V.I. Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy ( Chapter Four: The Philosophical Idealists as Comrades-In-Arms and Successors of Empirio-Criticism )

3. The Immanentists as Comrades-In-Arms of
Mach and Avenarius

In speaking of empirio-criticism we could not avoid repeatedly
mentioning the philosophers of the so-called immanentist
school, the principal representatives of which are Schuppe,
Leclair, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern. It is now necessary to
examine the relation of empirio-criticism to the immanentists
and the nature of the philosophy preached by the latter.

In 1902 Mach wrote: “. . . Today I see that a host of philosophers—positivists, empirio-criticists, adherents
of the immanentist philosophy—as well as a very few scientists, have all, without knowing anything of each other,
entered on new paths which, in spite of their individual
differences, converge almost towards one point” (Analysis of Sensations, p. 9). Here we must first
note Mach’s unusually frank admission that very few scientists are followers of the supposedly
“new,” but in truth very old, Humean-Berkeleian philosophy. Secondly, extremely important is Mach’s
opinion that this “new” philosophy is a broad current in which the immanentists are on the same
footing as the empirio-criticists and the positivists. “Thus”—repeats Mach in the
introduction to the Russian translation of the Analysis of Sensations (1906)—“there is a common
movement. . .” (p. 4). “My position [Mach says in another place], moreover, borders closely on that of the
representatives of the immanentist philosophy. . . . I found
hardly anything in this book [ i.e. , W. Schuppe, Outline of the Theory of Knowledge and Logic] with
which, with perhaps a very slight change, I would not gladly
agree” (p. 46). Mach considers that Schubert-Soldern is
also “following close paths” (p. 4), and as to
Wilhelm Schuppe, Mach even dedicates to him his latest work, the summary so to speak of his philosophical
labours, Knowledge and Error .

Avenarius, the other founder of empirio-criticism, wrote in
1894 that he was “gladdened” and “encouraged” by Schuppe’s sympathy for
empirio-criticism, and that the “differences” between him and Schuppe “exist, perhaps, only
temporarily” (vielleicht nur einstweilen noch bestehend ). [1]

And,

finally, J. Petzoldt, whose teachings Lessevich regards as the last word in empirio-criticism, openly acclaims the trio —Schuppe, Mach and
Avenarius— as the leaders of the “new” trend . (Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung, Bd. II, 1904, S. 295; Das Weltproblem, 1906, S. v. und 146). On this point Petzoldt
is definitely opposed to Willy (Einf ., II, 321), probably the only outstanding Machian who felt ashamed of such
a kinship as Schuppe’s and who tried to dissociate himself from him fundamentally, for which this disciple was
reprimanded by his beloved teacher Avenarius. Avenarius wrote
the words about Schuppe above quoted in a comment on
Willy’s article against Schuppe, adding that
Willy’s criticism perhaps “was put more strongly than was really necessary” (Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 18. Jahrg., 1894,
S. 29; which also contains Willy’s article against
Schuppe).

Having acquainted ourselves with the empirio-criticists’
opinion of the immanentists, let us examine the immanentists’ opinion of the empirio-criticists. We have
already mentioned the opinion uttered by Leclair in
1879. Schubert-Soldern in 1882 explicitly expressed his
“agreement” “in part with the elder
Fichte” (i.e., the distinguished representative of subjective idealism, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose son was
as inept in philosophy as was the son of Joseph Dietzgen), and
“with Schuppe, Leclair, Avenarius and partly with Rehmke,” while Mach (Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des
Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit) is cited with particular gusto in opposition to “natural-historical
metaphysics” [2]

—the

term given to natural-historical materialism by all the reactionary university lecturers and
professors in Germany. In 1893, after the appearance of
Avenarius’ The Human Concept of the World,
W. Schuppe hailed this work in An Open Letter to Prof . Avenarius as a “confirmation of the
naïve realism” which he (Schuppe) himself advocated. “My conception of thought,” Schuppe
wrote, “excellently harmonises with your
[Avenarius’] pure experience.” [3]

Then, in 1896, Schubert-Soldern, summarising the “methodological trend in philosophy” on which he
“bases himself,” traces his genealogy from
Berkeley and Hume down through F. A. Lange (“the real beginning of our movement in Germany dates from Lange”), and
then through Laas, Schuppe and Co., Avennrius and
Mach, Riehl (among the Neo-Kantians), Ch. Renouvier (among the Frenchmen),
etc. [4]

Finally, in their programmatic “Introduction” printed in the first issue of the
philosophical organ of the immanentists, alongside a declaration of war on materialism and an expression of
sympathy with Charles Renouvier, we read: “Even in the camp of the scientists themselves voices of individual
thinkers are being raised sermonising against the growing
arrogance of their colleagues, against the unphilosophical
spirit which has taken possession of the natural sciences. Thus the physicist Mach. . . . On all hands fresh
forces are stirring and are working to destroy the blind faith
in the infallibility of the natural sciences, and once again
people are beginning to seek for other paths into the profundities of the mysterious, a better entrance to the house
of
truth.” [5]

A word or two about Ch. Renouvier. He is the head of the
influential and widespread school in France known as the
neo-criticists. His theoretical philosophy is a combination of
the phenomenalism of Hume and the apriorism of Kant. The
thing-in-itself is absolutely rejected. The connection of
phenomena, order and law is declared to be a priori ; law is written with a capital letter and is converted into the
basis of religion. The Catholic priests go into raptures over
this philosophy. The Machian Willy scornfully refers to
Renouvier as a “second apostle Paul,” as “an obscurantist of the first water” and as a
“casuistic preacher of free will” (Gegen die Schulweisheit, S. 129). And it is such co-thinkers of the
immanentists who warmly greet Mach’s philosophy. When his Mechanics appeared in a French
translation, the organ of the neo-criticists— L’Année philosophique [11] —edited by Pillon, a
collaborator and disciple of Renouvier, wrote: “It is unnecessary to speak of the extent to which, in this criticism
of substance, the thing, the thing-in-itself, Mach’s positive science agrees with neo-critical idealism”
(Vol. XV, 1904, p. 179).

As for the Russian Machians, they are all ashamed of their
kinship with the immanentists, and one of course could not
expect anything else of people who did not deliberately adopt
the path of Struve, Menshikov, and the like. Bazarov alone
refers to “certain representatives of the immanentist school” as
“realists.” [6]

Bogdanov briefly (and in fact falsely) declares that “the
immanentist school is only an intermediate form between
Kantianism and empirio-criticism” (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xxii). V. Chernov
writes: “Generally speaking, the immanentists approach positivism in only one aspect of their theory, in other
aspects they go far beyond it” (Philosophical and Sociological Studies, p. 37). Valentinov says that
“the immanentist school clothed these [Machian] ideas in
an unsuitable form and found themselves in the blind alley of
solipsism” (op. cit., p. 149). As you see, you pay your
money and take your choice: constitution and salmon mayonnaise, realism and solipsism. Our Machians are afraid to
tell the plain and clear truth about the immanentists.

The fact is that the immanentists are rank reactionaries, I
open advocates of fideism, unadulterated in their obscurantism. There is not one of them who has not
frankly made his more theoretical works on epistemology a defence of religion and a justification of
medievalism of one kind or another. Leclair, in 1879, advocated his philosophy as one that satisfies “all the
needs of a religiously inclined mind” (Der Realismus, etc ., S. 73). J. Rehmke, in 1880,
dedicated his “theory of knowledge” to the
Protestant pastor Biedermann and closed his book by preaching
not a supersensible God, but God as a “real concept” (it was for this reason presumably, that
Bazarov ranked “certain” immanentists among the “realists”?), and moreover the “objectivisation of
this real concept is relegated to practical life,” while
Biedermann’s “Christian dogmatism” is declared to be a model of “scientific theology”
(J. Rehmke, Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und Begriff, Berlin, 1880, S. 312). Schuppe in the Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie assures us that though the
immanentists deny the transcendental, God and the future life
do not come under this concept (Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie, II. Band, S. 52). In his
Ethik he insists on the “connection of the moral law . . . with the metaphysical world conception”
and condemns the separation of the church from the state as a
“senseless phrase” (Dr. Wilhelm Schuppe, Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie [Principles of Ethics and the Philosophy of Law], Breslau, 1881,
S. 181, 325). Schubert-Soldern in his Foundations of the Theory of Cognition [7] deduces both the pre-existence of the
self before the body and the after-existence of the self after the body, i.e., the immortality of
the soul (op. cit., p. 82), etc. In The Social Question , [8] arguing against Bebel, he defends,
together with “social reforms,” suffrage based on class distinction, and says that the “Social-Democrats
ignore the fact that without the divine gift of unhappiness
there could be no happiness” (p. 330), and thereupon laments the fact that materialism “prevails”
(p. 242): “he who in our time believes in a life beyond,
or even in its possibility, is considered a fool” (ibid .).

And German Menshikovs like these, no less obscurantists of the
first water than Renouvier, live in lasting concubinage with
the empirio-criticists. Their theoretical kinship is in
contestable. There is no more Kantianism in the immanentists
than in Petzoldt or Pearson. We saw above that they themselves
regard themselves as disciples of Hume and Berkeley, an
opinion of the immanentists that is generally recognised in
philosophical literature. In order to show clearly what
epistemological premises these comrades-in-arms of Mach and
Avenarius proceed from, we shall quote some fundamental
theoretical propositions from the works of immanentists.

Leclair in 1879 had not yet invented the term “immanent,” which really signifies
“experiential,” “given in experience,” and which is just as spurious a label for concealing
corruption as the labels of the European bourgeois parties. In
his first work, Leclair frankly and explicitly calls himself a
“ critical idealist ” (Der Realismus, etc ., S. 11, 21, 206, etc.). In this
work he criticises Kant, as we have already seen, for his
concessions to materialism, and clearly indicates his wn path away from Kant to Fichte and
Berkeley. Leclair fights materialism in general and the tendency towards materialism displayed by the majority of scientists in particular as mercilessly as Schuppe,
Schubert-Soldern and Rehmke.

“ If we return,” Leclair says, “to the standpoint of critical idealism, if we do not attribute a
transcendental existence [ i.e. , an existence outside of human consciousness] to nature or the processes of nature,
then for the subject the aggregate of bodies and his own body,
in so far as he can see and feel it, together with all its
changes, will be a directly given phenomenon of spatially
connected co-existences and successions in time, and the whole
explanation of nature will reduce itself to stating the laws
of these co-existences and successions” (p. 21).

Back to Kant!—said the reactionary Neo-Kantians. Back to
Fichte and Berkeley!—is essentially what the reactionary immanentists are saying. For Leclair, all that
exists consists of “ complexes of sensations ” (p. 38), while certain classes of properties
(Eigenschaften), which act upon our sense-organs, he designates, for example, by the letter M, and other classes,
which act upon other objects of nature, by the letter N
(p. 150, etc.). Moreover, Leclair speaks of nature as the
“phenomena of the consciousness” (Bewusstseinsphänomen) not of a single person, but of
“mankind” (pp. 55-56). If we remember that Leclair published his book in Prague, where Mach was professor of
physics, and that Leclair cites with rapture only Mach’s
Erhaltung der Arbeit, which appeared in 1872, the question involuntarily arises: ought we not to regard the
advocate of fideism and frank idealist Leclair as the true
progenitor of the “original” philosophy of Mach?

As for Schuppe, who, according to
Leclair, [9] arrived at the “same results,” he, as we have seen, really
claims to defend “naïve realism,” and in his
Open Letter to Prof . Avenarius bitterly complains of the “established perversion of my
[Schuppe’s] theory of knowledge to subjective idealism.” The true nature of the crude forgery which
the immanentist Schuppe calls a defence of realism is quite
clear from his rejoinder to Wundt, who did not hesitate to
class the immanentists with the Fichteans, the subjective
idealists (Philosophische Studien, loc . cit ., S. 386, 397, 407).

“ In my case,” Schuppe retorts to Wundt, “the proposition ‘being is consciousness’
means that consciousness without the external world is inconceivable, that the latter belongs to the former,
i.e., the absolute connection (Zusammengehörigkeit) of the one with the other,
which I have so often asserted and explained and in which the
two constitute the primary whole of being.” [10]

One must be extremely naïve not to discern unadulterated
subjective idealism in such “realism”! Just think: the external world “belongs to consciousness” and is
in absolute connection with it! The poor professor was indeed slandered by the “established” practice
of ranking him with the subjective idealists! Such a philosophy completely coincides with Avenarius’
“principal co-ordination”; no reservations and protests
on the part of Chernov and Valentinov can sunder them; both
philosophies will be consigned together to the museum of
reactionary fabrications of German professordom. As a curiosity once more testifying to Valentinov’s lack of
judgment, let us note that he calls Schuppe a solipsist (it
goes without saying that Schuppe vowed and swore that he was
not a solipsist—and wrote special articles to this effect—just as vehemently as did Mach, Petzoldt, and
Co.), yet is highly delighted with Bazarov’s article in
the Studies ! I should like to translate into German
Bazarov’s dictum that “sense-perception is the reality existing outside us” and forward it to some more
or less intelligent immanentist. He would embrace and kiss
Bazarov as heartily as the Schuppes, Leclairs and
Schubert-Solderns embraced Mach and Avenarius. For
Bazarov’s dictum is the alpha and omega of the doctrines of the immanentist school.

And here, lastly, is Schubert-Soldern. “The materialism
of natural science,” the “metaphysics” of recognising the objective reality of the external world, is
the chief enemy of this philosopher (Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie, 1884, p. 31 and the whole of Chapter
II: “The Metaphysics of Natural
Science”). “Natural science abstracts from all relations
of consciousness” (p. 52)—that is the chief evil (and that is just what constitutes materialism!). For the
individual cannot escape from “sensations and, hence, from a state of consciousness” (pp. 33-34). Of course,
Schubert-Soldern admitted in 1896, my standpoint is epistemological solipsism (Die soziale Frage, S. x),
but not “metaphysical,” not “practical” solipsism. “What is given us
immediately is sensations, complexes of constantly changing
sensations” (Ueber Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts, S. 73).

“ Marx took the material process of production,” says Schubert-Soldern, “as the cause of inner processes
and motives, in the same way (and just as falsely) as natural
science regards the common [to humanity] external world as the
cause of the individual inner worlds” (Die soziale Frage, S. xviii). That Marx’s historical
materialism is connected with natural-historical materialism
and philosophical materialism in general, it does not even
occur to this comrade in-arms of Mach to doubt.

“ Many, perhaps the majority, will be of the opinion that
from the standpoint of epistemological solipsism no metaphysics is possible, i.e., that metaphysics is
always transcendental. Upon more mature reflection I cannot
concur with this opinion. Here are my reasons. . . . The
immediate foundation of all that is given is the spiritual
(solipsist) connection, the central point of which is the
individual self (the individual realm of thought)
with its body. The rest of the world is inconceivable without
this self, just as this self is inconceivable without the rest of the world. With the
destruction of the individual self the world is also annihilated, which appears impossible—and with the
destruction of the rest of the world, nothing remains for my
individual self, for the latter can be separated from the world only logically, but not in time and space. Therefore
my individual self must continue to exist after my death also, if the entire world is not to be annihilated with
it. . .” (ibid ., p. xxiii).

The “principal co-ordination,” “complexes of sensations” and the rest of the Machian banalities
render faithful service to the proper people!

“. . . What is the hereafter (das Jenseits)
from the solipsist point of view? It is only a possible future
experience for me. . .”
(ibid .). “Spiritualism . . . would be obliged to prove the existence of the Jenseits. But at any rate the
materialism of natural science cannot be brought into the
field against spiritualism, for this materialism, as we have
seen, is only one aspect of the world process within the
all-embracing spiritual connection” ( = the “principal co-ordination”) (p. xxiv).

All this is said in that philosophical introduction to Die soziale Frage (1896) wherein Schubert-Soldern all the time appears arm in arm with Mach and Avenarius. Only for
the handful of Russian Machians does Machism serve exclusively
for purposes of intellectual prattle. In its native country
its role as a flunkey to fideism is openly proclaimed!

---
Notes:
[1]
Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1894, 18. Jahrg., Heft I,
S. 29.
— Lenin

[2]
Dr. Richard von Schubert-Soldern, Ueber Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts [On the Transcendence of the Object and Subject], 1882, S. 37 and
5. Cf . also his Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie [Principles of a Theory of Knowledge],
1884, S. 3.
— Lenin

[3]
Vierteijahrsschlift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 17. Jahrg., 1893, S. 384.
— Lenin

[4]
Dr. Richard von
Schubert-Soldern, Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage [Human Happiness and the Social Question],
1896, S. v, vi.
— Lenin

[5]
Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie , [12] Bd. I, Berlin, 1896, S. 6, 9.
— Lenin

[6]

“ Realists in modern philosophy—certain representatives of the
immanentist school who have emerged from Kantianism, the
school of Mach-Avenarius, and many other kindred movements—find that there are absolutely no grounds for
rejecting the basis of naïve realism” (Studies, etc ., p. 26).
— Lenin

[7]
Schubert-Soldern, Grundlage einer Erkenntnistheorie .— Ed .

[8]
Die soziale Frage .— Ed .

[9]
Beiträge zu einer monistischen Erkenntnistheorie [Essays in a Monistic Theory of Knowledge], Breslau, 1882, S. 10.
— Lenin

[10]
Wilhelm
Schuppe, “ Die immanente Philosophie und Wilhelm Wundt ” [“ The Immanent Philosophy and Wilhelm Wundt ”] Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie, Band II, S. 195.
— Lenin

[12]
Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophia (Journal for
Immmanentist Philosophy)—a German reactionary journal, published in Berlin from 1895 to 1900 under the editorship of
M. B. Kauffmann, with the participation of Wilhelm Schuppe and
Richard von Schubert Soldern. p. 211

[11]
L’Année philosophique (The Philosophical
Year,)—the organ of the French “neo-criticists”, published in Paris from 1890 to 1913 under the
editorship of F. Pillon. p. 212