V. I.

Lenin

Recent years have seen a definite differentiation taking
place among the Russian liberals. The “genuine” bourgeoisie has been
setting itself apart from the general liberal camp. Liberal capital is
forming its own special party, which is to incorporate (and is
incorporating) many bourgeois elements which in the past made common cause
with the Octobrists and which, on the other hand, is being joined by the
most moderate, big-bourgeois, “respectable” elements of the Cadet Party.

The “Progressist” group in the Third and Fourth Dumas, as well as the
one in the Council of State are on the verge of becoming the official party
representatives of this national-liberal bourgeoisie in the parliamentary
arena. Indeed, the recent congress of the “Progressists” virtually out
lined the national-liberal programme which Russkaya Molva [1] is advocating.

What do the so-called “Progressists” want? Why do we call them
national-liberals?

They do not want full and undivided rule of the land lords and
the bureaucrats. They seek—and they say so plainly—a moderate
constitution with narrowly-restricted rights based on a bicameral system
and an anti-democratic suffrage. They want a “strong authority” that
would pursue the “patriotic” policy of conquering with sword and fire new
markets for “national industry”. They want the bureaucrats to heed them
as much as they heed the Purishkeviches. And then they would be willing to
forget their “old accounts” with the reactionaries and work hand in glove
with them to establish a “great” capitalist Russia.

What separates these people from the Octobrist Party is that the
landlords constitute too strong an element in that party and that it is tractable to the point of impotence. From the
Cadet Party they are separated by their distaste for the Cadets’
demagogical flirting with the democrats. The Cadets’ hypocritical talk
about universal suffrage and compulsory alienation of the land (even with
compensation) seems to these “respectable” constitutionalists quite
unnecessary and impermissible.

The national-liberals go straight to the point: one must not be afraid
of accusations of “pandering to the reactionary forces” but must fight
openly against “appeals for seizing the landed estates” and against
“fomenting hatred of the propertied classes”; as regards “military
might”, there should be neither Right nor Left.

“ We are back in our country.... The Russian army is
... our own army.... The Russian court of justice is not
Shemyaka’s [2] but our own .... Russia’s world standing is not a
vainglorious whim of the bureaucracy but our own strength and
joy” (see the policy statements of Russkaya Molva ).

The national-liberals undoubtedly have a certain “future” in
Russia. They will be a party of the “genuine” capitalist bourgeoisie,
such as we see in Germany. The purely intellectual, liberal elements who
have few “roots” will remain with the Cadets. The national-liberals will
gain such ideologists as Struve, Maklakov, Protopopov, Kovalevsky and
others, who have long had one foot in the reactionary camp. They will no
doubt be joined also by the exceedingly moderate “Shipovite”
Zemstvo-landlord elements, who likewise favour a constitution with
narrowly-restricted rights, a “constitution” for the rich. (It is not for
nothing that Mr. Struve has recently recalled Mr. Shipov in such kind
terms.)

The “Progressists’” dreams of a “strong authority” pursuing a liberal policy cannot, of course, materialise in the near
future. And so the Khvostovs and Purishkeviches are still sitting
pretty. It may be that the national liberal party will not take final shape
just yet and that their news paper will cease to exist as

Slovo , [3] a paper which on the whole had set itself the same
aims, did three years ago. (In the Duma, however, the “Progressists” have
become relatively stronger than the Cadets.) In any case, the coming into the open of the national-liberal bourgeoisie indicates a considerable
maturing of the class antagonisms in Russia.

The workers must counter the self-determination of the capitalist
bourgeoisie by putting ten times greater energy into their own
organisation and their own self-determination as a class.

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Notes:
[1]
Russkaya Molva ( Russian News) —a daily newspaper published by the Progressist Party in St. Petersburg from December 9 (22),
1912, to August 20 (September 2), 1913.

[2]
Shemyaka’s trial—an unjust trial (from the title of and old
Russian folk story).

[3]
Slovo ( The Word )—a daily newspaper published in
St. Petersburg from 1904 to 1909. From November 1905 to July 1906 it was an
organ of the Octobrist Party. Subsequently it became an organ of the
constitutional-monarchist Party of Peaceful Renovation.