies)
…“3. A third group comprises attempts by large banks to secure a foothold in a particular industry abroad—either by establishing their own enterprises, or often simply by taking stakes in existing ones”… (191) participation in South African mining companies (“Deutsche Bank” since 1894, etc.).
4. …“the German banking world also sought to secure for itself—or for the German capital behind it—a particular industry abroad, for its own exclusive exploitation” (192)… for example, efforts to “organize part of the kerosene industry, with Romania at its center, under their own hegemonic control”…
|||

|||

|||to create “one’s own” industry
…“The global kerosene market is still divided between two major financial groups: Rockefeller’s American Standard Oil Company and the masters of Russian Baku oil—Rothschild and Nobel. Though these two groups remain closely interconnected, for several years now, five adversaries have been threatening their monopolistic position.”
|||

|||the division of the world

(1) the exhaustion of American oil reserves (2) the Mantashev & Co. firm in Baku

× (3) oil sources in Austria *.

× (4) the same in Romania

× (5) overseas oil sources, especially in the Dutch colonies (the wealthy Samuel and Shell Transport & Trading Company) *.

|

|————|

|
× = participation by Deutsche Bank and other German banks.
————

…“Banks are driven to engage in foreign activities not by national fervor, but by the ever‑intensifying need—on a certain stage of modern capitalist development—to carve out for free German capital a lucrative sphere abroad where it can be put to productive use” (197)…
an elementary truth the technical role of large banks (of financial capital)
“Banks play such a role—assisting industrial enterprises—by establishing research and technical societies whose findings are intended to benefit friendly enterprises. For example, there is the Society for the Study of Electric High-Speed Railways, as well as the Central Bureau for Scientific and Technical Research, founded by the Leve Consortium, and the Central Mining Bureau, a limited liability company based in Frankfurt am Main, which, alongside leading industrialists, is also financed by top-tier banks” (210–211) **.
Sometimes banks bring diverse industrial enterprises closer together—sometimes driving them toward cartel formation, sometimes fostering specialization, and so forth—

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 236. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 212. Ed.

THE “β” NOTEBOOK (“BETA”)
…“The bank, in a certain sense, embodies the internal interconnections that emerge—alongside the growth of large-scale industry—among a vast number of enterprises; it represents the shared interests that already exist between them” (215)…
the bank = the “internal connection” among enterprises
…“What a rich opportunity to provide work to its friendly factories is offered by an enterprise such as the Baghdad Railway!” (217)…
“Although the convergence of diverse enterprises and industrial sectors, achieved through the occasional awarding of contracts, has hitherto been carried out by banks ‘in passing,’ it nonetheless constitutes a significant indicator of how, with the expansion of large-scale industrial production, connections grow ever more numerous—and at the same time increasingly complex and all but invisible. The ties and relations of interdependence that bind various branches of industry and individual enterprises find in large banks the organ through which they are articulated, while latent connections gradually transform into genuine forms of cooperative collaboration” (219)…
NB

the growth of connections

Complaints are heard about the “terrorism” of banks—(219–220)—which compel (through orders and the like) firms to do business exclusively with certain designated companies (220).
((!!
In the electrical industry, a particular crisis played a decisive role (apparently in 1900), and banks intensified and accelerated the demise of relatively small enterprises, absorbing them into larger entities (pp. 230–232). …“Banks withdrew their helping hand precisely from those enterprises that needed it most, thereby first triggering a frenzied surge of activity, only to bring about the hopeless collapse of those societies that had not been closely enough bound to them” (232) *.

banks and the bankruptcies of enterprises

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 234. Ed.

NB
|¯¯ Details concerning the electrical industry are of little interest. Compare with more recent accounts in Die Neue Zeit ¯¯|
The Leve Group.
In 1869, the Leve Sewing Machine Factory was founded; later, arms production was added, followed in the 1870s and 1880s by the manufacture of machinery, boilers, and the like—and then came the electrical industry, subsidiary companies, and so on [described rather inadequately by Eidel’s].
In the section on the relationship between large banks and cartels (pp. 253–258), the author becomes somewhat “diffuse,” scattering his attention across several points. He distinguishes four distinct forms: 1) indifference (toward minor cartels); 2) “unqualified interest” (254) in cartels such as those in the coal industry (in cartels that, for a given industry, are matters of “life and death”);
how does this differ from No. 2?

is it not “unqualified interest”?
3) “support” for cartels—for example, the steel industry,
(4) a purely “banking–businesslike” relationship—such as the establishment, for instance, of a “syndicate office” under the Schaffhausen Bank Association (1899)...
258–265: a description of concentration in the coal industry (Thyssen and others). For a better and more up-to-date account, see Werner’s treatment in Die Neue Zeit, 1913, in another notebook *.
265 onward: the electrical industry (see also Die Neue Zeit**).
“The overriding principle guiding banks in this regard is, above all, the conscious promotion of concentration—something they had already indirectly fostered in the past by providing financial support to thriving enterprises” (268)…
“transformation” “The transformation of large banks’ industrial policy—from that of a credit institution to one of industrial concentration—clearly reveals the threefold contradiction inherent in the development of modern banking practice” (268)…
1)...“The fact that competition among large banks is steadily being eliminated” (269)...

* See the “α” notebook, pp. 7–9 of the present volume. Ed.
** See the present volume, p. 313. Ed.

THE “β” NOTEBOOK (“BETA”)
2) “Decentralization” within banks—through local branches and connections with provincial banks—leads to “a growing consolidation of capital, uniting bank and industry into a single, unified whole”…
3)... “increasing concentration signifies a more purposeful form of organization”... (270)
“Through the proliferation of production integration—whose various manifestations can be observed in both the electrical industry and large-scale metallurgy—the scope of this consciously managed production can be significantly expanded, and in this unmistakable trend, large banks play a crucial role” (270)…
At the same time, there is a pronounced tendency to favor heavy industry—coal and iron—at the expense of other sectors…
“The drive of large banks toward concentration and purposeful industrial management becomes contradictory when it confines itself to certain specific industries, thereby leading to an even sharper lack of systematic planning in the remaining sectors of industry” (271) *.
NB
End
STILLICH AND “THE WORLD ECONOMY.”
NOTE
Dr. Oskar Stillich. “Political-Economic Studies on Large Industrial Enterprises.”

Volume I. “The Iron and Steel Industry.” Berlin, 1904.

II. “The Coal Industry.” Leipzig, 1906.
A cursory review reveals that these works consist of detailed descriptions of individual, major enterprises—technical aspects, commercial operations, and, in part, the conditions of the workers.
{
These are solely accounts of individual enterprises. There are no syntheses, nor any overarching conclusions…
}}

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 196–197. Ed.

NB
It is worth noting, among the cited literature, the reference to I. Hermann’s “The Qualification of Factory Workers” in Die Neue Zeit, 21st year of publication, Volume II, No. 30
((on the question of the displacement of unskilled labor by machines and the rising role of skilled workers in machine-based production))

“World Economy” – “Yearbook and Reader.” Published by Ernst von Halle.
Year of Publication: I. 1906
II. 1907
III. 1908
Each volume is divided into three parts: 1) International Surveys; 2) Germany; 3) Other Countries.
The surveys are inferior to Neumann-Spallart’s work, since they largely lack comprehensive conclusions—instead offering only country-specific data.
The material is fragmentary, incomplete, and not systematically organized. Data for various years are either entirely missing or available only in isolated instances, making the volumes suitable at best for occasional reference.
There is absolutely no scholarly rigor—or even a genuine scientific interest—in the analyses offered by Kalver in his “Introduction,” which merely presents statistical raw data without attempting to elucidate the intricate interconnections that constitute the global economy as a whole.
EXCERPTS FROM THE JOURNAL “THE BANK” “Die Bank,” 1912, No. 2.
“The Kerosene Monopoly of Mr. von Gwinner” (1032–) (Dr. Felix Pinner).

On March 15, 1911, the Reichstag almost unanimously approved the petition concerning the kerosene monopoly. The

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
The government seized upon this “popular” (1032) initiative. It turned out that the banks… “had been unable to reach an agreement on production” (1033). Only one bank—the Deutscher Bank—was in favor! The others—including the Disconto-Gesellschaft at their head—were, in part, opposed because they regarded the Deutscher Bank’s production plans as excessively ambitious **.
cf. p. 13 here *
The banks’ struggle was ultimately beneficial to the cause: “Only when the interested parties had thoroughly exposed one another—and they did so with great thoroughness, masterful skill, and a profound understanding of each other’s weaknesses—did clarity finally emerge on this issue” (1034)…
sic!
Consumers were terrified of the exorbitant (“colossal,” 1034) prices. The Standard Oil Company had long provided consumers with excellent service.
The only way to challenge the Kerosene Trust was through the establishment of an electric power monopoly—by harnessing water power to generate cheap electricity. Yet we would only achieve an electric monopoly when it became economically advantageous for producers.
“An electric monopoly will come into being only when it is needed by the producers—that is, when the next major crisis looms on the horizon in the electric power industry, and when those gigantic, costly electric power stations currently being built across the land by private electric power “concerns”—stations for which these “concerns” have already secured substantial monopolies from cities, states, and other entities—find themselves unable to operate profitably. At that point, we will be forced to tap into water power; but we cannot simply convert water power into cheap electricity at public expense—we must once again entrust it to a ‘private monopoly under state control,’ because

NB
sic!
!!

* See the present volume, pp. 63–64. Ed.
* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 237. Ed.

Private industry has already concluded numerous deals and secured hefty compensation for its expensive steam-powered enterprises—compensation that would place an unbearable burden on land rent for an electric monopoly managed by the state and powered by water resources. This was true of the potash monopoly; it holds true for the kerosene monopoly; and it will hold true for the electricity monopoly as well. It is high time that our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by lofty principles, finally recognize that in Germany, monopolies have never pursued the goal of benefiting consumers—or even of yielding a share of entrepreneurial profits to the state—but have instead served solely to prop up private industry at public expense, driving it nearly to bankruptcy” * (1036. Italic emphasis added by the author).
“A tribute” paid to financial capital|||

|||

|||
!!||
||||

||||

NB

NB

There exists a table detailing the “interconnections” within the kerosene “concerns.”
In 1907, the Deutscher Bank was soundly defeated by the Standard Oil Company and was compelled to enter into a highly disadvantageous agreement with it—a pact that, by 1912, allowed the Standard Oil Company to acquire the Deutscher Bank’s kerosene assets at bargain prices.
And so the Deutscher Bank “set to work” to establish a monopoly!!
Standing against the Deutscher Bank was the Disconto-Gesellschaft—with its Deutscher Erdöl-Aktiengesellschaft—and cautiously maneuvered toward an agreement with the Standard Oil Company.
{Colonial banks} “Die Bank,” 1912, No. 2, p. 695:

“Statistics of English Joint-Stock Banks” (England and Wales)

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 237–238. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
millions

£ sterling
NB||

||
11,890–104 banks (joint-stock) with 2,203 branches. Deposits: 368
1911–44 »» 5,417 »» 749
In Scotland
1890–10 »» 975 »
1911–9 »» 1,227 »
In Ireland
1890–9 »» 456 »
1911–9 »» 739«
Colonial banks
NB||

||1890–30 »» 1,742 »
1911–38 »» 3,645 » “Die Bank,” 1912, No. 2 (pp. 629 et seq.). Felix Pinner’s “Kerosene Strategy”:
On the one hand, the Germans—represented by the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the Erdöl-Aktiengesellschaft—seek to unite Romania (and Russia) against the Standard Oil Company;
on the other hand, the Standard Oil Company established a corporation (“Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij”) right in the Netherlands itself, acquiring sources (and concessions) in the Dutch East Indies—delivering a decisive blow to its chief rival: the Dutch–English Shell Trust (“Koninklijke Shell”) and beyond.

NB

The division of the world among kerosene trusts
The struggle for the division of the world. “The Partition of the World,” beginning on p. 630.
To the Dutch–English Trust—Asia.
To the Standard Oil Company—the rest of the world.
The Standard Oil Company seeks to seize everything.
The Germans, meanwhile, aim to defend themselves—and to secure the support of Romania, the Netherlands, and perhaps even Russia??

“Die Bank,” 1912, 1.
The Film Trust!!
L. Eshweger’s “The Patriotism of Trusts”: In Germany, a trust has been established to acquire film distributors! (The Pathé Company in Paris produces 80,000 meters of film per day at a rate of 1 mark per meter. All cinemas worldwide generate roughly 1 billion marks in annual revenue!!) (pp. 216–217). This industry lags behind in Germany, while it is particularly well developed in France. In Germany, around 40 distribution firms purchase films and “lease” them to cinema owners. (The “Deutsche Filmindustrie Aktiengesellschaft” trust was founded—known as “FiAG”—with the national-liberal deputy Paasche at its helm. Its capital amounted to 5 million marks, of which a “substantial portion,” clearly, was earmarked as “founder’s profit”...) They are introducing a monopoly. Will it succeed??

“Die Bank,” 1912, 1 (pp. 223 et seq.), an article by A. Lansburg. “The Financial Affairs of the Princely Trust” (this is how the “case” involving the princes of Fürstenberg and Hohenlohe—wealthy financiers—is referred to on the stock exchange). They invested millions, both their own funds and those of the Deutsche Bank, into the construction firm Boswau & Knauer. This firm amassed up to 100 million marks (!!), overextended itself with a host of highly risky ventures, and ultimately collapsed. The Deutsche Bank lost around 12 million, while Fürstenberg lost approximately 8 million (p. 226), covering up and concealing—through various means—the full extent of the collapse. The author is deeply outraged and writes: “There is something of the Knauer poison inherent in all of our economic development” (p. 230)... “The principle according to which they [Boswau and Knauer] operated was scarcely different from that upon which, for example, the two largest German electrical concerns owe their success” (p. 228)... *
the true face the Deutsche Bank!!!

and

sic!!

the “electrical concerns”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 223–224. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
If Boswau and Knauer had managed to shift the risks onto others, they would have been praised—and hundreds upon hundreds of others would have gone bankrupt!

“Die Bank,” 1912, 1.
L. Eshweger. “The Commodification of Capitalism” (pp. 12–). Elections to the Reichstag. The struggle between conservatives and democrats. “While debates rage over whether the people or the bureaucracy should rule, the decision has long since been made in favor of a third force—namely, plutocracy” (p. 12)... “Political freedom becomes an empty phrase in a state where the economic sources of wealth have become the monopoly of a few superhuman elites” (p. 12). Capitalism is being commodified: members are appointed to supervisory boards from the estates—municipalities, districts, and the like. For example, in the “Tempelhof Feld” Stock Corporation—a swindle!!—a “petty hypocrisy” (p. 15)—these delegates also receive salaries and other benefits. The result is an “internally dishonest arrangement” (p. 16)... officials move “in lockstep with plutocracy” (p. 19)...

“Foreign Capital Holdings in Canada,” pp. 32 et seq.
British holdings exceed 2 billion dollars
American holdings: 420
French holdings: 80

80

German holdings: 3232
Belgian holdings: 11.5
Dutch holdings: 123

L. Eshweger. “The History of One Incorporation” (pp. 420 et seq.)—the airport company.
“Flugplatz Johannisthal” near Berlin. Director Arthur Müller attracted princes and nobles, securing millions from them (share capital: 4.5 million marks), granting himself “free shares,” then reselling those shares (according to the appraisal report, these lands were expected to yield enormous profits—within 10–20 years!!), engaging in outright deception—and all in strict accordance with the law!!

Two banks—2.75 billion dollars (=11 billion marks)*.
A. Lansburg. “The Money Trust” (pp. 432 et seq.).

American banking magnates...
National City Bank (Rockefeller and Standard Oil Company) wields control over capital amounting to roughly 1 billion dollars. Bankers Trust Company (Morgan) controls capital totaling about 1.5–1.75 billion dollars.
The author notes that nowhere are banks regulated as strictly as in America (deposit banks and investment banks are rigorously separated; branch offices are prohibited; lending more than 10% of total capital to a single individual is forbidden, and so on). In America, there are 26,000 banks of “pygmy scale” (p. 438)—and yet none of it matters!! Billionaires effectively reign and rule. Changes in legislation merely serve to alter the form of their dominance.

“Die Bank,” 1912, 1, pp. 523 et seq.
L. Eshweger. “Cultural Fertilization” = German settlers in Brazil. The Brazilian government—like the Canadian government—engages in shameless advertising. Agents are paid 10 marks per settler. Lies are told about the settlers’ prosperity, their dire needs, and so forth. Land is sold to them on speculative terms, and so on.

“Die Bank,” 1911, 1, pp. 1 et seq.
NB: Title!||

||
A. Lansburg. “Germany—A Rentier State” *.
============
Savings deposits in German savings banks total roughly 16.5 billion marks. This represents a transformation of capital from a latent to an active state—a boon to large-scale capital, turning it into rent (mostly in the form of mortgages). By refusing to manage their own money, depositors “strengthen the power of big capital and weaken the resistance of small industry” (p. 8).
||

||

||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 207. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
||

||

||

||
“In Germany, people are quick to mock the tendency toward rentier status observed in France. Yet they forget that, when it comes to the bourgeoisie, German conditions are increasingly mirroring French ones” * (pp. 10–11).
||

||

||

||NB
Approximately 45 percent of all savings accounts—clearly, around 45%—contain deposits of 3,000 marks or more!!

Ibidem, p. 218: German banks domestic capital foreign capital capital
1883 160890 + 850 (million marks)
1907 4404450 + 7750”
+175% +400% +812%”
Austrian banks—millions of kroner domestic foreign capital
1883 38500620
1907 5311303130
+40% +126% +405% “Die Bank,” 1911, 2, pp. 605 et seq. “Twenty Years of English Banking” by Alfred Lansburg.
Banks—Deposits and current accounts
Scotland Ireland Capital (England +

Scotland +

Ireland)
Re-

serves
1891**110408.5+91.6+38.5 million 69.836.4
191146776.6106.662.5 f.st.78.749.0

||||

||||

||||

||||

||||

||||

||||

||||

||||
The Development of English Banks

Branches of English banks—5218 branches (1910)
Isle of Man: 29
Scottish banks: 91242
Irish banks: 9693

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 265. Ed.
** In the first column, the figures refer to the years indicated; in subsequent columns, they pertain to 1890 and 1910. Ed.

p. 813 et seq. Germany

Number of banks—own capital (millions of marks) —foreign funds—total capital under the control of the banks
1872174113 million marks.
191042251130 »

The Development of Banking in Germany||||

||||

||||

1872... Of the 174 banks, 23 had capital exceeding 10 million. These banks managed 60% of their assets using foreign funds.
1910/1... Of the 422 banks, 53 had capital exceeding 10 million. These banks managed 82.5% of their assets through foreign funds (p. 818).
Germany’s iron production: 1870: 1,346 thousand tons; 1910: 14,793 thousand tons. 17.

L. Eshweger, “Plutocracy and Bureaucracy” (pp. 825 et seq.), is typical of a petty-bourgeois reformist. Two examples:

“When, several years ago, a strong anti‑cartel movement swept across Germany in response to the staunch resistance of the Rhine–Westphalian Coal Syndicate, the Imperial Government established an inquiry commission to examine the problem of cartels. During the debates, Government Counselor Felker distinguished himself with his profound knowledge of the subject and his sharp, businesslike interventions against the cartel representatives. Shortly thereafter, Government Counselor Felker accepted a highly remunerative position as head of the German Steel Industry Association—the most powerful and most tightly knit cartel organization in Germany—
A fine example!! (Financial Capital and the State) 18

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
After the government thus lost its foremost expert on the subject, the matter came to a standstill” (pp. 827–8). There was no need, he argued, to look to America!
There exists the “Imperial Inspection for the Supervision of Private Insurance”—a body that has done much to regulate private insurance companies. Yet insurance companies themselves are quick to offer lucrative positions—up to and including directorships—to those very inspectors, poaching them away from their posts. “In recent years, no fewer than three officials from this inspection service have made the leap from the Imperial Inspection to the boardroom of an insurance company” (p. 831).

|

|

|!!

“Die Bank,” 1911, 1, pp. 94–95. The latest statistics on the iron industry:

1000 tons
GermanyEnglandU.S.A.FranceRussiaWorldwide production
18101515854---
1820--20198-1650
1850-22285644052044187
1870134660591665117836012021
1890462580339203196272727427
1910147939664272503500287060000

||

||

||

||
iron

and

pig-iron production
||

||

||

||

“Die Bank,” 1910, 1 (pp. 401 et seq. ...), Alfred Lansburg, “The Bank in the Service of the National Economy”—a review of Rissers’ book, in which the author is criticized for his optimism and for neglecting the shortcomings of German banks.

Idem: Alfred Lansburg, “The System of Shareholdings in German Banking” (pp. 497 et seq.) and “The Dangers of the Shareholding System.” Both articles offer little new; the general picture is already well known. Only the table on “shareholdings” (p. 500) is truly valuable,
“shareholdings” of the modern bank!!

Diagram from page 160

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 199–201. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“Die Bank,” 1910, 1, p. 288. Note: “German Concessions Abroad.”
The Chamber of Commerce in Barmen wrote in a report to the Minister of Trade:
“In the gold mines of the Transvaal, a significant amount of German capital is invested; yet, unfortunately, deliveries from German machine‑building plants to the Transvaal mines remain relatively modest, because technical management of the mines is predominantly in British hands. From this perspective, it would be deeply regrettable if the Mannesmann concessions—in Morocco—were to dissolve into the French Mining Syndicate. One can foresee with certainty that, once technical management of the Moroccan mines falls entirely into French hands, the hope of receiving deliveries of German machinery and equipment will vanish altogether. It would be an irreparable mistake if German capital, while participating in mining enterprises in Morocco, were to cede technical management to the French—as happened in the Transvaal with regard to the British. The German machine‑building industry would derive no benefit whatsoever from such a development of the Mannesmann mines, and German capital would serve exclusively the interests of the French machine‑building industry. On the contrary, it would be of paramount importance for German industry if even a relatively small portion of Moroccan mines were developed under German technical leadership.” (Quoted from pp. 288–289.)
A prime example of the role, significance, and politics of financial capital “The Campaign Against France’s Major Banks,” p. 236 et seq.

||
Articles by Lysis (first published in “La Grande Revue,” 1906).
||

||

||
The book by his supporter, Jules Domergue, “The Question of Credit Institutions.”
Objections to Lysis—Testis, “The Role of Credit Institutions in France,” 1907, a book (with articles published in “Revue politique et parlementaire”).
The assessment is superficial: Lysis exaggerates certain points, but his basic analysis is correct. The rentier state = France. Capital flows from countries with low interest rates to countries with high interest rates. Lysis, after all, is not a specialist, etc. According to Lysis, banks charge up to 7% in commissions when selling foreign securities!!!
=======
7%!!!||
=======

(1910, 2) p. 1200: based on data from the U.S. “National Monetary Commission.”
Statistics on deposits and savings.
NB

England (millions of pounds)

France (millions of francs)
Bank

deposits
Savings

accounts
Banked

deposits
Deposits in savings banks
18,804,258.4781.6
??12,800.9
18,886,2412.41052.0
19,231.527622.1
19,081,16023.22124.2
47033.752264.2

Germany
Bank deposits
Deposits in credit cooperatives
Deposits in savings banks
18,805,293642614
18,881,1424254550
19,087,067220713889

Total (my)

billions of marks
EnglandFranceGermany
10.0|

|

|?|

|

|3.5
14.43.76.0
27.47.923.1
And the editorial staff notes that this “apparent” national wealth should not be equated with national wealth in general.

From a note on the financier Eduard Engel, who died in November 1910:

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“A whole host of Berlin directors attained their positions only because their creditors saw no other way to safeguard their money than by cultivating a career for their debtor. While secretly resenting his recklessness, they publicly praised his business acumen—out of their own well-understood self-interest” (1202–3).
the careers of bank directors “Die Bank,” 1909, 1, p. 79. Note: “The Ascent to Banking”—the transition of civil servants into banking directorships (Walther Müller, F. Klitzing, Helferich, Schönfeld) and into industry (Felker, Buddé)...
“How, then, stands the matter with the integrity of the state official whose secret ambition lies in securing a comfortable post on Bärenstraße [Deutsche Bank]?* (79).

p. 301 et seq. Alfred Lanzburg. “The Economic Significance of Byzantinism”—a fiery article (laden with petty-bourgeois sentimentality) criticizing the ties between plutocracy and the emperor, etc.
“Let us recall our journey to Palestine and the immediate outcome of that journey—the construction of the Baghdad Railway, that fateful ‘great undertaking of German enterprise,’ which is more culpable for the ‘encirclement’ than all our political sins combined.”** (307)
Well said!

Ludwig Eshwege. “Revolutionary Tendencies in the German Iron Industry.”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 225. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.

the technical revolution in the iron industry
In Germany, the center of gravity for ore and iron extraction has shifted from the Rhine-Westphalian region to Lorraine–Luxembourg (to the southwest). The phosphorus-rich ore of Luxembourg and Lorraine (Minette ore) was once considered worthless. It was rendered highly valuable by (1) the Thomas process; and (2) electric steel (electric billets: a 15‑year warranty compared to the 9‑year warranty offered by older methods). The ore reserves in the Luxembourg–Lorraine region amount to 2 billion tons—enough to last for 200 years at the current rate of German consumption (pp. 316–317).

A. Lanzburg. “How Great Is German National Wealth?” p. 319 et seq.
German

national wealth (350??

billion s)
A critique of Steinmann–Buchner’s renowned book and his calculation: 350 billion marks (190–200—Lexis and Schmoller; England—250–300, France—200–225). The key figure in Steinmann–Buchner’s estimate is (a) = 180 billion marks of “private property in real estate and movable assets”—two or three times higher than reality, since he (and Ballod, p. 322) overlooked this crucial point!! He included insurance policies (162.6 billion marks, rounded up to 180!!), whereas insurance is always calculated based on the cost of renewal—not on the actual market value. “They made the same mistake that an old junk dealer would make if he tried to inventory his stock of old furniture and clothing at the price of new items” (325). And Steinmann–Buchner committed a host of other errors!!!

Ludwig Eshwege. “Cement.” 115 et seq. (1909, 1).
Highly cartelized industry. Monopolistic pricing (180 marks per wagon as cost, selling at 280 marks!! 230 marks!!). Selling with delivery at 400 marks.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
per wagon!! Profits of 12–16% in dividends. Every possible effort was made to eliminate competition: false reports about poor business conditions, anonymous advertisements in newspapers (“Capitalists! Beware of investing in cement factories!!”); the purchase of “outsiders” (examples: 60–80–150 thousand marks in “severance payments”: p. 125). Regional cartels: the South German, Upper Silesian, Central German, Hanoverian, Rhine–Westphalian, North German, and Lower Elbe syndicates*.
How do syndicates operate?

“Die Bank,” 1909, 2. Articles by Eugen Kaufmann on French banks. Three major institutions—Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir National, Société Générale.
All three: in 1908, they held 749.1 million francs in capital plus reserves and 4,058 million francs in deposits—almost entirely funds belonging to others.
NB
The number of members on the boards of directors (administrative councils) ranged from 13 to 15 to 17. Their income reached 500,000–750,000 (!!) francs (“Crédit Lyonnais”) (p. 851).
the incomes of directors and board members
At Crédit Lyonnais, the “Department for the Collection of Financial Information” employed over 50 people—engineers, economists, lawyers, statisticians, and others—and cost 0.6–0.7 million francs annually (studying industrial enterprises, railways, and other sectors across various countries, gathering data, and so forth). This department comprised eight divisions: 1) Industry; 2) Railways and Steamship Companies; 3) General Statistics; 4) Fund Information; 5) Financial Reports, and more. It collected clippings from financial newspapers and journals around the world, along with countless other materials. ** “department for the collection of information”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 196. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 210. Ed.

The number of branch offices (in France) in 1908 (p. 857):
French

major

banks

Paris and the surrounding provinces beyond the borders
Crédit Lyonnais 5319224522
Comptoir National 5114019123 (mostly in the colonies)
Société Générale 896367252 (p. 954)

1939681161| 47Σ my |
Société Générale operated, among other things, 222 mobile branches across the provinces—opening one to two times per week on market days.
Employees: Boys (grooms) aged 13–16 earned 30–40 francs per month; from age 16, junior clerks received 60 francs monthly, rising to as much as 2,000–2,400 francs annually. Department heads at Crédit Lyonnais could earn up to 40,000 francs per year.
Number of employees:
Crédit Lyonnais—up to 5,000
Comptoir National—4,000 (including 2,500 in Paris)
Société Générale—7,000 (including 1,000 in Paris)
of whom 300–400 were women...

The Baghdad Railway ||||
p. 1101 (1909, 2). A note on the Baghdad Railway, arguing that “frictions” with Britain, etc., the expenditure of half a billion German marks in an unfamiliar land, and the ensuing tensions with Britain and France, were not worth the life of a single grenadier—a “fateful adventure,” and so forth.
Attitude toward colonial policy |||||

|||||

|||||

p. 799; Note: “Banking in Professional Statistics.”

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
(Numbers in parentheses indicate the proportion of women)
(Rubrics) 1882 1895 1907 (1 and 2) Bankers, bank directors, etc. 6896 (148) 7719 (195) 11070 (185)
(3) Banking (and savings bank) employees 12779 (95) 23644 (444) 50332 (2728)
(4 and 5) Apprentices, watchmen, auxiliary staff
6207 (56) 5268 (170) 9275 (382)

Σ = 25882 (299) 36631 (809) 70677 (3,295)
For every 100 individuals in categories (1 and 2), there are (3)...

[For every 100 employers of employees:] 182.6 304.8 471.4 banks, their economic structure

Alfred Lanzburg. “German Capital Abroad,” p. 819 et seq.; Die Bank, 1909, 2.
The author advances Kautsky’s favorite thesis: trade with independent nations tends to flourish more readily *.

1889 1908 Increase in % “Debtor Countries” (Germany)
Romania 48.2 70.8 +47
Portugal 19.0 32.8 +73
Argentina 60.7 147.0 +143
Brazil 48.7 84.5 +73
Chile 28.3 52.4 +85
Turkey 29.9 64.0 +114

The author does not disclose these figures:

———Σ = 234.8 451.5 +92% ←

Financially independent nations
Great Britain 651.8 997.4 53
France 210.2 437.9 108
Belgium 137.2 322.8 135
Switzerland 177.4 401.1 127
Australia 21.2 64.5 205
Dutch East Indies 8.8 40.7 363

———Σ = 1206.6 2264.4 +87% ←

NB

Kautsky

NB
the author does not disclose these figures:

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 277. Ed.

cf. Kautsky (and Spektator)
And the author concludes:

“It is firmly established that it is a grave error to attribute any special, decisive influence to the investment of capital abroad—whatever form that investment may take—in favor of German products, or to regard such investment as a pioneer of German trade” (828).
============

This is particularly

NB!!

My addition:

Years of loans:

1890/1

?

?
(The author failed to draw conclusions that would refute his own arguments!!)
But even more decisively refuting the author are the specific data he himself provides regarding the relationship between loans and exports (pp. 826 and 827) *:
“In 1890/1, a Romanian loan was secured through German banks—which had already extended credit for this purpose in previous years. The loan was primarily used to purchase railway materials sourced from Germany. In 1901 **, German exports to Romania totaled 55 million marks. By the following year, this figure had fallen to 39.4 million, and after several intermittent declines, it dropped to 25.4 million in 1900. It was only in the very last few years that export levels once again reached those of 1891—thanks to two new loans.

1888/9
German exports to Portugal surged following the 1888/9 loans, reaching 21.1 million marks in 1890, then plummeted to 16.2 and 7.4 million over the next two years, only returning to its former level in 1903.

1888

1890
Even more striking are the data concerning German–Argentine trade. Thanks to loans taken out in 1888 and 1890, German exports to Argentina reached 60.7 million marks in 1889. Two years later, exports had fallen to just 18.6 million marks—less than one-third of their previous volume. It was only in 1901,

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 278. Ed.
** Lanzburg made a mistake here; it should have been 1891. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
that the export level of 1889 was not only attained but surpassed—driven by new state and municipal loans, by funds allocated to the construction of electric power plants, and by other credit operations.
?

1889
Exports to Chile rose following the 1889 loan, reaching 45 million marks in 1892—and then fell back to 22.5 million marks just one year later. After a new loan was secured through German banks in 1906, exports climbed to 84.7 million marks in 1907, only to decline once again to 52.4 million in 1908.”
1906
|

|

|——————|

|

|
It is strange that the author fails to recognize how these facts utterly refute his claims: export volumes actually increased precisely after loans were issued—and as a direct result of them.
—————— Lanzburg’s petty-bourgeois perspective: “Not only in terms of sheer volume, but also in terms of distribution, German industrial activity would benefit if the capital being exported remained at home” (if the capital were kept within the country). “Capital would be freely dispersed across numerous industries, flowing into countless channels—whereas, as experience has shown, capital flowing from abroad tends to concentrate in the order books of a small number of privileged firms, which moreover must pay dearly for their privileges. Krupp could tell us much about the millions in overhead costs—sometimes called ‘baksheesh,’ sometimes referred to by some other name—that are incurred in maintaining German credit operations overseas. Meanwhile, the natural dispersion of capital, which ought to benefit as many areas of industrial activity as possible, holds immense significance for the overall industrial development of Germany” (824–5). …“Production that is thus continuously

|||

|||!!
 
|

|

|pearl!!

“Persuaded”

Krupp!!!
||

||“Naturally”!!

Ha-ha

“Harmony”|||

|||
is regenerated by its own internal forces” (when capital is employed domestically), “and serves as a guarantee for further harmonious development” * (825),
|

|

|——————|

|

The dialectics of self-movement are not exhausted by the mere export of capital: this is what the author seeks to demonstrate through the examples cited on pages 826–827, which I have quoted above—pages 101–102 of this very notebook **.
——————

Levi versus Lifman|||

|||

|||
A. Lansburg: “Trends in Modern Enterprise” (“Two Books”), pp. 1043 et seq. The article is devoted to the works of Levi (“Monopolies and Trusts”) and Lifman (“Financial and Industrial Corporations”). A. Lansburg rightly observes that both works are one-sided: Levi focuses on the technical forces driving concentration, while Lifman emphasizes the power of financial (oligarchic) domination.

||||

||||

||||
“Progressive ‘effetification’ [‘financialization’] of industrial life forcibly drives the production process into ever more colossal conglomerates, reducing the number of independent producers—and making it easier for a small handful of capitalists, who refuse to allow any single giant trust to buy out their right to manage, to unite in order to suppress any nascent competition. This is something that neither Lifman nor Levi explicitly state, yet it nonetheless shines through in their writings. Perhaps someone will soon build upon this foundation to write a book—indeed, a book that is urgently needed—a book that depicts the triumph of oligarchic, securities‑manipulating finance over republican economic life” (pp. 1051–1052).

||

||

||
Sometimes development proceeds via concentration toward the formation of cartels (as Levi made particularly clear). But not always. Sometimes

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 278–279. Ed.
** See the present volume, pp. 168–170. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Through “securitization,” enterprises can be brought directly under the control of trusts—for example, in “colonial railway construction”... Technical concentration is progressive in its application; financial concentration, however, may reinforce—and often does reinforce—the all‑powerful dominance of monopoly capital, even when technology remains backward...
NOTES ((ON FINANCIAL CAPITAL IN GENERAL))
Export to colonies (and to financially dependent countries) versus export to independent nations:
Suppose the latter develops faster than the former—and that the former is less developed still. Does this prove that colonies and networks of financial dependency are “unnecessary”? (K. Kautsky.) No, for (1) even within exports to independent countries, the share of cartels, trusts, and dumping‑export practices is steadily increasing...
(2) Financial capitalism does not eliminate the lower (less developed, backward) forms of capitalism; rather, it grows out of them, rising above them...
(3) There exists a definite relationship between “normal” sales and monopolistic sales—ergo, between “normal” export and monopolistic export. Capitalists cannot afford to forego the sale of staple goods to millions of workers. Does this mean that they are “unnecessary” to reap extra profits from “deliveries” to the treasury, to railways, and so forth?
NB:

on financial capital and its significance (4) The extra profits generated by privileged and monopolistic sales offset the low returns on “normal” sales.
(5) Compare with banks: low—or sometimes even zero—returns on “normal” lending operations are compensated by the extra profits derived from intermediation in the provision of loans, from venture capital, and the like.
(6) The high level of technological sophistication found in concentrated enterprises, coupled with the “high art” of financial manipulation, and the “high rhetoric” (though in practice, often quite low) of financial capital’s oppressive grip—these are inextricably linked under capitalism. K. Kautsky seeks to sever this connection, to “whitewash” capitalism, to embrace the good while discarding the bad—a form of “modern Proudhonism,” petty‑bourgeois reformism masquerading as Marxism.
ΣΣ = Financial capital—monopolies, banks, oligarchies, bribery, and the like—is not a mere accidental growth atop capitalism; rather, it is an inseparable extension of capitalism, a product of its very essence… Not only colonies, but also (a) the export of capital; (b) monopolies; (c) the web of financial ties and dependencies; (d) the omnipotence of banking; (e) concessions and bribery, and so on and so forth.
CHIRSHKI. “THE CARTEL AND THE TRUST”
Dr. Z. Chirshki. “The Cartel and the Trust (A Comparative Study of Their Nature and Significance).” Göttingen, 1903 (p. 129).
(A work of little value. Bourgeois chatter about cartels—German, local, smaller-scale, quieter!—in opposition to trusts)...
This author is nothing more than a petty bourgeois philistine. A “practical man”—he served in syndicates and cartels.
p. 12, para. 1: The American Trust for Distilled Spirits closed 68 of the 80 distilleries it had acquired.
1/3 million workers||

||
p. 13: “United States Steel Corporation” employs “nearly one-third of a million workers.”
A prime example!!||

||

Its capital stock in 1902 amounted to 800 million dollars,
with bonds totaling 553 million.

Production: iron ore—13.3 million tons coke—9.1 million tons
pig iron, etc.—7.1 million tons steel—9.0 million tons *
tires—1.7 million tons and so on.

the last

1/3 or 1/4 of the 19th century|||

|||

|||
p. 19—cartels and trusts began to emerge “from the last third or quarter of the 19th century.”
p. 31—In the United States, a single weaver could operate 16 looms (looms

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 191. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
Northrop, improved in 1895).
p. 56—…“The idea of the cartel is, in essence, nothing other than the application and adaptation of the cooperative principle to modern industrial production”…
||| 
|||Ha-ha!
“Conclusions”
…“Based on my previous research, I have no doubt that trusts not only consolidate the advantages—but even more so—accentuate the inherent shortcomings of large-scale capitalist enterprises, characterized by an unrelenting, relentless drive forward. In contrast, cartel policy is far more inclined to exert restraint and to distribute resources in a measured way. Were large national trusts to dominate the global market, we would witness a fiercely competitive struggle on an unprecedented scale, waged over prices and markets… At the same time, cartels can—and indeed must—pursue technical and economic progress with the same vigor as free competition; perhaps they will even temper the pace of innovation somewhat, unlike trusts” (128) *,
characteristic!

(more timid!)

|||

|||

|||!!!

do not accelerate!!!
GHEIMAN. “MIXED ENTERPRISES”
Hans Gideon Gheiman. “Mixed Enterprises in German Heavy Iron and Steel Production.” Stuttgart, 1904 (65th volume of the Munich Economic Studies series).
A compilation of data—largely fragmentary—on the advantages of large-scale production, particularly “mixed” enterprises, that is, those which integrate various successive stages of the production process…

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 204. Ed.

a fine example!!
“A representative of the Krupp firm stated before the Iron Commission (Minutes, 1878, p. 82): ‘I do not believe that a plant producing 20–30 thousand tons per year could withstand competition from a plant capable of producing 100–150 thousand tons.’ Twenty-five years later, Carnegie deemed it necessary to produce twenty times more than 150,000 tons (‘The Empire of Business,’ New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1902, p. 233): ‘Corporations that produce one thousand tons of steel per day have little chance against a corporation producing ten thousand’” (p. 232, note).
the conditions of cartels…
The accumulation of capital and its “immobilization” (NB)—these are among the most crucial preconditions for monopoly and cartel formation.
“Mixed plants often belong to more than a dozen different cartels, as the fascinating table compiled by Felker clearly demonstrates…” (249)…
|

|

|——————|

|

|— ?
? Felker? Iron cartels?

December 1903 (where?) (p. 256)...
—————— NB||

||

||
“We see… everywhere in the production of finished goods the same pattern. Pure enterprises are crushed under the weight of high material costs and low prices for finished products, while mixed plants thrive on high material costs and secure outlets thanks to low prices for manufactured goods; for large plants shy away from exorbitant prices, fearing the inevitable subsequent decline, whereas small plants, in good times, seem possessed by an insatiable urge to expand ever upward. The same strategy is pursued in America by the mighty Steel Trust” (256).

NB|||

|||

||||||

|||

|||
Now competition has been eliminated. Only two or three dozen large plants remain. At their head stand Thyssen, Lüge, and Kirdorf (261): “Two gigantic alliances”—the “Kolen Syndicate” and the “Stahl Syndicate” ((87.5% of total steel production))—“are destined to dominate the entire industry.”
– – – Monopoly over the means of production; land has been consolidated (coal and ore).

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
“The controlling entity oversees the parent company” (“mother company,” literally); “in turn, the parent company exercises dominance over the subsidiaries” (“daughter companies”), “and these latter, in turn, govern the ‘grandchildren’ companies,” and so on. Thus, even with relatively modest capital, one can exercise control over vast realms of production. Indeed, if owning just 50% of the capital is often sufficient to gain control over a joint-stock company, then a manager need only possess 1 million to be able to oversee 8 million in capital held by the ‘grandchildren’ companies. And if this web of interlocking relationships extends further still, then with 1 million one can control 16 million, 32 million, and beyond” * (pp. 268–69).
better than Lifman’s, and earlier
In conclusion:
“On one side remained the major coal companies, extracting several million tons of coal and tightly organized within their own coal syndicate; and closely linked to them were the large steel mills, each with its own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per year” (one ton equals 60 poods) “with massive extraction of ore and coal, with the production of finished steel goods, employing 10,000 workers who lived in factory villages modeled after barracks, sometimes even equipped with their own railroads and harbors—these are the quintessential representatives of German iron and steel industry. And concentration continues to advance ever further. Individual enterprises grow ever larger; an increasing number of firms in the same industry—or in diverse industries—are merging into colossal conglomerates, for which half a dozen leading Berlin banks serve both as pillars of support and as guiding forces. With regard to German—

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 215. Ed.

the mining industry of Germany provides clear empirical confirmation of Karl Marx’s theory of concentration; to be sure, this applies to a country where industry is protected by protective tariffs and transport rates. Germany’s mining industry has reached the stage where expropriation becomes a viable option” * (pp. 278–79). (Final words of Chapter 5 of the book.)

NB
See p. 108.
Gheiman’s statistics:
24 mixed enterprises (among these 24 are Krupp, Stumm, “Deutscher Kaiser” (Thyssen), “Avmetz Friede,” and many others—each a “leader”)
thousands tons (1902)

total in 
Germany their production: Iron ore 693,417,963 (+?)
Coal 1,325,800 = 12.6% 1,074,360
Pig iron 584,985,230 (+?)
Steel 821,576,640 (?)
(operating) Blast furnaces 147 = 58.8% 250
Open-hearth furnaces 130 = 38.8% 335
Number of workers 206,920 ???
Capital 581.4 million marks
+ reserves 121.9 million marks
The growth of large-scale production in Germany’s iron industry
Pig iron
Operating enterprises
Production (millions of tons)
Workers

(thousands)
Output

per worker (tons)
Workers

per plant
%%%
1869–203,100 1.4 100 21.5 100 65.6 105.8
1880–140,692.7 194 21.1 98 129.2 150.8
1900–108,538.5 605 34.7 162 245.2 321.7
End of excerpts from Heymann.
End.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 186–187. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “β” (“BETA”)
ON THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM
On the question of imperialism:
Topics: (roughly)
5.1. Financial Capital.
4.2. Banks.
2.3. Cartels and Trusts.
3. Monopoly.
1.4. Concentration and Large-Scale Production.
6.5. Capital Export.
7.6. Colonies: Their Significance.
8.7. The History of Colonies.
9.8. The Division of the World.
International Trusts colonies

Calver
10.9. Free Competition versus Imperialism.
11.10. Back to Free Competition, or Forward toward the Overcoming of Imperialism and Capitalism?
12.11. Ultra-Imperialism or Inter-Imperialism?
12 bis: The Unevenness of Development.
13.12. Hobson, Kautsky, and Imperialism.
14.13. Apologists and Petty-Bourgeois Critics of Imperialism.
15.14. Parasitism in Imperialist Countries… (“Decay”) ((“Rentier State”)).
16.15. The Final Split within the Workers’ Movement… [“Imperialism and Opportunism”].
17.16. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1871–1914.
18.17. The National Question in the Age of Imperialism.
19.18. Interweaving versus “Socialization” (cf. Rißer).
The Constituent Elements of the Concept of “Imperialism.”
Roughly:
1. Monopoly, as the Outcome of Concentration
2. II Capital Export (as the Primary Factor)
4. III The Division of the World (α) – Agreements Among International Capital
5. IV (β) Colonies

3. V
Banking Capital and Its “Threads”
6. VI
The Shift from Free Trade and Peaceful Commerce to a Politics of Violence (Tariffs; Annexations, etc., etc.).
Shortcomings of Hilferding:

1) A Theoretical Error Regarding Money.

2) He Ignores (almost entirely) the Division of the World.

3) He Neglects the Relationship Between Financial Capital and Parasitism.

4) He Confuses Imperialism with Opportunism.
“Imperialism as the Highest (Contemporary) Stage of Capitalism.”
Roughly:
I Three Major, Relatively Independent Nations these

6
England

Germany

U.S.A.
 
=======
II Secondary Powers (First-Rate, but

Not Fully Independent)
France

Russia

Japan

=======
III Italy

Austria-Hungary