Date: 1905
Source: ru:PSS/v19

Source: PSS vol 19

Written at the end of September – November 1910

Published in December 1910 and January 1911 in the journal "Mysl" Nos. 1 and 2 Signature: V. Ilyin

Printed from the text of the journal

I

The well-known publications of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, "Statistics of Workers' Strikes on Factories and Plants" for the decade 1895–1904 and for the years 1905–1908, have already been repeatedly noted in our literature. The material collected in these publications is so rich and valuable that its complete study and comprehensive development will still require a great deal of time. The development made in the mentioned publication is only the first approach to the matter, far from sufficient. In the present article, we intend to acquaint readers with the preliminary results of one experience of a more detailed development, postponing a full exposition for another place.

It is fully established, first of all, that strikes in Russia in 1905–1907 represent a phenomenon unseen in the world. Here are the data on the number of strikers in thousands by year and country:

The triennium 1905–1907 stands out exceptionally. The minimum number of strikers in Russia during this triennium exceeds the maximum ever reached in the most capitalist countries of the world. This, of course, does not mean that Russian workers are more developed or stronger than in the West. But it means that humanity has not yet known what energy the industrial proletariat is capable of developing in this area. The peculiarity of the historical course of events is expressed in the fact that the approximate dimensions of this capacity were first revealed in one backward country, still undergoing a bourgeois revolution.

To understand how, in Russia, with a small number of factory and plant workers compared to Western Europe, the number of strikers could be so large, one must take into account repeated strikes. Here are the data on the number of repeated strikes by year in connection with the ratio of the number of strikers to the number of workers:

From this, we see that the triennium 1905–1907, which stands out exceptionally in terms of the total number of strikers, also stands out in terms of the frequency of repeated strikes and the high percentage ratio of the number of strikers to the total number of workers.

Statistics also provide us with the actual number of establishments affected by strikes and the number of workers who participated in strikes; here are these data by year:

And this table, like the previous one, shows that the decline in the number of strikers from 1906 to 1907 is much weaker, overall, than the decline from 1905 to 1906. We will see in the further exposition that in some industries and in some regions, from 1906 to 1907, there is not a decline but an intensification of the strike movement. For now, let us note that the provincial data on the number of workers actually participating in strikes show the following interesting phenomenon. From 1905 to 1906, the percentage of workers participating in strikes decreased in the vast majority of provinces with developed industry; but there are a number of provinces in which this percentage increased from 1905 to 1906. These are the least industrial, the most remote, so to speak, provinces. For example, these include the northern provinces: Arkhangelsk (11,000 factory and plant workers; 1905 – 0.4% of workers participating in strikes; 1906 – 78.6%), Vologda (6,000 factory and plant workers; 26.8% – 40.2% for the same years), Olonets (1,000 factory and plant workers; 0 – 2.6%); then the Black Sea province (1,000 factory and plant workers; 42.4% – 93.5%); among the Volga provinces – Simbirsk (14,000 factory and plant workers; 10.0% – 33.9%); among the central agricultural – Kursk (18,000 factory and plant workers; 14.4% – 16.9%); among the eastern border – Orenburg (3,000 factory and plant workers; 3.4% – 29.4%).

It is clear what significance the increase in the percentage of strike participants in these provinces from 1905 to 1906 has: the wave had not yet reached them in 1905, they began to get involved in the movement only after a year-long, unprecedented in the world, struggle of the more advanced workers. This phenomenon, very important for understanding the historical course of events, we will encounter repeatedly in the further exposition.

On the contrary, from 1906 to 1907, the percentage of strike participants increases in some very industrial provinces, for example, in St. Petersburg (68.0% in 1906; 85.7% in 1907 – almost as much as in 1905, 85.9%), in Vladimir (37.1% – 49.6%), Baku (32.9% – 85.5%), Kiev (10.9% – 11.4%) and in a number of others. Thus, if in the increase in the percentage of strikers in a number of provinces from 1905 to 1906, we observe the rearguard of the working class, which was late to the moment of the greatest development of the struggle, then the increase in this percentage in a number of other provinces from 1906 to 1907 shows us the vanguard in its striving to again raise the struggle, to stop the beginning retreat.

To make this correct conclusion more precise, let us present the absolute figures of the number of workers and the number of actual strike participants by provinces of the first and second kind:

On average, there are 6,000 factory and plant workers per province. The increase in the number of workers actually participating in strikes is only 15,000.

On average, there are 30,000 factory and plant workers per province. The increase in the number of workers actually participating in strikes is up to 100,000, and if we subtract the oil workers of the Baku province, not counted in 1906 (probably no more than 20–30,000), then about 70,000.

The role of the rearguard in 1906 and the vanguard in 1907 emerges clearly in these data.

For a more accurate judgment of these dimensions, one should take the data by regions of Russia and compare the number of strikers with the number of factory and plant workers. Here is a summary of these data:

*These figures are not entirely comparable with the data for the previous years, as in 1907, workers in the oil fields were included for the first time. The overestimation is certainly no more than 20–30,000.

Workers from different regions participated unevenly in the movement. In general, 1,660,000 workers put forward 2,863,000 strikers, i.e., 164 strikers per hundred workers, or, in other words, somewhat more than half of the workers went on strike twice on average in 1905. But these averages obscure the fundamental difference between the St. Petersburg and Warsaw districts, on the one hand, and all the others, on the other. In the St. Petersburg and Warsaw districts together, one-third of all factory and plant workers (550,000 out of 1,660,000) put forward two-thirds of the total number (1,920,000 out of 2,863,000). In these districts, each worker went on strike on average almost four times in 1905. In the other districts, there are 943,000 strikers for 1,110,000 workers, i.e., proportionally four times less than in the two aforementioned. From this, it is already clear how incorrect are the assertions of the liberals, repeated by our liquidators, that the workers overestimated their strength. On the contrary, the facts prove that they underestimated their strength, for they underutilized it. If the energy and persistence of the strike struggle (we are talking here only about this form of struggle) throughout Russia had been the same as in the St. Petersburg and Warsaw districts, the total number of strikers would have been twice as large. In other words, this conclusion can be expressed as follows: the workers were able to assess only half of their strength in this area of the movement, for they had not yet utilized the other half. Geographically speaking: the west and northwest had already awakened, but the center, east, and south were half asleep. The development of capitalism every day does something to awaken the lagging.

we have not yet utilized. Geographically speaking: the west and northwest have already awakened, but the center, east, and south were half asleep. The development of capitalism does something every day to awaken the lagging.

The next important conclusion from the district data is that from 1905 to 1906, the decline in the movement was universal, although uneven; from 1906 to 1907, with a huge decline in the Warsaw district, with a very small decrease in the Moscow, Kiev, and Volga districts, we see an increase in the St. Petersburg and Kharkov districts. This means that at the given level of consciousness and preparation of the population, the form of the movement under consideration had exhausted itself during 1905; it had to, since the objective contradictions of socio-political life had not disappeared, transition into a higher form of movement. But after a year of, if one may say so, rest or a period of gathering strength, in 1906, a new upsurge began to be outlined and started in part of the country. If the liberals, followed by the liquidators, evaluating this period, speak contemptuously of "romantics' expectations," then the Marxist must say that, by turning away from supporting this partial upsurge, the liberals undermined the last possibility of defending democratic gains.

On the question of the territorial distribution of strikers, it should also be noted that the vast majority of them are concentrated in six provinces with highly developed industry and large cities in five of them. These six provinces are: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Livonia, Vladimir, Warsaw, and Piotrkow. In these provinces, there were 827,000 factory and plant workers out of a total of 1,661,000 in 1905, i.e., almost half of the total number. The number of strikers in them over the decade 1895–1904 was 246,000 out of 431,000, i.e., about 60 percent of the total number of strikers; in 1905 – 2,072,000 out of 2,863,000, i.e., about 70 percent; in 1906 – 852,000 out of 1,108,000, i.e., about 75 percent; in 1907 – 517,000 out of 740,000, i.e., about 70 percent; in 1908 – 85,000 out of 176,000, i.e., less than half[63].

Thus, the role of these six provinces in the three-year period 1905–1907 was greater than in the preceding and following periods. It is clear, therefore, that the major urban and, in particular, capital centers developed much higher energy during this three-year period than all other regions. Workers scattered across villages and relatively small urban and industrial centers, making up half of the total number of workers, put forward 40 percent of the total number of strikers in 1895–1904, and in 1905–1907 only 25–30 percent. Supplementing the above conclusion, we can say that the large cities awoke, while the small ones and the villages to a significant extent still slept.

Regarding the countryside in general, i.e., factory and plant workers living in villages, there are, in addition, statistical data on the number of strikes (not the number of strikers) in cities and outside cities. Here are these data:

The compilers of the official statistics, presenting these data, point out that, according to certain studies by Mr. Pogozhev, out of the total number of factories and plants in Russia, 40 percent are located in cities, 60 percent outside cities{137}. Therefore, if in ordinary times (1895–1904) the number of strikes in cities tripled the number in the countryside, then the percentage ratio of the number of strikes to the number of establishments was 4.5 times greater in cities than in the countryside. In 1905, this ratio was approximately 8:1; in 1906 – 9:1; in 1907 – 15:1; in 1908[64] – 6:1. In other words: the role of urban factory and plant workers in the strike movement was much stronger in 1905 than in previous years, compared to the role of factory and plant workers living in the countryside, and in 1906 and 1907, this role became increasingly greater, i.e., the proportional participation of rural areas in the movement became smaller and smaller. Factory and plant workers living in the countryside, who were the least prepared for the struggle by the decade 1895–1904, showed the least stability and retreated most quickly after 1905. The vanguard, i.e., urban factory and plant workers, made special efforts in 1906, and even greater efforts in 1907 than in 1906, to halt this retreat.

Let us now consider the distribution of strikers by industries. For this, we will single out four main groups of industries: A) metalworkers; B) textile workers; C) printers, woodworkers, tanners, and chemical industry workers; D) workers in the processing of mineral substances and in the production of foodstuffs. Here are the data by year{138}:

Metalworkers were best prepared by the decade before 1905. During this decade, almost half of them went on strike (117 out of 252). Being the best prepared, they stand at the forefront in 1905. The number of strikers among them more than triples the number of workers (811 versus 252). The role of this vanguard stands out even more clearly when examining the monthly data for 1905 (a detailed examination of these data is impossible in a brief article, and we postpone it to another place). Of all the months in 1905, the maximum number of strikers among metalworkers occurs not in October, as in all other industry groups, but in January. The vanguard began the movement with maximum energy, "rousing" the rest of the mass. In just the month of January 1905, 155,000 metalworkers went on strike, i.e., two-thirds of the total number of metalworkers (252,000); in one month, the number of strikers was significantly greater than in the ten years prior (155,000 versus 117,000). But this almost superhuman energy exhausts the vanguard's strength by the end of 1905: metalworkers are in first place in terms of the scale of the decline in the movement in 1906. The decrease in the number of strikers among them is maximal: from 811,000 to 213,000, i.e., almost fourfold. By 1907, the vanguard gathers its strength again: the number of strikers decreases very slightly overall (from 213,000 to 193,000), and in the three main industries of the metalworking group, namely, machine building, shipbuilding, and foundry work, the number of strikers increases from 104,000 in 1906 to 125,000 in 1907.

Textile workers make up the main mass of Russian factory and plant workers, slightly less than half of the total (708,000 out of 1,691,000). In terms of preparation over the 10 years before 1905, they are in second place: one-third of the total number went on strike (237,000 out of 708,000). In terms of the strength of the movement in 1905, they are also in second place: about 180 strikers per 100 workers. They get involved in the struggle later than the metalworkers: in January, they had slightly more strikers than the metalworkers (164,000 versus 155,000), in October, more than twice as many (256,000 versus 117,000). Later to be drawn into the movement, this main mass holds out more steadily in 1906: the decline that year is universal, but among the textile workers, it is the smallest, with their numbers halving (640,000 versus 1,296,000), while among the metalworkers, it is almost fourfold (213,000 versus 811,000), and among the others, 2.5 to 3.5 times. Only by 1907 do the forces of the main mass also become exhausted: from 1906 to 1907, it is precisely in this group that the decline is the greatest, more than halving (302,000 versus 640,000).

Without dwelling on a detailed analysis of the data for the other industries, let us note only that Group D, the least prepared and the least participating in the movement, lags behind all. If we take the metalworkers as the norm, we can say that Group D "owed" more than a million strikers for the single year of 1905.

It was the least prepared and the least involved in the movement. If we take the metalworkers as the norm, it can be said that category G "owed" over a million strikers for just one year, 1905.

The relationship between the metalworkers and textile workers is characteristic of the relationship between the advanced layer and the broad masses. In the absence of free organizations, a free press, a parliamentary platform, etc., during 1895–1904, the masses could not coalesce in 1905 except spontaneously, in the course of the struggle itself. The mechanism of this coalescence consisted in wave after wave of strikers rising up, with the vanguard having to expend such enormous energy at the beginning of the movement to "rouse" the broad masses that it found itself relatively weakened by the time the movement reached its peak. In January 1905, there were 444,000 strikers, of whom 155,000 were metalworkers, i.e., 34 percent, while in October the total number of strikers was 519,000, of whom 117,000 were metalworkers, i.e., 22 percent. It is clear that such unevenness in the movement is equivalent to a certain dissipation of forces due to their fragmentation and insufficient concentration. This means, first, that the effect could have been increased by better concentration of forces, and second, that, given the objective conditions of the period under study, a series of groping actions, so to speak, of reconnaissances, trial movements, etc., was inevitable and necessary at the beginning of each wave. Therefore, when the liberals, followed by liquidators like Martov, from the standpoint of their theory about the "overestimation of its strength by the proletariat," accuse us of "trailing behind the spontaneous class struggle," these gentlemen are passing judgment on themselves and, against their will, paying us the greatest compliment.

To complete the review of the annual data on strikes, let us stop at the figures characterizing the size and duration of strikes and the amount of losses from strikes.

The average number of participants in a strike was:

The reduction in the size of strikes (by the number of participants) in 1905 is explained by the involvement of a mass of small establishments, which lowered the average numbers of participants. The further reduction in 1906 reflects, apparently, a decrease in the energy of the struggle. 1907 shows some progress here.

If we take the average number of participants in purely political strikes, we get the following figures by year: 1905 – 180; 1906 – 174; 1907 – 203; 1908 – 197. These figures even more clearly indicate a decrease in the energy of the struggle in 1906 and a new increase in 1907, or (and perhaps along with that) the predominant participation of the largest establishments in the movement of 1907.

The number of strike days per striking worker was:

The persistence of the struggle, characterized by these figures, was highest in 1905—then it rapidly decreased until 1907 and only increased again in 1908. It should be noted that in terms of the persistence of the struggle, Western European strikes stand incomparably higher. The number of strike days per striking worker for the five-year period 1894–1898 was 10.3 for Italy, 12.1 for Austria, 14.3 for France, and 34.2 for England.

If we single out purely political strikes, we get the following figures: 1905 – 7.0 days per striker; 1906 – 1.5; 1907 – 1.0 day. Strikes for economic reasons always show a longer duration of the struggle.

Taking into account the varying persistence of the strike struggle in different years, we arrive at the conclusion that the data on the number of strikers do not yet sufficiently determine the comparative sizes of the movement in different years. The precise determinant is the number of strike days, which was as follows by year:

Thus, the precisely determined size of the movement in 1905 alone is more than 11 times greater than the movement over all 10 preceding years combined. In other words, the size of the movement in 1905 exceeds the average annual size of the movement in the previous decade by 115 times.

This ratio shows us how short-sighted are those people, who are too often found among official scholars (and not only among them), who take the pace of socio-political development observed during so-called "peaceful," "organic," "evolutionary" epochs as the norm for all cases, as an indicator of the possible speed of development for modern humanity. In reality, the "pace of development" in so-called "organic" epochs is an indicator of maximum stagnation, of maximum obstacles to development.

Based on the data on the number of strike days, the compiler of the official statistics determines the losses incurred by industry. These losses (underproduction) amounted to 10.4 million rubles in total over 10 years, 1895–1904, 127.3 million rubles in 1905, 31.2 million rubles in 1906, 15.0 million rubles in 1907, and 5.8 million rubles in 1908. For three years, 1905–1907, the underproduction amounted to 173.5 million rubles.

The losses of workers from unpaid wages for strike days (determined based on the size of the average daily wage in different industries) for the years under consideration in thousands of rubles:

*See the present volume, p. 387. Ed.

For three years, 1905–1907, the losses of workers amounted to 23.2 million rubles, i.e., more than 14 times greater than for all ten preceding years combined[65]. The compiler of the official statistics calculates that these losses amounted to an average of about 10 kopecks per year for one worker employed in factory and plant industry (and not per one striker) for the first decade, about 10 rubles in 1905, about 2 rubles in 1906, and about 1 ruble in 1907. But this calculation leaves aside the huge differences in this respect between workers in different industries. Here is a more detailed calculation made on the basis of the figures in the table just presented:

From this, it can be seen that for one metalworker (category A), the size of the losses from strikes in 1905 was almost 30 rubles, three times the average, more than ten times the average loss of a worker in the processing of mineral substances and food products (category G). The conclusion we drew above, that the metalworkers had exhausted their strength in this form of movement by the end of 1905, is even more clearly confirmed by this table: in category A, the size of the losses decreased by more than eight times from 1905 to 1906, and in the other categories by 3-4 times.

Concluding this analysis of the annual data of the strike statistics, we will move on to the study of the monthly data in the next article.

II

To study the wavelike character of the strike movement, the annual period is too large. We now have statistical grounds to say that in the three-year period 1905–1907, each month was worth a year. The labor movement in these three years lived through 30 years. In 1905, the number of strikers did not fall below the annual minimum of strikers for the 10-year period 1895–1904 in any month, and in 1906 and 1907, there were only two such months each.

Unfortunately, the processing of monthly data, as well as data for individual provinces, is very unsatisfactory in the official statistics. Many summaries have to be done anew. For this reason, and also for reasons of space, we will limit ourselves for now to data on quarters of the year. Let us note regarding the division of economic and political strikes that the official statistics provide incomparable data for 1905 and for 1906–1907. Mixed strikes—according to the official nomenclature, categories 12 with economic demands and 12b with economic demands—were considered political in 1905, but later economic. We also classify them as economic for 1905.

Number of strikers in thousands{139}.

With 12 b of economic demands – in 1905, they were considered political, and later, economic. We also classify them as economic for 1905.

Number of strikers in thousands{139}.

The periods that show the highest surge of the wave are outlined. At first glance at the table, it is evident that these periods coincide with politically significant events that characterize the entire three-year period. 1905 I – the ninth of January and its consequences; 1905 IV – the October and December events; 1906 II – the first Duma; 1907 II – the second Duma; in the last quarter of 1907, the upsurge is the smallest, explained by a political strike in November (134,000 strikers) in connection with the trial of the second Duma workers' deputies. Thus, this period, which concludes the three-year period and marks a transition to a different phase of Russian history, is precisely such an exception that confirms the rule: if the upsurge of the strike wave does not signify a general socio-political upsurge, then upon closer examination, it turns out that there was no strike wave, but rather a single demonstration-strike.

The rule for the three-year period under study is that the upsurge of the strike wave signifies critical, turning points in the entire socio-political evolution of the country. The statistics of strikes vividly show us the main driving force of this evolution. This does not mean, of course, that the form of movement under consideration was the only or the highest form – we know that this is not the case – this does not mean that one can make direct conclusions from this form of movement to specific issues of socio-political evolution. But it means that before us is a statistical picture (of course, far from complete) of the movement of a class that was the main spring of the general direction of events. The movement of other classes groups around this center, follows it, is directed or determined by it (in a positive or negative sense), and depends on it.

Diagram of the number of striking workers by quarters of the year. – 1910. The shaded part – participants in political strikes, the unshaded – in economic ones. (From V. I. Lenin's notebook "Statistics of Strikes in Russia," Lenin Collection XXV)

It is enough to recall the main moments of the political history of Russia during the three-year period under consideration to be convinced of the correctness of this conclusion. Let us take the first quarter of 1905. What does the eve of it show us? The well-known zemstvo-banquet campaign. Was it correct to evaluate the workers' demonstrations in this campaign as the "highest type of demonstration"? Were the speeches about not causing "panic" among the liberals correct? Place these questions within the framework of strike statistics (1903: 87,000, 1904: 25,000, January 1905: 444,000, including 123,000 political), and the answer will be clear. The above-mentioned debate on tactics in the zemstvo campaign merely reflects the antagonism between the liberal and the workers' movements, rooted in objective conditions.

What do we see after the January upsurge? The well-known February decrees{140}, laying the foundation for some transformation of the state system.

Take the third quarter of 1905. In the forefront of political history is the law of August 6 (the so-called Bulygin Duma). Is this law fated to come to life? The liberals think so and decide to conduct their line of behavior according to this opinion. In the camp of the Marxists, the opposite view, not shared by those who, objectively, promote liberal views. The events of the last quarter of 1905 resolve the dispute.

According to the figures for whole quarters of the year, it seems that there was one upsurge at the end of 1905. In fact, there were two, separated by a slight weakening of the movement. In October, there were 519,000 strikers, including 328,000 purely political, in November 325,000 (including 147,000 political), and in December 433,000 (including 372,000 political). In the historical literature, the view of the liberals and our liquidators (Cherevanin and company) has been expressed, according to which there is an element of "artificiality" in the December upsurge. Statistics refute this view, showing precisely in this month the maximum number of purely political strikers: 372,000. The tendencies that led the liberals to a certain assessment are understandable, but from a purely scientific point of view, it is absurd to consider, in any measure, "artificial" a movement of such magnitude that in one month the number of purely political strikers amounted to almost 9/10 of the total number of strikers for the entire decade.

Finally, let us take the last two upsurges in the spring of 1906 and the spring of 1907[67]. Their common difference from the January and May upsurges of 1905 (of which the first was also stronger than the second) is that they proceed along the line of retreat, while the first two proceeded along the line of advance. This difference characterizes the last two years of the three-year period compared to the first year. Therefore, the accurate assessment of the increase in figures in the indicated periods of 1906 and 1907 will be that these increases signify a pause in the retreat and an attempt by the retreating to go back on the offensive. Such is the objective significance of these upsurges, clear to us now from the perspective of the final results of the entire "three-year storm and assault." The first and second Dumas were nothing more than political negotiations and political demonstrations at the top due to the pause in the retreat below.

From this, the short-sightedness of the liberals, who see in these negotiations something self-sufficient, independent, and separate from how long a particular pause in the retreat lasts and where it leads, becomes clear. From this, the objective dependence of the liquidators, like Martov, who now speak with contempt about the "expectations of romantics" during the retreat, on the liberals, becomes clear. Statistics show us that the matter did not concern the "expectations of romantics," but actual interruptions and pauses in the retreat. Had there been no such pauses, the event of June 3, 1907, historically inevitable as long as the retreats remained retreats, would have occurred earlier, perhaps a whole year, or even more than a year, earlier.

Having examined the history of the strike movement in connection with the main moments of political history, let us move on to the study of the relationship between economic and political strikes. Official statistics provide the most interesting data on this question. Let us first take the general totals for individual years of the three-year period under consideration:

The first conclusion from this is that economic and political strikes are in the closest connection. They rise and fall together. The strength of the movement in the era of the offensive (1905) is characterized by the fact that political strikes, as it were, are erected on a broad base of no less strong economic strikes, which, even taken separately, far surpass the figures for the entire decade of 1895–1904.

During the decline of the movement, the number of economic strikers falls faster than the number of political ones. The weakness of the movement in 1906 and especially in 1907 is undoubtedly characterized by the absence of a broad and solid base of economic struggle. On the other hand, the slower decline in the number of political strikers in general and the particularly small decline in this number from 1906 to 1907 indicates, apparently, a phenomenon already familiar to us: the advanced layers, with the greatest energy, try to stop the retreat and turn it into an offensive.

This conclusion is fully confirmed by the data on the relationship between economic and political strikes across various production groups. To avoid cluttering the article with numbers, let us limit ourselves to comparing metalworkers and textile workers by quarters of 1905, using the summary of official statistics[68], which, for that year, classified mixed strikes as political, as was noted above.

Let us take the data on metal and textile workers by quarters of 1905, this time using the summary from official statistics[68], which, as already noted above, classified mixed strikes as political for that year.

The difference between the advanced layer and the broad masses is clearly evident. Among the advanced, purely economic strikers are in the minority from the very beginning, as they are throughout the entire year. However, the first quarter in this group is characterized by a very high number (120,000) of purely economic strikers: it is clear that among the metalworkers there are many layers that needed to be "roused" and who began the movement with purely economic demands. Among the textile workers, we see at the beginning of the movement (the first quarter of the year) a huge predominance of purely economic strikers, who become a minority in the second quarter, only to regain the majority in the third quarter. In the last quarter of the year, at the peak of the movement, the number of purely economic strikers among the metalworkers equals 10% of the total number of strikers and 12% of all metalworkers; among the textile workers, purely economic strikers during the same period make up 30% of the total number of strikers and 25% of all textile workers.

It is now perfectly clear what the interdependence of the economic and political strike is: without their close connection, a truly broad, truly mass movement is impossible; the concrete form of this connection is, on the one hand, that at the beginning of the movement and when new layers are drawn into the movement, the purely economic strike plays a predominant role, and on the other hand, the political strike arouses and stirs the backward, generalizes and expands the movement, elevating it to a higher level.

It would be extremely interesting to trace in detail how exactly over the three-year period newcomers were drawn into the movement. The data on this is available in the primary material, as information was obtained on cards for each strike separately. However, the processing of these data in the official statistics is very unsatisfactory, and a wealth of rich material contained in the cards has been lost, not being included in the processing. Some approximate idea is given by the following table showing the number of strike cases as a percentage of the number of establishments of different sizes:

The advanced layer, which we have observed so far based on data about various regions and groups of industries, now emerges from the data on different groups of establishments. The general rule for all years is an increase in the percentage of establishments with strikes as the size of the establishment increases. For 1905, it is characteristic, firstly, that the larger the establishment, the more repeated strikes there are, and secondly, that compared to the decade 1895–1904, the increase in the percentage is more rapid the smaller the establishments. This clearly indicates the particular speed with which newcomers were drawn in, attracting layers that had never before participated in strikes. Quickly drawn into the movement during the period of maximum upsurge, these newcomers proved to be the least stable: the decline in the percentage of establishments with strikes from 1906 to 1907 is most pronounced in small establishments and least pronounced in large ones. The vanguard works the longest and most persistently to halt the retreat.

But let us return to the data on the relationship between the economic and political strike. The data by quarters for the entire three-year period, presented above (p. 19)[69], show first of all that all major upsurges are associated with an increase in the number of not only political but also economic strikers. The only exception is the upsurge in the spring of 1907, when the maximum number of economic strikers occurs not in the second, but in the third quarter of the year.

At the beginning of the movement (the first quarter of 1905), we see a huge predominance of the number of economic strikers over political ones (604,000 and 206,000). The peak of the movement (the fourth quarter of 1905) brings a new wave of economic strikes, weaker than the January one, with a strong predominance of the political strike. The third upsurge, in the spring of 1906, shows another very significant increase in the number of both economic and political strikers. These data alone are sufficient to refute the view that the combination of the economic and political strike was the "weak side of the movement." This view has been repeatedly expressed by liberals; it was repeated by the liquidator Cherevanin in relation to November 1905; recently, it was also repeated by Martov in relation to the same period. It is especially often cited in support of such a view that the struggle for the eight-hour working day{141} was unsuccessful.

The fact of this failure is indisputable, and it is also indisputable that any failure means a weakness in the movement, but the liberal point of view is reflected in the recognition that the "weak side of the movement" was precisely the combination of the economic struggle with the political; the Marxist point of view sees the weakness in the insufficiency of this combination, in the insufficiently large number of economic strikers. Statistics vividly confirm the correctness of the Marxist view, revealing the "general law" of the three-year period: the strengthening of the movement with the intensification of the economic struggle. And this "general law" logically connects with the basic features of any capitalist society: in it, there will always be such backward layers that can only be roused by the most acute exacerbation of the movement, and otherwise, without economic demands, the backward layers cannot be drawn into the struggle.

Comparing the upsurge of the last quarter of 1905 with the previous and subsequent upsurges, i.e., with the first quarter of 1905 and the second quarter of 1906, we clearly see that the October-December upsurge is weaker than both the previous and the subsequent ones in terms of the breadth of the economic base, i.e., in the percentage of the number of economic strikers in the total number of strikers. There is no doubt that the demand for an eight-hour working day repelled many elements from the bourgeoisie who could sympathize with other aspirations of the workers. But it is equally certain that this demand attracted many elements not from the bourgeoisie who had not yet been drawn into the movement, who, having put forward 430,000 economic strikers in the last quarter of 1905, reduced this number to 73,000 in the first quarter of 1906 and then increased it again to 222,000 in the second quarter of 1906. The weakness, therefore, was not the lack of sympathy from the bourgeoisie, but the insufficient or untimely support from non-bourgeois elements.

It is characteristic of a liberal to fear that a movement of this kind always repels certain elements of the bourgeoisie. It is characteristic of a Marxist to note that a movement of this kind always attracts broad non-bourgeois elements. Suum cuique – to each his own.

Extremely instructive on the question of the vicissitudes of the struggle between workers and employers are the data from official statistics on the results of strikes. The overall totals of this statistics are as follows:

The general conclusion from this is, first of all, that the maximum strength of the movement means the maximum success for the workers. It is most advantageous for them in 1905, when the pressure of the strike struggle was greatest. This year is also distinguished by an extraordinary frequency of compromises: the parties had not yet adapted to the new, unusual conditions, employers were disoriented by the frequency of strikes, and matters ended in compromise more often than ever. In 1906, the struggle becomes more stubborn: cases of compromise are much rarer; but the workers still generally win: the percentage of winning strikers is greater than the percentage of losing ones. Starting from 1907, the defeats of the workers continuously increase, with a decrease in the number of compromises.

If we take the absolute figures, we see that over 10 years, 1895–1904, a total of 117,000 workers won strikes, while in just one year, 1905, more than three times as many: 369,000, and in 1906, about one and a half times as many: 163,000.

If we look at the absolute figures, we will see that in total over 10 years, 1895–1904, 117,000 workers won strikes, while in the single year of 1905, more than three times as many: 369,000, and in 1906, about one and a half times more: 163,000.

But a year is too long a period to study the wave-like movement of strike struggles during the triennium of 1905–1907. Without providing monthly data, which would take up too much space, we will present data by quarters for the years 1905 and 1906. The year 1907 can be omitted, as we do not observe interruptions, declines, and upsurges in the results of strikes in this year; instead, we see a continuous retreat of the workers and an offensive by the capitalists, fully expressed in the already presented annual data.

*In official statistics, there are no monthly totals on this issue; they had to be summed up from data by industries.

From these data, very interesting conclusions follow, requiring detailed consideration. In general, we have seen that the struggle is the more successful for the workers, the stronger their pressure. Is this confirmed by the presented data? The first quarter of 1905 is less favorable for the workers than the second, although the movement weakened during this period. However, this conclusion turns out to be erroneous, because the three-month data combine the January upsurge (321,000 economic strikers) with the decline in February (228,000) and March (56,000). By singling out the month of upsurge, January, we see that in this month the workers won: 87,000 strikers won strikes, 81,000 lost, and 152,000 ended in compromise. Both months of decline in this period (February and March) result in the defeat of the workers.

The second period (the second quarter of 1905) is a period of upsurge, which reaches its peak in May. The upsurge of the struggle means the victory of the workers: 71,000 strikers won strikes, 59,000 lost, and 109,000 ended in compromise.

The third period (the third quarter of 1905) is a period of decline: the number of strikers is much smaller than in the second quarter. The decline in pressure means the victory of the owners: 59,000 workers lost strikes, only 45,000 won. The percentage of workers who lost strikes is 35.6%, i.e., higher than in 1906. This means that the "general atmosphere of sympathy" for the workers in 1905, about which liberals speak so much as the main reason for the workers' victories—(recently, Martov also spoke about the "main reason"—the sympathy of the bourgeoisie)—in no way prevented the defeat of the workers when their pressure weakened. You are strong when society sympathizes with you, the liberals tell the workers. Society sympathizes with you when you are strong, the Marxists tell the workers.

The last quarter of 1905 seems to be an exception: with the greatest upsurge, the defeat of the workers. But this exception is apparent, for it combines the month of upsurge—October, when the workers won both in the economic sphere (+57, -22: thousands of workers who won and lost strikes), and the months—November (+25, -47) and December (+12, -31), when the economic struggle declined and when the workers were defeated. Moreover, November, the month of the turning point, the month of the greatest fluctuations, the greatest balance of opposing forces, the greatest uncertainty about the overall results and the general direction of Russian history in general, and the history of relations between the owners and the workers in particular, gives the highest percentage of all months in 1905 of cases of compromise: out of 179,000 economic strikers in this month, there were 106,000, i.e., 59.2% of strikers who ended the struggle in compromise[70].

The first quarter of 1906 again presents an apparent exception: the greatest decline in the economic struggle and the greatest gain for the workers (+34, -11). Here, too, the month of the workers' defeats, January (+4, -6), and the months of the workers' victories, February (+14, -2) and March (+16, -2.5), are combined. The number of economic strikers decreases throughout this period (January – 26,600, February – 23,300, March – 23,200), but the upsurge of the general movement is clearly outlined (the total number of strikers in January – 190,000, in February – 27,000, in March – 52,000).

The second quarter of 1906 is a major upsurge of the movement and a gain for the workers (+86, -78); this gain is especially strong in May and June—in June, the number of economic strikers reaches a maximum for 1906, 90,000—while April is an exception: the defeat of the workers, despite the growth of the movement compared to March.

Starting from the third quarter of 1906, we see a generally continuous decline in the economic struggle until the end of the year, and, accordingly, the defeat of the workers (a minor exception in August 1906, when the workers won in the economic struggle for the last time: +11.3, -10.3).

To briefly summarize the vicissitudes of the economic struggle in 1905 and 1906, we can use the following approach. In 1905, three main upsurges of the strike struggle in general and the economic struggle in particular stand out clearly: January, May, and October. Over these three months together, the number of economic strikers amounted to 667,000 out of a total of 1,439,000 for the year, i.e., not a quarter, but close to half. And all these three months were months of the workers' victories in the economic sphere, i.e., the number of workers who won strikes exceeded the number of workers who lost strikes.

In 1906, the year is clearly divided, in general, into the first and second halves: in the first, a pause in the retreat and a major upsurge; in the second, a major decline. The first half of the year saw 295,000 economic strikers, and the second half, 162,000. The first half brought the workers a victory in the economic struggle, and the second, a defeat.

These general results fully confirm the conclusion that not the "atmosphere of sympathy," not the sympathies of the bourgeoisie, but the strength of the pressure played the decisive role in the economic struggle.