An assessment of the Russian revolution, that is, of its first three years, is on the order of the day. Without clarifying the class nature of our political parties, without taking into account the interests and mutual position of classes in our revolution, we cannot move a single step forward in determining the immediate tasks and tactics of the proletariat. On one of the attempts at such an assessment we intend to dwell in the present article.

In issue No. 3 of the *Voice of the Social-Democrat*{27} F. Dan and G. Plekhanov come forward—one with a systematic assessment of the results of the revolution, the other—with concluding observations on the tactics of the workers' party. Dan's assessment comes down to the fact that hopes for a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry could not but prove illusory. "The possibility of a new broad revolutionary uprising of the proletariat… is conditioned in considerable degree by the position of the bourgeoisie." "At the first stages of it (the new upsurge), – as long as the upsurge of revolutionary working-class movement does not stir up the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the development of urban revolution does not kindle a fire in the countryside – the proletariat and bourgeoisie will face each other as the chief political forces."

The tactical conclusions from such kind of "truths" are clearly left unsaid by F. Dan. He was, obviously, too embarrassed to complete what flows by itself from his words: to recommend to the working class the famous Menshevik tactic—to support the bourgeoisie (recall the blocs with the Kadets; support for the slogan of a Kadet ministry; Plekhanov's full-power Duma, etc.). But Plekhanov made up for this, concluding his feuilleton in issue No. 3 of the *V. of S.-D.* with the words: "It would be well for Russia if Russian Marxists in 1905–1906 were able to avoid the errors made by Marx and Engels in Germany more than half a century ago" (namely: the underestimation of the capacity of capitalism at that time to develop and the overestimation of the capacity of the proletariat for revolutionary action). "It would be well!"

This is clear as day. Dan and Plekhanov are attempting, warily, without calling things by their proper names, to justify the Menshevik policy of dependence of the proletariat on the Kadets. Let us examine their "theoretical justification" of this undertaking.

Dan reasons thus: that "peasant movement" depends on "the growth and development of urban revolution in its bourgeois and proletarian channels." Therefore, the upsurge of "urban revolution" was followed by an upsurge of peasant movement, while in its decline the "internal antagonisms of the countryside, compressed by the uprisings of the revolution, began to intensify again" and "government agrarian policy, the policy of dividing the peasantry, etc., began to enjoy relative success." From this follows the conclusion we cited, that at the first stages of a new upsurge the chief political forces will be the proletariat and bourgeoisie. "This position," in F. Dan's opinion, "ought and can be used by the proletariat for such a development of the revolution as will leave far behind the starting point of its new upsurge and will lead to the complete democratization of society under the sign (sic![3]) of a radical (!!) solution of the agrarian question."

It is not difficult to see that this reasoning is built entirely on a radical misunderstanding of the agrarian question in our revolution and that this misunderstanding is covered up poorly by cheap and empty phrases about "complete democratization" "under the sign" of a "solution" of the question.

F. Dan thinks that "hopes for a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" depended and were dependent on Populist prejudices, on a forgetting of the internal antagonisms of the countryside and the individualistic character of peasant movement. These are the usual and long-familiar Menshevik views. But it is scarcely likely that anyone has heretofore displayed so strikingly all their absurdity as F. Dan does in the article we are examining. The esteemed publicist succeeded in not noticing that both "solutions" of the agrarian question opposed by him correspond to "the individualistic character of peasant movement"! Indeed, the Stolypin solution, which in Dan's opinion enjoys "relative success," is based on the individualism of the peasants. This is beyond doubt. But what of the other solution, which F. Dan called "radical" and connected with the "complete democratization of society"? Does the esteemed Dan not think that it is not based on the individualism of the peasants?

Therein lies the trouble—that an empty phrase about "complete democratization of society under the sign of a radical solution of the agrarian question" masks in Dan a radical lack of thought. He blindly, as if sightless, stumbles upon two, objectively possible and not yet definitively chosen by history, "solutions" of the agrarian question, unable to imagine clearly and precisely the character of both solutions and the conditions of each solution.

Why can Stolypin's agrarian policy enjoy "relative success"? Because in our peasantry hostile classes of peasant bourgeoisie and peasant proletariat have long been created by capitalist development. Is a complete success of Stolypin's agrarian policy possible, and what does such success mean? It is possible if circumstances work out exceptionally favorably for Stolypin, and it means a "solution" of the agrarian question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of a final consolidation (until the proletarian revolution) of private property in all land, both landlord and peasant. This would be a "solution" of the Prussian type, which would indeed ensure Russia's capitalist development, but an enormously slow one, surrendering power for a long time to the Junker, infinitely more painful for the proletariat and peasantry than the other possibility, objectively likewise capitalist, "solution of the agrarian question."

This other solution Dan, without thinking it through, called "radical." A cheap word, and there is not a grain of thought in it. The Stolypin solution is also very radical, for it radically breaks up the old commune and the old agrarian order of Russia. The real distinction between the peasant solution of the agrarian question in the Russian bourgeois revolution and its Stolypin-Cadet solution consists in the fact that the former destroys landlord private property in land unconditionally, while peasant property—very probably (we shall not touch upon this particular question concerning peasant allotment land for now, since all of Dan's reasoning is incorrect even from the standpoint of our present, "municipalization," agrarian program).

The question now arises: is this second solution objectively possible? Undoubtedly. On this point all thinking Marxists agree, for otherwise the support by the proletariat of the aspiration of small proprietors to confiscate large property would be reactionary charlatanism. In no other capitalist country would any Marxist write a program supporting the peasant aspiration to confiscate large landed property. In Russia both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks agree on the necessity of such support. Why? Because it is objectively possible for Russia a different path of capitalist agrarian development, not "Prussian," but "American," not landlord-bourgeois (or Junker), but peasant-bourgeois.

Stolypin and the Kadets, the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, Nicholas the Second and Peter Struve are agreed that it is necessary to "clear up" capitalism in Russia's decrepit agrarian order through the preservation of landlord land property. They differ only in how best to preserve it and to what extent.

Workers and peasants, social-democrats and Populists (Laborites, Popular Socialists, Socialist Revolutionaries included) are agreed that it is necessary to "clear up" capitalism in Russia's decrepit agrarian order through the violent destruction of landlord land property. They differ in that social-democrats understand the capitalist character in contemporary society of any, however most radical, agrarian revolution, whether municipalization, or nationalization, or socialization, or partition, while Populists do not understand this, cloaking their struggle for peasant-bourgeois agrarian evolution against landlord-bourgeois evolution in petty-bourgeois utopian phrases about equality.

All of F. Dan's confusion and all his lack of thought derive from the fact that he radically failed to understand the economic basis of the Russian bourgeois revolution. Behind the disagreements of Marxist and petty-bourgeois socialism in Russia on the question of the economic content and significance of the peasants' struggle for land in this revolution, he "failed to notice" the struggle of real social forces for one or another path of the objectively possible capitalist agrarian evolution. And he covered up his complete misunderstanding with phrases about the "relative success" of Stolypin and about "the complete democratization of society under the sign of a radical solution of the agrarian question."

In reality, the agrarian question now stands in Russia thus: for the success of Stolypin's policy long years of violent suppression and extermination of the masses of peasants are needed, peasants who are unwilling to starve to death and be expelled from their villages. History has known examples of the success of such a policy. It would be empty and foolish democratic phraseology if we were to say that in Russia the success of such a policy is "impossible." It is possible! But our task is clearly to show the people at what price such success is bought, and to struggle with all our strength for another, briefer and faster path of capitalist agrarian development through peasant revolution. Difficult is peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in a capitalist country, very difficult, but it is possible, and one must struggle for it. Three years of revolution have taught us and the whole people not only that one must struggle for it, but also how to struggle. No Menshevik "approaches" to a policy of supporting the Kadets will eradicate these lessons of the revolution from the consciousness of the workers.

Further. What if, despite the struggle of the masses, Stolypin's policy endures long enough for the success of the "Prussian" path? Then Russia's agrarian order will become fully bourgeois, large peasants will seize almost all allotment land, agriculture will become capitalist, and no, neither radical nor non-radical, "solution" of the agrarian question under capitalism will become possible. Then conscientious Marxists will directly and openly cast aside altogether any "agrarian program" and say to the masses: workers have done all they could to assure Russia not Junker but American capitalism. Workers now call you to the social revolution of the proletariat, for after the "solution" of the agrarian question in the Stolypin spirit no other revolution, capable of seriously changing the economic conditions of the life of the peasant masses, can come to pass.

Herein lies the relationship of the question concerning the relationship between bourgeois and socialist revolution in Russia, a question especially muddied by Dan in his German paraphrase of his Russian article (*Neue Zeit*{28} No. 27).

Bourgeois revolutions are possible, even inevitable, in Russia and on the ground of the Stolypin-Cadet agrarian path. But in such revolutions, as in the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, it will be impossible even to speak of "complete democratization of society under the sign of a radical solution of the agrarian question." Or rather: in such revolutions only petty-bourgeois quasi[4]-socialists will still chatter about a "solution" (especially a "radical" one) of the agrarian question already solved for a capitalistical-formed country.

But in Russia, far, very far from settled are the capitalist agrarian orders. This is clear not only to us, to Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, not only to people sympathizing with the revolution and desiring its new upsurge—this is clear even to such consistent, conscious, and frankly-bold enemies of the revolution and friends of the reactionary autocracy as Mr. Peter Struve. If he "cries out" that we need a Bismarck, that it is necessary to transform reaction into revolution from above, then it is precisely because Struve does not see in us either a Bismarck or a revolution from above. Struve sees that on Stolypin's reaction alone and on a thousand gallows one cannot create a solid landlord-bourgeois Russia of serfs. Something else is needed, something like a solution (even if in Bismarckian fashion) of national historical tasks, the unification of Germany, the introduction of universal suffrage. But Stolypin has only to unite Dumbadze with the heroes of the Riga museum!{29} Has even to repeal the Witte suffrage by the law of December 11, 1905!{30} Instead of peasants content with Dan's "relative success" of agrarian policy, Stolypin even has to hear from Third Duma peasants the "Laborite" demands!

How could Peter Struve not "cry out," groan, and weep when he clearly sees that it is not working out, it still is not working out—an orderly, modest, moderate, and accurate, curtailed and solid "constitution"?

Struve knows well where he is going. But F. Dan has learned nothing and forgotten nothing over three years of revolution. He still, like a blind man, drags the proletariat under the wing of Messrs. Struve. He still mutters the same reactionary Menshevik speeches, as though the proletariat and bourgeoisie could turn out in our country as "chief political forces"… against whom, esteemed sir? Against Guchkov? Against the monarchy?

To what incredible flattering of liberals Dan reaches is shown by his German article. To the German public he is not even ashamed to recount that in the Third Duma the petty bourgeoisie of the cities elected "progressive electors" (that is, Kadets), while the peasants allegedly gave 40% of reactionary electors! Long live the "progressive" Milyukovs and Struves, applauding Stolypin! Long live the union of Dans with Milyukovs against the "reactionary" peasants, manifesting a Laborite spirit in the Third Duma!

And Plekhanov falsifies Engels in deference to the same reactionary Menshevik theories. Engels said that Marx's tactics in 1848 were correct, that they alone truly gave the proletariat correct, firm, unforgettable lessons. Engels said that these tactics did not succeed despite being the only correct ones, did not succeed because of the insufficient preparedness of the proletariat and the insufficient development of capitalism{31}. But Plekhanov, as if in mockery of Engels, as if for the greater amusement of Bernsteins and Streltsovs,—interprets Engels as though he "repented" of Marx's tactics! As though he later recognized them as erroneous and gave preference to the tactics of supporting the German Kadets!

Will Mr. Plekhanov tell us tomorrow that Engels, concerning the uprisings of 1849, held that "one ought not to have taken up arms"?

Marx and Engels taught the proletariat revolutionary tactics, tactics of developing struggle to its highest forms, tactics leading the peasantry after the proletariat, not the proletariat after liberal traitors.

*Proletarii* No. 29, (29) April 16, 1908

Printed from the text of the newspaper *Proletarii*