V. I.

Lenin

The questions indicated above occupy, from the point of view of their
importance, one of the foremost, if not the foremost place in the
system of views of a Marxist who wishes to understand the realities surrounding
him. The period 1908–10 undoubtedly bears a distinctive character. The social
structure of society and of state power is characterised by changes, and unless
these changes are understood not a single step can be taken in any sphere of
social activity. The understanding of these changes determines the prospects for
the future, by which we mean, of course, not idle guessing about things unknown,
but the basic trends of economic and political development—those trends,
the resultant of which determines the immediate future of the country, those
trends which determine the tasks, direction and character of the activity of
every intelligent public man. And this last question of the tasks, direction and
character of activity is most closely connected with the question of
liquidationism.

No wonder then that as far back as 1908, as soon as it had become—or was
beginning to become—clear that we were confronted with a new, distinctive
period in Russian history, the Marxists paid particular attention to the questions of the social structure of state power, prospects for the future, and
liquidationism; they pointed to the inseparable connection between these
questions and systematically discussed them. Furthermore, they did not confine
themselves to mere discussion, for that would have been “literary
scribbling” in the worst sense of the word; that would have been possible
only in a discussion group of intellectuals not conscious of their
responsibility and not troubled by politics. No, they worked out an exact
formulation of the results of the discussion, a formulation that could serve as a guide, not only
for a member of the given literary circle, not only for a person connected in
one way or another with a definite intellectualist category, but for any and
every conscious representative of the class who regards the ideology of Marxism
as his own. This necessary work was completed by the end of 1908.

I have already pointed out the principal results of this work in No. 2 of our
journal. I take the liberty of quoting a few lines in order to make further
exposition more intelligible.

“ The development of the Russian state system during the past three
centuries shows that its class character has been changing in one
definite direction. The monarchy of the seventeenth century with the Boyars’
Duma did not resemble the bureaucratic-aristocratic monarchy of the eighteenth
century. The monarchy of the first half of the nineteenth century was not the
same as the monarchy of 1861–1904. In the 1908–10 period a new phase was clearly
outlined, marking one more step in the same direction, which may be
described as the direction leading towards a bourgeois monarchy. The character
of the Third Duma and the present agrarian policy are closely connected with
this step. The new phase, therefore, is not, an accident but represents a
specific stage in the capitalist, evolution of the country. This new phase does
not solve the old problems, nor can it do so; consequently, since it is unable to eliminate them , it calls for the use of new methods of approach
to old solutions of old problems” (No. 2, p. 43). And a few lines further:
“Those who deny (or who do not understand) ... that we are confront ed
with the old problems and are heading towards the old solution of these
problems, are in fact deserting Marxism, are in fact surrendering to the liberals (as Potresov, Levitsky and others have done)” (p. 44). [1]

Whatever attitude one may adopt towards the set of ideas expressed in these
propositions, it would hardly be possible to deny the very close connection and
interrelation existing between the separate parts of this appraisal of the given
period. Take, for instance, the decree of November 9, 1906 (the law of June 14, 1910). There can be no disputing the fact that each of
them bears a clearly expressed bourgeois character which marks a change of
principle in the agrarian policy long pursued by the “upper” strata
towards the village commune and allotment ownership. But so far, not even the
most unprincipled weathercocks such as the Cadets, have ventured to assert that
this change of principle has already settled the question, has
already created new foundations of capitalist peasant economy, or has
already eliminated the old problems. The connection between the law of
June 14, 1910, and the system of elections to the Third Duma, as well as the
social composition of the latter is obvious; it would have been impossible to
carry out this law, to take a series of measures to put it into practice other
than by establishing an alliance between the central government and the feudal
(let us use this not very exact, general European expression) landowners and
the upper strata of the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie. We are thus faced
with a distinctive stage in the entire process of capitalist evolution
of the country. Does this stage do away with the retention of “power and
revenue” (speaking in a sociological sense) in the hands of the landowners
of the feudal type? No, it does not. The changes that took place in this, as in
all the other spheres, do not remove the fundamental traits of the old
regime, of the old relation of social forces. Hence the fundamental task of a
politically conscious public man is clear; he must evaluate these new changes,
“make use” of them, grasp them, if we may use that expression, and
at the same time, he must not allow himself to drift helplessly with the stream,
he must not throw out the old baggage, he must preserve the essentials in the
forms of activity and not merely in theory, in the programme, in the principles
of policy.

How then did Potresov and Martov, Dan and Axelrod, Levitsky and Martynov, the
“ideological leaders “who group themselves round publications of the
Vozrozhdeniye , Zhizn , Dyelo Zhizni , Nasha Zarya , etc., type, react to
this definitely formulated answer to the “vexed questions”, to this
direct and clear exposition of definite views? The fact is that they did not
react like politicians, “ideological leaders”, responsible
publicists, but like a literary group, like a circle of intellectuals, like free lances of free groups of the writing
fraternity. Like men who knew how to appreciate the fashion and the spirit of
the times as accepted in liberal parlours, they tittered condescendingly over
this antiquated, out-of-date, eccentric striving to formulate answers to vexed
questions. Why such exactitude, when one can write wherever one pleases, about
anything one pleases, whatever one pleases, and in any way one pleases, when the
Milyukovs and Struves furnish excellent examples of all the advantages,
conveniences and privileges that follow from the evasion of direct answers, of
an exact enunciation of views, of formulated professions de foi , etc.,
when Forgetful Ivans (and especially the Ivans who do not like to recall the
exact formulations of the past) are being honoured and respected in the broadest
circles of “society”?

Thus, throughout the past three years, we have not observed the slightest
attempt on the part of this entire literary fraternity to present their own formulated answer to the “vexed questions”. There have been
many metaphors and idle hypotheses, but not a single straight answer. The
distinguishing, characteristic feature of the fraternity under consideration was
their love of amorphism , i. e., of that symptom which was recognised in
the most definite, precise and unequivocal terms to be an integral part of
liquidationism at the very time the direct reply to the vexed
questions was given. To drift aimlessly with the stream, to delight in
one’s amorphism, to “put paid” to that which is contrasted to
the amorphous present—this is one of the main features of
liquidationism. Opportunists always and everywhere passively abandon themselves
to the stream, rest content with answers “from event to event”, from
congress (drunks) to congress (factory), [4] they are satisfied to transfer their
affiliation from one “association” (albeit the most respectable and
useful—trade unions, consumers’ societies, cultural societies, temperance
societies, etc.) to another, etc. Liquidationism is the sum total of the
tendencies that are peculiar to all opportunism in general, and reveal
themselves in definite forms in one of our social-political trends in a certain
period of Russian history.

History has preserved only two definite opinions of the liquidators on the above
“direct answer” (to the vexed questions).

The first opinion: the adjective “bourgeois” ought to be replaced by the
adjective “plutocratic”. Such a substitution, however, would be utterly
incorrect. The epoch of 1861–1904 reveals to us the growth of the
influence (and often the preponderating influence) of the plutocracy in the
most varied spheres of life. What we see in the 1908-10 period is no longer
plutocracy, but something different —the result of the bourgeoisie having recognised itself as a class. It is mindful of the
lessons received during the preceding three years and is creating an
ideology which in principle is hostile to socialism (not to European
socialism, not to socialism in general, but specifically to Russian
socialism) and to democracy. Moreover, the bourgeoisie is organised
nationally, that is, as a class, a definite section of which is permanently
represented (and in a very influential way, too) in the Third
Duma. Finally, in the agrarian policy of 1908–10, too, there is a system
which carries out the definite plan of a bourgeois agrarian regime. To be
sure, this plan does not “work” yet; but this failure is the failure of
one of the bourgeois systems, while the plutocracy has undoubtedly been “successful” in the villages, i. e., the village
plutocracy is certainly gaining in consequence of the agrarian policy of
1908–10, whereas the bourgeois regime, for which so many sacrifices are
made, is still unable to “fit in”. In a word, the proposed term
“plutocratic” is inept in every respect, so much so that the liquidators
themselves apparently prefer to forget this proposal.

Another opinion: the answer outlined above is incorrect because it is
equal to the advice to “shove in where we once met with

...” [5] bad luck. This brief but energetic opinion is valuable because
it expresses in a striking form the results of all the literary productions
of the liquidators from Potresov’s The Social Movement down to
Mr. Levitsky in Nasha Zarya . This opinion is a purely negative
one; it confines itself to condemning “shoving” without giving any
positive indication as to where one should “shove”. Swim, they
seem to say, as best you can, like “everybody else”, but do not consider
it worth while to indulge in generalisations as to where you will or should
emerge.

However much the opportunists would like to avoid being worried by
generalisations, to avoid all “unpleasant” talk about giving a direct answer to the “vexed questions”—this is
impossible. Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in through the
window. By the irony of history the very same liquidators who like to pose
as “progressives”, as alien to “conservatism”, and who in 1908
scornfully turned up their noses at the suggestions that there was need for
a direct answer, were forced, almost a year and a half later , in
the summer of 1910, to reckon with these suggestions. And they were forced
to do so by events in their own camp. They had almost completely evaded the
direct answer demanded in certain contemptible, out-of-date, atrophied,
useless, pernicious, “hopeless quarters”, when suddenly, a year and a
half later, a “trend” arises among the liquidators themselves, which also
demands a direct answer and which challengingly gives a direct answer!

As was to be expected, the role of “challenger” was assumed by
Y. Larin; but this time he was not alone. Larin, we know, is the enfant terrible of opportunism. He is distinguished by a great fault (from
the point of view of the opportunists); he takes the trends that appear
among them seriously, sincerely and thoughtfully, tries to link them up
into a consistent whole, to think them out to the end, to obtain direct
answers, to draw practical conclusions. Those who are familiar with Larin’s
book on a broad workers’ party (it appeared three or four years ago) will
certainly remember how he crushed in his fervent embraces Axelrod’s
notorious idea of a labour congress.

In March 1910, Larin began to publish a series of articles in
Vozrozhdeniye on this very question of the social structure of
state power, the prospects for the future, and liquidationism. He was
joined by Mr. Piletsky. Both writers tackled these questions, to which they
vainly sought a direct answer in their liquidationist camp, with the zeal
of neophytes, and they began to hit out right and left: no use talking of
serfdom in present-day Russia, the government has already evolved
into a bourgeois government. “Both the first and the second “elements,”
says Larin singling out the notorious “third element”, [6] “may sleep in peace; October 1905 is not on the order of
the day” ( Vozrozhdeniye , No. 9–10, p. 20). “If the Duma were
abolished, it would be restored more rapidly than in post revolutionary
Austria, which abolished the Constitution in 1851 only to recognise it again in 1860, nine
years later, without any revolution, simply because it was in the interests
of the most influential section of the ruling classes, the section whose
economy was run on capitalist lines. Eventually, the struggle of the
various sections of the ruling classes amongst themselves, after the social
system of bourgeois relations has been extended, will force them in our
country, as elsewhere, to expand the framework of the electoral system”
(ibid., p. 26). “The process of bringing Russia into the capitalist world
... is being completed in the political sphere as well. This means that at
the present stage a nation-wide revolutionary movement like that
of 1905 is impossible” (p. 27).

“ Thus, since power [according to Larin’s conclusions] is not vested
‘almost entirely’ in the hands of the feudal landowners, the struggle for
power by the ‘capitalists of land and factory’ against the feudal
landowners cannot be transformed into a nation-wide struggle against the
existing government” (No. 11, p. 9). “... To base one’s tactical line on
the expectation of an approaching ‘nation-wide revival’ would mean
condemning oneself to fruitless waiting” (ibid., p. 11). “One must not
sit between two stools. If nothing has changed in the social nature of the
government, then the tasks and the forms of activity will necessarily prove to be the old ones, and the only thing left to do is
‘fight the liquidators’. But if anyone wants to go further, to build the new to replace, to continue and to raise up the old that is in
ruins and has become useless, then let him be consistent and realise what
the conditions for construction are” (ibid., p. 14).

Well, isn’t that Larin naïve? He demands that the opportunists be
“consistent”, that they should not try “to sit between two stools”.

The editors of Vozrozhdentye were taken aback. In No. 9–10
they announced that they disagreed with Larin and wrote that while he
revealed “freshness of thought”, “Y. Larin’s articles failed to convince
us”. In No. 11, apparently on behalf of the editors, V. Mirov wrote
disagreeing with Larin, and acknowledged that Larin and Piletsky
represented “a definite trend which theoretically has not yet
been definitely established, but which speaks in very clear language” (the
greatest defect from the standpoint of the opportunists!).

Mr. Mirov wrote: “Larin has touched on another question of liquidationism
incidentally and unexpectedly [just like that! this restless Larin with his
“very clear language” is always causing annoyance to his friends!]. It
seems to us that there is no close connection between the way in which the
Party is to be built up and the nature of the Russian Government, and we
reserve to ourselves the right to deal separately with this matter” (issue
of July 7, 1910, p. 22).

It was L. Martov in Zhizn , No. 1, of August 30, 1910, who
“dealt separately” with the matter on behalf of that “we”. He declared
(p. 4) that “he could only join” with V. Mirov and the editors against
Larin. Thus the last word in this entire discussion among the liquidators
has been uttered by L. Martov.

Let us take a close look at this last word of the liquidators.

As usual, Martov tackles the matter in a very lively manner and very
... “dexterously”. He begins by saying that “a careful search was made
for the bourgeoisie in power, or for the ruling bourgeoisie, immediately
after the coup d’état of June 3, 1907”. “The June Third regime is
that of the domination of the Russian trading and industrial
bourgeoisie. This conception was accepted equally by the above-mentioned
group of Menshevik writers (Larin, Piletsky) and by their opposites, the
orthodox Bolsheviks, who in 1908” wrote “about the birth of a bourgeois
monarchy in Russia”.

Isn’t this a priceless gem of “dexterity”? Larin reproaches Martov
for trying to sit between two stools and bluntly admits, without
subterfuges and stratagems, that it is necessary to fight the liquidators
if the answer to the vexed questions given by the “orthodox” is not to be
redrafted.

But Martov “dexterously” turns somersaults in mid-air and attempts to
persuade the readers (who in August 1910 had no opportunity whatever of
hearing the other side) that “this scheme” “ was equally acceptable ” to both Larin and the “orthodox”!!

This dexterity smacks of that of Burenin or

Menshikov [7] for it is impossible to imagine a more shameless ...
deviation from the truth.

Among other things, Martov writes in the same article:

“In literary discussions people usually forget who really

‘started it’”. True, that happens in discussions among literary men in which there is no question of working out an exact,
properly formulated answer to vexed questions. But it is precisely not a discussion among literary men and not just a
literary “ discussion ” with which we are dealing. L. Martov is fully aware of the fact hut deliberately
misleads the readers of Zhizn . Martov knows perfectly well the
nature of the formulated answer given and supported by the
“orthodox”. Martov knows perfectly well that it is precisely this answer
that Larin is fighting, calling it “ossified routine”, “building castles
in the air”, etc. Martov knows perfectly well that he himself
and all his adherents and colleagues rejected the formulated answer given
by the “orthodox”. Martov knows perfectly well “who really started
it”, who began (and finished) the framing of the precise answer, and who
confined himself to sniggering and expressing dissent, without giving
any answer at all.

It is impossible to imagine a more disgusting, a more dishonest trick
than the one played by L. Martov! Larin by his straightforwardness and
outspokenness painfully hurt the diplomats of liquidationism when-he
admitted (though only after a year and a half) that it was quite impossible
to dispense with a definite answer. They cannot face the truth. And
L. Martov tries to deceive the reader by making it appear that Larin
accepts a scheme that is identical” with that of the orthodox, although in
reality the two schemes are opposed to each other; Larin’s scheme
implies the justification of liquidationism, that of the
“orthodox” implies the condemnation of liquidationism.

In order to cover up his trick, Martov picks out from the “scheme”
one little word and distorts its connection with the context (a
method worked out to perfection by Burenin and Menshikov). Martov asserts
that the “orthodox” wrote about the “birth of a bourgeois monarchy in
Russia”—and since Larin writes that there can be no talk of feudalism in
Russia, that the government is already bourgeois—“ ergo ” the
schemes of Larin and of the “orthodox” are “ identical ”!! The
trick is done; and the reader who believes Martov is fooled.

In reality, however, the “scheme”, or, to be more precise, the answer
of the orthodox, is that the old power in Russia is, “ taking another step in the transformation into a bourgeois
monarchy”; and that the path of capitalist development should be such as
would “preserve their power and their revenue for precisely the feudal type of landowners” and that as a result of this state of
affairs “the basic factors of economic and political life which
called forth” the first crisis in the beginning of the twentieth century
“ continue to operate ”.

Larin says that the government is already bourgeois, therefore
only partisans of “ossified routine” speak of the “preservation of
power” by the feudal landowners, therefore the “basic factors” of the
former upsurge no longer operate, therefore it is necessary to
build something new “in place of ‘the old that has become
useless’”.

The “orthodox” say that the government is taking another
step along the path of transformation into a bourgeois (not
government in general, but) monarchy, while the real power remains and is
preserved in the hands of the feudal land owners, so that the “basic
factors” of former tendencies, of the former type of evolution “continue
to operate”, and therefore those who talk of “the old that has become
useless” are liquidators who in reality are captives of the
liberals.

The contrast between the two schemes, between the two answers is
obvious. We have before us two different complete answers, which
lead to different conclusions.

Martov is juggling à la Burenin, alleging that both answers “ speak of ” the “birth of a bourgeois
monarchy”. One might with equal justice refer to the fact that both
answers recognise the continuing capitalist development of Russia! On the basis of the common recognition (by all Marxists and by all those
who wish to be Marxists) of capitalist development, a dispute is proceeding as to the degree, forms and conditions of that
development. Martov confuses the issue in order to represent what is
beyond dispute as the point at issue. It is on the basis of the
common recognition (by all Marxists and by all those who wish to
be Marxists) of the development of the old power along the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy that the dispute is
proceeding as to the degree, forms, conditions and course of this
transformation; and Martov confuses the issue (do the former factors
continue to operate, is it admissible to renounce the old forms, etc.?) in
order to represent what is beyond dispute as the point at issue!

That the government, of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries has been generally evolving “along the path of transformation
into a bourgeois monarchy” is not denied by Larin, just as hitherto it has
never been denied by any sane man wishing to be a Marxist. The
proposal to substitute the word “plutocratic” for the adjective
“bourgeois” incorrectly appraises the degree of this transformation, but it dares not dispute in principle the fact
that the actual “path”, the path of real evolution, lies
precisely in this transformation. Let him try to assert that the monarchy
of 1861–1904 (i. e., undoubtedly a less capitalistic monarchy than the
present one) does not represent one of the steps “in the
transformation into a bourgeois monarchy” when it is compared with the
period of serfdom under Nicholas I!

Martov does not try to assert this, but on the contrary, “joins”
V. Mirov, who, in refutation of Larin, refers to the bourgeois character of
the Witte reforms and of the reforms of the sixties! [8]

Now let the reader judge of the “dexterity” of Mirov and Martov. At
first, in opposition to Larin, they repeat the arguments which a year and a half ago were used by the “orthodox” against the closest
friends, adherents and colleagues of Martov and Mirov, and then they assure
the reader that the “schemes” of Larin and of the “orthodox” are
identical.

This is not only an example of “literary scribbling” versus politics
(for politics demands definite and direct answers, whereas literary men
often confine themselves to beating about the bush); it is more than
that—it is an example of the degradation of literature to the level of
Bureninism.

After quoting the above words of Larin that “if nothing has changed”,
etc., “then ... the only thing to do is to fight the liquidators”, Martov
replies to him:

“ Hitherto we thought that our tasks were determined by the social
structure of the society in which we act and that the forms of our activity
were determined, in the first place, by these tasks and, in the second
place, by political conditions . The ‘social nature of the
government’ has, therefore, no direct [the italics are Martov’s]
bearing on the determination of our tasks and forms of activity.”

This is not an answer, but an empty, evasive phrase. Martov again
attempts to confuse the issue, to shift the dispute to irrelevant ground. The question is not whether the social nature
of the government is directly or indirectly connected with the tasks and forms of activity. Even if this connection is an
indirect one it will in no way alter things once the close and
indissoluble connection is recognised. Martov does not venture to say a
word against the recognition of this close and indissoluble
connection. His reference to “political conditions” is nothing but dust
thrown in the eyes of the reader. To draw a contrast between “the social
nature of the government” and the “political conditions” is as senseless
as if I were to contrast goloshes made by human hands, to
overshoes. Overshoes are goloshes. And there are no other goloshes than
those made by human hands. The nature of the government corresponds to the
“political conditions”. And the nature of the government can never be
anything but social.

The sum total of all this is that Martov “beat about the bush” and
evaded a direct answer to Larin. He evaded an answer because he had no
answer to give. Larin is quite right in stating that views on the “social
nature of the government” (to be more precise—its economic nature). are
closely and inseparably connected with views on the “tasks and forms of
activity”. Both Larin and the “orthodox” acknowledge and apply this
connection. Martov (and his tribe) displays no such consistency in his
views. That is why Martov is compelled to wriggle and make shift with
“overshoes”.

Listen further.

“ There flashed more or less clearly in the minds of these Mensheviks [Martov is referring to Kogan, Obrazovaniye ,
1907, as an example ] the idea of the gradual, so to speak
‘organic’, entry of the working class into that ‘legal country’ [2] which received the rudiments of a constitutional regime, of gradual extension of the June Third
privileges of the bourgeoisie [not “plutocracy”, eh?] to broad
democratic circles. If such were really the fundamental principles of
contemporary ‘liquidationism’ in quotation marks, or of contemporary
‘legalism’, we would be confronted with the actual liquidation of our
traditions, with actual legalism elevated to a principle, with a break
in principle with all our past. We would have to wage a serious struggle
with such liquidationism.... Are we really destined to see the
reformists creeping into the regime of a renovated
Tolmachovism?” Then comes a footnote by Martov: “Of course [!!] I do
not suspect Larin of reformist tendencies”.

This long quotation was necessary in order to demonstrate Martov’s
“method” clearly to the reader. He admits that reformism “flashed more
or less clearly” in the mind of Kogan (a Menshevik who systematically
collaborates in serious “works” with Martov). He admits that if
reformism were really the fundamental principle of liquidationism it would
be a “break with the past”. He hurls a ringing, noisy, stinging phrase at
the “reformists” who are “creeping into”, etc. And he winds up with,
what do you think? with an assurance that he, of course , “does
not suspect” Larin of reformist “tendencies”!

This is exactly what Eduard Bernstein, Jean Jaurès or
Ramsay MacDonald say. They all “admit” that in the minds of certain
“extremists” there “flashes” something that is bad: reformism,
liberalism. They all admit that if liberalism were the “fundamental principle” of their policy, that would be a “break
with the past”. They all hurl ringing, noisy, stinging phrases at the
“liberals who are cringing”, etc. And they all wind up with
... assurances that they “do not suspect” the Larins—I beg
pardon—they “do not suspect” their more candid, more “Right”
comrades, adherents, friends, colleagues and collaborators, of
liberal-bourgeois tendencies.

The crux of the matter is this: in the articles quoted Larin gave an
exposition of the “system” of views of the most undoubted, most genuine
reformism! To deny this means denying the obvious, robbing the concept
reformism of all meaning. And if you “refute” Larin, “condemn”
reformism as “a principle”, hurl ringing phrases at those who are
“creeping into”, and at the same time positively assert that you “do not
suspect” Larin of reformism, surely you thereby expose yourselves completely! By this you prove to the hilt that your
reference to your hostility “on principle” to “reformism as a
principle” is the same as the vow of a peddlar who says: “Believe me,
upon my oath, I paid more for it”.

Believe me, upon my oath: I condemn reformism as a principle,
but I do not “suspect” Larin of reformism (those suspicious orthodox people are really disgusting!), and I am at
one with Larin in his liquidationist practice.

Such is the “detailed formula” of present-day Russian opportunism.

Here is an example of the application of this formula by Martov
himself , whom naïve people (or those unable to understand the
depth of the new re-grouping) still regard as an “undoubted”
non-liquidator:

“ The tactics which are to be observed in the activities of the so-called ‘liquidators’,” writes Martov on pp. 9–10,
“are those which place the open workers’ movement in the centre, strive
to extent it in every possible direction, and seek within [the italics are Martov’s] this open workers’ movement,
and only there [note: and only there!], the elements for the revival of
the Party.”

This is what Martov says. And this is nothing but reformism
creeping into the regime of a renovated

Tolmachovism. [9] The italics “creeping into” I have borrowed from
Martov himself, for it is important to note that it is precisely
“creeping into” that Martov in fact preaches in the words just
quoted. Irrespective of the extent to which such preachings are accompanied
by oaths and imprecations against “reformism as a principle”, the
matter is not changed, one iota. In reality, having said “and
only there”, and “in the centre”, Martov specifically pursues a
reformist policy (in the particular situation in Russia in 1908–10); and
as to the vows, promises, assurances, oaths—let political babes believe
them.

“ The disputes between Marx and Willich-Schapper in the early
fifties of the last century hinged precisely [!!] on the question of the
Importance of secret societies and the possibility of leading the
political struggle from within them .... The Blanquist, [in
France in the sixties] ‘prepared’ for these events [the downfall of
Bonapartism] by setting up secret societies and bottling up individual
workers in them, but the French section of the Marxists ... went into
the labour organisations, founded them and ‘fought for legality’ by
every means....”

The cases mentioned are tunes from quite a different opera. The dispute between Marx and Willich in the fifties, between the

Blanquists [10] and the Marxists in the sixties, was not one of
whether it was necessary to seek “elements for the revival of the Party”
“only” within “peaceful, tolerated organisations” (Martov,
Zhizn , No. 1, p. 10). Martov knows this perfectly well and is
wasting his time trying to mislead his readers. Neither of these
disputes was conducted over the “revival” of the workers’ party; at that
time it was impossible to dispute about its revival because it had
never existed. These two disputes hinged on the question of
whether a workers’ party—a party based on the working-class
movement, a class party—was necessary at all. That was what
Willich denied and the Blanquists of the sixties again denied, as Martov
well knows, although he tries to obscure matters in dispute
today by general talk about what is now indisputable. The view
that “ only ” in peaceful and tolerated organisations should one
seek elements for the revival or for the birth of the Party was
never shared by Marx, either in the fifties or in the sixties; even at the end of the seventies , during an immeasurably
higher phase of development of capitalism and bourgeois monarchy, Marx and
Engels declared ruthless war on the German opportunists who had
wiped out the recent past of the German party, deplored “extremes”,
talked of “more civilised” forms of the movement (in the language of the
present-day Russian liquidators it is called “Europeanisation”), and
advocated the idea that “ only ” in “peaceful and tolerated”
organisations should one “seek the elements for the revival”, etc.

“ To sum up,” writes Martov. “The fact that the present
regime is an inherently contradictory combination of absolutism and
constitutionalism, and that the Russian working class has sufficiently
matured to follow the example of the workers of the progressive countries
of the West in striking at this regime through the Achilles heel of its
contradictions is ample material for the theoretical substantiation and
political justification of what the Mensheviks who remain true to Marxism
are now doing.”

Martov’s words (“ample material”) are also ample material
for us to make our summary from. Martov regards as “ample” what is
recognised by both the Cadets and a section of the Octobrists. In
January 1911 it was none other than

Rech that formulated the question in the way Martov proposed its
formulation in August 1910: a contradictory combination of
constitutionalism and anti-constitutionalism; two camps—for the
constitution and against it. What is ample for Rech is “ample” for Martov. There is not a grain of Marxism in
this. Marxism has completely disappeared and has been replaced by
liberalism. The fact that we have a “contradictory combination” is
not by any means “ample” for a Marxist. Marxism only begins with
the beginning of the realisation or understanding that this truth is not
enough, that it contains within itself a spoonful of truth and a barrel of
untruth, that it obscures the depth of the contradictions, that it
embellishes reality and rejects the only possible means of finding a way
out of the situation.

“ The contradictory combination” of the old regime and constitutionalism exists not only in present-day Russia, but also in
present-day Germany and even in present-day England (the House of Lords;
the Crown’s independence of the people’s representatives in matters of
foreign policy, etc.). What, then, is the position taken up in reality (i. e., irrespective of good wishes and pious speeches) by the
politician who declares that it is “ample” for a Russian to recognise
what is true as regards Germany as well as England? Such a politician is,
in reality , taking the stand of a liberal , of a
Cadet. Even a more or less consistent bourgeois democrat in our country
cannot, and does not, take such a stand. Martov’s last word , his
concluding formula which sums up the entire discussion among the
liquidators, is a remarkably exact, a strikingly clear and exhaustively
complete expression of liberal views smuggled in under a
pseudo-Marxist flag.

When the liberals, not only the Cadets, but also a section of the
Octobrists, say that it is ample for the theoretical substantiation and political justification of our activity to recognise the
inherently contradictory combination of the old regime and
constitutionalism, the liberals are remaining quite true to themselves. In
these words they give a really precise, liberal formula, the formula of the
liberal policy of 1908–10 (if not of 1906–10). A Marxist, on the other
hand, reveals his Marxism only when and to the extent that he explains the
inadequacy and falsity of this formula, which eliminates those specific features which radically and in principle distinguish the
Russian “contradictions” from those of the English and German. The
liberal says: “It is ample to admit that a great many things in our
country contradict constitutionalism”. The Marxist replies: “Such an
admission is altogether inadequate. It must be understood that there is no
elementary, fundamental, cardinal, essential, necessary basis for
‘constitutionalism’ at all . The fundamental error of liberalism is
that it declares that there is such a basis, whereas there is not; and this
error accounts for the impotence of liberalism and is itself explained by
the impotence of bourgeois altruism”.

Translating this political antinomy into the language of economics, we
may formulate it as follows. The liberal assumes that the path of economic
(capitalist) development is already mapped out, defined, completed, that it
is now only a matter of removing obstacles and contradictions from
that path. The Marxist believes that this particular path of
capitalist development has not, so far, provided a way out of the impasse,
despite such undoubted bourgeois progress in economic evolution as
was marked by November 9, 1906 (or June 14, 1910), the Third Duma, etc.;
and he believes that there is another path which is also
a path of capitalist development, a path that can lead us on to the high
road, a path which must be pointed out, which must be explained, prepared,
insisted upon, pursued, in spite of all the vacillation, lack of faith and
faint-heartedness of liberalism.

Martov argues with Larin as if he himself were much more to the
“Left” than Larin. Many naïve people allow themselves to be deceived
by this and say: certainly, Potresov, Levitsky and Larin are liquidators,
certainly, they are of the extreme Right, something like Russian

Rouanet [11] ; but Martov—Martov is certainly no liquidator! In reality,
how ever, Martov’s flamboyant phrases against Larin, against the creeping
reformists, are only a blind, for in his conclusion , in his last
word, in his resumé , Martov actually supports
Larin. Martov is not more “Left” than Larin; he is only more diplomatic,
more unprincipled than Larin; he hides himself more cunningly beneath the
gaudy rags of pseudo-Marxist phrases. Martov’s conclusion that recognition
of the contradictory combination is “ample”, provides just that
corroboration of liquidationism (and liberalism) which Larin requires. But Larin wants to
justify this conclusion, to prove it, to think it out to the end, to make
it a matter of principle. And Martov says to Larin, as Vollmar, Auer and
the other “old birds” of opportunism used to say to the young opportunist
Eduard Bernstein: “Dear Larin—I mean dear Eddy—you are an ass! Such
things are done, but not talked about”. “Dear Larin, for you and me,
liquidationist practice should be ‘ample’, the liberal recognition of the
contradiction between the old regime and constitutionalism is ‘ample’; but,
for God’s sake, don’t go any further, don’t ‘deepen’ the question, don’t
seek clarity and consistency of principles, don’t make any appraisals of
the ‘present situation’, for that would expose us both . Let us act
and not talk.”

Martov teaches Larin how to be an opportunist.

“ One must not sit between two stools,” says Larin to Martov,
demanding an explanation and justification of the liquidator principles so
dear to both of them.

“ Well, what sort of opportunist are you,” replies Martov, “if you
don’t know how to sit between two stools?” What sort of opportunist are
you if you insist on exact, clear and direct justification of the
principles of our practice? It is the business of a real opportunist to sit
between two stools, he must advocate the “tactics-as-a-process” [3] (remember Martynov and Krichevsky in the period of 1901), he must drift
with the stream, cover up his traces, evade all matters of principle. Take
Bernstein, he knows now (after the lessons given him by Vollmar, Auer,
etc.) how to be a revisionist without proposing any amendments to
the orthodox Erfurt profession de foi . [12] And we two must also know how to act as
liquidators without proposing any amendments to the orthodox formal answer (of 1908) given to the “vexed questions”
of the

day. [13] In order to be a real opportunist, my dear, dear Larin, one must
do the creeping in reality, in one’s practice, in the way one goes
about one’s work; but, in words, before the public, in speeches, in the
press, one must not only abstain from seeking theories justifying the act
of creeping , but, on the contrary, one must shout all the more
loudly against those who creep, one must all the more assiduously vow and protest that we are not of the creeping kind.

Larin was silenced. Probably, in the depths of his heart he could not
help admitting that Martov was a more skilful diplomat, a more subtle
opportunist.

We must examine still another aspect of Martov’s concluding formula: it
is “ample” to recognise the contradictory nature of the combination of
the old regime and constitutionalism. Compare this formula with
V. Levitsky’s notorious formula—“ Not hegemony,
but a class party” ( Nasha Zarya , No. 7). In this formula
Levitsky (the Larin of Nasha Zarya ) expressed, only in a more
direct, open, principled manner, what Potresov confused, glossed over,
covered up and clothed in pretentious phrases. when, under the influence of
Plekhanov’s ultimatums, he cleaned up and revised the article he
wrote against the hegemony of the proletariat.

Martov’s formula and that of Levitsky are two sides of the same
medal. The object of the next article will be to explain this circumstance
for the benefit of Martov who pretends not to understand the connection
between the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat and the question of
liquidationism.

P.S. The present article had already been sent to press when we
received Dyelo Zhizni , No. 2, containing the conclusion of
Y. Larin’s article “Right Turn and About Turn!” Larin explains reformism,
of which L. Martov “of course does not suspect” him, as clearly in the
new liquidationist magazine as he explained it previously. For the present,
we shall confine ourselves to quoting the substance of the
reformist programme:

“ A state of perplexity and uncertainty, when people simply do not know what to expect of the coming day, what tasks to set
them selves—that is what results from indeterminate, temporising
moods, from vague hopes of either a repetition of the revolution or of
‘we shall wait and see’. The immediate task is, not to wait fruitlessly
for something to turn up, but to imbue broad circles with the guiding
idea that, in the ensuing historical period of Russian life, the working
class must organise itself not ‘for revolution’, not ‘in expectation of a revolution’, but simply for the determined and systematic defence
of its particular interests in all spheres of life;for the gathering and
training of its forces for this many-sided and complex activity; for the
training and building-up in this way of socialist consciousness in
general; for acquiring the ability to orientate itself [to find its
bearings]—and to assert itself—particularly in the complicated
relations of the social classes of Russia during the coming
constitutional re form of the country after the economically inevitable
self-exhaustion of feudal reaction....” (p. 18).

This tirade expresses exactly the entire spirit and meaning of Larin’s
“programme” and of all the liquidationist writings in Nasha Zarya, Vozrozhdeniye, Dyelo Zhizni , and others, including L. Martov’s
“ample” which we have examined above. It is the purest and most complete
reformism. We cannot dwell on it now; we cannot examine it here in the
detail it deserves. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a brief
remark. The Left Cadets, the non-party socialists, the petty-bourgeois
democrats (like the “Popular Socialists”) and reformists who would like
to be Marxists, preach the following programme to the workers: gather your
forces, train yourselves, learn, defend your interests simply in
order to stand up for yourselves during the coming constitutional
reform. Such a programme curtails, narrows and emasculates the political
tasks of the working class in the period 1908–11 in the same manner as the
Economists emasculated these tasks in the period 1896–1901. The old
Economists, deluding themselves and others, liked to refer to Belgium (the
predominance of reformism among the Belgians was recently brought to light
by the excellent writings of de Man and Brouckère; we shall revert
to these another time); the Neo-Economists, i. e., the liquidators, like to
refer to the peaceful way in which a constitution was obtained in Austria
in 1867. Both the old Economists and our liquidators choose instances,
cases, episodes in the history of the working-class movement and democracy
in Europe that occurred when the workers, for one reason or another, were
weak, lacked class-consciousness and were dependent on the
bourgeoisie—and they advance such instances as a model for Russia. Both
the Economists and the liquidators serve as conductors for bourgeois
influence among the proletariat.

---
Notes:
[1]
See pp. 68–69 of this volume.— Ed .

[2]
Perhaps not all readers will understand this gallicism which to my mind
is an extreme misfit. “Legal country” is a literal translation of the
French pays legal which implies those classes or groups, those
strata of the population which are represented in parliament and which,
unlike the masses of the people, enjoy constitutional privileges. Incidentally, this is typical and may serve as an appraisal
of Martov’s vacillations. He does not want to admit that Russia in
1908–10 took “another step in the transformation into a bourgeois
monarchy”. But he does admit that the “bourgeoisie” (and not the
plutocracy) on June 3, 1907, “obtained the rudiments of a
constitutional regime”. Who can make head or tail of this? — Lenin

[3]
See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 387–97.— Ed .

[4]
Lenin refers here to the first all-Russia temperance congress, held in
St. Petersburg on December 28, 1909–January 6, 1910 (January 10-19, 1910),
and the first all-Russia congress of factory doctors and representatives of
industry, which took place in Moscow on April 1–6 (14–19), 1909.

[5]
Lenin is quoting from the speech of the Menshevik-liquidator Dan, at
the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908, in the
discussion on “The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party”.

[6]
The expression “third element” was first used by the Vice-Governor of
Samara, V. G. Kondoidi, in his speech at the opening of the Samara Gubernia
Zemstvo meeting in 1900, to describe persons representing neither the
administration nor the social estates—employees of the Zemstvo, doctors,
statisticians, teachers, agronomists, etc. The expression “third element”
found its way into literature to describe the democratically-minded
intellectuals of the Zemstvos.

[7]
The dexterity of Burenin or Menshikov —a dishonest method of
conducting polemics, characteristic of Burenin and Menshikov, contributors
to the Black-Hundred monarchist paper Novoye Vremya ( New Times ). Lenin used these names as synonyms for dishonest methods of
controversy.

[8]
Witte reforms —reforms in the sphere of finance, customs
policy, railroad construction, factory legislation, carried out by
S. Y. Witte between 1892 and 1906, while Minister of Communications and later Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Reforms of the sixties —bourgeois reforms carried out by the
tsarist government: the Peasant Reform (1881), financial reforms
(1860–64), abolition of corporal punishment (1863), reforms in the sphere
of public education (1862–64), Zemstvo reform (1864), legal reform (1864),
reform of press and censorship (1865), municipal reform (1870), military
reform (1874).

[9]
See Note 62.

[10]
Blanquists —supporters of a trend in the French socialist
movement headed by the outstanding revolutionary and prominent
representative of French utopian communism—Louis-Auguste Blanqui
(1805–1881). The Blanquists expected “that mankind will be emancipated
from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a
conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals”

Substituting the actions of a small group of conspirators for those of a
revolutionary party, they took no account of the real situation necessary
for a victorious uprising and disregarded the question of ties with the
masses.

[11]
Rouanet, Gaston —a French journalist, member of the Socialist
Party; belonged to the Right wing of the Party.

[12]
The Erfurt profession de foi —programme of the German
Social-Democratic Party adopted at the Erfurt Congress in 1891.

[13]
Lenin refers to the section of the resolution “The Present Moment and
the Tasks of the Party” adopted at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the
R.S.D.L.P. in 1908, in which it was decided to combat liquidationism.