Date: 1911
Source: ru:PSS/v20

There are literary pronouncements whose entire significance lies in their Herostratean character. The most commonplace literary work, like, for example, the well-known "Premises" of Ed. Bernstein, acquires outstanding political significance, becomes a manifesto of an intra-Marxist current that departs from Marxism along the entire line. Undoubtedly, the article by Mr. Potresov on trifles in the February issue of "Our Dawn" last year and the response by V. Bazarov in the April issue of "Our Dawn" have the same outstanding significance in their Herostratean character. Of course, the questions touched upon by these articles are far from being as profound, as broad, and do not have the same international significance as the questions raised (or rather: put forward following the bourgeoisie) by Bernstein, but for us, Russians, in the period of 1908–1909–1910—?, these are questions of immense, cardinal importance. Therefore, the articles by Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov have not become obsolete, and it is necessary, obligatory, to talk about them.

I

Mr. Potresov, a lover of artificial, elaborate, and contrived words, dedicates his article to the "contemporary drama of our socio-political trends." In reality, he has not pointed out, and could not point out, anything dramatic whatsoever in the post-revolutionary evolution of liberalism, Narodism, and Marxism, which he undertook to discuss. But there is no end of the comical in Mr. Potresov's reasoning.

Cover of the journal "Thought" No. 2, January 1911, which contained the second chapter of V. I. Lenin's article "On Statistics of Strikes in Russia" and the beginning of the article "Our Liquidators (On Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov)" (Reduced)

"Liberalism, precisely," writes Mr. Potresov, "as an ideological current, presents a picture of the greatest disintegration and the greatest helplessness. Take, for example, this deepening crack that has formed between practical liberalism and theorizing liberalism," – between the "empiricism" of Milyukov's "Speech" and the theories of the Vekhi authors.

– Enough, my dear! A deepening crack has formed between what you and those like you, semi-liberals, said and thought about the Cadets in 1905–1906–1907, and what you are forced to admit, getting confused and contradicting yourselves, in 1909–1910. The contradiction between the "empiricism" of liberal practitioners and the theories of gentlemen à la Struve was quite clear even before 1905: remember how the then "Liberation" literally stumbled at every attempt to "theorize." If you are now beginning to realize that liberalism "turned out" to be "torn apart" (this is again and again a verbal twist, an empty phrase, because the Vekhi authors have not broken with "Speech" and vice versa, but have gotten along, and are getting along, and will get along perfectly), "fruitless," "hanging in the air," that it is only the "least stable" (sic!) "part of the bourgeois democracy," "a not bad provider of ballots," etc., then your cries about the "drama" of liberalism only signify the tragicomedy of the collapse of your illusions. Liberalism "turned out" to be the least stable part of the bourgeois democracy not precisely at the present time, not in the three-year period of 1908–1910, but precisely in the previous three-year period. "Least stable" are those quasi-socialists who serve up mustard after dinner. The distinguishing feature of the previous three-year period, on the question being analyzed by Mr. Potresov, is liberalism "hanging in the air," a "fruitless" "provider of ballots," etc. Then, recognizing such a character of liberalism was the political task of the day, warning the masses was the urgent duty not only of socialists, but also of consistent democrats. In March 1906, and not in February 1910, it was important to warn about the fact that the liberalism of the Cadets was hanging in the air, that it was fruitless, that objective conditions reduced to nothing, to a comedy of "not bad providers of ballots," that the Cadet victories were an unstable zigzag between the "serious" constitutionalism (read: allegedly constitutionalism) of Shipovs or Guchkovs and the struggle for democracy of those elements that do not hang in the air and are not limited to lovingly contemplating ballots. Remember, my dear, who spoke this truth about the liberals in time, in March 1906?

The distinguishing feature, the peculiar trait of our three-year period (1908–1910) is not at all the "fruitlessness" of liberalism "hanging in the air," etc. On the contrary. Nothing has changed in the class impotence of liberalism, in its fear of democracy, in its political wretchedness, but this impotence reached its apogee when there were opportunities to show strength, when there were conditions that gave the liberals complete dominance in at least a certain arena of action. Here, when the Cadets had a majority in the I, for example, Duma, then they could use this majority to serve democracy and to hinder the cause of democracy, to promote democracy (even in a small matter, say, in the organization of local land committees) and to stab democracy in the back. This period is characterized by the fact that the Cadets "hung in the air," that the "not bad provider of ballots" turned out to be the author of instructions for the future Octobrist Duma, and only that.

In the next three-year period, the Cadets, remaining what they are, what they have always been, are less "hanging in the air" than before. You are like that hero of folk epics who shouts out his wishes and opinions not quite in time. The Vekhi authors of 1909 are less "hanging in the air" than Muromtsev of 1906, because the Vekhi authors bring serious benefits, provide business service to a class that has great power in the national economy of Russia, namely, landowners and capitalists. The Vekhi authors help these respectable people collect an arsenal of weapons for the ideological and political struggle against democracy and socialism: this is a matter that cannot be destroyed by any dispersal of the Duma, by any political upheavals whatsoever on this socio-economic ground. As long as there is a class of landowners-landlords and capitalists, there will be their journalistic clerks: Izgoevs, Struves, Franks and Co. But the "cause" of the Muromtsevs and the first Duma Cadets in general could be "destroyed" (because they had no cause, but there were words that corrupted the people, and did not serve the people) by the dispersal of the Duma.

The Cadets in the Third Duma are the same party, with the same ideology, with the same policy, to a large extent with the same personnel, as in the First Duma. And that is precisely why the Cadets in the Third Duma are much less "hanging in the air" than in the First. You don't understand this, dear Mr. Potresov? Then you should not have undertaken to reason about the "contemporary drama of our socio-political trends"! I will even tell you in secret that in the future, probably for quite a long time, the political activity of the Cadets will not be "fruitless" – not only thanks to the reactionary "fruitfulness" of the Vekhi authors, but also thanks to the fact that as long as democracy has political carps, the pikes of liberalism will have something to live on. As long as there is such instability in socialism, such flabbiness in democracy, which is illustrated very clearly by figures à la Potresov, the art of the "empiricists" of liberalism will always be enough to catch these carps. Don't grieve, Cadets: you have something to live on as long as the Potresovs are alive!

II

Speaking of Narodism, Mr. Potresov even less makes ends meet. He calls the Cadets "former democrats" and even "former liberals." He says about the peasantry: "the peasantry that has entered political life (in Mr. Potresov's opinion, it has not yet entered this life) would begin a completely new chapter in history – the history of peasant democracy – and thereby put an end to the old, intellectual, Narodnik one."

So, the Cadets are former democrats, and the peasantry are future ones. Where are the present ones? Or was there no democracy, no mass democracy in Russia in 1905–1907? Is there none in Russia in 1908–1910? The present is hidden by Potresov by means of various "circumventing," bypassing the essence of the question, phrases, because a direct and simple recognition of the undoubted present hits in the face the entire liquidationist philosophy of Messrs. Potresovs. This simple and direct recognition of a now completely indisputable historical fact consists in the fact that the Cadets never represented any mass democracy in Russia, never pursued a democratic policy, and the peasantry – the very "multi-million peasantry" that Mr. Potresov also speaks of – represented and represents this bourgeois democracy (with all the limitations of bourgeois democracy). Mr. Potresov evades this fundamental question in order to save precisely the liquidationist philosophy. You will not save it!

Trying to circumvent the past and present of peasant democracy, Mr. Potresov again gets into trouble, confidently speaking about the future. Again you are late, my dear! You yourself speak of the "possible consequences of the law of November 9" – which means that you yourself recognize the possibility (of course, purely abstract) of its success. And with such success, the "new chapter in history" may be a chapter not only from the history of peasant democracy, but also from the history of peasant agrarians.

The development of peasant farming in Russia, and therefore, of peasant land ownership and peasant politics, cannot proceed otherwise than capitalistically. The Narodnik agrarian program in its essence, in the form, for example, of the well-known platform of the 104 (I and II Dumas), not only does not contradict this capitalist development, but, on the contrary, means the creation of conditions for the broadest and fastest capitalist development. The modern agrarian program, on the contrary, means the slowest, narrowest, most burdened with traces of serfdom capitalist development. Objective, historical and economic conditions have not yet decided which of these programs will ultimately determine the form of bourgeois agrarian relations in the new Russia.

Such are the simple facts that the representatives of liquidationism have to confuse.

"Unchanged in all changes," writes Mr. Potresov about the changes in intellectual, Narodnik democracy, "one thing has remained: the concrete peasantry has not yet (!) introduced its correction into the intellectual ideology on a peasant basis."

This is a purely Vekhi and thoroughly false phrase. In 1905, the most "concrete" and most ordinary, mass peasantry was on the open historical stage, introducing a whole series of "corrections" into the "intellectual ideology" of the Narodniks and Narodnik parties. Not all of these corrections were understood by the Narodniks, but the peasantry introduced them. In 1906 and 1907, the most "concrete" peasantry created labor groups and the project of the 104, thereby introducing a number of corrections, some of which were even noted by the Narodniks. It is generally recognized, for example, that the "concrete" peasantry revealed its хозяйские (khoziain, master-like) aspirations and, instead of the "commune," approved personal and товарищеское (tovarishcheskoe, comrade-like) land ownership.

The Vekhi authors, cleansing liberalism of democracy and systematically turning it into a servant of the moneybag, are correctly fulfilling their historical purpose when they declare the movement of 1905–1907 intellectual and assure that the concrete peasantry has not introduced its correction into the intellectual ideology. The tragicomedy of liquidationism consists in the fact that it does not notice how its assertions have turned into a simple paraphrase of the ideas of the Vekhi authors.

III

This transformation becomes even more obvious when Mr. Potresov moves on to reasoning about Marxism. The intelligentsia – he writes – "overshadowed... the proletariat with its party-circle construction." You cannot deny the fact that this idea has been put into the widest circulation by the bourgeoisie, both through "Vekhi" and through the entire liberal press, and used by it against the proletariat. Axelrod wrote in the very feuilleton in which he put forward this idea, about the "prankster-history" that could provide bourgeois democracy with a leader from the school of Marxism. The prankster-history took advantage of the pit that Axelrod kindly threatened to dig for the Bolsheviks in order to place Axelrod himself in this pit!

If you turn to objective historical facts, then all of them, the entire era of 1905–1907, even the elections to the II Duma (if we take for example a fact not from the largest, but from the simplest), proved irrevocably that "party-circle construction" did not "overshadow" the proletarian, but directly turned into the party and trade union construction of broad masses of the proletariat.

But let's move on to the main thing, to the "nail" of Mr. Potresov's Herostratean performance. He asserts that Marxist thought "stupefies itself with the hashish of trifles" – the struggle against Machism and the struggle against liquidationism – "debating about everything, about anything, but not about what is the nerve of such a socio-political trend as Marxism, but not about questions of economics and not about questions of politics." How many of these questions are there, Mr. Potresov exclaims. "How is the economic development of Russia going, what shifts of forces does it produce under the surdina of reaction, what is happening in the countryside and in the city, what changes does this development bring to the social composition of the working class of Russia, etc., etc.? Where are the answers or the approach to answering these questions, where is the economic school of Russian Marxism?"

The answer, and in any case an approach to the answer, is given by the very "hierarchy" whose existence Mr. Potresov maliciously and hypocritically denies. The development of the Russian state system over the past three centuries shows us that it has changed its class character in one particular direction. The monarchy of the 17th century with the Boyar Duma is not like the bureaucratic-noble monarchy of the 18th century. The monarchy of the first half of the 19th century is not the same as the monarchy of 1861–1904. In 1908–1910, a new period clearly emerged, marking another step in the same direction, which can be called the direction towards a bourgeois monarchy. The III Duma and our modern agrarian policy are closely connected with this step. The new period, therefore, is not an accident, but a peculiar stage in the capitalist evolution of the country. Without solving the old problems, without being able to solve them, and therefore, without eliminating them, this new period requires the application of new methods of preparing for the old solution of old problems. This is the peculiarity of this cheerless, gray, heavy, but inevitably emerging period. The peculiarity of its economic and political features gives rise to the peculiarity of ideological groupings within Marxism. Those who recognize new methods of preparing for the old solution of old problems come together on a common business ground, on a common task of this period, although they continue to be divided by the question of how, during the previous period, the old solution should have been applied or moved forward at one time or another. Those who deny (or do not understand) the new methods of preparation or the fact that we are facing old problems, that we are moving towards their old solution, those in fact leave the ground of Marxism, those in fact find themselves in the captivity of the liberals (like Potresov, Levitsky, etc.) or of the idealists and syndicalists (like V. Bazarov and others).

Being in the captivity of other people and other ideas, both Potresov and Bazarov, together with their like-minded people, inevitably get confused and find themselves in the most comical, most false position. Mr. Potresov, beating his chest, shouts: "where is this approach and what is this answer?". Martov, knowing this answer just as well, tries to assure the public that this answer recognizes "the bourgeoisie in power": the usual trick of the liberals to use the forced temporary silence of the opponent! And they ask us with an offended look: what is liquidationism? Well, precisely this trick, esteemed ones, when people who claim to belong to the "whole," taking advantage of its weakness, assure the public that there is no "answer" (while the "answer" is given precisely by the "whole"), is already one of the tricks of liquidationism (if not renegacy).

Liquidationism is a "phantom in a sick imagination," writes Mr. Potresov, because it is impossible to liquidate what "no longer lends itself to liquidation, what in reality no longer exists, as an organized whole."

I am unable to fully convey to the reader my view on these lines; to approximately convey it, I will ask the reader: what is the name of a person whose closest like-minded people and colleagues accept proposals from the "whole" that are beneficial to them (precisely as from the "whole") and who the next day declares in the press: there is no "whole"?

Point on this matter.

The fundamental question arises: can the view on the necessity of the old solution of old problems change depending on the degree of disintegration – even, if you will, on the disappearance – of the "whole"? Everyone understands that it cannot. If objective conditions, if the fundamental economic and political features of the modern era require the old solution, then the stronger the disintegration, the less remains of the "whole," the more one must take care, the more passionately the publicist must speak about the necessity of the "whole." New methods of preparation should be recognized, as we have already indicated, but who should apply them? Clearly, the "whole." Clearly, the tasks of the publicist for those who have understood the significance of the period being experienced, its main political features, are diametrically opposed to the entire line of Messrs. Potresovs. There can be no question of anyone seriously denying the connection between the "answer" I have outlined above (to the question about the economics and politics of the current moment) and anti-liquidationism.

From the general principled formulation of the question, let us move on to the concrete historical one. In the period of 1908–1910, that current in Marxism that preaches the necessity of the old solution, pursues a corresponding line, was fully outlined. Another current was also outlined, which for all these three years opposed the recognition of the "old solution" and the creation of the old basic forms of the whole. It is ridiculous to deny this fact. A third current was also outlined, which for all these three years did not understand the new forms of preparation, the significance of activity from within the III Duma, etc. Such people turned the recognition of the old solution into a phrase, learned by heart, but not understood, repeated out of habit, but not applied consciously, thoughtfully to the changed situation (changed at least in the field of Duma work, but, of course, not only in this field).

The connection of liquidationism with the general philistine mood of "fatigue" is obvious. "Tired" people (especially tired of doing nothing) do not bother to work out for themselves an exact answer to the question of the economic and political assessment of the current moment; they all disagree with the assessment given above and formally generally recognized as an assessment on behalf of the whole, but they are all afraid to even think about opposing their exact assessment, even the assessment of the employees of the liquidationist "Our Dawn," "Life," etc. "Tired" people repeat: the old is gone, the old is not viable, has died, etc., etc., but they do not intend to bother themselves with an answer, a purely political, precisely formulated answer to the obligatory (for every honest publicist obligatory) question: what exactly is needed instead of the old, is it necessary to restore the "not subject (allegedly) to liquidation, as already liquidated" (according to Potresov), they do not intend to bother themselves with this. For three years they have been scolding the old, denouncing it – especially from such platforms where the entrance of defenders of the old is prohibited, and, tenderly embracing the Izgoevs, they exclaim: what trifles, what a phantom are the conversations about liquidationism!

About such "tired" people, about Mr. Potresov and Co., one cannot repeat the famous verse: "they did not betray, they were tired of carrying their cross; the spirit of anger and sorrow left them halfway."

Such "tired" people, who enter the tribune of the publicist and from it justify their "fatigue" from the old, their unwillingness to work on the old, are precisely the people who not only "tired," but also betrayed.

IV

The philosophical struggle of materialists, Marxists, with Machists, i.e., with idealists, is also attributed to the number of "trifles" by Mr. Potresov. Mr. Potresov is deeply outraged by the "bacchanalia (– "my friend, Arkady Nikolaevich, don't speak beautifully!") of this philosophizing" and, naming Plekhanov and me on the part of the materialists, characterizes us as "yesterday's politicians." I laughed at this expression for a long time. Indeed, the boasting here is so obvious and so amusing that our hare should be given a piece of the bear's ear. Plekhanov and etc. – "yesterday's politicians"! Today's politician, obviously, is Potresov and his "young men." Nice and frank.

When Arkady Nikolaevich happens, as an exception, to say a word without a twist and without grimaces, he beats himself in the most magnificent way. Strain yourself, Arkady Nikolaevich, try to think: you deny liquidationism as a political trend that distinguishes no less Menshevism from Bolshevism, and Potresov and Co. from Plekhanov and the Bolsheviks taken together. And next to this denial, you call Plekhanov and so-and-so "yesterday's politicians." Look how clumsy you are: after all, we, together with Plekhanov, can be called yesterday's politicians precisely in the sense that for us the yesterday's organization, as a form of yesterday's (in its foundations yesterday's) movement, is obligatory today. We were sharply separated from Plekhanov and continue to be separated by questions about what steps should have been taken at one time or another by this yesterday's organization on the basis of this yesterday's movement, but we are brought together by the struggle against people who today deny precisely the foundations of yesterday's movement (this also includes the question of hegemony, to which I will now turn), precisely the foundations of yesterday's organization.

Well, Arkady Nikolaevich, do you still not understand what liquidationism is? Do you still think that we and Plekhanov were brought together by some Machiavellian plan or a malicious desire to replace the "overcoming" of liquidationism with a "struggle on two fronts"?

But let's return to the "bacchanalia of philosophizing."

"We know," writes Mr. Potresov, "what a deep furrow the struggle of Engels with Dühring once passed through the consciousness of the German Social Democracy and how the most seemingly abstract theses had in fact a living concrete significance for the movement of the German working class..." The most abstract theses had a living concrete significance! Again a phrase and nothing more than a phrase. Try to explain, if "you know," what "living concrete significance" the thesis of Engels had that Dühring's philosophical reasoning about time and space is erroneous! That is your trouble, that you have learned like a schoolboy: "Engels's dispute with Dühring was of great importance," but you have not thought about what this means, and therefore you repeat what you have learned in an incorrect, grotesquely incorrect form. It cannot be said that "the most abstract theses (of Engels against Dühring) had in fact a living concrete significance for the movement of the German working class." The most abstract theses of Engels had the significance that they explained to the ideologists of the working class the erroneousness of deviations from materialism to positivism and idealism. If you had given such, that is, philosophically somewhat definite, an exposition of Engels's views instead of sonorous, but empty phrases about a "deep furrow," a "living concrete significance of the most abstract theses," then you would immediately see that the reference to Engels's dispute with Dühring speaks against you.

"...We know," continues Mr. Potresov, "in the history of the formation of Russian Marxism the role of the struggle against subjective sociology..."

And not the role of the positivist and idealist teachings of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky in the errors of subjective sociology? After all, with you, Arkady Nikolaevich, every shot misses. If we take a historical parallel, then we must single out and accurately indicate what is similar in various events, because otherwise, instead of a historical comparison, we will be throwing words to the wind. If we take the historical parallel you have taken, then we must ask: was it possible for Russian Marxism to "form" without Bel'tov clarifying the foundations of philosophical materialism and their significance for refuting Lavrov and Mikhailovsky? The answer to this question can only be one, and this answer – if we draw a conclusion from the historical parallel as applied to the dispute with the Machists – speaks against Mr. Potresov.

"...But precisely because we know all this" (well, of course! we have now seen what it means when Mr. Potresov writes: "we know all this"), "we want, finally, a living real connection to be established between the philosophical dispute that occupies us and the Marxist socio-political current, its tasks and needs. And in the meantime..." – follows a reference to Kautsky's letter, to the fact that Machism is a Privatsache (private matter), that the dispute about it is a "fata morgana," etc.

The reference to Kautsky is an example of a philistine judgment. It is not that Kautsky is "unprincipled," as Mr. Potresov jokes (in an Izgoev-like manner), but that Kautsky does not know how things stand with Russian Machism, and does not claim to know this. Kautsky in his letter recognizes Plekhanov as a connoisseur of Marxism, expresses his conviction in the irreconcilability of idealism with Marxism, and the opinion that Machism is not idealism (or: not every Machism is idealism). That Kautsky is mistaken on the last point and especially about Russian Machism is undoubted. His mistake is quite excusable, because he has not studied Machism as a whole, wrote a private letter with the clear purpose of warning against exaggerating disagreements. For a Russian Marxist writer, under such conditions, to refer to Kautsky means to show purely philistine laziness of thought and cowardice in the struggle. Kautsky could have hoped in 1908, when he wrote his letter, that Machism in a certain interpretation is "reconcilable" with materialism, but in Russia in 1909–1910 to refer to Kautsky on this issue means to undertake the reconciliation of Russian Machists with materialists. Does Mr. Potresov or anyone else undertake this seriously?

Kautsky is not unprincipled, but Potresov and Co., who want to declare Machism a "private matter," are an example of unprincipledness among modern Russian Marxism. Kautsky was quite sincere and not at all unprincipled when he, in 1908, without reading the Russian Machists, advised them to seek peace with Plekhanov, as a connoisseur of Marxism, as a materialist, because Kautsky has always spoken out for materialism and against idealism and spoke out in the same letter. But the Messrs. Potresovs and Co., hiding behind Kautsky in 1909–1910, have not a grain of sincerity, not a drop of respect for principledness.

You do not see, Mr. Potresov, a living real connection between the philosophical dispute and the Marxist current? Allow me, a yesterday's politician, to most respectfully point out to you at least the following circumstances and considerations: 1) The dispute about what philosophical materialism is, why deviations from it are erroneous, what is dangerous and reactionary about them, is always connected by a "living real connection" with the "Marxist socio-political current" – otherwise the latter would not be Marxist, not socio-political, and not a current. Only limited "real politicians" of reformism or anarchism can deny the "reality" of this connection. 2) With the richness and versatility of the ideological content of Marxism, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in Russia, as in other countries, different historical periods put forward especially to the fore now one, now another side of Marxism. In Germany before 1848, the philosophical formation of Marxism was especially put forward, in 1848 – the political ideas of Marxism, in the 50s and 60s – the economic doctrine of Marx. In Russia before the revolution, the application of the economic doctrine of Marx to our reality was especially put forward, during the revolution – Marxist politics, after the revolution – Marxist philosophy. This does not mean that it is permissible at any time to ignore one of the sides of Marxism; it only means that the predominance of interest in one side or another depends not on subjective desires, but on the totality of historical conditions. 3) The time of social and political reaction, the time of "digesting" the rich lessons of the revolution is not by chance the time when the basic theoretical, including philosophical, questions for any living direction are put in one of the first places. 4) In the advanced currents of Russian thought, there is no such great philosophical tradition as is connected among the French with the Encyclopedists of the 18th century, among the Germans with the era of classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach. Therefore, the philosophical "analysis" was necessary precisely for the advanced class of Russia, and there is nothing strange in the fact that this belated "analysis" came after this advanced class had fully matured during the recent great events for its independent historical role. 5) This philosophical "analysis" was prepared long ago and in other countries of the world insofar as, for example, the new physics raised a number of new questions with which dialectical materialism had to "cope." In this respect, "our" (in Potresov's expression) philosophical dispute has not only a certain, i.e., Russian, significance. Europe gave the material for "refreshing" philosophical thought, and backward Russia, during the forced lull of 1908–1910, especially "greedily" pounced on this material. 6) Belousov recently called the III Duma a prayerful Duma. He correctly grasped the class peculiarity of the III Duma in this respect and rightly branded the hypocrisy of the Cadets.

It is not by chance, but by necessity that our entire reaction in general, the liberal (Vekhi, Cadet) reaction in particular, "pounced" on religion. One stick, one whip is not enough; the stick is still broken. The Vekhi authors help the advanced bourgeoisie to acquire the latest ideological stick, the spiritual stick. Machism, as a variety of idealism, is objectively a tool of reaction, a conductor of reaction. The struggle against Machism "at the bottom" is not accidental, but inevitable, therefore in such a historical period (1908–1910), when "at the top" we see not only the "prayerful Duma" of the Octobrists and Purishkeviches, but also the prayerful Cadets, the prayerful liberal bourgeoisie.

Mr. Potresov "stipulated" that he "is not touching on God-building" "now." This is what distinguishes the unprincipled and philistine publicist Potresov from Kautsky. Kautsky knew nothing about either the God-building of the Machists or the prayerful Vekhi authors and therefore could say that not every Machism is idealism. Potresov knows this and, "not touching" on the main thing (for those who look narrowly-"publicistically," the main thing), is hypocritical. By declaring the struggle against Machism a "private matter," Mr. Potresov and those like him become, in the "socio-political" sense, accomplices of the Vekhi authors.

V

Turning from Mr. Potresov to Bazarov, we must note first of all that, by objecting to the former on the question of the philosophical dispute, we thereby answered the latter as well. It is only necessary to add one thing: V. Bazarov's tolerance towards Mr. Potresov, his desire to find a "grain of truth" in Potresov is quite understandable, because Mr. Potresov (like all liquidators), verbally and formally fencing himself off from Machism, in fact concedes to it the most essential thing. Machism, as a current and as a group with a "platform," does not dare to demand anything else than the recognition of its break with Marxism as a "private matter"! It is therefore no accident that Potresov and Bazarov are making eyes at each other. The group of liquidationist writers and the group of Machist writers are indeed in solidarity in order to protect "freedom of disintegration" from the supporters of Marxism, from the defenders of the theoretical foundations of Marxism in our time of disintegration. And this solidarity is not limited to philosophical questions, as V. Bazarov shows further in his article.

I say: even, because Bazarov has always been distinguished by the most thoughtful attitude to serious questions of politics. This must be mentioned in order to assess the significance of the incredible vacillations of such a person, not only in order to emphasize the most useful activity in the past of a writer who chased after the laurels of Herostratus.

Herostratean is, for example, Bazarov's statement: "I consider the notorious question of "hegemony" to be one of the biggest and most trivial misunderstandings of our days." Some kind of fate weighs on the Machists from our midst: some protect "freedom of disintegration," declaring recallism a legitimate shade, others, understanding the stupidity and harm of recallism, directly extend a hand to the liquidators in politics. It is precisely the liquidators in both "Our Dawn," and "Life," and "Social Movement" who are waging a direct and indirect war with the idea of hegemony. We state with regret that Bazarov has gone to their camp.

What are his arguments in essence? Five years ago, hegemony was a fact. "At present, for perfectly understandable reasons, this hegemony has not only disappeared, but has turned into its complete opposite." Proof: "in our days, kicking Marxism is an indispensable condition for popularity in democratic circles of society." Example – Chukovsky.

You read – and you can't believe your eyes: Bazarov, who wanted to be a Marxist, turns into a former person capable of taking Messrs. Potresovs by the arm.

You are not afraid of God, V. A. Bazarov. Chukovskys and other liberals, as well as a host of democrats-Trudoviks, have always "kicked" Marxism, especially since 1906, and "hegemony" was not a "fact" in 1906? Stick your head out of the liberal-literary closet, look at least at the attitude of the Third Duma peasant deputies to the worker deputies. A simple comparison of indisputable facts about their political behavior over three years, even a simple comparison of their transition formulas and Cadet formulas, not to mention a comparison of political statements in the Duma with the living conditions of broad sections of the population during this time, proves in the most irrefutable way that hegemony is still a fact. The hegemony of the working class is its (and its representatives') political influence on other elements of the population in the sense of cleansing their democratism (when there is democratism) from undemocratic impurities, in the sense of criticizing the limitations and short-sightedness of any bourgeois democratism, in the sense of fighting against "Cadetism" (if we call the ideologically corrupting content of the speeches and politics of the liberals) and etc., and etc. There is nothing more characteristic of our time than the fact that Bazarov could write such incredible things, and that a group of journalists, who also consider themselves friends of the workers and supporters of Marxism, kindly patted him on the shoulder for this!

"How things will stand by the time of the coming upswing, it is completely impossible to predict," Bazarov assures the readers of the liquidationist journal. "If the spiritual image of urban and rural democracy is approximately the same as 5 years ago, then the hegemony of Marxism will again become a fact... But there is absolutely nothing impossible in the assumption that the physiognomy of democracy will change significantly. Let us imagine, for example, that the petty bourgeoisie of Russian villages and cities will be radically enough настроена (nastroena, настроенный, настроенность, настроить, настроиться - настроенный is a passive participle, but it is used here as an adjective, meaning "disposed", "attuned", "in a mood") against the political privileges of the ruling classes, sufficiently united and active, but imbued with a sharp nationalistic spirit.